Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem, Inc.Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem, Inc.
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Wе accepted this discretionary appeal to resolve whether a trial court’s order finding that a prima facie showing required by
Case Background
{¶ 2} In February 2004, before enactment of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3970 (“H.B. No. 292”), which included new requirements for the filing of asbestos complaints pursuant to
{¶ 3} Because the amended complaint was filed аfter the effective date of H.B. No. 292, American Optical Corporation filed a motion to administratively dismiss appellees’ claim for failure to comply with
{¶ 4} Appellants filed an appeal with the Eighth District Court of Appeals that was dismissed as premature pursuant to
Background of New Legislation
{¶ 5} Recognizing that asbestos claims have proven to be a challenge to Ohio defendants, plaintiffs, and the court system as a whole, the General Assembly enacted H.B. No. 292 in 2004. The bill was a comprehensive new approach to asbestos litigation, and the changes were codified in amendments to
{¶ 6}
{¶ 8} As noted by Section 3(A)(5), H.B. No. 292, the General Assembly found that “reasonable medical criteria” are necessary to “expedite the resolution of claims brought by those sick claimants * * * [to] ensure that resources are available for those who are currently suffering from asbestos-related illnesses and for those who may become sick in the future.” That there must now be prima facie evidence of exposure to asbestos as a substantial contributing factor to a plaintiffs medical condition is an attempt to place those already ill at the head of the line for compensation. In this discretionary appeal, we examine whether the trial court’s order finding that appellees have made a prima facie showing is a final, appealable order.
Final Orders
{¶ 9} For Ohio’s appellate courts to have jurisdiction over an appeal, Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution requires that the court decision under review be a judgment оr final order.
{¶ 10} Six appealable orders are listed in
{¶ 11} “(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
{¶ 12} “ * * *
{¶ 13} “(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:
{¶ 15} “(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.”
{¶ 16} Thus,
Definition of “Provisional Remedy” —
{¶ 17} The first question is whether the order is a provisional remedy. The term “provisional remedy” is defined by
{¶ 18} Thus, a prima facie showing pursuant to
{¶ 19} In this case, the trial court found that appellees had met their burden, “had satisfied the minimum medical requirements fоr bringing certain asbestos claims contained in H.B. 292,” and had presented evidence that satisfied the intent of the new statute. The trial court’s determination, therefore, constitutes an order issued pursuant to
Preventing a Judgment —
{¶ 20} Second, even though the order, which found that appellees had satisfied the minimum medical requirements of
{¶ 21} As already noted, if plaintiffs do not make the prima facie showing required, their action is subject to administrative dismissal. The trial court here determined that appellees had met the minimum medical requirements under
{¶ 22} The order finding that the requirements were met in this case also prevented a judgment in favor of the appellаnts regarding appellees’ prima facie showing under
No “Effective Remedy”' —
{¶ 23} The third and final рart of the test is whether “[t]he appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.”
{¶ 24} Appellees argue that appellants have the remedy of final appeal, which is available to any nonprevailing party after final judgment, and that allowing an interlocutory appeal leads to a рiecemeal approach. Appellants, on the other hand, argue that the trial court’s order allowing the case to proceed to trial requires them to spend funds that cannot be recovered even if they ultimately prevail upon the merits. We are persuaded that appellants have the better argument.
{¶ 26} In the limited context of asbestos litigation, where preservation of resources for the benefit of those actually manifesting injury is a stated purpose of the General Assembly, we determine that the incurrence of unnecеssary trial expenses is an injury that cannot be remedied by an appeal from a final judgment; thus, this appeal from a provisional remedy satisfies
{¶ 27} Although we did not accept the stated proposition, we note that appellees interpret
{¶ 28} Appellees’ argument, however, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of
{¶ 29} The summary judgment standard requires the trial court to grant judgment for the moving party “when, looking at the evidence as a whole, (1) no
Conclusion
{¶ 30} An order finding that a plaintiff in an asbestos action has made the prima facie showing required by
{¶ 31} For these reasons, we reverse thе judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissing appellant’s appeal for lack of a final, appealable order and remand to the court of appeals for a determination on the merits of the appeal.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
. James Sinnott died on August 25, 2005, and this action was maintained by his surviving spouse. While this appeal was pending, his spouse also died.
. Aqua-Chem, Inc., and other defendants are not parties to this appeal.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 32} I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that a trial court order finding that a plaintiff in an asbestos action has made the prima facie showing required by
{¶ 33} While I agree with the majority that the first requirement of
{¶ 34} Thе majority states that appellants would not be afforded a meaningful or effective appellate remedy following final judgment because “allowing the case to proceed to trial requires [appellants] to spend funds that cannot be recovered.” This holding is contrary to this court’s established precedent.
{¶ 35} The majority is correct in stating that “[a]s a general rule, ‘contentions that appeal from any subsequent advеrse final judgment would be inadequate due to time and expense are without merit.’ State ex rel. Lyons v. Zaleski (1996),
{¶ 36} The majority’s decision to stray from our previous holdings is an error: appellants’ argument in this case could be applied to virtually every appellant arguing that a provisional remedy is a final, appealable order. As we stated in State v. Muncie (2001),
{¶ 37} The majority states that in some instances, “ ‘the proverbial bell cannot be unrung,’ ” quoting Gibson-Myers & Assoc. v. Pearce (Oct. 27, 1999), Summit App. No. 19358,
{¶ 38} The phrase “the proverbial bell cannot be unrung” was cited by this court in Muncie, in which we held that an order compelling the administration of psychotropic medication under
{¶ 39} In this case, appellants will be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment. Unlike the cases cited, which held that the appealing parties would not be afforded a meaningful remedy if a trade secret were disclosed, if an order compelling a person to receive psychotropic medication were upheld, or if an attorney-client privilege were breached, appellants here argue that they will not be afforded a meaningful remedy on appeal because they will be forced to spend funds. Quitе simply, appellants’ rationale does not approach the rule of law developed by this court’s earlier cases.
{¶ 40} The majority reasons that the General Assembly’s purpose for the prima facie requirement is to “reduce litigation costs and thereby preserve the resources of asbestos defendants so that more injured plaintiffs can be made
{¶ 41} Because appellants cannot meet the requirements of