Nakeisha FREDERICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS and Joiners of America, Defendant-Appellee, Salvatorre Tagliagferro, Martin Tuozzo, Joseph Dinapoli, Maria Concillo, Defendants.
No. 15-1065
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
November 3, 2016
664 F. App‘x 31
III. Conclusion
We have considered Stern‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
For Plaintiff-Appellant: NAKEISHA FREDERICK, pro se, Brooklyn, N.Y.
For Defendant-Appellee: HANAN B. KOLKO, Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., New York, N.Y.
Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, RALPH K. WINTER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Nakeisha Frederick, proceed-
As an initial matter, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Ameriсa (the “Union“) argues that our jurisdiction is limited to the grant of summary judgment because Frederick did not identify the first order in her notice of apрeal. A notice of appeal must “designate” the judgment or order being appealed.
Here, Frederick‘s notiсe of appeal was both dated April 1, 2015 and designated an April 1, 2015 decision. Nothing was entered in the district court on that date. Summary judgment was granted and judgment was entered in March 2015. However, construing the notice of appeal liberally, we infer that Frederick intendеd to appeal the judgment. Cf. Elliott v. City of Hartford, 823 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that “in the absence of prejudice to an appellee, we read a pro se appellant‘s appeal from an order closing the case as constituting an appeal from all prior or-
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). To state a Title VII claim, “a plaintiff must allege that the employer took adverse action against her at least in part for a discriminatory reason, and she may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015). In particular,
[a]n inference of discrimination can arise from circumstаnces including, but not limited to, the employer‘s criticism of the plaintiff‘s performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee‘s protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff‘s discharge.
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
After review, we conclude that the court properly dismissed Frederick‘s claims based on the alleged failure to promote, her termination, a hostile work environment, the disрarity between her pay and that of prior office managers, and retaliation. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its November 6, 2014 decision.
We additionally conclude that, as to her termination, Frederick did not allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that she was fired due to her race, color, or national origin. Rather, she alleged that a Union officer and a newly hired secretary conspired to have her fired so that they could hire “people they know” and elect favоrable board members. Title VII does not “forbid[] favoritism, nepotism, or cronyism, so long as it is not premised on animus against a protectеd class.” Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 613 (2d Cir. 2016). The complaint did not allege any facts supporting an inference that these individuals were motivated by a prohibited animus. Cf. DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (ruling that employer‘s promotion of his paramour “although unfair, simply did not violate Title VII“).
We also review the grant of summary judgment de novо, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2013). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant; the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts revealed in materials such as affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory аnswers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass‘n., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995)). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
To establish a prima facie case of pay discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the job in question, (3) she was paid less than [a person outside the protected class] for the same work, and (4) the employer‘s аdverse employment decision occurred under circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination.” Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 140 (2d Cir. 1999).
After review, we conclude that the district court properly granted the Union summary judgment on the disparate pay claim. We affirm for substantially the reаsons stated by the district court in its March 26, 2015 decision.
In particular, we affirm because Frederick failed to come forward with any evidence of discrimination. See Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[C]onclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation are inadequate to defeat а motion for summary judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In her deposition, Frederick herself attributed her initial pay rate to her reduced negotiating position (because the Union knew she was being paid less by her employment agency), and not to prohibited animus. She thus did not show that the decision to set her hourly rate “occurred under circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination.” Belfi, 191 F.3d at 140.
We have considered all of Frederick‘s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.