ALLYSON EIGHMEY v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, ET AL.
No. 104779
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
May 18, 2017
[Cite as Eighmey v. Cleveland, 2017-Ohio-2857.]
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CV-14-822702
JUDGMENT: REVERSED
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., Keough, A.J., and Boyle, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 18, 2017
Barbara A. Langhenry
Law Director
City of Cleveland
BY: Gary S. Singletary
Assistant City Prosecutor
601 Lakeside Avenue, Room 106
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frank A. Bartela
Nicole T. Fiorelli
Patrick J. Perotti
Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A.
60 South Park Place
Painesville, Ohio 44077
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, city of Cleveland (“Cleveland” or “the city“), appeals an order certifying a class of plaintiffs who claim the city issued unlawful traffic citations generated by unmarked traffic cameras. The city assigns one error for our review:
The trial court erred in granting class certification as Plaintiff Eighmey is precluded from seeking judicial review and does not meet the requisite typicality requirement that would allow her to represent an identified class.
{¶2} We find merit to the appeal and reverse the trial court‘s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} In July 2005, Cleveland enacted
[a]t each site of a red light or fixed speed camera, the Director of Public Works shall cause signs to be posted to apprise ordinarily observant motorists that they are approaching an area where an automated camera is monitoring for red light or speed violators.
{¶4} On October 3, 2013, a mobile speed unit recorded a traffic violation committed by the plaintiffs’ class representative, Allyson Eighmey (“Eighmey“), at the intersection of Detroit Avenue and West 32nd Street in Cleveland. She later received the notice of violation in the mail and promptly paid her ticket on October 27, 2013.
A notice of appeal shall be filed with the Hearing Officer within twenty-one (21) days from the date listed on the ticket. The failure to give notice of appeal or pay the civil penalty within this time period shall constitute a waiver of the right to contest the ticket and shall be considered an admission.
Appeals shall be heard by the Parking Violations Bureau through an administrative process established by the Clerk of the Cleveland Municipal Court. At hearings, the strict rules of evidence applicable to courts of law shall not apply. The contents of the ticket shall constitute a prima facie evidence of the facts it contains. Liability may be found by the hearing examiner based upon a preponderance of the evidence. If a finding of liability is appealed, the record of the case shall include the order of the Parking Violations Bureau, the ticket, other evidence submitted by the respondent or the City of Cleveland, and a transcript or record of the hearing, in a written or electronic form acceptable to the court to which the case is appealed.
{¶6} In the complaint, Eighmey alleged that challenging the citation would have been “futile because the City‘s own failure to comply with the ordinance is not one of the enumerated defenses to a notice of liability under
{¶7} Eighmey filed a motion in support of class certification. The city opposed the motion, arguing, in part, that Eighmey lacked standing to represent the class because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by appealing the citation as provided in the ordinance. The city also argued that Eighmey‘s claims were barred by res judicata because she did not contest the violation and paid her ticket.
{¶8} The trial court granted Eighmey‘s motion for class certification. In a written opinion, the court expressly found that Eighmey met all the requirements for class certification set forth in
All persons (a) issued tickets or notices of Liability by a “mobile speed unit” under
Cleveland Codified ordinance[s] § 413.031 et seq. , (b) during the period September 25, 2013 to December 26, 2016, (c) which were not warnings, and (d) upon which there was not a finding of no liability pursuant to§ 413.031(k) .
The opinion did not mention the city‘s arguments regarding Eighmey‘s inability to represent the class due to her alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies, res judicata, or standing. Rather, the court found that Eighmey‘s claims were typical of the class because “[t]here [wa]s no express conflict between the interests of named class representative, Allyson Eighmey, and the interests of putative class members.” Cleveland now appeals the order of class certification.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶10} To be eligible for class certification pursuant to
{¶11} Failure to satisfy one of the
{¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[a] trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether a class action may be maintained and that determination will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 509 N.E.2d 1249 (1987), syllabus. We apply the abuse of discretion
{¶13} Nevertheless, “the trial court‘s discretion in deciding whether to certify a class action is not unlimited, and indeed is bounded by and must be exercised within the framework of
{¶14} Cleveland argues the trial court erred in granting class certification because Eighmey, the class representative, fails to meet the typicality requirement of
{¶15} A plaintiff‘s claim is typical “‘if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.‘” Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ohio St.3d 480, 485, 727 N.E.2d 1265 (2000), quoting 1 Newberg, Class Actions, Section 3.13, 3-74 to 3-77 (3d Ed.1992). “‘When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually met irrespective of varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims.‘” Id. at 485, quoting 1 Newberg, Class Actions, Section 3.13, 3-74 to 3-77. The typicality requirement is met where “there is no express
{¶16} Cleveland argues that Eighmey lacks standing and cannot legally represent the class because (1) she failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and (2) her claims are barred by res judicata. However, unique defenses applicable to the class representative will not destroy typicality of representation unless it is “so central to the litigation that it threatens to preoccupy the class representative to the detriment of the other class members.” Hamilton at 78, quoting 5 Moore, Federal Practice, Section 23.25[4][b][iv], at 23-126, Section 23.24[6], at 23-98.
{¶17} In Baughman, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “‘defenses asserted against a class representative should not make his or her claims atypical. Defenses may affect the individual‘s ultimate right to recover, but they do not affect the presentation of the case on the liability issues for the plaintiff class.‘” Baughman at 486, quoting 1 Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, Section 3.16, at 3-90 to 3-93. The doctrines of res judicata and failure to exhaust administrative remedies are affirmative defenses that relate to the merits of Eighmey‘s claims. Lycan v. Cleveland, 146 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-422, 51 N.E.3d 593, ¶ 30, Dworning v. Euclid, 119 Ohio St.3d 83, 2008-Ohio-3318, 892 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 11.
{¶18} These defenses may or may not destroy the typicality of Eighmey‘s class representation depending on how central they are to the litigation. See Hamilton at 78. However, as the Ohio Supreme Court explained in Lycan, standing is an entirely different
{¶19} The doctrine of standing requires a court to satisfy itself that a plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court‘s jurisdiction. Id.; see also Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. Of Commerce, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550 (a party must have standing to be entitled to have a court decide the merits of the dispute).
{¶20} Traditional standing principles require the plaintiff to show that she has suffered (1) an injury that is, (2) fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 22, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). It is not sufficient for the individual to have a general interest in the subject matter of the action. To have standing, the plaintiff must be the party who will be directly benefitted or injured by the outcome of the action. Tate at ¶ 12.
{¶21} The fact that a plaintiff seeks to bring a class action does not change the standing requirements. Hamilton, 82 Ohio St.3d 67 at 74, 694 N.E.2d 442 (a class representative must have “proper standing“). Individual standing is a threshold
{¶22} According to the complaint, Eighmey was injured by having to pay Cleveland a fine that was wrongfully generated by an unmarked mobile vehicle. However, Eighmey admitted in her complaint that she voluntarily paid the ticket. (Complaint ¶ 14.)
{¶23} Finally, Eighmey argues her claims are not barred for failing to exhaust her administrative remedies because an appeal through the administrative process would have been futile. Indeed, parties are not required to pursue administrative remedies “‘if doing so would be a futile or vain act.‘” Schneider v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103647, 2017-Ohio-1278, ¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 132 Ohio St.3d 47, 2012-Ohio-1861, 969 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 18-24.
{¶24} In Teamsters, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that “a ‘vain act’ occurs when an administrative body lacks the authority to grant the relief sought,” and that “a
{¶25} However, the defenses listed in
{¶26} Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the administrative proceedings set forth in
{¶27} Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶28} The trial court‘s judgment is reversed.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR