Custom Pro Logistics, L.L.C. v. Penn Logistics, L.L.C.Custom Pro Logistics, L.L.C. v. Penn Logistics, L.L.C.
Doyle & Hassman, LLC, and Thomas P. Doyle, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Lindhorst & Dreidame, Co., LPA, Barry F. Fagel and Elizabeth M. Johnson, for Defendant-Appellant.
{1} Defendant-appellant Penn Logistics LLC (“Penn“) appeals the denial of its motion to vacate the default judgment entered against it by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas and the denial of its motion for relief from judgment under
Factual and Procedural History
{2} On March 6, 2020, Custom Pro Logistics, LLC, (“CPL“) filed a complaint against Penn, alleging three causes of action based on goods allegedly damaged by defendant during transport. The summons and complaint were issued via certified mail service to Penn on March 10, 2020. Confirmation of delivery was returned on March 16, 2020, showing delivery on March 13, 2020. Penn did not file an answer. On September 11, 2020, CPL moved for a default judgment against Penn, pursuant to
{3} Penn filed a motion to vacate the default judgment on December 4, 2020, claiming that Penn never received a copy of the summons and complaint and did not sign for the certified mail. It claimed that neither a Penn employee nor Penn‘s registered agent was the signatory, and whoever signed for the certified mail did not give it to Penn. Attached to the motion was an affidavit of Gagandeep Singh, who claimed to be Penn‘s registered agent. The affidavit averred that Penn‘s office, at the address of its principal place of business, is connected to a gas station and that someone from the gas station, which has no common ownership with Penn, “probably” signed for the certified mail. CPL filed a response in opposition to the motion and attached an affidavit of Thomas P. Doyle, attorney for plaintiff, in which Doyle averred that an accompanying “Google print out” showed that the address of the gas station
{4} Penn subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment on March 12, 2021, arguing that it was entitled to relief under
{5} Penn timely filed a notice of appeal on August 6, 2021, and now raises two assignments of error for our review. In its first assignment of error, Penn argues that the trial court erred in denying its
Law and Analysis
{6} A judgment rendered by a court lacking personal jurisdiction is void. Belisle Constr. Inc. v. Perry, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-17-11, 2022-Ohio-239, ¶ 10, citing Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988), and TCC Mgt., Inc. v. Clapp, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-42, 2005-Ohio-4357, ¶ 9. “‘The authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from
Motion to Vacate
{7} In its second assignment of error, Penn argues that the trial court erred when it denied its motion to vacate the default judgment against it. We review the denial of a motion to vacate for an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Hisle, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170717, 2018-Ohio-3693, ¶ 9, citing Hoffman v. Hoffman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170640, 2018-Ohio-3029. “However, a trial court‘s determination of whether it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law that we review de novo.” Id., citing CommuniCare Health Servs., Inc. v. Murvine, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23557, 2007-Ohio-4651, ¶ 13. Yet, decisions regarding whether service was proper are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Perry at ¶ 22, quoting Britton v. Britton, 4th Dist. Washington No. 18CA10, 2019-Ohio-2179, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion signifies that a decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Britton at ¶ 13.
{8}
{9} “If a plaintiff follows the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure that govern service of process, a presumption of proper service arises.” Adams at ¶ 10, citing Erin Capital Mgt. LLC v. Fournier, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-483, 2012-Ohio-939, ¶ 18. “[A] defendant may rebut the presumption of proper service by establishing that the plaintiff failed to direct service to an address where it would be ‘reasonably calculated’ to reach a person or entity that may be served under
{10} Here, certified mail service was issued to Penn at 600 Buck Road, Monroeville, NJ 08343. Penn confirmed that this was the address for Penn‘s principal place of business and business office. Two summonses were issued to this address, one to “Penn Logistics LLC,” and one to “Penn Logistics LLC, CO Jaydeep Patel.” The record contains a status report regarding Penn from the New Jersey secretary of state, which lists Penn‘s agent as Jaydeep Patel and has the same address listed for the agent as is listed for Penn‘s principal place of business. Both summonses were returned delivered.
{12} Penn next argues that it rebutted the presumption of proper service by asserting in its affidavit that an unknown person signed for the certified mail and never provided Penn with a copy. However, when certified mail service is delivered to a proper address, a defendant‘s claim that the signatory is unknown or unrelated to the defendant is insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service. Adams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-729, 2013-Ohio-1573, at ¶ 12. Additionally, certified mail service
{13} “Valid service exists when the civil rules for obtaining service have been fulfilled.” Broadvox at ¶ 15, citing Tate. Because the certified mail was claimed at Penn‘s place of business in accordance with the civil rules, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to find that service was valid. See Broadvox at ¶ 15. Thus, Penn failed to rebut the presumption of proper service and we cannot determine that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that service was valid. Therefore, we cannot determine that the trial court erred when denying Penn‘s motion to vacate the judgment against it as the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over Penn when service of process upon Penn was complete. See Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984) (“[Personal Jurisdiction] may be acquired * * * by service of process upon the defendant * * *.“). Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.
Motion for Relief from Judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)
{15} In relevant part,
{16} Penn argues that it is entitled to relief from judgment under
{17} Neglect is inexcusable “when is it a ‘consequence of the party‘s own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court * * *,‘” as opposed to a “‘consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident.‘” (Ellipses sic.) Treasurer of Lucas Cty. v. Mt. Airy Invests. Ltd., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1254, 2019-Ohio-3932, ¶ 26, quoting Mason v. Mason, 5th Dist. Perry No. 10-CA-18, 2011-Ohio-4775, ¶ 28. Negligent or insufficient internal procedures in an organization may not constitute excusable neglect. John W. Judge Co. v. USA Freight, LLC, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27708, 2018-Ohio-2658, ¶ 27, citing Middleton v. Luna‘s Restaurant & Deli, LLC, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011 CA 00004, 2011-Ohio-4388, ¶ 31.
{18} This court has upheld a trial court‘s finding that a corporation‘s failure to answer a complaint was excusable neglect where the corporation was properly served and had procedures in place to be followed when it was served, but the complaint was never received by the appropriate office due to an unknown, inadvertent clerical error during the process. Heard at ¶ 21-24. We found that, “Courts, including this one, have held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in granting relief from a default judgment on the basis of excusable neglect, when service was properly made on a corporation, but a corporate employee failed to forward the summons and complaint to the appropriate person.” Id. at ¶ 24.
{19} Conversely, in USA Freight, the Second District reversed a trial court‘s determination of excusable neglect where the certified mail service was properly delivered to address of the LLC‘s statutory agent but was signed for by the mother of
{20} Thus, inexcusable neglect comes down to whether an entity‘s internal procedures for receiving service are insufficient or negligent. Here, Penn‘s business office, which is also the office of its statutory agent, is located at the address where the certified mail was delivered. Penn is a New Jersey company, and this is the same address listed for Penn and its agent with the New Jersey secretary of state. While there is conflicting evidence in the record on who the statutory agent actually was, Penn does not dispute this was the correct address for service. Penn‘s office is connected to a gas station, which is a separate company from Penn with no common ownership. The evidence in the record shows that the address of the gas station is the same as the address of Penn‘s business. Penn does not know who signed for the certified mail receipt, but it was assumed that it was someone from the gas station. Penn does not assert that any procedures were put into place to ensure its mail was delivered to the appropriate business.
{21} Based on these facts, it would be reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the case at hand is more comparable to the circumstances presented to the court in USA Freight. Penn attempts to distinguish the instant case from USA Freight by stating that the person who mishandled the complaint in this case was not someone associated with the company who “internally” mishandled the summons and complaint; however, the complaint was mishandled by someone at the address which Penn had listed as its business address and the address of its statutory agent. The fact that two businesses are operating out of the same address is of no consequence to the result as there is no evidence in the record of any internal procedures put into place at the address to ensure that service is delivered to the appropriate business or person. It would not be unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that the mishandling of the complaint could have been avoided had Penn had better systems in place to ensure receipt of service or chosen a better statutory agent to receive service on its behalf. Thus, it would be reasonable for the trial court to have concluded that Penn‘s failure to receive the complaint was a result of its own carelessness or inattention, as opposed to a consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident. Therefore, we cannot determine that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Penn‘s
{22} Penn also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not providing any rationale for its decision to deny the motion. However, “‘[t]here is no requirement for that the trial court issue findings of fact and conclusions of law or otherwise explain its reasons for its disposition of a
{23} Penn additionally argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not holding a hearing on its motion. “A trial court possesses discretion when determining whether to hold a hearing regarding a
{24} Here, because Penn did not dispute that the complaint was sent to the correct address and that two unrelated businesses operate out of that same address, we cannot determine the trial court abused its discretion in not holding a hearing as Penn failed to allege operative facts which would demonstrate its entitlement to relief under
Conclusion
{25} Having overruled both assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
WINKLER and Bock, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.
ZAYAS, PRESIDING JUDGE