FRIENDS OF THE SOUTH FORK GUALALA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY AND FIRE PROTECTION, Defendant and Respondent; RICHARDSON RANCH, LLC, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
A168163
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
Filed 11/22/24
Opinion following rehearing
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCV-268396)
In this California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (
We set forth the full procedural setting in greater detail below, but to frame our holding at the outset, a quick thumbnail sketch of the relevant background is as follows.
In July 2023, the court granted in part and denied in part a petition for a writ of mandate bringing various CEQA challenges to CalFIRE’s approval of a rancher’s plan to harvest timber (the Timber Plan). Although the court granted the petition on the merits, vacating the approval as deficient in several respects—inadequate consideration of geologic, biologic, and cultural resources—it rejected FSFG’s complaint that the tardy publication of a complete written response to public comments (the Official Response) rendered CalFIRE’s approval of the Timber Plan defective. In FSFG’s view, the incomplete and late Official Response should have been an additional ground for vacatur.
Unsatisfied with the scope of its victory, FSFG now appeals on the ground that the trial court denied it a full and fair opportunity to litigate the alleged invalidity of the Official Response, an issue it claims CalFIRE attempted to explain away after the fact based on false extra-record evidence. According to FSFG, the trial court erroneously denied a May 2023
We decline to endorse such a wooden application of
First, CEQA actions have statutory calendaring priority and must be “quickly heard and determined.” (
II. BACKGROUND
In December 2020, real party in interest below and respondent in this appeal Richardson Ranch LLC (Richardson Ranch)2 submitted the Timber Plan to CalFIRE. The Timber Plan called for the harvesting of 267 acres of redwood forest along the South Fork of the Gualala River. This land is located in the Gualala River Watershed, which comprises 7,904 acres. Richardson Ranch owns 62 percent of the watershed acreage and is the only entity that has conducted timber harvesting in it during the last decade.
CalFIRE made the Timber Plan available for public comment and received 23 letters from the public. On April 13, 2021, CalFIRE approved the Timber Plan and published an Official Response. According to CalFIRE, it intended at that time to publish a complete, 87-page response but instead published an incomplete, 25-page version because of a clerical error; it then realized its mistake, and on May 20, 2021, published a corrected Official Response (the Corrected Official Response).
On May 13, 2021, prior to the publication of the Corrected Official Response, FSFG filed in Sonoma County Superior Court a petition for a writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney fees against CalFIRE and Richardson Ranch. FSFG challenged CalFIRE’s approval of the Timber Plan under CEQA and alleged the Official Response was inadequate.
Over the next two years, the parties litigated their dispute. The litigation included significant disagreements regarding the administrative
Based on things such as CalFIRE’s failure to produce an original signature page for the Official Response, FSFG took the view that CalFIRE published an incomplete response to the public comments on April 13, 2021, and then covered up having done so. According to FSFG, CalFIRE lied about whether a signed 87-page Corrected Official Response existed when it filed the earlier, incomplete version—CalFIRE claimed it inadvertently omitted 63 pages—and, based on that allegation, accused CalFIRE of spoliation of evidence. This led to further disputes between the parties regarding FSFG’s efforts to obtain discovery from CalFIRE on the allegations of procedural irregularity and, ultimately, to an effort by FSFG to obtain evidentiary and issue sanctions for discovery abuse and spoliation of evidence.
Between August 2022 and June 2023, while FSFG sought to litigate these issues, it repeatedly requested continuances of hearings and extensions of various briefing deadlines, each time citing the mental health disability of its counsel, Garrett-Steinman. According to FSFG, respondents’ counsel engaged in a pattern of “mistreating” Garrett-Steinman because of his mental health disability, causing him to suffer manic episodes and making it difficult for him to meet briefing deadlines and attend hearings. Respondents and their counsel deny any such “mistreatment” of Garrett-Steinman.
Without getting into the competing narratives about how the opposing lawyers in this case treated one another, suffice it to say that the court gave measured and thoughtful consideration to the impact these interpersonal frictions had on calendar management, and until May 2023, appears to have adopted the view that neither side was any more responsible for causing delay than the other.
But that slowly changed. From August 2022 to April 2023, FSFG and Garrett-Steinman asked the trial court for six sets of continuances, extensions of time, and other calendar adjustments on different discovery and trial matters. Most of these requests were made in the form of disability accommodation requests under
First, in August 2022, FSFG asked the court to grant it permission to file a motion to reopen discovery regarding CalFIRE’s Official Response, coupling the motion with a confidential disability accommodation sought on Garrett-Steinman’s behalf. Following an in camera hearing, the court granted this request and scheduled the hearing on the motion for October 14, 2022. It also ordered the parties to obtain leave of court before filing any further motions in the action.
Second, in October 2022, the trial court granted FSFG’s motion to reopen discovery so it could depose certain CalFIRE staff regarding the Official Response. The court noted Garrett-Steinman was “suffering from
Third, in December 2022, Garrett-Steinman made a request for a scheduling adjustment, again in the form of a disability accommodation under
Fourth, in February 2023, the trial court granted a disability accommodation request from FSFG on Garrett-Steinman’s behalf, this one seeking to continue the merits hearing to March 24, 2023, modify the related briefing schedule, and set a briefing schedule for a sanctions motion by FSFG regarding CalFIRE’s purported discovery abuses related to its Official Response. The parties later stipulated to, and the court ordered, a modified briefing schedule and a continuance of the merits hearing to April 11, 2023.
Fifth, in March 2023, FSFG submitted another disability accommodation request on behalf of Garrett-Steinman, this time for a four-week suspension of proceedings, to April 10, 2023, and for a further
Further, Garrett-Steinman wrote, “[p]etitioner is concerned for its counsel’s long-term mental health and believes a significant disruption in the proceedings may occur absent an accommodation.” He represented that “[p]etitioner will make good-faith efforts to associate additional counsel during the suspension of proceedings” and “believes its efforts will be successful due to the consequential nature of the matters at issue.” The trial court granted this request, resetting the merits hearing to June 9, 2023.
Sixth, on April 7, 2023, FSFG once again applied for a disability accommodation on Garrett-Steinman’s behalf, this time requesting another continuance of the merits and a modified briefing schedule regarding both FSFG’s motion for evidentiary and issues sanctions against CalFIRE and the merits of its claim regarding CalFIRE’s Official Response. FSFG stated this was “necessary because proceedings in this matter are currently suspended pursuant to petitioner’s accommodation request of March 13, 2023.” It added that the parties had discussed but could not agree on a new schedule.
Initially, the trial court was unmoved. It denied the April 2023 accommodation request on the grounds that to grant it “[c]reates an undue financial or administrative burden for the court” and “[c]hanges the basic nature of the court’s service, program, or activity.” It indicated the grounds for denial by checking boxes corresponding to the above-noted reasons on the request form. The court also concluded that “[c]ontinuances and revised
Explaining further, the court stated, “Significant time has passed” since “[a] representation to the court was made by the applicant that he was going to associate counsel and assured the court he would make that effort to avoid another continuance,” and “that has not been fulfilled. . . . [T]he matter has been pending for a long time and at some point it is imperative that justice be served for all parties and the matter heard to conclusion. More continuances will be costly to the court as this matter has been special set on several occasions su[p]planting jury trial time and requiring additional staffing for each date. The matter has been set for merits hearing at least four times, and remote appearance was approved as a specific accommodation to the applicant.”
Despite these expressed reservations, the court in effect granted a sixth disability accommodation based on Garrett-Steinman’s mental health disability. On its own motion, the court issued an “order for continuance of hearing on merits.” For good cause, the court continued the merits hearing to June 9, 2023, and further modified the briefing schedule as requested by
But in May 2023, FSFG submitted another disability accommodation request on Garrett-Steinman’s behalf. This time, it sought more modifications to the briefing schedule for its pending sanction motion and added a request for an extension of the schedule for briefs on the merits of the parties’ Official Response dispute, proposing to extend the deadlines for completion of this briefing into late June 2023. It also asked the court to set a hearing on these matters in July 2023, after the June 9, 2023 merits hearing, and requested that its counsel be relieved of further meet-and-confer obligations concerning its proposed sanctions briefing “in the interest of preventing any further disruptions to the schedule.”5 CalFIRE filed an objection to the accommodation request.
In support of FSFG’s May 2023 disability accommodation request, Garrett-Steinman offered more explanation of his circumstances. Reiterating, once again, the litany of challenges he had been dealing with for nearly a year, he said he suffered from “numerous mental health disabilities,” which disabilities had “precluded timely completion of petitioner’s sanctions motions and public comment brief.” He suffered from manic episodes that could “last many weeks and [had] consistently caused a nearly complete halt in [his] workflow.” He said he had started to take new medication; he said he had diligently attempted to complete the briefs at issue, such as by working six days a week for several weeks on the sanctions
The trial court denied this latest accommodation request, again on the grounds, checked by the court on the response to the request form, that to grant it would “[c]reate[] an undue financial or administrative burden for the court” and “[c]hange[] the basic nature of the court’s service, program, or activity.” The court stated, “This is a request for continuance rather than an accommodation. As explained in the previous request, granting this request will create undue financial and administrative burdens to the court in adding an additional hearing, additional administrative processing of documents, and duplication of court processing which has already burdened the court numerous previous times due to prior similar requests. Petitioner has not actually used the previously granted accommodations, but instead has continued to ask for additional time.”
FSFG then turned to us, filing a petition for writ of mandate seeking review of the trial court’s denial of its May 2023 disability request, accompanied by a stay request. We summarily denied the petition and stay request on June 7, 2023.
B. The Trial Court’s Rejection of FSFG’s Sanctions Motion and Ruling on the Merits
FSFG filed a partially briefed sanctions motion on April 19, 2023.6 This motion, which sought sanctions for discovery abuse under
The trial court held the merits hearing on FSFG’s petition on June 9, 2023. At the hearing, FSFG continued to press for an opportunity to submit further briefing on its motion for issue sanctions, indicating at one point it would be willing to waive any right to further hearing if such briefing were allowed. The court declined to allow further briefing. In a written order
Specifically, the court granted the petition “with respect to the [Timber Plan’s] analysis of impacts on sedimentation, impacts on biological resources, impacts on cultural resources, cumulative impacts, and analysis of alternatives.” It denied the petition “with respect to the claim that the late publication of the full 87 pages of the official responses renders the responses defective or improper to consider, or otherwise violates CEQA.” And it found that FSFG “has cited nothing showing that the failure to publish the full 87-page set of responses . . . itself results in a prejudicial violation of CEQA. Although [CalFIRE] did not publish the full set of responses until May 2021, more than a month after the [Timber Plan’s] approval, the evidence and record demonstrate that [CalFIRE] in fact had prepared this complete set of responses prior to the approval, but it simply failed to publish the full set at the time of approval due to a clerical error.”
FSFG filed a notice of appeal on June 28, 2023 from a “[j]udgment after court trial.”7
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Appeal is Not Moot
At the threshold, respondents argue mootness. Because the parties have indicated their intention to litigate the issue of prevailing party
In July 2023, the trial court, in accordance with its order on the merits and judgment, issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing CalFIRE to set aside its approval of the Timber Plan and the notice of conformance based thereon and file an initial return in the court within 60 days specifying the steps taken to comply with the writ. That same month, the parties, relying on
In September 2023, CalFIRE set aside its approval of the Timber Plan and filed a return in the trial court. Shortly thereafter, the trial court filed an order discharging the writ. Subsequently, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the trial court ordered that its discharge did not deprive it of the jurisdiction necessary to take such further action as may be directed by this court.
Based on these events, respondents argue that this appeal is moot because FSFG cannot obtain any further relief as a result of this appeal. FSFG argues this matter is not moot for multiple reasons, including that our appeal could impact the court’s ruling on attorney fees. We agree with the latter point and therefore do not address the other arguments FSFG makes.
As FSFG points out, appellate courts have concluded that an otherwise moot CEQA claim is not moot when the resolution of the merits of an appeal affects a party’s entitlement to attorney fees.8 We reach the same conclusion here. FSFG argues that, in theory, we might decide that the trial court erred in denying Garrett-Steinman’s May 2023 accommodation request; that such an error could have impacted the trial court’s resolution of FSFG’s Official Response claim; and that, as a result, our decision could ultimately impact the trial court’s resolution of any motion for attorney fees. Suffice it to say we agree. The chain of reasoning is somewhat attenuated, but it has enough plausibility to convince us there is a live issue here. Accordingly, though the question is close, we conclude the appeal is not moot.
1. Applicable Rule 1.100 Principles
“It is the policy of the courts of this state to ensure that persons with disabilities have equal and full access to the judicial system.” (
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None of the parties has brought to our attention any precedent addressing whether an applicant under
2. Standard of Review
The applicable standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. (Gropen v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1075, 1082.) “Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, the ‘trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ [Citation.] A ‘court abuses its discretion “where no reasonable basis for the action is shown.” ’” (In re Tobacco Cases II (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 779, 790.)
On one level, “[a]ny exercise of discretion must rest on correct legal premises, . . . and in that respect our review is de novo.” (Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.) “ ‘Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion.’” (Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 813, 831
On another level, any exercise of legal discretion will rest upon some factual underpinning, which itself is entitled to deferential substantial evidence review. (Department of Parks & Recreation, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 831 [while the substantial evidence standard “deals with evidentiary proof,” the broader abuse of discretion standard “is concerned with legal principles”].) This embedded level of deference to predicate fact-finding reflects the institutional reality that trial courts are generally better positioned to resolve contests of historical fact than we are in the appellate courts. It applies here to the assessment of procedural events unfolding before the trial court and their impact on the court’s case management obligations, just as surely as it does to substantive facts.
The ruling FSFG challenges in this case easily passes muster under this two-level standard for discretionary decision-making. Contrary to FSFG’s suggestion, we are not dealing with a legal issue that compels us to say the trial court’s discretion could be exercised in only one way. Nor is this a “mixed question” case (e.g., Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 385–386) where the factual aspects of a trial court ruling under review are undisputed or admitted, and the legal aspects of the ruling predominate, thus allowing us to substitute our judgment because the underlying legal premise of the trial court’s ruling demands unfettered appellate judgment. (See People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 857.)
Under
For example, every superior court and appellate court must designate at least one person to be the ADA coordinator to address requests for accommodations (
Failure to rule promptly, in the specified manner, on a properly presented
Faced with these circumstances, it was reasonable to deny a request for further extensions of the schedule into mid-summer 2023, a point in time more than two years after FSFG filed its writ petition. Not only did FSFG’s pattern of repeated requests for adjustment of the schedule unduly burden the court by interfering with its ability to manage other cases on its docket efficiently, but it is fair to say, as the court did here, that permitting FSFG to continue to interpose its own open-ended scheduling preferences “fundamentally alter[ed] the nature” of this expedited CEQA proceeding.
Two months earlier, in support of a previous accommodation request, Garrett-Steinman had represented to the court that FSFG would seek associate counsel in order to avoid the need for further continuances, expressing confidence that those efforts would “be successful due to the consequential nature of the matters at issue.” Yet he made no mention of any such efforts in his two subsequent requests and FSFG did not retain associate counsel. Thus, despite numerous continuances and extensions of time, Garrett-Steinman remained unable to effectively participate in the proceedings. The court had little reason to believe further time accommodations would enable him to fulfill his briefing obligations on the expedited schedule demanded of the case, or to obtain assistance from new counsel brought into the case by FSFG to help him.11
FSFG‘s contention that the trial court had no choice but to grant its May 2023 request for accommodation under
Before trial on spouse James C.‘s dissolution petition in August 2005, the trial judge (Judge Silbar) denied Christine‘s
After promising she would not return to Judge Silbar asking for another trial continuance (Marriage of James, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1268-1269), in February 2006 Christine made a second accommodation
Trial was then completed in Christine‘s absence, and rulings were made on the division of the marital assets, spousal support, and attorney fees. (Marriage of James, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1264, 1271.) Christine moved for a new trial, supporting her motion with additional medical declarations explaining her inability to appear at trial and arguing she should have been granted a continuance. (Id. at pp. 1271-1272.) In denying the motion, Judge Silbar criticized Christine for making a second accommodation request to Judge Wieben Stock without indicating she was doing so, even though the record showed the request had been personally served on both judges. (Id. at p. 1269.) Judge Silbar did not mince words, commenting, “This is absurd, absolutely absurd. Two-and-a-half years, 30 to 35 appearances on a very simple dissolution is unacceptable, costly, and inexcusable. [¶] The court finds that the tactics by [Christine] were manipulations to obtain continuances.” (Id. at pp. 1272-1273.)
Reversing, the appellate panel began with the undisputed facts: “Christine suffered from bipolar disorder, a potentially incapacitating
In Judge Wieben Stock‘s view, granting Christine a trial continuance would have “fundamentally alter[ed] the nature of the service[,] program or activity” offered to litigants by undermining Judge Silbar‘s decisionmaking power to control her courtroom. (Marriage of James, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270.) This reading of
Compounding that problem, Judge Silbar also erred as a matter of law. She found that Christine had “manipulat[ed]” the
Central to FSFG‘s position in this appeal is its view that Marriage of James justifies de novo review here. That is incorrect. The treatment of the standard of review in Marriage of James—which is limited to a couple of passing references to abuse of discretion in the description of James‘s arguments (see Marriage of James, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1272, 1276)—is unilluminating, since as we note above, abuse of discretion is not a unified standard and can mean different things in different contexts. It seems evident that the appellate panel there gave no deference to the rulings by either Judge Wieben Stock or Judge Silbar because, for different reasons, both judges proceeded on incorrect legal premises.
We grant that Marriage of James has some broad similarities to this case—the nature of the disability for one, multiple continuance requests for another—but we view those similarities as superficial at best. That case involved an unusual situation in which two judicial officers overlooked undisputed medical evidence of a pro se litigant‘s inability to appear at trial;
Factually, the denial of FSFG‘s May 2023 accommodation request was supported by the record, and legally it was within the range of reasonable choices permitted by
But another point bears emphasis. Wholly apart from the fact that this is a case with statutory calendaring priority, another aspect of the record here has independent significance under
Why does this distinction matter to the
Months before presenting its final request for scheduling relief in May 2023, FSFG obviously recognized as much. In October 2022, FSFG moved to reopen discovery and extend various deadlines, and it subsequently submitted a proposed order suggesting, as an alternative form of relief, that Garrett-Steinman be ordered to withdraw as counsel. The court declined to make such an order. FSFG‘s extraordinary suggestion that, if the court had concerns about Garrett-Steinman‘s need for more time, it should kick him off the case—surely, an invitation to commit error if there ever was one—points up a fundamental flaw in the position we are asked to adopt here. It was not up to the court to assess whether, in order to keep the case moving forward, Garrett-Steinman should step aside in favor of some other lawyer.
Waving aside the history of prior accommodation requests leading up to its only unsuccessful
That reading makes sense, but only in context. The Marriage of James panel reversed without examining prejudice on a record where, by reason of an unrepresented person‘s disability, she was “denied the benefit of court services.” (Marriage of James, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274.) “Unlike most legal error, structural error calls for reversal per se because the error prevents a reviewing court from ascertaining what might have happened absent the error.” (Biscaro, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 710.) Biscaro “involve[d] not a denial of [a] motion [for accommodation] but a failure to rule on it,” which, the appellate panel there said, “presents an even stronger argument for structural error” than the denial of access to judicial services in Marriage of James did. (Ibid.) There was no denial of
FSFG insists the trial court‘s stated reasons were wrong as a matter of law because the court erroneously thought a continuance is not a form of available accommodation under
Even assuming error in the trial court‘s articulated reasoning, we are not persuaded it was reversible error. Absent a due process violation or some other error that undermines the fundamental fairness of the proceeding involved, appellate courts are not empowered to reverse without engaging in a prejudice analysis. (
If FSFG truly had a new “magic bullet” sanctions argument, we expect the basis for that argument would have been identified and even previewed in its May 2023
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
HITE, J.*
* Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to