Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

to the filed pursuant Appellant’s disposing order 9541-9546, in the Act, §§ 42 Pa.C.S. Relief Post Conviction v. 1997. See Commonwealth at 952 CA docketed matter n. 4. CAP, n. A.2d at 575 at 404 Dowling, Op. 883A.2d 579 CORPORATION/CBS, Appellant ELECTRIC WESTINGHOUSE APPEAL COMPENSATION WORKERS’ (KORACH), Appellee. BOARD Pennsylvania. Supreme Court of May Argued 2004. Sept.

Decided Fricker, Jr., A. Joseph for Westinghouse Electric Corpora- tion/CBS Kenger,

Amber Marie for Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. DeBernardo,

Anthony W. for William C. Korach. CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, Before: NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, JJ.

OPINION Justice NEWMAN.

By Notice of Compensation (NCP), Payable Westinghouse Electric Corporation/CBS (Employer) accepted injury sus- (Claimant) tained by William Korach 14, 1984, on November this, nature In sprain. back the most recent litiga- tion, Employer appeals by from allowance an Order of the Commonwealth affirming an Order of the Workers’ (Board) Compensation Appeal Board that affirmed in part and 81, reversed in part the July 2001 decision of a Workers’ (WCJ). Compensation on Judge Based the following ratio- nale, we reverse the Order of the Commonwealth Court. AND

FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY Claimant worked various positions for Employer from shearman, 1970 until notably as a coil fitter, former pull, handler, material and coil processor. On November Claimant sustained work injury related in the nature of a “back sprain.” At the time of his injury, Claimant was employed as a coil processor; he sprained his back lifting a weighing coil excess of one pounds hundred out of the presses.1 4, 1984, On December Employer issued an NCP acknowledging injury. 1988, In specific work an indepen- dent medical examiner approved Claimant for or sedentary modified light-duty 1989, In work. another independent medi- only 1. This regarding is the specifics information of Claimant's injury contained in the record before us. of complaints between cal examiner noted inconsistencies examination, and recommended that physical and his Claimant a restriction. Pursuant return to work without Claimant benefits were reduced Agreement, Claimant’s Supplemental 1989, 16, November as work was disability effective partial on that him within his Also physical capabilities. available to date, appropriate docu- Claimant and executed commu- the Board for a ments could so Claimant accept preferred his loss benefits. Claimant wage tation of than an because disability employment rather offer partial Accordingly, partial his support. he had other means of for 500 was commut- weeks disability $154.00 $77,000.00, by dated a sum Order lump payment ed to 28, proceeding, 1990. As of the commutation February part responsi- “remain would parties stipulated expenses medical payment necessary ble for of reasonable and ” Record, injuries.... (Original related to Claimant’s work Fact; of Law Proposed Findings of Conclusions Stipulation: 3.) Order, 1990, 24 January page and dated Proposed mid-1989, al- and Claimant Between November and change he leged gradual personality underwent and ignored personal hygiene, that he became his depressed, wife, home, his child. After took little interest his his years increasing depres- levels of nearly disability five sion, see a psychiatrist Claimant’s wife insisted that he (Dr. Lisowitz, M.D. made the with Gerald appointment first Lisowitz). the same Critically, approximately occurred Claimant being negotiated. time that the commutation was years some after the Dr. from late five saw Lisowitz Lisowitz through sometime when Dr. original injury, came under suffered severe heart and Claimant problems (Dr. Himmelhoch), Himmelhoch, his M.D. care of M. Jonathan Although Supple- neither the treating psychiatrist. current Stipulation specifically mental nor the referenced Agreement Em- component injury, work psychiatric Claimant’s psychiatric out of Claimant’s paid arising all the bills ployer Following personnel change through August care of 1998. internal re- subsequent risk insurer and Employer’s within view, Employer refused to continue these on payments the basis they that were not work related. Claimant then filed 25, 1998, Claim Petition on September that he suf- alleging fered a psychiatric injury in the nature depression of that was precipitated by his 1984 back the injury; sought Petition of payment fees, related medical bills as as well counsel but not request did the be NCP amended reflect additional injuries. Petition, In its to the Claim Employer answer only admitted Claimant suffered work-related low back 14, 1984, on sprain November for which compensation was early commuted in asserted that Claimant’s injury claim of psychic by was barred P.S. 631,2 § of the statute limitations contained in Sections 315 413(a) of (Act), the Compensation Workers’ Act Act of amended, 2, 1915, as 602,3 June P.L. §§ 77 P.S. 772.4 pertinent part: 2. Section 311 states the employer knowledge Unless shall have of the occurrence of the behalf, injury, employe or the unless or someone in his or some of the behalf, dependents give or someone in their shall notice thereof twenty-one employer days injury, compensation within after the no and, given, shall be due until such notice be unless such notice be given twenty days within one hundred and after the occurrence of the injury, compensation no shall be allowed. §631. 77 P.S. following pertinent 3. Section 315 language: contains the personal In injury compensation cases of all claims for shall be barred, unless, years injury, parties article; forever within two after the agreed upon compensation shall have payable under this years or injury, parties unless within two after one of the shall Where, petition provided have filed a however, as in article four hereof.... case, payments any had been made in said limitations not expiration years shall take effect until the of two from making payment prior time of the most recent date petition.... such § 77 P.S. 602. 413(a) applicable language 4. The from Section is: compensation judge designated A department may, workers’ time, reinstate, any modify, suspend, or terminate a notice of com- pensation payable upon ... party filed either with the department, upon proof disability injured employe of an has increased, recurred, decreased, ceased, temporarily or finally has or modification, any dependent that the changed. status has Such reinstatement, suspension, or termination shall be made as upon date disability injured which it is employe shown that the Petition that the Furthermore, complained Claim Compensa- Notice of treated a Petition to Review should be 413(a). 311, 315, and also barred Sections Payable, tion 5, 2000, granted the the WCJ September decision dated By Claimant, of his testimony the crediting of Claim Petition Himmelhoch, Employ- of Dr. over that treating psychiatrist, testimony of also credited the The WCJ expert. er’s medical of wife, rejected Employer argument his and the Claimant and The concluded time barred. WCJ that the Claim Petition was by Employer bills psychiatric Claimant’s payment the that tolled compensation lieu of payments constituted 315, the Petition rendering Claim period limitations of Section of medical bills payment The that the timely. WCJ believed lulled Claimant into false period of time long for such medical care related reasonable security sense of this was Further, the injury. Employer his WCJ ordered work future from 1998 into the care pay psychiatric Claimant’s unreasonable care was found to be or until such time as that pay was ordered unnecessary. Finally, Employer Claimant, con- based an unreasonable attorney’s upon fees of test. remanded part, affirmed in vacated part,

The Board finding It the WCJ the decision to the WCJ. affirmed The Board filed. timely that Claimant’s Claim Petition was 315, of Section upon tolling provision based this decision of Claimant’s payment by § P.S. due to mid-1998, until on Levine expenses relying psychiatric (Newell Corp.) Bd. 760 A.2d Compensation Appeal Workers’ (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), grant- appeal allowance petition of (2002). remanded, 568 Pa. 798 A.2d 1273 Howev- ed and er, and remanded the attorney’s the award of fees vacated recurred, increased, decreased, temporarily finally or has or has ceased, any dependent upon or which it is shown that status Provided, payable, changed: That ... no notice of has reviewed, modified, reinstated, or agreement be or award shall department years within three after is filed with the unless prior payment compensation made recent the date of the most petition.... of such § 772.

77 P.S. findings regarding matter to WCJ to render the reason- Employer’s ableness of contest. remand,

On held one hearing WCJ which time counsel for testified and offered a Claimant statement and, counsel fees. The the charges individually WCJ reviewed July 31, decision dated again the WCJ awarded attorney’s upon fees based unreasonable contest. 29,1990, noted that a report WCJ dated October from S. Anne Valko, M.D., behalf, who examined Claimant on his indicated that Claimant from receiving psychiatric care Dr. Lisow- itz, and that such treatment be should continued. This led the to conclude that Employer’s WCJ contest was unreasonable because terminated payment of Claimant’s psychiat- ric treatment receiving without a medical opinion supporting denial of payment. Pursuant to the terms of the commuta- tion, the that parties stipulated Employer would “remain for responsible of reasonable and payment necessary medical ” injuries.... expenses related Claimant’s work Board, The in an August Order dated affirmed portion Petition, that of the WCJ’s decision the Claim granting but reversed that portion awarding attorney’s the decision agreed fees. The Board that its Employer with contest was a reasonable there was definite statute of limitations issue response raised in to the of Claimant’s Claim Petition. In a published Opinion, a panel Commonwealth Court affirmed the Order of the Board. Westinghouse Electric (Korach), Comp. v. Workers’ Bd. Appeal 829 A.2d 387 Co./CBS (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). that, The court indicated in its in decision (Hernandez), AT & T v. Workmen’s Bd. Comp. Appeal 707 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), A.2d 649 which reaffirmed in deanes (Haas), Hospital Appeal v. Workers’ Bd. Comp. 819 A.2d 131 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (hereinafter I), Hospital deanes it had Petition, they warned that file a claimants should rather Claim Petition, a than seeking Review when to amend an NCP reflect conditions which had not been liability accepted by The court employer. reasoned there was nothing (Act)5 a claim- permitted Act Compensation the Workers’ it provide an NCP nor did the denial of challenge ant admission. entity employer’s to add any authority that the T, acknowledged court A.2d at 650 n. The AT & 707 perceived a murky, noting in this area is decisional law I and the Hospital AT T Jeanes & and dichotomy between v. Credit Claims Workmen’s decisions Commercial existing (Lancaster), Pa.325, A.2d 902 Comp. Appeal Bd. (1999), (Keystone Bd. Comp. Appeal Workers’ Guthrie (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). However, Co.), A.2d 634 Coal any conflicts the deci- perceived to address court declined to resolve principles in favor of contract applying sional law a commutation is an court reasoned that dispute. lia- terminating compensation the parties between agreement matter, the present In the employer. bility part on lulled Employer the WCJ that Claimant agreed court with commutation tender- security after the into false sense on this bills. Based psychiatric ing payment Claimant’s conclusion, from estopped court held to the According defense. a statute of limitations raising court, Petition or Review immaterial Claim it was whether intentionally either filed Petition was where believing that his psychi- misled into unintentionally Claimant problem atric was covered. that, alternative, by filing a Claim

In the court decided Petition, seeking to enforce the 1990 actually Claimant was conclusion, In to this the court inter- coming commutation. the commutation award as contract between preted acceptance responsi- of its Employer’s included parties, which The court then psychiatric Claimant’s treatment. bility for (Second) of of Section 202 the Restatement Contracts applied following on the (1981), emphasis language: particular with (4) an occasions for agreement repeated involves Where knowledge by party either with

performance for opportunity objection performance nature of the and other, accepted any performance course of to 1-1041.4; amended, 2, 1915, §§ as 77 P.S. Act of June P.L. 5. 2502-2626. or acquiesced objection in without is given great weight in the of interpretation agreement.

(5) reasonable, Wherever the manifestations of of intention to a parties promise agreement interpreted or are as other,

consistent each with and any with relevant course of performance, dealing, course of or of usage trade. Applying precepts, these the court noted that the course of performance for eight almost for years was Claimant to sub- mit his psychiatric bills to and Employer, to Employer pay Finding them. the course of of parties conduct reflected an acceptance Employer obligation that its to continue pay Claimant’s “reasonable and necessary medical expenses” obligation included pay psychi- Claimant’s treatment, atric the court determined that “Employer’s unilat- eral refusal to continue making those payments August after contrary to the terms of the 1990 commutation agreement” and that Employer its prom- “[b]ecause breached ise under the commutation agreement, properly WCJ Electric, ordered the Westinghouse NCP amended....” A.2d 393-94. granted appeal We allowance of to Employer, which .6 following

raised the issues for our review chal lenges Court, the use of estoppel by the Commonwealth particularly Claimant failed to raise the defense. It contin ues to assert that Claimant’s Claim Petition was time-barred and that the proper form of the ais Petition for Finally, Review. Employer contends that contract principles are inapplicable to commutation.7 Throughout prior 6. proceedings, Employer included the notice provisions § challenge. P.S. in its timeliness However, Employer aspect did not choose to discuss this in its brief requirements this Court we day. leave notice to another Appellate review a workers’ Order is limited occurred, determining whether a constitutional violation error law supports necessary whether substantial evidence findings Claims, fact. Commercial Credit 728 A.2d at 903. does not violation, allege a previous constitutional but does contend that all tribunals have committed an error of law.

421

DISCUSSION Equitable Estoppel I. that, fact that Claim complains despite equitable estoppel, plead to raise and properly

ant failed to sponte sua the doctrine applied Commonwealth Court the untimeli asserting from estopped that it was determine that Claimant Employer argues Petition. of ness Claimant’s Employer’s stat his defense to equitable estoppel has waived of this the decisions argument, relying upon of limitations ute (Snizaski), Bd. Appeal in Rox Coal v. Comp. Workers’ (2002), Pa.60, 807 A.2d 906 and Cahill Workmen’s (North Pa.223, Corp.), Bd. American Coal Comp. Appeal (1993), that the doctrine proposition 621 A.2d 101 for compensation proceedings. applicable waiver is workers’ Coal, Snizaski, Randy superintendent, a coal mine In Rox on his to way company- in a vehicle accident work died asserting His filed a Claim Petition vehicle. widow supplied Rox Coal compensation to benefits. entitlement workers’ 1) laws, and violation of vehicle raised two defenses: Snizaski’s 2) vehicle WCJ company policy. the violation its Petition, fatal but Board denied and dismissed the Claim a Petition for Recon- simultaneously Rox filed reversed. Coal On appeal and an with Commonwealth Court. sideration reconsideration, the 1993 amendments argued Rox Coal traveling to the and exception going to the Act eliminated the held that this coming rule.8 The Board defense was waived appeal to from for failure raise before WCJ. On Court, this Court also con- affirmance the Commonwealth claim by Rox had its 1993 amendment cluded that Coal waived (deciding its appeal. raise it See also Cahill failing prior rule, going coming to what has become known as the 8. Pursuant injuries employer employee is “an not liable to traveling employer’s premise employee is off the while the received (Thomas Appeal Comp. Bd. Mekis from work.” Biddle v. Workmen's Sons, Pa.343, (1995). Inc.), excep- Four 652 A.2d 808-09 & (1) recognized: employment previously have been tions this rule (2) (traveling exception); transportation no fixed that includes contract work; (4) (3) special employer; place mission on behalf of employer’s special circumstances furtherance business. that claimant had waived issue the agreement’s validity because it never raised before employer was the WCJ and matter). opportunity never had an to be heard on the Unlike Cahill, Rox Coal and equitable Claimant articulated the estop- 7, defense pel April before the WCJ at the held on hearing 7, 10.) (Hearing transcript April at dated 1999 Claim- ant correctly argument equitable of proving estoppel. elements to see Dr. Lisowitz judice, began In the case sub Claimant time, At in had point in 1989.9 that same Claimant sometime independent two medical examinations re- undergone duty that he return to in a limited status. vealed could work negotiating were to have Claimant’s Concurrently, parties commuted to a sum and Claim- disability lump benefits partial 29, for on November 1989. ant filed Petition Commutation accomplished by dated The commutation award was Order 28, 1990, respon- to remain February Employer and required However, Claimant never testi- sible for medical treatment. believing Employer fied that he lulled into had was accepted pro- for his treatment or responsibility psychiatric documentation to show that had constructive Employer duced no indication in the record relationship. notice of the There is to the initial bills for Dr. Lisowitz’s treatment arrived as when 1989, by Employer pay in albeit did paid Employer, were However, there in nothing those bills in course. is regular adduced, to activity, nor there indicate that was evidence an attempt bills in to induce Employer paid psychiatric these psychiatric to omit a Petition to add his Claimant nothing to date when Claimant had 9. There is in the record indicate the Lisowitz, in appointment except with Dr. that was sometime his first 424

infirmity its “concealment, to NCP. There is no misrepresen- tation, or inequitable conduct” in of payment these bills and conduct is Employer’s “as consistent with purpose honest and with negligence absence of as with their opposites.” While there is some case that an employer’s law may unintentional conduct be held invoke the doctrine equitable our estoppel,10 review of this record fails rise to necessary the level to allow the application equitable estop- pel. facts this case differ from those Sharon Steel where the Commonwealth Court offered a selection cases for which the application equitable is estoppel appropriate. See, e.g., Corp. Bethlehem Steel v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal (Krause), (em- (1983) Bd. 77 Pa.Cmwlth. 1342 A.2d ployer that substituted unemployment compensation payments Sons, workers’ & payments); M. Gordon Bd., Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Pa.Cmwlth. (1974) A.2d (employer who informs claimant that papers have been filed and were being processed); and Mucha v. Co., (1955) M.L. & Bayard 177 Pa.Super. 108 A.2d 925 (indications by employer that surgery would be “taken care of.”). Here, Employer merely paid the bills submitted to it one injured of its employees which it already compen- sating medical treatment. Nothing exists record that demonstrate attempted into lure Claimant thinking psychiatric treatment was included within its sphere responsibility. Nor is anything there in the conduct of Employer that prevented would have Claimant from filing Petition to amend Accordingly, the NCP. the Commonwealth in finding erred that the equitable doctrine of estoppel served to toll the limitations period.

II. Form the Petition of Employer steadfastly has maintained the proper in this matter filing is Petition to Review Notice of Compen Payable sation and that the Claim Petition of Claimant is time , that, argues barred. in Employer the affirming decision of See, e.g., Corp. Compensation Appeal Sharon Steel v. Workmen's Bd. 10. 1194, (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (Myers), (citing 670 A.2d 1200 Thorn v. Straw Clothier, 59, (1959)). bridge Pa.Super. & 191 155 A.2d 414

425 that, WCJ, Court held whether Claim- the Commonwealth the or by by 315 Section governed was Section ant’s petition 413(a) estop- equitable as the doctrine of inconsequential of timeliness of asserting from the lack pel barred that, even if Claimant contends claim. Claimant’s estoppel, of pled equitable the doctrine raised properly fail- by reversible error Court committed the Commonwealth or the of Section applicability to determine ing 413(a) have deter- As we by to the Petition filed Claimant. not apply does equitable estoppel mined that the doctrine of limitations of a statute of Employer’s to bar use this instance of claim. defense, on the merits we turn to a decision Petition of a Claim governs Section 315 the shall be forever compensation “all claims for and states that barred, unless, injury, after the the years parties within three ... or compensation payable the agreed upon have shall of the years injury, parties three after the one unless within hereof.” provided article four shall have filed a time forth in Section 315 § 602. The restrictions set 77 P.S. repose unless tolled conduct specific act as a statute of Comp. Appeal Bd. v. Workers’ employer. Schreffler (2002).11 (Koeher Co.), In 567 Pa. 788 A.2d Coal remedy procedural extinguishes the A of limitations is statute however, repose, is than the cause of action. A statute rather extinguishes remedy and the actual cause of substantive and both the Generally, classifying as one the critical distinction in a statute action. designated as repose one limitations is the event or occurrence claim, compensation the com- "triggering” event. In a workers’ disability triggering purposes mon event for statute of limitations is That is the employee, which defines the accrual of the action. coalesced, resulting all of the action have point at which the elements Co., legally cognizable Vargo Koppers Pa. 715 A.2d claim. (1998). however, typically triggering event as repose, A sets the statute of something point at which the of action arises. other than the cause scheme, triggering the workers’ the common Within incident/injuiy, regardless work-related of whether disabili- event is the Thus, repose may prevent also ty at that time. Id. statute of results necessary of a cause of action where final element accrual beyond period time the statute. its occurs established creation statute, period specified in the cause of action At end the time exist, any tolling bring unless the claimant can himself within ceases to provision in that statute. enunciated matter, the instant the work-related on injury occurred No- If, held, vember as the Commonwealth Court has a claim be petition injuries must filed to add additional to an NCP, then the repose statute of for this injury expired as of 13,1987. November Clearly, begin did not psychiat- Claimant ric treatment until mid to late 1989. Employer could not have lulled into a security Claimant false sense of when the limita- expired, tions period tolling thus its provisions, because had to yet begun very not for the pay treatment issue. Claim- ant did not file September his Claim Petition until of 1998.

Claimant is essentially asserting that he is to required file Claim Petition within years three diagnosis each new condition original injury. T; related to the work See AT & Jeanes I. Hospital This is neither consistent with the Act nor with decisions of this Court in Hospital Jeanes v. Workers’ Bd.(Haas), (Pa.2005) (hereinafter Comp. Appeal 872 A.2d 159 II) Hospital Jeanes and Commercial Credit Claims. In Claims, Commercial Credit Court stated that “claimant’s subsequently alleged psychiatric injuries could have formed the predicate for compensation under if only the Act Compensation Notice of payable was first properly modified in 413(a)], accordance with supra, to reflect [Section the employ er’s liability increased injuries.” these distinct Commer Claims, cial Credit A.2d at 904. II,

Our recent Hospital decision Jeanes addressed the issue of whether to proper supplement NCP for injuries additional is a claim a review petition. There, an intensive care injured nurse was while to attempting relocate a ventilator-dependent patient. Her employer accept- ed the to injury one her “low Nearly years back.” four after injury, the employer’s physician certified her full recovery, employer and the filed Petition to Suspend/Termi- nate Benefits. The claimant then filed a Petition to Review Compensation 413(a) pursuant Benefits seeking Section amend the NCP to reflect additional physical mental injuries. granted Review, The WCJ her Petition and the Board affirmed. The Commonwealth reversed conclud- that, 413(a) ing apply, material mistake and that the issued at the time that NCP was NCP must exist pursuant file a Claim Petition required to the claimant was the content in AT & T. Applying and its decision Section 315 T,12 that a claim AT the court opined in & of footnote two T., 2. at n. AT & 707 A.2d must be filed. petition petition a claim that the Notwithstanding the fact denial and appeal an from an NCP essentially as functions to reflect authority to amend an NCP a has the that WCJ responsi injuries employer the becomes additional which ble, claim must be filed petition the that a dispelled notion we NCP, at injuries arising to an either in to add order further from the flowing incident or of the the time work-related Thus, we reversed the deci injury. work-related recognized I, Hospital reit Jeanes sion of the Commonwealth 413(a) appropriate the Act the provides erating Section injuries. only The to add related to amend NCP procedure is Schreffler, create confusion possible that could decision incident. more one work-related where there was than distinct the had sustained two work- Schreffler, employee In employer different occasions. The injuries on related two to the injury employee’s injury, physical the second accepted back, injury based injury, psychic as The first compensable. a mine of dead co-workers from on the removal bodies em~ accident, compensable by not as the accepted had been T, quoted frequently 12. & which has been footnote from AT position petition filed in order to that a claim must be substantiate the NCP, part: amend an states provision no for a claimant to amend a We note that the makes [Act] payable injury compensation to include an additional not notice of employer initially employer the the issued admitted to time compensation pay- compensation payable. A notice of the notice of but, rather, agreement parties, is a not an between the able is voluntary employer; litigation, by the in an effort to avoid admission liability, responsibility, employer and assumes admits compensa- employee's injury specifically described the notice of right appeal is from a notice of payable. Because there no tion denial, authority and because there exists no employer entity itself to add to the permit any other than would compensation payable, employer’s in the notice of Claim- admission a claim in order to receive benefits ant here should have filed injury alleges April from his hip which he also resulted for the 1989 work incident. T, & 707 A.2d at 650 n. AT ployer though even the employer paid psychiatric had expenses treatment of its employee for more than a decade. It injuries was uncontested that the were not related. When the employer voluntarily ceased paying employee’s psycho- logical expenses, filed a employee Petition pursu- Review 413(a). ant to Section claim,

This Court determined that this was indepen- new dent of the back injury; and that the employee in Sckreffler not seeking NCP, the amendment of an but acceptance of injury. a new and different We held that 315 rather Section 413(a) than governed petition. We further con- cluded that payment medical toll expenses could the statute in repose contained in Section 315 an appropriate case and that, (3) because the Claim Petition was filed within three years from the date of the last payment medical expenses, the Petition in timely. was Sckreffler

As reflected in our most recent decision in Hospital Jeanes II, appropriate filing to amend an NCP to add additional injuries is a Petition to Amend of Compensation Notice Pay- 413(a). pursuant able to Section In the case judice, sub Employer accepted liability for the work-related incident and an issued NCP. The of a Claim Petition pursuant erroneous, Section 315 was unnecessary particularly and alleging Claimant was that his psychiatric condition arose as a direct result of his work-related back injury. Accordingly, as indicated by present facts and our decisions in Jeanes Hospital Claims, II and Commercial Credit Employer is Section-413(a) correct that governs this matter and Claimant made an filing. incorrect Board,

The as affirmed Court, Commonwealth for, alia, cited footnote of AT & T two inter the proposition that the form of the petition is not controlling when claimant is entitled to relief. This principal had its genesis in Johnson Co., Highland (1930), v. Jeddo Coal 99 94 Pa.Super. wherein the Superior Court noted of pleadings strictness is inap plicable matter, within a compensation workers’ and also in 111.44(c) Rules, of the Referee’s which stated that “a may grant or the Board judge] compensation [workers’ either filed that the claimant notwithstanding relief claimant pleading[,] amend that pleading failed to an inappropriate relief the claimant the record supports provided v.Co. be entitled to.” General properly would Refractories Pa.306, A.2d Bd. Comp. Appeal (Wright), Workmen’s (1993). an Court affirmed Refractories, In General Compensa- the Workmen’s of fatal claim benefits under award in that case under filed claimant tion Act remarked that the work- Disease Act. Occupational in has the is remedial nature and ers scheme construed effectuate being liberally intended purpose objectives. There we stated: humanitarian is the authority is similar in all of these cases What the evidence compensation judge] evaluate [workers’ the claim- notwithstanding benefits appropriate award of his claim. In these identifying the basis ant’s error cases, proven, only no that a claim had been disputed one Act had not been particular that the section correct cited. There, that General Refracto- at 123. the Court observed

Id. that demonstrated that was well aware ries filed answer under the Workmen’s Com- proceed that the claimant could that, findings suggested noted its pensation Act. The Court conclusions, Refractories couched its request General claims rather than to worker’s applicable terms no Thus, because there were disease claims. occupational jurisdiction, of and deprive the tribunal time limitations to the of resolution employer possibility considered because Compensation Act ac- proceeded under Workmen’s arid of the reversed the Order Commonwealth cordingly, the Court claim benefits. the award of fatal Howev- Court affirmed er, as in Section 111.44 was Refractories, noted General 1991, repromulgated. in not been March of and has repealed has continued to follow this Commonwealth purpose on the basis that satisfies humanitarian precept Act, initially establishing for the alternate basis examine whether Claimant principal. must therefore We could obtain relief if the Petition filed was treated as one filed 413(a). pursuant to Section argued has consistently filing the correct is a

Petition to Compensation Payable, Amend Notice of is which equally unavailing Claimant under these facts. Section 413(a) states that workers’ compensation judge designated “[a] by department may, any at time ... modify ... a notice of compensation payable ... upon petition by filed party either department, with the upon proof that of an disability injured Provided, has ... employe That, increased ... no reviewed, notice of ... compensation payable shall be or modified, reinstated, or a petition unless is with the filed department within three years the date the most after of recent payment compensation made prior of of added). petition.” § such P.S. 772 (emphasis Further, 306(f.l)(9), 531(9), § Section specifically P.S. states that “payment by medical, or employer insurer for any surgical or hospital services after supplies any statute of limitations provided for this act expired shall have shall act not reopen or revive the compensation of rights purposes such Thus, limitations.” a critical distinction exists between repose statute of present Section where the employer’s not liability yet ripened, has the statute limitations' of 413(a), employer’s Section where liability has been established. section, Pursuant to the payment former expenses medical loss wage payments benefits as lieu of compensation and/or may toll the time limitations Section 315. Con- Schreffler. however, versely, latter, pursuant liability to the is established expenses and medical and wage loss benefits are then consid- 531(9). separately. § ered 77 P.S. The parties were granted commutation award dated February Order 306(f.l)(9) Because Section precludes tolling of the limita- 413(a) tions period payments for medical treat- ment, the statute of limitations for amending expired the NCP February on 1993. Claimant failed to any petition file all, form, much less in until proper September and it was, therefore, untimely.

431 Principles III. Contract styled the theory, the an alternate Commonwealth As by sought to as a mechanism which Claimant Petition Claim subsequently applied and commutation order enforce 1990 (Second) to of Contracts of the Restatement 302 Section accepted responsibili- implicitly had Employer determine that contract applied injury. court ty psychiatric for Claimant’s virtually had breached concluding Employer that principles treat- psychiatric of Claimant’s calling payment a contract position. cannot subscribe ment. We 582, n. Pa. 849 A.2d Pietrzykowski, In Dudas (2004), a articulated the difference between this Court and release agreement. commutation order and a compromise a release the result compromise There we said: “While is parties, request an of the a commutation is agreement Thus, Employer directed to the for determination.” [Board] se, per agreement” that there is no “commutation is correct Drake, In Drake v. 555 Pa. quasi-judicial but a order. (1999), noted that commutation 725 A.2d 719 n. we “[a] that payment one form of for another” and award substitutes “[cjommutation may be effected but private agreement, correctly a usually Employer is done under statute.” states for it to violate. parties that there is no “contract” between the award, A is an reflected an order of the commutation award, such an determining Board.13 In whether to make of the as the stipulation parties Board considers the well If best interests of all concerned to arrive a conclusion. commutation,” is, that if “enforce the his Claimant wished intent was reimburse the only require referred to in the commutation expenses treatment psychiatric Order, Petition Penalty pursuant he should have filed a Act, significant, § It we 435 of 77 P.S. 991. is believe, had not recognized Claimant a in that he filed psychiatric problems his Claim acknowledged Industry regulations require Department Labor and that Petition NCP; affidavit, (1) (2) copy of the for Commutation include: agreement basis for stipulation, parties intended to form the commutation; (3) § sample order. 34 Pa.Code 111.33. Petition. Nowhere in his request Claim Petition does he that the be injuries. NCP amended reflect additional While we are prepared say not that contract principles are inapplica- ble in workers’ compensation we hold that proceedings, do not they are to a applicable commutation award.

TV. CONCLUSION that, In summary, we observe when the employer has not accepted an initial injury, work-related a claim must petition be years filed within three injury. the date of 77 P.S. § 602. That claim petition the injury forms basis for all incident, claims arise from the work whether there was a material misstatement at the time that an NCP was issued or whether a subsequent emotional or physical condition flows from the original injury. § 77 P.S. Hospital Jeanes II. When a claimant sustains injuries additional from result harm, original timely petition must be filed to add the injuries to those for the employer already which is responsi- ble. 771, 772, §§ filed, P.S. a petition When such is the WCJ must treat the respective burdens as if parties petition review original were an claim petition. 77 P.S. § 773. aWhile certain logic existed within the Common- cases, wealth T, Court’s line of particularly AT & because the employer accepted had not liability problems that are not NCP, included the provisions of the Act do not support Moreover, this interpretation. claimants, by limiting who need injuries, to add additional three-year period follow- ing the date of compensable injury, the Commonwealth Court has fostered a harsh result is inconsistent with the objectives humanitarian of the Act.

Accordingly, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed.

Justice EAKIN files concurring opinion. Justice SAYLOR files a dissenting opinion which Justice join. NIGRO BAER EAKIN, Concurring.

Justice Comp. I v. Workers’ Hospital While dissented Jeanes (Pa.2005), (Hass), Pa. 872 A.2d 159 Bd. Appeal opposite position, my colleagues were majority Commonwealth; join hence I that the law the making herein. Majority Opinion SAYLOR, Dissenting.

Justice that, majority Hospital under Jeanes agree I with the (2005), (Hass), Claimant’s 582 Pa. 872 A.2d 159 WCAB petition be as in the nature should treated 413(a) Compensation of the Workers’ review under Section however, differ, Act, I its respectfully § P.S. 772. with 77 forth in that the statute of limitations set enforcing holding to the relief awarded workers’ provision preclude Instead, I affirm judge in this would case. principles equitable Court’s decision invoke Commonwealth respect solely enforcement of such limitation with preclude of medical pertaining category expenses to claim a defined paid statutory peri- limitations throughout (and plain additional years), implication od for an five with terms of a payment pursuant express that such “Defendant/Employer mandating commutation order will for responsible necessary remain reasonable payment inju- work-related expenses medical related to the claimant’s Pennsylvania required by ries as terms of the Workers’ Act.” R.R. at 248a. As the Commonwealth Compensation observed, pre- such consistent with previously result is SWIF, See, 22 vailing e.g., (Reedy) WCAB precedent. (1976) 498, 505, (stating 349 A.2d Pa.Cmwlth. raising from may estopped [the “the or its carrier be employer 413(a) actions, if their or statute limitations defense] Section them, unintention- intentionally action of have or either claimant to that his claim be ally caused the believe would 306(f.l)(9) to”). majority relies on Section attended While the Act, 531(9), § an of such to foreclose award P.S. 306(f.l)(9) benefits, expired an speaks reviving or mistaken upon gratuitous entitlement to benefits based made payments after the of an expiration applicable statute of limitations, not to the fact of payments made within the (“The period, such limitations here. occurred See id. payment by medical, insurer or employer any surgical or hospital supplies any services statute limitations after provided act expired shall have shall not act to reopen or revive the compensation rights for such purposes of added)). limitations.” (emphasis join Justice NIGRO and JUSTICE Baer this dissenting opinion.

884 A.2d 247 In the Matter of Goodman Sheri SHAFFER. (No. 2005).

No. DB20 31 RST Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of

Aug. ORDER PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT

FROM INACTIVE STATUS PER CURIAM: NOW,

AND 3rd day August, the Report and Recommendations of Disciplinary Board dated June 2005, are approved and IT IS ORDERED that SHERI SHAFFER, status, GOODMAN who has been on inactive has never suspended disbarred, been and has demonstrated that she has the qualifications, moral competency and learning in law required for admission to practice in the Common- wealth, is, hereby shall be and reinstated to active as a status member Bar of this Commonwealth. The expenses notes his to this Court he was to an required equitable not raise until estoppel defense Employer rule, raised the statute of limitations. As a general claimant would then amend his or her Petition to reflect the WCJ, additional issue though now before the this is not required by statute. also recognized raising WCJ that Claimant was the issue whether had lulled Claimant into false Thus, of secuiity. sense Id. put on reasonably notice that the WCJ believed Claimant was pleading fact, equitable estoppel. point As a the Employer argued merits of defense hearing to WCJ on conducted 27, 1999. Although October Claimant never his amended Petition to include equitable estoppel, parties both and, WCJ conducted matters as if this were the case unlike an raised, eases which issue is never waiver is clearly not established in instant matter. Equitable estoppel arises in compensa the workers’ acts, tion arena when employer, “by representations, [its] admissions, or or by silence ought out, when to speak [its] [it] intentionally through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other relies rightfully belief, acts on such so that he prejudiced will be if the permitted former is to deny the existence of such facts.” In Tallarico, 280, (1967). 736, re Estate 425 Pa. 228 A.2d 741 Commonwealth, Accord Northwestern v. Nat’l Bank 345 Pa. 192, (1942). 27 20 A.2d The essential elements of are estoppel “an party sought inducement to be estopped party who asserts the estoppel believe certain facts party exist—and the asserting estoppel acts in reliance on Cutaiar, 460 Pa. 333 A.2d belief.” Blofsen (1975) (emphasis It is original). well established that “in under the estoppel for the Claimant avail [himself] order Act, relied on must have prove that the [actions] must [he] security----” into a false sense of reasonably lulled [him] Niemann, Bd. v. Pa.Cmwlth. Appeal Comp. Workmen’s that, (1976). “in also indicated 370, 373 We have 356 A.2d fraud, estop- there can be no proved expressly the absence of to be party sought acts or conduct based on the pel honest purpose are as consistent with estopped, they where opposites.” their as with negligence and with absence Tallarico, stated that Finally, specifically A.2d at 741. we concealment, or other misrepresentation, there is no “[w]here may not [employer], inequitable [claimant] conduct in his from his estoppel claim that an arises favor properly Id. bears the burden of omission or mistake.” Claimant own

Case Details

Case Name: Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Sep 29, 2005

Citation: 883 A.2d 579

Docket Number: 73 WAP 2003

Court Abbreviation: Pa.