Eighmey v. Cleveland, 2017 Ohio 2857

Cleveland enacted C.C.O. 413.031 (2005) authorizing automated speed/red‑light cameras and requiring signs at fixed sites and that mobile speed units be "plainly marked vehicles."
On Oct. 3, 2013 a mobile speed unit recorded Allyson Eighmey; she received the notice, appealed was available under C.C.O. 413.031(k), but she paid the fine on Oct. 27, 2013 and did not pursue an administrative appeal.
In Feb. 2014 Eighmey filed a putative class action alleging mobile units were unmarked and citations therefore unlawful; she sought class certification for persons ticketed by unmarked mobile units.
The trial court certified the class under Civ.R. 23 without addressing the city’s arguments that Eighmey lacked standing, had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and was barred by res judicata.
On appeal the city argued the named representative failed the typicality requirement because she lacks standing (having waived the right to contest by paying) and failed to exhaust administrative remedies; the court of appeals reversed class certification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether named plaintiff meets Civ.R. 23(A) typicality and has standing to represent the class	Eighmey claimed she was injured by paying a fine from an unmarked mobile unit; class rep can raise ordinance noncompliance and argued administrative appeal would be futile	City argued Eighmey lacks standing/typicality because she paid the fine (waiving the right to contest under C.C.O. 413.031(k)) and thus cannot obtain redress for herself; also asserted res judicata and failure to exhaust	Reversed class certification: Eighmey lacks standing because payment waived right to contest; therefore she cannot represent the class and typicality fails
Whether Eighmey’s failure to pursue the administrative appeal was excused by futility	Eighmey argued administrative appeal would be futile because C.C.O. 413.031(k)’s enumerated defenses did not expressly include noncompliance with marking requirement	City argued administrative process provided the available remedy and that listed defenses were non‑exhaustive; administrative appeal was available and not futile	Court held administrative appeal would not have been futile; because adequate administrative remedy existed and Eighmey did not pursue it, her claims are barred and she cannot represent the class

Stammco, L.L.C. v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio, 125 Ohio St.3d 91 (2010) (Civ.R. 23 prerequisites for class certification)
Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 200 (1987) (trial court has broad discretion on class certification reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 82 Ohio St.3d 67 (1998) (rigorous analysis required and standing requirement for class reps)
Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ohio St.3d 480 (2000) (typicality normally met where same conduct affects rep and class; defenses relating to merits generally do not defeat typicality)
Lycan v. Cleveland, 146 Ohio St.3d 29 (2016) (distinguishes standing/jurisdictional issues from affirmative defenses)
Dworning v. Euclid, 119 Ohio St.3d 83 (2008) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense)
Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55 (2012) (standing elements explained)
State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union No. 436 v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 132 Ohio St.3d 47 (2012) (futility/vain act doctrine for exhaustion of administrative remedies)
State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324 (2006) (administrative proceedings under C.C.O. 413.031 provide an adequate remedy)
Walker v. Toledo, 143 Ohio St.3d 420 (2014) (cites Scott for adequacy of administrative remedy for automated citation challenges)