800 F.Supp.3d 759
E.D. Ky.2025Background
- April 8, 2020 encounter: State troopers arranged to stop Everage at a school parking lot to execute a felony arrest warrant; unmarked and marked KSP vehicles and county deputies were present.
- During the stop, Everage’s wife drove away; deputies detained her and Everage remained in the vehicle where Trooper Gayheart struck the passenger window, grabbed Everage’s right arm, and a struggle ensued causing both to fall to pavement.
- Everage alleges he was struck in the face with a weighted glove (a “skull buster”), suffered a displaced right zygomatic arch fracture requiring surgery, and was later handcuffed and jailed.
- Everage was tried in Knott County and convicted by a jury of resisting arrest under KRS § 520.090(1)(b); menacing charge was dismissed.
- Everage filed § 1983 and state-law claims (excessive force, assault/battery, IIED, conspiracy, negligence); he later waived several claims and conceded IIED except if other claims were barred.
- District court granted summary judgment for trooper defendants, holding Everage’s § 1983 excessive-force claim and state assault/battery claims were barred by Heck because he did not raise excessive force as a defense in his resisting-arrest prosecution; IIED claim was dismissed for lack of factual support.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Everage's § 1983 excessive-force claim is barred by Heck | Everage: excessive-force claim does not invalidate resisting-arrest conviction | Defendants: Heck bars § 1983 claim because excessive force could have been an affirmative defense to resisting arrest but was not raised | Court: Heck bars excessive-force claim to extent force challenged occurred during resistance that formed basis of conviction; summary judgment for defendants |
| Whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims | Everage: state claims arise from same events and should proceed | Defendants: ask court to decide state claims after resolving federal issue | Court: exercises supplemental jurisdiction because claims derive from common nucleus of operative fact |
| Whether state-law assault and battery claims survive given resisting-arrest conviction | Everage: alleged weighted-glove blows create genuine issues of fact | Defendants: assault/battery precluded because force was lawful and conviction precludes inconsistent finding | Court: assault/battery claims barred for same Heck-based reasoning; summary judgment for defendants |
| Whether IIED claim survives despite other claims being barred | Everage: IIED could remain viable if other claims are barred | Defendants: argue no factual basis shown | Held: Everage failed to present facts meeting IIED elements; claim dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (court summarizes summary-judgment standard)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claim that would imply invalidity of conviction is barred until conviction is invalidated)
- Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2010) (two circumstances where § 1983 excessive-force claim can conflict with conviction)
- Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (resisting-arrest conviction can bar excessive-force claim if excessive force could have been asserted as defense)
- Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2014) (discusses interplay of conviction and § 1983 claims)
- United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (supplemental jurisdiction/Gibbs test)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment excessive-force framework)