Everage v. GayheartEverage v. Gayheart
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I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants Kentucky State Police Troopers Chadd Daniels, Matthew Gayheart, Nathan Roark, and Bobby Roberts‘s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 60). The Motion has been fully briefed and is therefore ripe for review. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are, by and large, undisputed. On April 8, 2020, a law enforcement officer with a felony warrant for Plaintiff‘s arrest texted Plaintiff to meet him at a local school in Knott County, Kentucky at 10:00 p.m. under the guise of an offer about a log truck job. (Doc. # 60 at 2). The Defendants intended to arrest Plaintiff after he pulled into the parking lot of the school. (Id.). Defendants Matthew Gayheart and Chadd Daniels were in an unmarked vehicle in a driveway off the parking lot, while Defendant Nathan Roark was in a marked Kentucky State Police (“KSP“) vehicle behind the school. (Id.). Then-Trooper Michael Caudill, who is not a named party in this action, was in a marked KSP vehicle across the road and Sheriff‘s Deputy Michael Blair, who has since been terminated as a named Defendant, was in a marked Knott County Sheriff‘s vehicle also across the road. (Id. at 3).
When Plaintiff and his wife, who was driving the vehicle, arrived on the scene, Defendant Gayheart directed Defendant Roark to initiate the stop, which Defendant Roark did by pulling up behind Plaintiff‘s vehicle and activating his blue lights. (Id.). Defendants Gayheart and Daniels followed Defendant Roark towards Plaintiff‘s vehicle as Defendant Gayheart announced that they were State Police and had a warrant for his arrest. (Id.). Defendant Gayheart additionally directed Plaintiff to get out of his vehicle. (Id.). Rather than comply with Defendant Gayheart‘s commands, Plaintiff‘s wife drove the vehicle across the bridge, where she was stopped by Trooper Caudill‘s vehicle. (Id.). Deputy Blair then removed Plaintiff‘s wife from the vehicle. (Id. at 3-4).
With Plaintiff still inside the vehicle, Defendant Gayheart approached the vehicle, gave further commands and identification, and proceeded to strike the passenger side window with his service weapon. (Id. at 4). Defendant Gayheart then opened the passenger side door at the same time Plaintiff was moving towards the driver‘s side of the vehicle, away from Defendant Gayheart. (Id.). Defendant Daniels, who was in front of the vehicle, unholstered his taser as Defendant Gayheart grabbed Plaintiff‘s right arm to pull Plaintiff out of the vehicle. (Id.). During this struggle, both Plaintiff and Defendant Gayheart fell out of the vehicle to the pavement, where Plaintiff landed face down with his left arm under his torso. (Id.). Plaintiff testified in his deposition that as he fell, there was a steel plank on the bridge that “[took] his head off.” (Doc. # 60-2 at 24). At that point, Defendant Gayheart had control of Plaintiff‘s right arm from when he had grabbed it before
Plaintiff alleges that at some point during these events “he was beaten by one of the Defendants with a weighted glove.”1 (Doc. # 68 at 1). Plaintiff alleges that upon contact, he asked the Trooper hitting him why he was using a “skull buster” to which the Trooper responded by asking Plaintiff how he knew what a “skull buster” is. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff eventually complied with the commands to release his left arm and was subsequently handcuffed, transported to Hazard ARH Regional Medical Center for medical assessments, and then transported to the Kentucky River Regional Jail. (Id. at 5; Doc. # 60-3 at 2).
On April 27, 2020, Plaintiff presented to the University of Kentucky Albert B. Chandler Medical Center for an “evaluation of a zygomatic fracture on the right side, status post assault on 04/8/2020.” (Doc. # 86-1 at 1). Upon evaluation, medical staff discovered that Plaintiff had a “severely displaced right zygomatic arch fracture” which required surgical repair to reduce the fracture. (Id.).
Plaintiff was subsequently charged in Knott County Court with menacing in violation of
Plaintiff went to trial on the resisting arrest claim. (Doc. # 60-3 at 3). Plaintiff was ultimately convicted by a jury of resisting the arrest attempted by Defendant Gayheart by “[u]sing any other means creating a substantial risk or causing physical injury to Kentucky State Trooper Matthew Gayheart or another person” and was sentenced to confinement in the County Jail for 90 days. (Doc. # 60-3 at 3-5).
On April 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint against Kentucky State Police Troopers Matthew Gayheart, Bobby Roberts, Leo Slone, Chadd W. Daniels, and Nathan Roark, as well as Knott County Deputy Sheriffs Michael Blair and Knott County Deputy Robbie Slone.2 (Doc. # 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged: (1) violation of constitutional rights under
After discovery had been completed, the Kentucky State Police Trooper Defendants filed the instant Summary Judgment Motion, seeking summary judgment on all of Plaintiff‘s claims. (Doc. # 60). In his Response to Defendant‘s summary judgment Motion, Plaintiff voluntarily waived his false imprisonment under
A. Standard of Review
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s claims. (Doc. # 60). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact.” Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 483 (6th Cir. 2008). The movant may do so by “citing to particular parts or materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]”
Moreover, the trial court is not required to “search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Rather, the “nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court‘s attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
B. Analysis
Defendant moves for entry of summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s claims. (Doc. # 60). In Plaintiff‘s Response, Plaintiff states he is waiving his claims of false imprisonment in violation of
1. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Supplemental jurisdiction allows a district court to have jurisdiction over a claim that does not satisfy the traditional jurisdictional requirements for federal court. Watson v. Cartee, 817 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 2016). A district court has supplemental jurisdiction over state claims if: (1) the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claim, (2) the state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, and (3) the claims must be such that the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them in one
As a preliminary matter, this Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff‘s
2. Violation of
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he intentional assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful imprisonment and excessive use of physical force upon Plaintiff violated the rights of Plaintiff as guaranteed by the
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s conviction of resisting arrest bars his excessive force claim. (Doc. # 60 at 10). Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment claim is barred by the Heck doctrine, which prohibits
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a
process clause through the incorporation doctrine[.]” (Doc. # 68 at 3). Therefore, to the extent needed, the Court will analyze Plaintiff‘s claims under a Fourth Amendment standard.
a conviction: (1) the criminal offense includes the absence of excessive force as an element, or (2) excessive force would have served as an affirmative defense in the criminal case but was not raised. Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323, 334 (6th Cir. 2010); Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 684 (6th Cir. 2005).
Here, Plaintiff was convicted by a jury of violating
The second Schreiber prong, however, warrants closer scrutiny. “Under Kentucky law, an individual may claim
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff‘s state trial in its entirety, and Plaintiff did not raise such a defense. As the Sixth Circuit, and district courts within this Circuit, have repeatedly emphasized, where a plaintiff could have raised excessive force as an affirmative defense to a resisting arrest charge but did not, a subsequent
Plaintiff urges this Court not to apply the Heck doctrine for a variety of reasons. First, Plaintiff states that he was not convicted of using or threatening to use physical force or violence but was “convicted for ‘using any other means creating a substantial risk of causing physical injury to Kentucky State Trooper Matthew Gayheart or another.‘” (Doc. # 68 at 3). This is irrelevant. Plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest, pursuant to
Second, Plaintiff argues that this Court should not apply the Heck doctrine because “[t]he trial court refused to acknowledge this situation as constituting ‘passive resistance’ which is not actually resisting
Plaintiff next argues that the resisting arrest statute under which he was convicted, “does not state that the arrest must be lawful in order for person to be convicted of resisting arrest. Thus, lawfulness of the arrest is not an element of the offense or resisting arrest.” (Id. at 4). Moreover, Plaintiff states that “there is no requirement that the Commonwealth must prove a lack of excessive force by the police at the time of the arrest.” (Id.). This is true. However, this has also already been addressed by this Court. As previously stated, in Kentucky, neither lack of excessive force nor lawful arrest is an element of resisting arrest, which precludes the Court from applying the first Schreiber prong. However, excessive force is a defense to resisting arrest in Kentucky, which, as this Court has already discussed, is why the second Schreiber prong applies in this case. Any argument Plaintiff may attempt to make on the grounds that lawfulness or excessive force need not be proved in a resisting arrest charge is simply immaterial under the second Schreiber prong.
Finally, Plaintiff admits that he did not raise a defense of excessive force during his resisting arrest trial. (See Doc. # 68 at 4-5). However, he argues that despite this failure, Heck is still not applicable. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that because “there was no evidence presented that Mr. Everage committed any affirmative use of physical force or violence toward the officers at the time of his arrest” there would have been “no justification for Mr. Everage to have raised a defense of excessive force by the officers where there was no claim that Mr. Everage had used force against them.” (Id. at 5). The Court appreciates Plaintiff elaborating on his trial strategy. However, why a plaintiff decides not to raise such an excessive force defense has no bearing on the Heck analysis. Rather, the analysis focuses squarely on whether the defense of excessive force could have been raised, but was not. As has been acknowledged by this Court, a charge of resisting arrest pursuant to
Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s conviction for resisting arrest pursuant to
Therefore, Defendant‘s motion for summary judgment as to Count I of Plaintiff‘s Complaint is granted.4
Defendants next assert that Plaintiff‘s state law assault and battery claims fail because the force used to effect the arrest was lawful and necessary and therefore bars the assault and battery claims. (Doc. # 60 at 19-20). Additionally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s resisting arrest conviction precludes his assault and battery claims. (Id. at 20). Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that his claims of the Defendants use of a “skull buster” raises genuine issues as to material facts. (Doc. # 68 at 7).
The Court need not address whether there remains a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff‘s state law claims of assault and battery are precluded on the same grounds as his federal excessive force claims. Kentucky law defines assault as an act intending
to cause a harmful or offensive contact. Moreover, Kentucky law defines battery as “any unlawful touching of the person of another” and in the context of law enforcement an “officer making an arrest may use such force as may be necessary to make the arrest but no more.” Thomas v. Walker, No. 6:19-cv-226-REW, 2022 WL 989011, at * 11 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2022) (internal quotations omitted). This non-justified force is often referred to as “excessive force” by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68 (Ky. 2007).
As previously discussed in detail (supra at III(B)(2)), Kentucky law permits an individual to claim self-defense to a charge of resisting arrest if the officer used more force than was reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. Plaintiff admittedly did not do so. Accordingly, if this Court were to find in favor of Plaintiff on his assault and battery claims, it would mean the officer used force improperly, while Plaintiff‘s conviction for resisting arrest maintains the opposite conclusion. Numerous district courts in Kentucky have come to the same conclusion that a successful assault or battery claim would necessarily invalidate a conviction of resisting arrest. See Dobson v. Sandidge, No. 1:20-cv-00115-GNS, 2021 WL 707657, at * 3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2021) (staying the plaintiff‘s state law claims of assault and battery until her resisting arrest charge was addressed because a favorable judgment on the assault and battery claims could provide a defense to the resisting arrest charge under Kentucky law.); Lacer v. Pickard, No., 2011 WL 2940721, at * 2 (W.D. Ky. July 19, 2011) (staying the case because if the plaintiff was successful on his excessive force, assault, or battery claims “it would undoubtedly impact the prosecution‘s success” at his resisting arrest trial under
Therefore, Defendant‘s motion for summary judgment as to Count III of Plaintiff‘s Complaint is granted.
4. IIED (Count IV)
Plaintiff conceded his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress except “in the event Plaintiff‘s other claims should be legally barred by the Heck doctrine[.]” (Doc. # 68 at 8). In the event such claims were barred, Plaintiff argued that his IIED claim “could remain as a viable claim due to the elimination of his other claims as legal remedies.” (Id.). Because this Court found that both Plaintiff‘s federal and state law claims were barred by the Heck doctrine, it now turns to his IIED claim.
IIED, also known as the tort of outrage, is typically considered a “gap-filler,” meaning that the tort is available when a more traditional tort, such as assault and battery, would not provide an appropriate remedy. Brewer v. Hillard, 15 S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Ky. App. 1999). To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law, Plaintiff must allege four elements. Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Ky. 1984) (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974)). First, Plaintiff must demonstrate “the wrongdoer‘s conduct was intentional or reckless.” Id. Plaintiff can demonstrate this when “the wrongdoer had the specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where he intended his specific conduct and knew or should have known that emotional distress would likely result.” Id. Second, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that “the conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against the generally accepted standard of decency and morality.” Id. This element is “aimed at limiting frivolous suits and avoiding litigation in situations where only bad manners and mere hurt feelings are involved.” Id. Third, Plaintiff must demonstrate that “there was a causal connection between the wrongdoer‘s conduct and the emotional distress.” Id. And fourth, Plaintiff must demonstrate that the “emotional distress was severe.” Id.
Plaintiff has provided this Court with little to no facts that would allow it to conclude that his IIED claim should remain viable. Plaintiff‘s Response to Defendant‘s Motion failed to substantively address his state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress or attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact that would warrant the presentation of this claim to the jury. In fact, the entirety of Plaintiff‘s argument in his Response was that his “emotional distress claim could remain as a viable claim due to the elimination of his other claims as legal remedies.” (Doc. # 68 at 8).5 Therefore, Defendant‘s motion for summary judgment as to Count IV of Plaintiff‘s Complaint is granted.
Therefore, Defendant‘s motion for summary judgment as to Count IV of Plaintiff‘s Complaint is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
- Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 60) is GRANTED;
- This matter is STRICKEN from the Court‘s docket; and
- A Judgment in favor of Defendants will be entered contemporaneously herewith.
This 17th day of September, 2025.
Signed By:
David L. Bunning
Chief United States District Judge