We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether or not the oral reading of a written defamation is publication of a libel. This is an issue of first impression in Georgia. Our interpretation of the relevant statute, Code Ann. § 105-705, and the authorities and law of other states, convince us to answer the question affirmatively.
The plaintiff in this case was employed at one оf defendant’s 7-11 stores, but was "discharged for shortages.” An entry to this effect was made in her personnel file. The plaintiff then applied for employment elsewhere. When that prospective employer inquired as to the reason for plaintiffs firing, he was told by a new secretary, that "all she could do was pull the personnel file, which she did, and she read a statement off of it, her precise wоrds was [sic], 'Christine was discharged for shortages.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) Plaintiff then sued defendant in a two count complaint; Count 1 was dismissed by the trial court and was not appealed. At the trial on Count 2, the jury awarded the plaintiff $5,000. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s judgment holding that there was no libel because the reading of the defamation over the phone was not "publication” as contemplated by Code Ann. § 105-705. It also held that while there wеre jury questions involved in considering the statement slanderous, the trial court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant bеcause the plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that the defendant’s agent was "either directed or authorizеd” to make the statement by the corporation.
We granted certiorari on only the holding of the Court of Appeals that the statement could not be considered a libel. Since we are reversing the Court of Appeals on this issue, we need not, and do not, express any opinion as to its further rulings regarding slander.
Libel is defined in Code Ann. § 105-701 as "a false and malicious dеfamation of another, expressed in print, or writing, or pictures, or signs, tending, to injure the reputation of an individual, and expоsing him to public *785 hatred, contempt, or ridicule. The publication of the libelous matter is essential to recovery.” (Emphasis supplied.) Publication is defined in Cоde Ann. § 105-705: "A libel is published as soon as it is communicated to any person other than the party libeled.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals in construing the statute not to include oral communication, reliеd on
Allen v. American Indemnity Co.,
In construing a statute, however, great weight must be given to the plain meaning оf the words used in an effort to determine the intent of the legislature. See Code Ann. § 102-102 (1, 9);
Brooks v. Brooks,
The Restatement, Torts, § 577, comment a, defines publication equally broadly. "In the case of libel there is usually some act whereby written or printed words are brought to the attention of a third person . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) In a comment the drafters of the Restatement opined that "the fact that the defamatory words are spoken with the intention that they be embodied *786 forthwith in a physical fоrm makes the speaking of them not only the publication of a slander, but a libel as well provided they subsequently are so еmbodied.” Restatement, supra, Comment f. If an oral defamation not yet in writing can constitute libel, then a fortiori the oral rеading of an already written statement must also be libelous.
In Hartmann v. Winchell,
The reasoning of these other states persuades us to adopt a similar rule, perhaps best expressed by Justice Cardozo in Ostrowe v. Lee, supra, p. 39. "The schism in the law of defamation between the older wrong of slander and the newer оne of libel is not the product of mere accident. [Cits.] It has its genesis in evils which the years have not erased. Many things that are defamatory may be said with impunity through the medium of speech. Not so, however, when speech is caught upon the wing and trаnsmuted into print. What gives the sting to the writing *787 is its permanence of form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abides and perрetuates the scandal.” Thus it is the writing of the defamatory words that distinguishes libel from slander. The fact that the defamation is then cоmmunicated orally does not erase this distinction. The written words remain on the page, available to be read by and to others. This is the essence of libel.
We therefore hold that the oral communication of a written defamation constitutes libel. Since the Court of Appeals did not consider the defendant - appellant’s other contentions as to libel, we reverse and remand this case for further consideration not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and remanded.