Gаbriel R. FALCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUSTICES OF THE MATRIMONIAL PARTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-863-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Nov. 12, 2015.
805 F.3d 425
Mark H. Shawhan, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor Generаl, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees. Patricia Weiss, Sag Harbor, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Beforе: SACK, LOHIER, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Finally, the district court‘s additional reasons for denying Gomez‘s motion do not provide an alternative basis to affirm because they are clearly erroneous. First, the district court faulted Gomez for failing to provide support for the assertion that he was in Afghanistan at the time Reid signed the stipulation. But neither Gomez‘s motion nоr his attached letter asserts that he was in Afghanistan when Reid signed the stipulation; Gomez‘s letter merely states that he “returned back from Afghanistan and [had] only been home for [a] cоuple weeks.” ECF No. 21. Put simply, Gomez‘s failure to provide support for an assertion that he never made cannot supply a basis for denying his motion.
Second, the district court notеs that Gomez was present at the April 12, 2013 conference at which the stipulation was discussed and that he failed to assert at the conference that he did not consent tо the stipulation. In his letter submitted four days after the conference, however, Gomez explains that “[w]hile I was in your Chambers I heard the Corp Counsel, my attorney, and you discuss the dismissal of 1983 claims but I did not understand or know what that meant.” ECF No. 21. Coming from a layperson, this is unsurprising. Moreover, Gomez‘s subsequent actions—immediately moving for relief from the stipulation, requesting withdrawal оf counsel, and hiring a new attorney—are consistent with his statement that he did not understand what was happening at the conference or authorize his attorney to sign the stipulatiоn. At best, Gomez‘s silence at the conference is ambiguous; his subsequent actions are not. Cf. Assocs. Disc. Corp., 524 F.2d at 1053–54 (“[W]hen, as here, the manifestations of the client‘s anxiety occur almost simultaneously with thе entry of judgment and are inconsistent with an understanding of its consequences, the fact of consent requires scrutiny.“).
CONCLUSION
When, as here, a party promptly raises a colorable аrgument that his or her attorney lacked authority to settle or otherwise dismiss his or her claims, a factual dispute arises that must be resolved through an evidentiary hearing, unless, of course, the parties agree that no such hearing is necessary. On remand, the district court should hold an evidentiary hearing and determine whether Reid had authority to stipulate to a dismissal of Gomez‘s claims. If Gomez rebuts the presumption that Reid had authority to dismiss his claims, he is entitled to relief from the stipulation of dismissal that Reid signed.
For the reasons stated herein, we VACATE the district court‘s judgment and its order denying relief from the stipulation of dismissal, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LOHIER, Circuit Judge:
Gabriel R. Falco appeals from a judgment of the United Statеs District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Bianco, J.) granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss Falco‘s complaint based on the abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Because abstention was warranted under Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013), we affirm the decision of the District Court.
BACKGROUND
In 2013 Falco sued his wife for divorce and sought custody of their two children in New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County. In these circumstances, New York law permits a State court to appoint an attornеy to represent the couple‘s children. See
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review the District Court‘s decision to abstain de novo. Cf. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2004).
In granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the District Court relied entirely on our decision in Spargo. There we held that district courts must abstain whenever the three conditions identified in Middlesex Cоunty Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982), were satisfied: “(1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that implicates an important state interest, and (3) the state prоceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims.” Spargo, 351 F.3d at 75; see Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432.
In Sprint, which was decided after Spargo, the Supreme Court cautioned that the “three Middlesex conditions . . . were not dispositive; they wеre, instead, additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking Younger.” 134 S.Ct. at 593 (emphasis omitted). This was true in part, the Court explained, because relying on the three conditions alone “would extend Younger to virtually all parallel state and federal proceedings . . . where a party could identify a plausibly important state interest.” Id. Without completely casting aside the Middlesex conditions, the Court clarified that district courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction only in three “exceptional circumstances” involving (1) “ongoing state criminal prosеcutions,” (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Id. at 591 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). The Court explained that “these three ‘exceptional’ categories . . . define Younger‘s scope.” Id.
Although the Middlesex/Spargo conditions are not dispositive, it remains unclear how much weight we should afford these “additional factors” after Sprint. But we need not address that issue in this case. It is enough to say that the District Court erred by treating them as disрositive (rather than additional) factors and ignoring the straightforward categorical approach required by Sprint.
On de novo review, however, we independently conclude that Falco‘s case presents circumstances that qualify as “exceptional” under Sprint and that Younger abstention was therefore warranted. Falco‘s federal lawsuit implicates the way that Nеw York courts manage their own divorce and custody proceedings—a subject in which “the states have an especially strong interest.” Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir.1973) (Friendly, J.).
Accordingly, we conclude that, despite its error in applying the Spargo factors, the District Court correctly аbstained from exercising federal jurisdiction under Sprint.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Falco‘s remaining arguments, including that he had no avenue in the New York State courts to further appeаl or otherwise challenge the attorney appointment order, and conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.