Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Parts of the Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19717

Gabriel R. Falco sued his wife in New York state court (Suffolk County) for divorce and sought custody of two children; the state court appointed an attorney to represent the children and ordered Falco and his wife to each pay half the attorney’s retainer and fees.
Falco failed to pay and the state court issued an order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
While the state proceedings were ongoing, Falco filed a § 1983 action in federal court challenging the constitutionality of New York statutes authorizing state judges to require parents to pay for attorneys appointed for their children.
The state judges (defendants) moved to dismiss under the Younger abstention doctrine; the district court granted the motion relying on Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed de novo and applied the Supreme Court’s guidance in Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, concluding Falco’s challenge implicated state courts’ management of divorce and custody proceedings and thus fell within Sprint’s third “exceptional” Younger category.
The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal, rejecting Falco’s argument that he lacked an adequate state-court avenue to challenge the attorney-appointment/order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether federal court must abstain under Younger and dismiss Falco’s § 1983 challenge to a state-court order requiring parents to pay for court‑appointed counsel for children	Falco argues the federal court should hear his constitutional challenge because state remedies are inadequate and the federal claim warrants adjudication	Defendants argue Younger requires abstention because the federal suit interferes with ongoing state divorce/custody proceedings and state courts’ ability to appoint/compensate counsel for children	The court held Younger abstention warranted under Sprint’s third category (state civil proceedings involving orders uniquely necessary to state courts’ judicial functions); affirmed dismissal

Sprint Commc’ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013) (limits Younger abstention to three exceptional categories and clarifies Middlesex factors are not dispositive)
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (establishes federal-court abstention doctrine for ongoing state proceedings)
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982) (identifies factors for Younger abstention in certain state proceedings)
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (advises federal courts to avoid interfering with state courts resolving related matters)
Spargo v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003) (applied Middlesex factors to require abstention in prior Second Circuit precedent)
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973) (recognizes strong state interest in managing divorce and custody proceedings)