GAVIN C. NEWSOM v. FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC
Case No. N25C-06-251 SPL
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Decided: April 30, 2026
Submitted: January 30, 2026
On Fox News Network, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and Special Motion to Strike, DENIED.
On Fox News Network, LLC’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Incurred in Moving to Strike Plaintiff’s Claim under Unfair Competition Law, DENIED.
Michael J. Teter, Esq. (Argued), LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER TETER LEGAL, Salt Lake City, Utah, Mark Bankston, Esq., FARRAR & BALL LLP, Houston, Texas, Brian E. Farnan, Esq., Michael J. Farnan, Esq., FARNAN LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiff, Gavin C. Newson.
Patrick F. Philbin, Esq. (Argued), Kyle T. West, Esq., Chase T. Harrington, Esq. TORRIDON LAW PLLC, John L. Reed, Esq. of DLA PIPER LLP (US), Attorneys for Defendant, Fox News Network, LLC.
LUGG, J.
In the midst of civil unrest in Los Angeles, California, Governor Gavin C. Newsom spoke on the telephone with President Donald Trump. The call took place after 10:00 p.m. on the night of Friday, June 6, 2025 (Pacific Daylight Time) (after 1:00 a.m. on Saturday, June 7, 2025 (Eastern Daylight Time)). The two did not speak again before President Trump, at a Tuesday, June 10, 2025, Oval Office press conference, was asked when he last spoke with Governor Newsom; President Trump responded that he and Governor Newsom spoke “[a] day ago.” Soon thereafter, Governor Newsom posted on X that “[t]here was no call.” President Trump then provided Fox News Network (“FNN”) reporters a “phone log” evidencing the Friday night / Saturday morning call he had with Governor Newsom. On this information, FNN published – through nationally televised reporting overlaid by chyron1 – that “Gavin Lied About Trump’s Call.”
Governor Newsom sued FNN for defamation. FNN has moved to dismiss and has moved for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in its effort to strike Governor Newsom’s California Unfair Competition Law claim. Having reviewed and considered the Amended Complaint, the parties’ briefing and arguments, and the record in this case, the Court denies FNN’s motions.
On June 6, 2025, at approximately 10:23 p.m. Pacific Daylight Time (or June 7, 2025, at approximately 1:23 a.m. Eastern Time), California Governor Gavin Newsom spoke on the telephone with President Donald Trump for about 16 minutes.3 The next day, Governor Newsom discussed this conversation in an interview with MSNBC.4 Other news outlets covered Governor Newsom’s statements about the call,5 and, on Sunday, June 8, 2025, Fox News Sunday, The Big Weekend Show, and Life, Liberty, & Levin noted that a call occurred between Governor Newsom and President Trump.6 On Monday, June 9, 2025, a local FNN
On Tuesday, June 10, 2025, during a press conference in the White House Oval Office, President Trump discussed the civil unrest in Los Angeles, his plan to deploy the National Guard, and his criticisms of Governor Newsom.8 A reporter asked President Trump, “[w]hen was the last time you spoke to Governor Newsom?”9 President Trump responded “A day ago. Called him to tell him, got to do a better job, he’s doing a bad job. Causing a lot of death and a lot of potential death.”10
Governor Newsom, on X, responded to a video clip of President Trump’s statement about a call “[a] day ago” writing that “There was no call. Not even a voicemail. Americans should be alarmed that a President deploying Marines onto our streets doesn’t even know who he’s talking to.”11 Informed of Governor Newsom’s X post, President Trump provided FNN host John Roberts a screenshot
Roberts, on X, then replied to Governor Newsom’s statement that “[t]here was no call,” by posting:
President Trump just contacted me from Air Force 1 to say this: “First call was not picked up. Second call, Gavin picked up, we spoke for 16 minutes. I told him to, essentially, ‘get his ass in gear,’ and stop the Riots, which were out of control. More than anything else, this shows what a liar he is – Said I never called. Here is the evidence.”13
Roberts did not include the screenshot of President Trump’s call log with his X post.14 On the afternoon of June 10, 2025, reporting on FNN, Roberts referenced the call between Governor Newsom and President Trump,15 describing President Trump as stating the call occurred “yesterday or the other day.”16
Later in the evening of June 10, Jesse Watters, on his FNN show Jesse Watters Primetime, played an edited clip of the Oval Office press conference.17 The edited footage included President Trump’s comment, “Called him to tell him, got to do a better job, he’s doing a bad job. Causing a lot of death and a lot of potential death,”
Newsom responded, and he said there wasn’t a phone call. He said Trump never called him. Not even a voicemail, he said. But John Roberts got Trump’s call logs, and it shows Trump called him late Friday night and they talked for 16 minutes. Why would Newsom lie and claim Trump never called him? Why would he do that?19
The chyron appearing below Watters during his report displayed a “Fox News Alert” that “Gavin Lied About Trump’s Call.”20
Governor Newsom, on June 27, 2025, issued a retraction demand to FNN and initiated a defamation lawsuit in Delaware.21 On July 17, 2025, Watters, on Jesse Watters Primetime, addressed his June 10, 2025, report.22 Watters played the unedited video of President Trump’s response to the question: “When was the last time you spoke to Governor Newsom?” and included President Trump’s response that he and Governor Newsom spoke “[a] day ago.”23 Watters explained that, in his June 10 report, he excluded President Trump’s response that the call occurred “[a]
Governor Newsom amended his original complaint to remove the California Unfair Competition Claim and to include Watters’ July 17, 2025, response to the retraction demand.28 FNN moved to dismiss the amended complaint on September 25, 2025.29 Upon Governor Newsom’s withdrawal of the Unfair Competition Claim in his amended complaint, FNN now seeks attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing its original motion and as a “prevailing party” under California’s anti-SLAPP law.30
I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
A. Legal Standard for forum non conveniens claims
FNN argues that this case, to the extent that it belongs anywhere, does not belong in Delaware.36 Governor Newsom contends that FNN has not shown an overwhelming hardship compelling dismissal of the Delaware case.37 The parties appear to agree that California substantive law controls.38 On the record before it, the Court finds that California law applies to the substantive issues raised by Governor Newsom’s defamation claim,39 and that Delaware procedural law controls.40
Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(3) governs a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens.41 The doctrine of forum non conveniens empowers this Court to “decline to hear a case despite having jurisdiction over the subject
Where there are no issues of prior pendency in other jurisdictions, this Court, in assessing a forum non conveniens claim, considers the “Cryo-Maid factors”:
(1) the relative ease of access to proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process for witnesses; (3) the possibility of the view of the premises; (4) whether the controversy is dependent upon the application of Delaware law which the courts of this State more properly should decide than those of another jurisdiction; (5) the pendency or nonpendency of a similar action or actions in another
jurisdiction; and (6) all other practical problems that would make the trial of the case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.47
Dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds requires the movant to show that “overwhelming hardship and inconvenience” would result if dismissal is not granted.48 “It is not enough that all of the Cryo-Maid factors may favor defendant.”49
Depriving the plaintiff of their chosen forum requires the movant to meet the high burden of showing that the Cryo-Maid factors weigh so heavily that the defendant will face overwhelming hardship if the lawsuit proceeds in Delaware.50 The overwhelming hardship standard is not an “insurmountable burden for defendants;”51 it is a “stringent,” but not “preclusive” standard.52 On the record here, the Court concludes that FNN has failed to establish overwhelming hardship warranting removal from this forum.
1. Relative Ease of Access of Proof
FNN contends that the Court should dismiss the Delaware action because it involves “a California resident claiming California-based injuries, while Fox News Network is headquartered in and produced the challenged statements in New York.”53 Governor Newsom responds that where the defendant is a “larger, more sophisticated entity,” such as FNN, “the hardship of out-of-state litigation is lessened”54 and that California does not present a more favorable forum than Delaware because witnesses are subject to Delaware process.55
The location of witnesses and evidence may stretch from New York, where the broadcast initiated, to California, where Governor Newsom resides. But the advancement of “modern methods of information transfer render concerns about transmission of documents virtually irrelevant.”56 Likewise, modern methods of transportation have lessened the Court’s concern about the travel of witnesses who
Governor Newsom sued FNN in Delaware, FNN’s corporate home, for statements published in a national broadcast. To be sure, some witnesses and evidence may cross state lines; however, the associated burdens extend to both Governor Newsom and FNN and, of course, there is no single forum convenient for all parties and witnesses.
2. Availability of Compulsory Process for Witnesses
FNN contends that witnesses such as Governor Newsom’s staff and social media team are beyond the Court’s compulsory process.60 Governor Newsom responds that “he has subjected himself to this Court’s jurisdiction and compulsory
To the extent there may be some difficulty in securing evidence, the Court should consider whether “another forum would provide a substantial improvement as to the number of witnesses who would be subject to compulsory process.”62 FNN identifies Governor Newsom’s staff and social media team as witnesses whose testimony would be unavailable if this case proceeds in Delaware.63 Not so.
The view of the premises generally holds “little to no weight even in a case where there was a relevant ‘premises’ that the fact-finder might want to view.”67 But here, this factor carries no weight because there is no premises to view or, viewed another way, the premises may be viewed anywhere. Governor Newsom alleges defamatory statements made during a national news broadcast. The briefing in this case reveals that the partes are in possession of the pertinent “scene” – the broadcast footage. The scene, or premises, is readily available for review and examination.68
4. Application of Delaware Law
This Court next considers “whether the controversy is dependent upon the application of Delaware law which the courts of this State more properly should decide than those of another jurisdiction.”69 When “important and novel issues” stem from a different state’s law, that state is best positioned to determine the law’s application.70 Nonetheless, “[w]hile not preferable, Delaware courts are accustomed to applying the laws of sister states.”71
In Martinez, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s dismissal under forum non conveniens where Argentinian nationals initiated a lawsuit in Delaware invoking Argentinian substantive law, drafted in Spanish.75 The Delaware Supreme Court found these factors, and the unique international policy issues, rendered Argentina’s Courts best equipped to hear the case.76 The Court concluded that Delaware is not a proper venue where “a Delaware court was being asked to
These unique considerations do not exist here. Delaware Courts are capable of addressing defamation claims guided by the substantive law of a sister state. FNN claims that California’s retraction statute and anti-SLAPP law provide important protection to publishers like FNN and that should compel this Court to allow California to decide this case.78 But Delaware courts are fully capable of applying California law and “often decide legal issues—even unsettled ones—under the law of other jurisdictions.”79 The application of California substantive law here is not a compelling reason to grant dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
5. Pendency of Similar Action in Other Jurisdictions
Where no other actions are pending between the parties, “the plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded even more weight.”80 The absence of other pending litigation between Governor Newsom and FNN therefore “weighs significantly against” granting FNN’s forum non conveniens motion.81
The sixth and final Cryo-Maid factor examines “all other practical problems that would make the trial of the case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.”82 FNN does not identify any other practical problems not previously addressed. FNN chose to establish its corporate home in Delaware. In so doing, it has availed itself of the benefits of this State. This self-selected domicile, too, serves to establish Delaware as a jurisdiction for resolving suits against it. For this reason, and because the Cryo-Maid factors do not favor dismissal, FNN’s motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens is denied.
A. The Rule 12(b)(6) standard for a defamation claim.
Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) governs a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.83 When assessing a motion to dismiss under this rule, this Court must:
(1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept even vague allegations as “well pleaded” if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, (3) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and (4) do not affirm a dismissal unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.84
Delaware’s pleading standards at the motion to dismiss stage are minimal.85 This Court, in U.S. Dominion v. Fox, explained that even where the applicable substantive state law contains an anti-SLAPP statute, Delaware’s conceivability standard of review applies to a motion to dismiss.86 A complaint is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “[if] a plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint.”87 If, based on the circumstances presented, the plaintiff may recover,
Defamation suits call for additional scrutiny when evaluating a motion to dismiss. “Early dismissal of defamation lawsuits for failure of the complaint to state a claim on which relief can be granted not only protects against the costs of meritless litigation, but provides assurance to those exercising their First Amendment rights that doing so will not needlessly become prohibitively expensive.”91 Courts set a “high bar to clear to establish defamation,” especially for claims made by a public figure against the free press.92
B. Applicable substantive law.
This Court follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws which directs that the law of the jurisdiction with the “most significant relationship” to the
C. Federal Constitutional Considerations
To the extent First Amendment protections are asserted, the Court will apply precedent assessing Constitutional protections applicable to defamation claims.97
“The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall
Commentary relating to political, social, and other community concerns are fairly considered addressing matters or public concern warranting greater Constitutional scrutiny.104 The Delaware Supreme Court has concluded that “statements on matters of public concern are actionable in defamation when, even if
For statements concerning a public official to be actionable, a plaintiff must allege actual malice.106 “‘Actual malice’ means that a defendant published false information about a plaintiff ‘with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.‘”107 Reckless disregard is understood to mean the defendant “entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication” or had a “high degree of awareness of [its] falsity.”108 “The failure to investigate a statement‘s truth, standing alone, is not evidence of actual malice, even if a prudent person would have investigated before publishing the statement. But a speaker cannot purposefully avoid the truth and then claim ignorance.”109 If a plaintiff is able to offer “some direct evidence that the defendant‘s statement “was probably false, the Court may infer that the defendant intended to avoid the truth.”110
Under California law, defamation “involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.”111 “The defamatory statement must also specifically refer to, or be ‘of and concerning,’ the plaintiff.”112 As explained in McGarry v. University of San Diego, a valid defamation claim must be supported by statements containing a “provable falsehood,” while generally protected, “expressions of opinion may imply an assertion of objective fact and a statement that implies a false assertion of fact, even if couched as an opinion can be actionable.”113
FNN argues that its statements cannot be proven false because they are statements of opinion.114 Because falsity is a necessary element of defamation, “only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action.”115 Pure opinions are not actionable.116 Opinions do not, however, enjoy blanket protection.117 “[W]here an expression of opinion implies a false assertion of fact,
To answer this question, California Courts have developed a “totality of the circumstances test,” under which the language and context of the statement are to be examined.121 For the statement to be defamatory, it must be “understood in a defamatory sense.”122 Where the indicia of an opinion piece are present, “readers can be expected to discount the statements made in that context as more likely to be the stuff of opinion than fact.”123 Courts must consider “the nature and full content of the communication and the knowledge and understanding of the audience to whom the publication was directed.”124
A plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice through circumstantial evidence.129 Circumstantial evidence may include:
(i) obvious reason to doubt the veracity of the informant; (ii) a basis wholly on an unverified, anonymous source; (iii) such an inherent improbability ‘that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation;’ (iv) financial motive; (v) a departure from journalistic standards; (vi) a preconceived false narrative; and (vii) a refusal to retract the statement and continuing to repeat statements that have been proven false.130
1. It is reasonably conceivable that FNN knew the statements were false at the time of making them.
FNN contends that the “‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of the suggestion that Newsom lied was substantially true,”131 because “[t]he word ‘lie’ certainly encompasses Newsom‘s misleading tweet categorically denying he had a call with the President.”132 “Substantial truth,” FNN asserts, “turns on what Newsom actually said, not what he wishes he had said.”133 Governor Newsom responds that “the central—indeed, the only—dispute between Newsom and Trump was
when
the two had last spoken.”134 According to Governor Newsom, this issue was so important that “reporters asked Trump when he has last spoken to Newsom.”135 Governor Newsom‘s comment that he had no call with President Trump “[a] day ago” was not a lie as “[t]he timing of any call was not minor. It was the question.”136Governor Newsom offers Dickinson v. Cosby140 as a framework for assessing the falsity of FNN‘s statements. There, the plaintiff publicly accused Bill Cosby of rape.141 Cosby‘s attorneys declared the “story accusing Bill Cosby of rape is a lie” and publicly branded Dickinson as a liar.142 Dickinson sued Cosby for defamation.143 Cosby argued that the “gist or sting of the statements was not that Dickinson lied about the rape allegations, but simply that she was a liar,” which Cosby argued was substantially true.144 The Court disagreed and found Cosby‘s repeated characterization of Dickinson‘s rape allegation as a fabrication was not a
Here, Governor Newsom contends that the gist or sting of FNN‘s statements was that Governor Newsom lied about having spoken to President Trump.146 Not that he is a liar generally.147 At this stage of the litigation, based on the record before it, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party – Governor Newsom – the Court finds that the complaint sets forth facts on which it is reasonably conceivable the plaintiff could recover.
The crux of FNN‘s statements is that Governor Newsom was dishonest – lied – about not speaking with President Trump. Roberts’ response on June 10, 2025, to Governor Newsom‘s X post states that President Trump‘s call logs, and President Trump himself, assert that the President spoke with Governor Newsom.148 Roberts‘s response on X does not indicate when this conversation between Governor Newsom and President Trump occurred.149 Watters’ questioned why Governor Newsom would lie about speaking with the President.150 Watters’ statement does not indicate
It is reasonably conceivable, under the facts set forth in the complaint, that the “gist” or “sting” of FNN‘s statements is that Governor Newsom lied about having ever talked with President Trump and, thus, FNN‘s statements may reasonably be understood to be substantially untrue.
2. It is reasonably conceivable that Watters’ statement is not a protected opinion.
FNN asserts that Watters’ statements are constitutionally protected opinions based on disclosed facts.153 FNN argues that the language used by Watters indicates his statement was an opinion because he “did not make a definitive assertion, but instead asked questions in an openly skeptical tone.”154 Watters’ questions, FNN contends, “Why would Newsom lie and claim that Trump never called him? Why would he do that?” were rhetorical questions meant to invite the audience to consider
Governor Newsom argues that rephrasing statements of fact as rhetorical questions does not immunize FNN from liability.158 “Viewers would have understood the broadcasts as communicating as a fact that Newsom lied about the timing of a call between himself and Trump.”159 Governor Newsom points to the chyron beneath Watters, framed as a “Fox News Alert” stating “Gavin Lied About Trump‘s Call,” and argues that “[t]he language spoken—and displayed in the corresponding chyron—demonstrate that FNN was presenting as fact that Newsom was lying about not speaking to Trump.”160 Governor Newsom contends that FNN was not basing an opinion on disclosed facts because FNN intentionally edited the
“Use of hyperbolic, informal, crude, or ungrammatical language, satirical tone, or vituperative, juvenile name-calling provide support for the conclusion that offensive comments were nonactionable opinion.”162 However, stating “in my opinion, this person is a liar,” “implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that [a particular person] told an untruth.”163 “To decide whether a statement is fact or opinion, a court must put itself in the place of an average reader and determine the natural and probable effect of the statement, considering both the language and the context.”164
Here, the language of FNN‘s statement is not contested. Watters, framed by the chyron “Gavin Lied about Trump‘s Call,” stated:
Newsom responded, and he said there wasn‘t a phone call. He said Trump never called him. Not even a voicemail, he said. But John Roberts got Trump‘s call logs, and it shows Trump called him late Friday night and they talked for 16 minutes. Why would Newsom lie and claim that Trump never called him? Why would he do that?165
The alleged facts do not support finding Watters’ rhetorical question to be a constitutionally protected opinion. FNN broadcast the statement on Fox News Channel.166 The statement was announced as a “Fox News Alert.”167 “[A] headline over a news story arguably implies a factual assertion.”168 It is reasonably conceivable that an average viewer could determine the statement to be one of fact, not opinion.
3. A finding of actual malice is reasonably conceivable
FNN contends that Governor Newsom cannot meet the “daunting requirements” of pleading actual malice.169 FNN alleges that the conclusory allegations in Governor Newsom‘s complaint that FNN “maliciously lied,” acted “with actual malice” or “knew the falsity” of its statements, do not suffice to prove
Governor Newsom alleges that FNN “deliberately presented a false picture” of the June 6/7 phone call “to fulfill their preconceived narrative”171 and that “Fox advanced this falsity about Governor Newsom out of a desire to harm him politically.”172 He contends that FNN harbors ill-will towards him and engages in a “pattern of employing preconceived false narratives to attack Governor Newsom.”173 To support this claim, Governor Newsom cites to a segment aired on Jesse Watters Primetime, on June 20, 2025, in which Watters states Governor Newsom attended “a swanky wine tasting party as riots engulfed Los Angeles and mobs vandalized buildings.”174 While Governor Newsom asserts the June 20 comments about his attending a “swanky wine tasting party” are false, the Court understands their inclusion in the complaint to support his allegation of actual malice. This “misrepresentation,” Governor Newsom argues, represents “Fox‘s perverse internal
The Amended Complaint alleges facts which, when viewed in a light most favorable to Governor Newsom, evidence FNN published false information about Governor Newsom with knowledge of the statement‘s falsity or with a reckless disregard for whether or not it was true.176 Thus, under the standard applicable here, the facts are reasonably susceptible to a finding of actual malice.
FNN also maintains that Governor Newsom failed to state a claim for defamation based on Roberts statements177 and the wine tasting commentary.178 To be sure, Governor Newsom‘s lawsuit is against FNN for its alleged misrepresentation of Governor Newsom‘s veracity in his description of his communication with President Trump.179 The Court understands these additional allegations to relate to Governor Newsom‘s assertion of actual malice. At this stage, the Court declines to dissect the complaint in the manner proposed by FNN. To the extent evidentiary objections are asserted in advance of trial, the Court will address them at that time.
FNN contends that Governor Newsom sent a “belated” request for correction on June 27, 2025, the same day FNN was served with this lawsuit.180 That request, FNN contends, does not satisfy
Governor Newsom responds that “§ 48a does not impose a requirement that a plaintiff have served the retraction demand on a defendant before filing suit,” and instead, provides that “a plaintiff must serve a demand ‘within 20 days after knowledge of the publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.‘”185 Further, Governor Newsom argues that for a retraction to be legally sufficient and effective, “it must be full and complete and cannot be evasive or
“Watters‘s remarks,” according to Governor Newsom, “were evasive, equivocal, partial, hesitant, and full of insinuations.”187
Under
Here, Governor Newsom timely served a retraction request on FNN. The alleged defamatory statement was made on June 10, 2025, and under § 48a,
5. Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 9(g) does not bar Governor Newsom‘s claim.
FNN argues that “Delaware‘s Rule 9(g) also requires ‘specifically stat[ing] the amount of special damages‘”198 and, because Governor Newsom did provide such a statement, his complaint is barred from proceeding under Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 9(g).199 Governor Newsom argues that he “was not required to plead those damages because they are presumed.”200
Under Superior Court Civil Rule 9(g), “[a] pleading . . . which prays for unliquidated money damages, shall demand damages generally without specifying the amount, except when items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated.”201 As a general rule, “oral defamation is not actionable without special damages.”202 However, in cases involving slander per se, the claim may be
Here, FNN speaks about Governor Newsom‘s professional career in a critical manner. As a public official, Governor Newsom has accepted a risk of closer public scrutiny.208 FNN assails Governor Newsom‘s veracity – his personal character. When a personal critique greatly impacts a plaintiff‘s professional standing and reputation, a plaintiff may proceed without pleading special damages.209 Governor
III. ATTORNEYS’ FEES
FNN contends that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees under California‘s anti-SLAPP Statute based on Governor Newsom‘s withdrawal of his California Unfair Competition Law claim.212 FNN argues that “Newsom‘s decision to abandon his meritless [Unfair Competition Law] claim makes [it] a ‘prevailing defendant’ under California‘s anti-SLAPP law and entitles [FNN] to a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees it incurred addressing the [Unfair Competition Law] claim.”213 Governor Newsom, of course, opposes this application.214
California‘s anti-SLAPP statute serves “to prevent and deter ‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.‘”215 “The anti-SLAPP statute provides a
To be sure, Delaware procedural law controls here. Because California and New York‘s anti-SLAPP statutes provide procedural guardrails to litigation, the Court declines to apply those statutes to the claim Governor Newsom chose to withdraw.
The Court finds that FNN will not suffer an overwhelming hardship defending itself in Delaware – the State it has chosen as its corporate home. And, at this stage, under facts set forth in the amended complaint and upon reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Governor Newsom, recovery is conceivable even when viewed through the more discerning lens applied to allegations of defamation of a public official. A reasonable interpretation of the facts presently before the Court support Governor Newsom‘s claim. And this Court declines to apply California or New York procedural rules to Delaware litigation. Accordingly, FNN‘s motion to dismiss under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(3) and (b)(6) and its motion for attorneys’ fees are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sean P. Lugg, Judge