FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. COSPER.
S23Q0625
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 19, 2023
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court‘s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court‘s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
Although product-liability claims are generally subject to a ten-year statute of repose in Georgia, see
As explained below, we answer the first question in the affirmative: under
As further explained below, the answer to the second question is that “reckless . . . disregard for
1. In its certification order, the federal district court recounted the factual and procedural history of this case as follows:
This case arises out of a rollover accident (“the Accident“) that occurred on December 25, 2015[,] in Haralson County. During the Accident, the roof structure (passenger side) in the crash-involved Ford Explorer intruded into the occupant compartment. Cindy Pollard was the driver of the Explorer. Ronnie Ammerson was the front seat passenger. Mr. Ammerson suffered severe cervical spinal (C6/C7) fractures with spinal cord trauma. After months of rehabilitation, he was discharged to his home where he succumbed to his injuries by pneumonia. An autopsy concluded that the cause of death was acute right lung pneumonia resulting from the cervical spine trauma/quadriplegia sustained in the Accident.
. . .
Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on May 6, 2018[,] and their First Amended
Complaint on January 7, 2020.1 In Count I, Plaintiffs asserted three strict liability claims — design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn. In Count II, Plaintiffs asserted four negligence claims — negligent design, negligent manufacture, negligent sale, and negligent failure to recall. Plaintiffs also sought attorneys’ fees, general damages, special damages, punitive damages, and recovery for wrongful death. Ford filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 15, 2022, arguing that all of Plaintiff[s‘] claims failed as a matter of law. Most relevant here, Ford asserted that Georgia‘s statute of repose barred Plaintiffs’ negligent design claims because Ford did not act willfully or wantonly as a matter of law. In response, Plaintiffs argued that the statute of repose did not bar their negligent design claims because a jury could find that Ford acted recklessly, willfully, or wantonly. Plaintiffs conceded all other substantive claims. Ford replied on May 6, 2022[,] and argued that: (1) recklessness is not an independent exception to the statute of repose; and (2) Plaintiffs failed to put forth enough evidence to support a jury finding that Ford acted willfully or wantonly.
In ruling on Ford‘s motion, the [federal district court] held that Georgia‘s statute of repose did not bar Plaintiffs’ negligent design claims because a jury could find that Ford‘s actions were at least reckless.2 To reach this finding, the [district court] applied the Chrysler Grp., LLC v. Walden, 339 Ga. App. 733 (792 SE2d 754) (2016) court‘s interpretation of [OCGA] § 51-1-11 (c), the statute governing exceptions to the statute of repose. The [district court] applied Walden, a Georgia Court of Appeals case, because it found that the Supreme Court of Georgia had not addressed whether “recklessness” was an independent exception to Georgia‘s statute of repose. The [district court] also upheld Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages based on the roof negligent design claim and Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees. Finally, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ other substantive claims.
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original).
Ford filed a Motion to Certify Ruling for Interlocutory Appellate Review, but the federal district court concluded that the Eleventh Circuit would likely need to seek clarity from this Court to resolve Ford‘s appeal. Accordingly, the court denied Ford‘s motion and sua sponte certified to this Court the two questions of law regarding
2. Generally, product-liability claims “filed more than ten years after the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the product are completely barred” under OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2) ‘s statute of repose. Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 725-726 (2) (450 SE2d 208) (1994) (citation and punctuation omitted). See OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (1) (providing that a manufacturer is liable for product defects that proximately cause injury); id. § 51-1-11 (b) (2) (“No action shall be commenced pursuant to this subsection with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury.“). Under OCGA § 51-1-11 (c) , however, the statute of repose does not apply to certain product-liability claims sounding in negligence. That provision, which was added to the statute in 1987, see Ga. L. 1987, p. 613, states in relevant part that OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2) ‘s ten-year statute of repose
shall also apply to the commencement of an action claiming negligence of a manufacturer as the basis of liability, except an
action . . . arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property.
In Batten, we clarified that actions arising out of conduct that manifests either “willful . . . disregard for life or property” or “wanton disregard for life or property,”
To answer that question, we must “examin[e] the statute‘s plain language,” Green v. State, 311 Ga. 238, 242 (1) (857 SE2d 199) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted), “view[ing] the statutory text in the context in which it appears,” Thornton v. State, 310 Ga. 460, 462 (2) (851 SE2d 564) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted), “presuming that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant,” Star Residential, LLC v. Hernandez, 311 Ga. 784, 785 (1) (860 SE2d 726) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted), and “read[ing] the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would,” Thornton, 310 Ga. at 463 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[F]or context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and common law alike — that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.” Thornton, 310 Ga. at 462-463 (2) (citations and punctuation omitted).
We begin our construction of
Ford argues that the “or” in the three-word phrase “willful, reckless, or wanton” is not used in its ordinary, disjunctive sense because that phrase is a “term of art” that “encompass[es] one mindset, not three.” To support this proposition, Ford raises two primary arguments, neither of which are persuasive. First, Ford argues that Batten construed the phrase “willful, reckless, or wanton” as “describ[ing] an entire mindset.” As explained above, however, this Court in Batten provided separate definitions for “[w]ilful conduct” and “wanton conduct.” Batten, 264 Ga. at 726 (3).
We did not purport to provide a singular definition for the entire phrase. Nor did we state that the terms “willful,” “reckless,” and “wanton” have the same meaning. Although Batten did not separately define the word “reckless” in
Second, Ford contends that
As Ford points out, Prosser and Keeton on Torts explains that “the words ‘willful,’ ‘wanton,’ or ‘reckless‘” have often “been grouped together” as forms of “quasi-intent,” which “[lie] between intent to do harm . . . [and] ordinary negligence” and “apply to conduct which is still, at essence, negligent, rather than actually intended to do harm, but which is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were so intended.” Prosser and Keeton on Torts 212-213 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (footnotes and punctuation omitted). In particular, Ford highlights the treatise‘s observation that “the three terms [‘willful,’ ‘wanton,’ or ‘reckless‘] have been treated as meaning the same thing, or at least as coming out at the same legal exit.” Id. at 212 (emphasis supplied).
But Ford has not shown that this general description of the words “willful,” “wanton,” and “reckless” tracks their use in Georgia law. A review of Georgia civil cases leading up to the enactment of
Some Georgia cases grouped “willful,” “wanton,” and “reckless” conduct together under the generic label of “willful and wanton” conduct, but even those cases appeared to draw conceptual distinctions between some or all of these terms. See Truelove, 159 Ga. App. at 908 (4) (discussing different uses of the phrase “wilful and wanton“). For example, in Carr v. John J. Woodside Storage Co., 217 Ga. 438 (123 SE2d 261) (1961), we described “willful” conduct and “wanton” conduct in terms that track Batten‘s definitions. Compare Carr, 217 Ga. at 444 (1) (holding that the trial evidence could support a finding that a driver‘s “conduct was such as to evince a wilful intention to inflict the injury which caused [the decedent‘s] death, or else was so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences, where human life was involved, as to justify the jury to find a wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual intent“), with Batten, 264 Ga. at 726 (3) (defining “[w]ilful conduct” as conduct involving “an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury” and “wanton conduct” as conduct that “is so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences as to be the equivalent in spirit to actual intent” (citation and punctuation omitted)). See also Lumley v. Pollard, 61 Ga. App. 681, 694 (2) (7 SE2d 308) (1940) (Allegations that a train engineer had “constructive knowledge” of a dead body on the tracks were insufficient to “sustain the conclusion that the engineer‘s acts were wilful and wanton. Nor do any facts alleged show such a reckless disregard of the rights of others as to amount to wilfulness and wantonness.“).
In sum, pre-1987 Georgia civil cases reveal that the words “willful,” “reckless,” and “wanton” were often used together when describing related forms of conduct, all of which were more culpable than negligence and were likely to cause harm. However, we have not identified any pre-1987 Georgia civil case providing a unified definition for the three-word phrase “willful, reckless, or wanton” or a variation thereof.3
Moreover, the historical context of
For all the reasons stated above, we conclude that the “or” in
3. The second certified question asks us to define “reckless . . . disregard for life or property,” as used in OCGA § 51-1-11 (c) .
We acknowledge at the outset that the word “reckless” can bear different meanings in different contexts. See McIver v. State, 314 Ga. 109, 126 (2) (d) (875 SE2d 810) (2022) (noting that “the term ‘reckless’ has been somewhat elastic and has had different meanings in different contexts“). See also Black‘s Law Dictionary 1270 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “[r]eckless” as “[n]ot recking; careless, heedless, inattentive; indifferent to consequences,” but noting that, “[a]ccording to circumstances [‘reckless‘] may mean desperately heedless, wanton or willful, or it may mean only careless, inattentive, or negligent” (emphasis supplied)). Further, as explained below, when
(a) The parties each contend that the word “reckless” had a settled meaning in Georgia when
(i) Ford argues that the word “reckless” in
A person commits a misdemeanor when he causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause the harm or endanger the safety, and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1325-1326.4 According to Ford, “reckless” in OCGA § 51-1-11 (c) must be understood to carry the same meaning as the crime of “reckless conduct” because “[t]he General Assembly has provided but one definition” of “reckless conduct,” and that definition appears in its definition of the crime. We disagree.
Although there is an “elementary rule of statutory construction that statutes relating to the same subject matter are ‘in pari materia‘” and generally should be “construed together and harmonized,” In the Interest of T. B., 313 Ga. 846, 853 (3) (874 SE2d 101) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted), the product-liability statute and the statute defining the crime of reckless conduct are not related to the same subject matter. The former statute is civil in nature whereas the latter statute is criminal, and Ford has not provided any authority suggesting that
Further, the text of the two statutes does not indicate that
Moreover, we have previously declined to use the criminal definition of “reckless conduct” when interpreting a similar phrase in the “criminal negligence” statute, which criminalizes “an act . . . which demonstrates a . . . reckless disregard for the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured thereby.” McIver, 314 Ga. at 126-127 (2) (d) (quoting
(ii) Cosper, by contrast, argues that Arrington v. Trammell, 83 Ga. App. 107 (62 SE2d 451) (1950), which quoted from the Restatement (First) of Torts’ definition of “Reckless Disregard of Safety,” see Arrington, 83 Ga. App. at 111, established the meaning of “reckless” for Georgia civil cases prior to
(b) Although Georgia law had not clearly defined “reckless” as that term was used in civil cases prior to
Here, as we observed in Division 2 above, Georgia precedent leading up to the enactment of
Further, Georgia case law leading up to
Our historical definitions of the terms “willful” and “wanton” further suggest that the three terms — willful, wanton, and reckless — fall on a spectrum of culpable conduct, with willful conduct being the most culpable and reckless conduct being the least culpable. Specifically, as noted above, “willful” conduct has been described as involving “an actual intent to do harm or inflict injury.” Batten, 264 Ga. at 726 (3). See Carr, 217 Ga. at 444 (1) (describing willful conduct as involving “a wilful intention to inflict the injury“). Wanton conduct, by contrast, does not involve an actual intent to harm or inflict injury but is nevertheless described as highly culpable conduct that is “equivalent in spirit to actual intent” to do harm or inflict injury. Batten, 264 Ga. at 726 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Carr, 217 Ga. at 444 (1) (describing wanton conduct as “equivalent in spirit to actual intent“). The definition of “wanton” conduct further suggests that what primarily differentiates such conduct from “reckless” conduct is the degree of reckless indifference exhibited. Specifically, “wanton” conduct involves a greater degree of reckless indifference than “reckless” conduct alone: conduct is “wanton” if it is ”so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences as to be the equivalent in spirit to actual intent.” Batten, 264 Ga. at 726 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). See also Carr, 217 Ga. at 444 (1) (describing wanton conduct as that which “was so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences, where human life was involved, as to justify the jury to find a wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual intent” (emphasis supplied)); Truelove, 159 Ga. App. at 908 (4) (describing “wanton conduct” as that which “was so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences as to justify the jury in finding a wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual intent” (citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted; emphasis supplied)); Arrington, 83 Ga. App. at 112 (noting that there were Georgia cases holding that wantonness could not be established absent “proof that the misconduct is reckless in the degree that the jury would be justified to find it equivalent in spirit to actual intent” (emphasis supplied)).5
(c) The broader legal context in which
The Restatements are not Georgia law, but when
As explained below, the Restatement (First) of Torts provides a definition of “Reckless Disregard of Safety” that is largely consistent with how the term “reckless” had been used in Georgia civil cases leading up to
The Restatement defines “Reckless Disregard for Safety” as follows:
The actor‘s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor‘s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him.
Restatement (First) of Torts § 500.6
Consistent with the Georgia case law discussed in Division 2 above, the Restatement
Further, consistent with the Georgia case law discussed in Division 3 (b) above, the Restatement clarifies that “reckless” conduct is distinct from, and less culpable than, conduct deemed intentional. Specifically, the Restatement explains that “[r]eckless misconduct differs from intentional wrongdoing” because a reckless actor “does not intend to cause the harm which results” and may “even . . . hope[ ] or . . . expect[ ] that his conduct will prove harmless.” Id. § 500, cmt. (f). According to the Restatement, conduct can be “reckless” so long as the actor “realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result,” and the Restatement further clarifies that “a strong probability is a different thing from the substantial certainty without which [an actor] cannot be said to intend the harm in which his act results.” Id.
Given that the Restatement‘s definition of “Reckless Disregard of Safety” describes “reckless” conduct as being more culpable than “negligent” conduct, as being less culpable than conduct deemed “intentional,” and as involving a high risk of harm, the definition is consistent with how the word “reckless” was used in Georgia civil cases leading up to
One aspect of the Restatement‘s definition, however, does not fit well with
Certified questions answered. All the Justices concur.
Notes
Walden, 339 Ga. App. at 737 (1) (a) (third alteration in original) (quoting Arrington, 83 Ga. App. at 112, which was quoting the Restatement (First) of Torts § 500 cmt. (f)). As described above, the legal principles included in this definition are relevant in determining whether conduct is “reckless.” See Restatement (First) of Torts § 500 cmt. (f). However, Walden‘s definition of “reckless” conduct was incomplete and failed to acknowledge several important features of the definition of “reckless” we have provided above. Among other things, Walden‘s definition did not incorporate the reasonable-person standard and failed to acknowledge that recklessness involves the creation of an unreasonable and substantial risk of harm. Accordingly, Walden is disapproved to the extent that it conflicts with the definition we have provided above.[A] reckless act [is] an act that is “intended by the actor, [although] the actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realize or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that his conduct may prove harmless.”