FRANCES HOUSE, INC., d/b/а Kanthak House, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH; THERESA GARATE, Assistant Director of Public Health; and DAMON T. ARNOLD, Director of Public Health, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 1-14-0750
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division
October 13, 2015
November 6, 2015
2015 IL App (1st) 140750
Hon. Peter Flynn, Judge, presiding.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.
Polsinelli PC, of Chiсago (Jason T. Lundy and Paula S. Kim, of counsel), for appellee.
PRESIDING JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Neville and Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Defendant Illinois Department of Public Health (Department) appeals from an order of the circuit court that reduced plaintiff Kanthak House‘s (Kanthak) violation of
BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Kanthak, an intermediate care facility for the developmentally disabled, is licensed by the Department pursuant to the
¶ 4 In 2009, a 59-year-old mentally disabled woman (hereinafter “R4“) resided at Kanthak. On August 22, 2009, R4 shoplifted a 300-count bottle of aspirin during a shopping trip to Walmart with the Kanthak staff and other residents. The staff was unaware that R4 had shoplifted the aspirin until they discoverеd the bottle later that day in her possession. The bottle was taken away from R4 and stored in administrator Melissa Terry‘s office in an unlocked desk drawer. No facts indicate that the office door was locked.
¶ 5 Sometime on September 29, 2009, R4 went into the office, took out the aspirin bottle, and ingested about 100 pills. Terry was in the dining room assisting another resident at the time. No one else was in the office when R4 ingested the pills. R4 later told Terry that she had taken the pills. Terry called 911 immediately and R4 was taken to a local emergency room.
¶ 6 R4 was given activated charcoal, admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU), and monitored for poisoning by salicylates (the analgesic agents in aspirin). A toxic level of salicylate is above 30. R4‘s levels were monitored every two hours. R4‘s level was 21 upon arrival and rose to 25 two hours later. R4 suffered two seizures because of the metabolic disturbance caused by the aspirin: one partial seizure and one toxic-clonic seizure.
¶ 7 R4 gave different reasons to different people for taking the pills. She told Terry she had a headache. R4 told the treating hospital physician, Dr. Gueorguiev, that she had a headache, she wanted to kill herself, changed her mind and said she wanted to kill someone else, and that she wanted to return to her birthplace. Dr. Gueorguiev observed that R4 stated “she has everything you ask her for,” and that her suicidal and homicidal thoughts were “questionable” and “cannot be very serious.” He also concluded that “the rest
¶ 8 On October 1, 2009, R4 was discharged from the hospital and involuntarily admitted to the hospital‘s inpatient mental health unit. R4 spent six days there, after which she was released because her past psychiatrist, Dr. Glavin, reported that she was less depressed, and was not suicidal or homicidal. R4 was then released back to Kanthak. Kanthak did not notify the Department of R4‘s incident or hospitalization.
¶ 9 On September 30, 2009, the day after R4 ingested the aspirin, Kanthak‘s safety committee had a meeting to address the cause of the incident. As a result of the meeting, the committee determined that “[m]edication will not be stored in an office,” and that “[s]tolen items will be returned to the store immediately.”
¶ 10 On December 11, 2009, the Department conducted its mandatory annual licensure survey of Kanthak. During the survey, Deborah Montgomery, the health care facility surveillance nurse responsible for investigating Kanthak, discovered that Kanthak failed to report the R4 incident to the Department. As a result of Kanthak‘s failure to report, on February 3, 2010, the Department issued a notice of violations pursuant to
¶ 11 The violation notice classified Kanthak‘s infractions as “one or more Type A violations.” A “Type A” violation is a violation of the Care Act or the Department‘s regulations “which creates a condition or occurrence relating to the operation and maintenance of a facility” that (1) crеates a substantial probability that the risk of death or serious mental or physical harm to a resident will result therefrom or (2) has resulted in actual physical or mental harm to a resident.
¶ 12 On April 12, 2011, the parties appeared before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Prior to the start of the hearing, the Department withdrew the charged violation of
¶ 13 Two witnesses testified at the hearing: Melissa Terry and Deborah Montgomery, the health care facility surveillance nurse who investigated Kanthak in December 2009. Deborah Montgomery testified on behalf of the Department. She had been a registered nurse since 1983 and was an employee of the Department at thе time of the December 2009 inspection. She testified as to the R4 incident. She testified regarding R4‘s hospital records from the September 29, 2009 emergency room trip and ICU admission, and her inpatient mental health care treatment and release back to Kanthak. She also testified as to Policy 5.24. Finally, she opined that based on her Kanthak investigation, Kanthak did not provide “what was needed to maintain the safety of the individual,” “did not provide safety” related to the unsecured aspirin bottle, and “did not provide monitoring of a close enough nature to keep R4 safe.”
¶ 14 Melissa Terry testified on behalf of Kanthak. She testified that at the time of the R4 incident, she was employed as the qualified mental retardation [sic] professional (QMRP) at Kanthak. She began working therе in April 2009. R4 had lived at Kanthak since November 2000. Terry had become familiar with R4‘s behavior plan and “addressed [R4‘s] behaviors of throwing objects, hitting, and some other aggressive behaviors.” She testified that R4 did go on the August 22, 2009 shopping trip to Walmart and that R4 shoplifted a 300-count bottle of aspirin on that trip. She testified that Kanthak confiscated the stolen aspirin bottle from R4 and stored it “in an office аt the facility.” Terry testified that on September 29, 2009, R4 told Terry that she ingested the pills and Terry called 911. Terry also testified to R4‘s September 29, 2009 emergency room trip and ICU admission, inpatient mental health care treatment, and release back to Kanthak. Terry testified that Policy 5.24 only applied when there had been a suspected violation of resident rights, abuse, neglect, or injury from an unknown source. She did not think that the R4 incident triggered the policy, and, therefore, the policy did not require reporting to the Department. She also testified that there was no need to report the R4 incident “[b]ecause there was no significant harm or injury caused to R4.”
¶ 15 Kanthak also called Montgomery as a witness “as if under cross examination pursuant to
¶ 16 On July 11, 2011, the ALJ issued his report and recommendation. The ALJ found no violation of
¶ 17 On August 8, 2011, the Department‘s Director adopted the ALJ‘s report and entered a “Final Order” that assessed a “Type A” violation against Kanthak for the
¶ 18 On August 24, 2011, Kanthak timely filed a petition for administrative review in the circuit court seeking reversal of the Department‘s order. Kanthak argued that it did not violate
¶ 19 On November 16, 2012, on remand, the ALJ found that no contradiction existed between finding that Kanthak satisfied its own reporting requirements but failed to satisfy the reporting requirements in
¶ 20 Before the circuit court a second time, Kanthak renewed its challenge to the Department‘s violation classification, again arguing that its violation of
ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Before we address the merits of the Department‘s arguments, we must address the appropriate standard of review. In administrative review cases, “this court review[s] the Director‘s decision and not the decision of the ALJ or the circuit court.” Parikh v. Division of Professional Regulation of the Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 19 (citing Lindemulder v. Board of Trustees of the Naperville Firefighters’ Pension Fund, 408 Ill. App. 3d 494, 500 (2011)). The applicable standard of review “depends on the question presented.” Parikh, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 19 (citing Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455 (2005)). “When an issue of pure law is raised, we review de novo.” Parikh, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 19 (citing Village Discount Outlet v. Department of Employment Security, 384 Ill. App. 3d 522, 525 (2008)). “When the issue raised is one of fact, we will only ascertain whether such findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Parikh, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 19 (citing Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, 236 Ill. 2d 368, 386-87 (2010)). Lastly, “[a] mixed question of law and fact is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” Parikh, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 19 (citing Heabler v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2013 IL App (1st) 111968, ¶ 17). A mixed question of law and fact is one ” ‘in which the historical facts are admittеd or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard.’ ” Parikh, 2014 IL App (1st) 123319, ¶ 19 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)
¶ 23 There is no dispute between the parties here that the question presented is a mixed question of law and fact and therefore the clearly erroneous standard should apply. We are in agreement because the question presented here is whether the facts satisfy the statutory stаndard for classifying a violation as “Type A.”
¶ 24 The clearly erroneous standard of review lies between the manifest weight of the evidence standard and the de novo standard, and lends some deference to the agency‘s decision. Lombard Public Facilities Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 378 Ill. App. 3d 921 (2008). The Department‘s decision will be deemed clearly erroneous only where, upon review of the entire record, we are “left with the definite and firm cоnviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 393 (2001).
¶ 25 Kanthak does not dispute the finding that it violated
“[A] violation of the [Care] Act or the Department‘s regulations ‘which creates a condition or occurrence relating to the operation and maintenance of a facility’ that (i) creates a substantial probability that the risk of death or serious mental or physical harm to a resident will result therefrom or (ii) has resulted in actual physical or mental harm to a resident.” Community Living Options, Inc. v. Department of Public Health, 2013 IL App (4th) 121056, ¶ 36 (citing
210 ILCS 45/1-129 (West 2008) ).
¶ 26 Here, the ALJ found that Kanthak failed to report the R4 incident аnd thus violated
¶ 27 Applying the essentially undisputed facts of this case and the violation of
CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the above reasons, we reverse the circuit court but affirm the decision of the Director finding that Kanthak‘s
¶ 30 The Director‘s decision is affirmed.
