FELIX JOSUE MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
No. 4D17-2321
District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District
October 10, 2018
MIRMAN, LAWRENCE, Associate Judge.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Charles E. Burton, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2003-CF-003597-AXXX-MB. Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
OPINION
MIRMAN, LAWRENCE, Associate Judge.
At the age of seventeen, Appellant, Felix Martinez, shot two people who were seated in a car during the course of a drug transaction. One lived, the other perished. A jury convicted Appellant of second degree murder with a firearm, attempted second degree murder with a firearm, and shooting into an occupied vehicle. The trial court originally sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the second degree murder with a firearm count and to thirty years in prison with a minimum mandatory of twenty-five years under Florida’s 10-20-Life statute.1
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and the subsequent codification of
The starting point for analyzing Appellant’s claim on appeal are two United States Supreme Court decisions: Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In Graham, the court provided that any sentence imposed on a juvenile offender for a non-homicide offense must provide a “meaningful opportunity [for the offender] to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 560 U.S. at 75. Following Graham, the Miller court held that before imposing a life sentence on a juvenile for a homicide offense, the sentencing court must first “take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” 567 U.S. at 480.
In response to Graham and Miller, the Florida Legislature adopted
Appellant now argues that although he was resentenced as required by Miller and Landrum, the trial court’s imposition of minimum mandatories under Florida’s 10-20-Life statute nonetheless rendered his sentences unconstitutional. Reducing his argument to its simplest form, Appellant argues that any mandatory minimum sentence as applied to a juvenile offender divests the trial court of the authority to consider the juvenile offender’s “youth and its attendant circumstances,” and, therefore, violates the mandates of Miller and Landrum. We disagree.
This Court’s decision in St. Val v. State, 174 So. 3d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015), is instructive. There, we affirmed a juvenile offender’s twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence for the crime of attempted first degree murder and, in doing so, held that minimum mandatory sentencing schemes not resulting in sentences of life without parole do not violate the principles espoused in Graham and Miller as applied
Despite the parallels between the holding in St. Val and the instant case, Appellant argues that St. Val is not controlling because the St. Val court based its decision on the possibility for release and did not consider the specific argument raised by Appellant, which is that minimum mandatory sentences are unconstitutional because they prevent a juvenile offender from receiving individualized sentencing. Although the St. Val court did not specifically address the “individualized sentencing” concerns espoused by Miller, its holding was clear: non-life minimum mandatories imposed on juvenile offenders are not unconstitutional under Graham or Miller. Id. This holding does not leave any room for Appellant’s nuanced argument.
Alternatively, Appellant suggests that St. Val was incorrectly decided in light of the Florida Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Landrum. Specifically, Appellant argues that the St. Val court narrowly viewed Miller as limiting its disapproval to mandatory sentencing schemes resulting in life without parole. However, in Landrum, the Florida Supreme Court noted “that the Miller court had no intention of limiting its rule of requiring individualized sentencing for juvenile offenders only to mandatorily imposed sentences of life without parole, when a sentencing court’s exercise of discretion was not informed by Miller’s considerations.” 192 So. 3d at 467. Thus, Appellant maintains that St. Val’s interpretation of Miller is at odds with Landrum.
Appellant’s argument on this point also misses the mark. While Landrum does clarify that the holding of Miller applies to more than just mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole imposed on a juvenile offender, it does not expand Miller to the bounds advocated by Appellant—that is—to all sentences imposed on a juvenile offender. Rather, the Landrum court clarified that any life sentence imposed on a juvenile offender, whether mandatory or discretionary, must be informed by the individualized considerations outlined in Miller. 192 So. 3d at 469. As explained by the St. Val court, a twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence as imposed on a juvenile offender is not the same as a life sentence. 174 So. 3d at 449−50. Thus, Landrum did not alter the holding of St. Val and, therefore, it remains that a twenty-five year minimum mandatory sentence “does not violate the stricture of Graham or Miller.” Id. at 449.
Additional support for this conclusion can be found in our sister court’s decision in Young v. State, 219 So. 3d 206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). The Young court held that a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence imposed on a juvenile offender under the 10-20-Life statute did not violate Miller or Graham. 219 So. 3d at 209. In line with St. Val, the court reasoned that although the minimum mandatory “does limit, to some extent, the discretion of a trial court in sentencing a juvenile offender,” such a limitation did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the sentence still allowed for “‘meaningful opportunity’ for early release at a young age.” Id. at 209−10. The court also rejected the same “individual considerations” argument raised by Appellant here, holding that it was without merit because the juvenile received an individualized sentencing hearing pursuant to
Together, St. Val and Young establish that a sentence with a non-life minimum mandatory imposed against a juvenile offender facing a potential life sentence does not violate Graham or Miller so long as the juvenile was afforded an individualized sentencing hearing pursuant to
Here, the trial court considered the propriety of imposing a life sentence against Appellant at a
Appellant also argues that
Affirmed.
CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.