Albert FARGO, Petitioner v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (CITY OF PHILADELPHIA), Respondent
No. 2239 C.D. 2015
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Filed October 11, 2016
Submitted May 6, 2016
148 A.3d 514
HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
Moreover, “[t]he goal of an upset tax sale is to realize a price sufficient to bring the tax obligation on the property fully current.” Bell v. Berks County Tax Claim Bureau, 832 A.2d 587, 592 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). With upset tax sales, the upset price satisfies a property‘s “delinquent and current taxes.” Id.
But, with judicial sales or private sales, the tax claim bureau may agree to a price that does not fully satisfy the outstanding tax claims and liens. See
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, absent legal authority in support of Purchasers’ abatement claims, and in light of the purpose of the upset sale to make the tax obligation fully current, Purchasers, as the equitable owners of the property at the close of the upset sale, are responsible for any taxes accruing on the properties after the upset sale. For these reasons, we conclude the trial court properly denied Purchasers’ motions and compelled them to satisfy the real estate taxes on their investment properties.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s orders.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of October, 2016, the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, at docket numbers 14 CV 5774 and 11 CV 6348, dated October 14, 2015, are AFFIRMED.
Kristopher A. Kachline, Eagleville, for respondent.
BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
Albert Fargo (Claimant) petitions for review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the decision and order of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), denying a claim petition filed by Claimant seeking benefits under Section 108(r) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act),1 relating to the occupational disease of cancer suffered by a firefighter caused by exposure to a known carcinogen recognized as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). The WCJ denied the claim petition on the basis that the claim was not brought within 600 weeks of Claimant‘s last exposure to work-
In this appeal, we are called upon to interpret the provision in Section 301(f) that a claim under Section 108(r) “may be made within six hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease.”
Sections 108(r) and 301(f) were both added to the Act by the General Assembly through Act 46 of 2011.2 Section 108(r) recognizes the occupational disease of “[c]ancer suffered by a firefighter which is caused by exposure to a known carcinogen which is recognized as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer.”
Notwithstanding the limitation under subsection (c)(2) with respect to disability or death resulting from an occupational disease having to occur within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease, claims filed pursuant to cancer suffered by the firefighter under section 108(r) may be made within six hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease. The presumption provided for under this subsection shall only apply to claims made within the first three hundred weeks.
Section 301(c)(2) of the Act,
[t]hat whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease....
Id. This provision requires that in occupational disease cases, a compensable disability must manifest within 300 weeks of the last date of the claimant‘s exposure to the hazard and that a disability that first manifests more than 300 weeks after the exposure is not compensable under the Act. See City of McKeesport v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Miletti), 560 Pa. 413, 746 A.2d 87, 89 (2000); Hutz, 147 A.3d at 51-52; see also Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 623 Pa. 60, 81 A.3d 851, 863-65 (2013) (holding that when an occupational disease manifests outside the 300-week period of Section 301(c)(2) such that the claimant is barred from filing a claim, the exclusivity provision in the Act does not apply and the claimant may pursue a common-law claim); Cable v. Workmen‘s Compensation Appeal Board (Gulf Oil/Chevron USA, Inc.), 541 Pa. 611, 664 A.2d 1349, 1351-52 (1995) (holding that the 300-week period of Section 301(c)(2) begins to run on the date of exposure rather than the date of the claimant‘s last employment). Section 301(c)(2) requires that the claimant‘s disability arise within 300 weeks of the last exposure, however, this provision does not mandate that the claimant actually file a claim within 300 weeks of the last exposure. City of McKeesport, 746 A.2d at 90-91.
The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed. Claimant began working for Employer as a firefighter in 1972. (WCJ Decision, Finding of Fact (F.F.) ¶ 1.) In 1997, Claimant was diagnosed with squamous skin cell carcinoma after a biopsy of a growth on his leg. (Id. F.F. ¶ 3.) On July 31, 2001, Claimant injured his back in a motor vehicle accident, and he elected to take sick leave, remaining out of work until he retired on September 16, 2002. (Id. F.F. ¶ 12; Apr. 25, 2014 Hearing Transcript (H.T.) at 27-28, Reproduced Record
On July 15, 2014, the WCJ issued a decision and order dismissing the claim petition as untimely filed. The WCJ found that the claim petition of March 14, 2014 was filed more than 600 weeks4 after July 31, 2001, the last day that Claimant appeared at work for Employer and therefore the last day that Claimant could have possibly been exposed to a carcinogen in the workplace. (WCJ Decision, F.F. ¶ 9.) The WCJ recognized that while Section 301(f) expanded the time period for filing occupational disease claims under Section 108(r) for cancer suffered by a firefighter to 600 weeks, there is nothing in the Act that would explicitly allow for any extension of time for filing a petition beyond 600 weeks and accordingly concluded that the claim petition was untimely. (WCJ Decision, Conclusion of Law ¶ 1, Discussion.)
Claimant appealed to the Board, and the Board affirmed the determination by the WCJ that the claim petition was untimely under Section 301(f). The Board rejected the argument by Claimant that the 600-week period referred to in Section 301(f) was merely an extension of the 300-week manifestation period of Section 301(c)(2) of the Act,
On appeal to this Court,5 Claimant first argues that the Board erred in analyzing Section 301(f) as imposing a different type of limitations period compared to Section 301(c)(2) by holding that Section 301(f) re-
Upon review, we agree with the Board that the General Assembly enacted a distinct limitations period in Section 301(f) compared to Section 301(c)(2) and by its plain language Section 301(f) mandates that an occupational disease claim pursuant to Section 108(r) be filed within 600 weeks of the last date of workplace exposure to a known carcinogen classified as Group 1 by the IARC. First, Section 301(f) sets itself apart from Section 301(c)(2) by providing that “[n]otwithstanding the limitation under [Section 301(c)(2)] that disability or death resulting from an occupational disease having to occur within” 300 weeks of the last date of workplace exposure.
Claimant‘s argument that Section 301(f) is simply an extension of the manifestation period of Section 301(c)(2) relies on the fact that both statutes employ nearly identical language that the limitations periods begin to run “after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease.”
This holding that it is the date of filing that is determinative in Section 301(f) rather than the date that the disability manifests is consistent with our decision in Hutz, which addressed the operation of the last sentence of Section 301(f), providing that “[t]he presumption provided for under this subsection shall only apply to claims made within the first three hundred weeks.”
On appeal, the claimant argued that the Board erred by interpreting Section 301(f) as requiring that a firefighter asserting a claim under Section 108(r) file the claim within 300 weeks rather than requiring only that a compensable disability manifest within 300 weeks as courts have interpreted Section 301(c)(2). Id. at 51-52. This Court rejected this argument, holding that the date of filing of the claim was determinative under Section 301(f). Id. at 52-53. Observing that more than 300 weeks had passed from June 2006, the conclusion of the period at which the claimant alleged his disability ceased, to April 2012 when he filed the claim, and any workplace exposure after June 2006 could not be causally related to his earlier disability, we affirmed the determination by the Board that the Claimant was not entitled to the statutory presumption. Id.
Thus, Section 301(f) sets forth a two-tiered limitations period for Section 108(r) claims distinct from the time limit in Section 301(c)(2). First, a claimant must file the claim within 300 weeks of the last date of work with exposure to a known Group 1 carcinogen; if the claimant fails to do so, he is not foreclosed from bringing a claim by Section 301(f), but he loses the statutory presumption of Sections 301(e) and 301(f). However, if the claimant does not file the claim until more than 600 weeks after the date of last workplace exposure, the claimant is foreclosed from bringing that claim in its entirety.
Claimant next argues that, if Section 301(f) requires a claim under Section 108(r) be filed within 600 weeks of the last date of workplace exposure, then that provision is subject to a discovery rule to extend the time for filing. Claimant cites Price v. Workmen‘s Compensation Appeal Board (Metallurgical Resources), 533 Pa. 500, 626 A.2d 114 (1993), in which our Supreme Court held that the three-year statute of limitations of Section 315 of the Act7 for filing a claim for compensation does not begin to run in occupational disease cases until the claimant knows or should know that he is disabled as a result
We agree with the Board that the 600-week limitations period of Section 301(f) acts as a statute of repose and is not subject to a discovery rule under Price. Our Supreme Court has explained the difference between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose as follows:
A statute of limitations is procedural and extinguishes the remedy rather than the cause of action. A statute of repose, however, is substantive and extinguishes both the remedy and the actual cause of action. Generally, the critical distinction in classifying a statute as one of repose or one of limitations is the event or occurrence designated as the “triggering” event. In a workers’ compensation claim, the common triggering event for statute of limitations purposes is the disability of the employee, which defines the accrual of the action. That is the point at which all the elements of the action have coalesced, resulting in a legally cognizable claim.
A statute of repose, however, typically sets the triggering event as something other than the point at which the cause of action arises. Within the workers’ compensation scheme, the common triggering event is the work-related incident/injury, regardless of whether disability results at that time. Thus, a statute of repose may also prevent the accrual of a cause of action where the final element necessary for its creation occurs beyond the time period established by the statute. At the end of the time period specified in the statute, the cause of action ceases to exist, unless the claimant can bring himself within any tolling provision enunciated in that statute.
Westinghouse Electric Corp./CBS v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Korach), 584 Pa. 411, 883 A.2d 579, 588 n.11 (2005) (citations omitted). The “triggering event” for the purposes of Section 301(f) is not the date of injury or disability, as in Section 315, but rather the claimant‘s last day at work with exposure to a known Group 1 carcinogen. A firefighter who contracts cancer may file a claim under Section 108(r) within 300 weeks of the last workplace exposure and take advantage of the statutory presumption of compensability. In addition, the General Assembly provided a Section 108(r) claimant an additional 300 weeks to file a claim albeit without the benefit of the statutory presumption. However, once 600 weeks elapse from the date of the last workplace exposure, the cause of action under Section 108(r) ceases to exist.
Claimant‘s argument that the 600-week limitation period of Section 301(f) was intended by the General Assembly to supersede Section 315 and Price is unsupported by the text of the Act as neither Section 301(f) nor Section 108(r) state that Section 315 is inapplicable to Section 108(r) claims. Furthermore, the 600-week limitation of Section 301(f) does not conflict with the application of the discovery rule to Section
Accordingly, because Claimant filed his claim petition in March 2014, more than 600 weeks after July 31, 2001 when Claimant could have last been exposed to carcinogens in the workplace, we conclude that the claim petition is untimely under Section 301(f). The order of the Board is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of October, 2016, the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in the above matter is affirmed.
JAMES GARDNER COLINS
SENIOR JUDGE