Eder's Appeal from Probate
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Syllabus
D, the biological son of the settlor, J, appealed to the trial court from the order and decree of the Probate Court concluding that the remainder beneficiaries of J‘s irrevocable trust included not only D, but also J‘s adopted adult children, S and M. J had created the trust in 1991, and it terminated in 2011. The trust provided for distribution of the trust property upon its termination “to each child of the settlor then living.” J had one biological child, D, born in 1963, and adopted S and M in 2010. J had established a relationship with S and M as early as 1972 when he first met their mother, R, and began to live with R, S, and M in 1975, when S was six years old and M was four years old. Following J‘s separation from R in 1985, J continued his relationship with S and M, and provided them with financial and emotional support. J and D had a falling-out in 2009. In 2011, the trustees of the trust filed an application in the Probate Court seeking a determination of the trust‘s beneficiaries. The Probate Court decreed that D, S, and M were all remainder beneficiaries of the trust. Thereafter, D appealed to the trial court, claiming that by adopting S and M, J improperly added two remainder beneficiaries to the trust to reduce the size of his share of the trust‘s corpus. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that the Probate Court had properly construed the trust and it rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, from which D appealed to this court. Held:
- D could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the intent of J in adopting two adults was not relevant to determining whether the adoptions were a sham: that court, which found that, pursuant to the trust, D‘s share could be reduced permissibly only if J had another biological child or had adopted a child under circumstances in which the adoption could be viewed as a natural expression of a desire to recognize a preexisting familial bond between the settlor and the adopted children, concluded that the adult adoptions in the present case were not a sham or subterfuge just to hurt D, but were consistent with J‘s affectionate and long-term relationship with S and M, who at the time of the adoptions could be considered natural objects of the settlor‘s bounty, and that the adoptions were a recognition of the desire of J, S and M to continue that bond, independent of a desire to harm D; furthermore, J, as the settlor, adopted the two adults and brought them into the class of remainder beneficiaries of the trust, which defined the beneficiaries as J‘s then living children, either biological or adopted, adopted children are permitted under state law to take under a trust unless it explicitly excludes them, the trust here unambiguously included S and M, and their adoptions did not alter the intent of the trust or do violence to public policy concerning adoption.
- The trial court properly concluded that because S and M were the natural objects of J‘s bounty, their adoptions by J did not contravene the purpose or intent of the trust, which had to be determined from the language of the trust, not external factors; the trust provided that a remainder beneficiary was, at the time the trust terminated, a child of the settlor then living, biological or adopted, our statutes permit adult adoptions and adoptees to take under a testamentary instrument, unless they are expressly excluded, which did not occur here, and the trust contemplated that J could have more children after its creation.
Argued May 30—officially released October 10, 2017
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the Probate Court for the district of New Haven determining the beneficiaries of a certain trust, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven and tried to the court, Hon. Thomas J. Corradino, judge trial referee; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Glenn W. Dowd, with whom, were Seth Morgan Kaplowitz and Casey R. Healey, and, on the brief, Howard Fetner, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion
LAVINE, J. David Eric Eder (David Eder), the biological son of the settlor, John Dennis Eder (settlor), appealed to the Superior Court from a decree of the Probate Court concluding that the remainder beneficiaries of the John Dennis Eder Annuity Trust (trust) include not only the settlor‘s biological child, but also his adult adopted children.1 Following a hearing, the Superior Court concluded that the Probate Court properly had construed the trust and dismissed the appeal. David Eder appealed to this court, claiming that, as a matter of law, the Superior Court erred by holding (1) that the settlor‘s intent in establishing the trust was not relevant to determining whether the subject adoptions were a sham and (2) that the adoptions did not contravene the purpose and intent of the trust because the adoptees were the natural objects of the settlor‘s bounty. We affirm the judgment of the court.
The root cause of the present appeal appears to be a falling-out between a father and his biological son. The Court of Probate for the district of New Haven succinctly set forth the crux of the appeal in its decree issued on February 12, 2014. “[The settlor created the trust] on October 21, 1991. The trust has terminated as of October 21, 2011. An irrevocable trust, the trust provides for distribution of trust property upon termination to ’
After the Probate Court issued its decree, on March 11, 2014, David Eder appealed to the Superior Court. As reasons for the appeal, he alleged that he was aggrieved by the Probate Court‘s decree because “neither adoptee is a ‘Child’ of John Eder within the meaning of that term contained in the [trust]; and even if the term ‘Child’ in the [trust] could be interpreted to include adopted children, the adoption of the Richter brothers was a fraud/sham entered into for the sole purpose of changing the beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust.”
The court found the following facts, which are not challenged by David Eder. David Eder was born to the settlor and Pearl-Ellen Bench (mother) in 1963, when the settlor was eighteen years old. The settlor and mother divorced soon thereafter. Throughout his childhood, David Eder lived in Connecticut with his mother and her second husband, H. William Shure. Shure had a parent-like relationship with David Eder, and they remain close today. The settlor had little involvement with David Eder and moved to Provincetown, Massachusetts, in 1970.
The settlor met Jill Richter in 1972 and began to live with her and her sons, the Richter brothers, in 1975. At the time, Sacha Richter was six years old and Mischa Richter was four years old. For the next ten years, the settlor, Jill Richter, and the Richter brothers lived together in Provincetown. The settlor and Jill Richter separated in approximately 1985, but the settlor has continued his relationship, including financial and emotional support, with the Richter brothers to the present day.
In 1991, for tax planning purposes, Arthur Eder, the settlor‘s father, directed his attorney to draft a trust instrument for the settlor.3 Pursuant to the settlor‘s trust, the settlor was to receive $114,000 per year for twenty years at which time the trust ended;
David Eder and the settlor had an amicable relationship until approximately 2009. For reasons that are not directly relevant to this appeal, the settlor had a falling-out with David Eder and sought to disinherit him. He consulted Michael D‘Addio, an attorney trustee, to undo the monetary gifts that he had made to David Eder. Michael D‘Addio informed the settlor that, for tax purposes, the trust was irrevocable and that the settlor did not have the authority to revoke the trust or change the beneficiary.
The court found that, in 2010, the settlor wished to legalize his parental relationships with the Richter brothers and talked to them individually about his plan. The Richter brothers, who were adults, agreed to be adopted by the settlor, and the Probate and Family Court for the County of Barnstable, Massachusetts, approved the adoptions on June 30, 2010. The settlor admitted that the reason he adopted the Richter brothers at the time was “to include them in the [trust] before the date expired.” The trust terminated on October 21, 2011.
David Eder claims that by adopting the Richter brothers, the settlor improperly added two remainder beneficiaries to the trust to reduce the size of his share of the trust‘s corpus. On November 3, 2011, the trustees, Michael D‘Addio and Gail D‘Addio, filed an application in the Probate Court seeking a determination of the trust‘s beneficiaries. After the Probate Court decreed that David Eder as well as the Richter brothers were the remainder beneficiaries of the trust, David Eder appealed to the Superior Court.
The standard of review applicable to probate appeals is well known. “In a probate appeal . . . the Superior Court‘s jurisdiction is statutory and limited to the order appealed from. The issues presented for review are those defined in the reasons of appeal. The Superior Court cannot consider or adjudicate issues beyond the scope of those proper for determination by the order or decree attacked. This is so even with the consent of the parties to the appeal because the court has subject matter jurisdiction limited only to the order or decree appealed from.” Silverstein‘s Appeal from Probate, 13 Conn. App. 45, 58, 534 A.2d 1223 (1987). “[The Superior Court] tries the questions presented to it de novo, but in so doing it is . . . exercising a special and limited jurisdiction conferred on it by the statute authorizing appeals from probate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 53–54.
The probate appeal was tried on July 27 and 28, 2015. On March 2, 2016, the court issued a lengthy and comprehensive memorandum of decision dismissing the appeal, holding that the Richter brothers, as adoptees, are children of the settlor within the meaning of the trust and that the adoptions were not a sham as the adoptees were the natural objects of the settlor‘s bounty. David Eder appealed.
In this court, David Eder claims that, as a matter of law, the Superior Court erred in holding (1) that the settlor‘s intent in adopting two adults was not relevant to a determination of whether the adoptions were a sham and (2) that the purpose of the trust was not contravened by the settlor‘s adopting the Richter brothers because they were the natural objects of his bounty. We disagree.
I
THE TRUST
In adjudicating the probate appeal, the court first construed the trust. “Where the language of the [trust instrument]
The court found that, at the urging of his father, the settlor established an annuity trust in 1991, which was to terminate in twenty years. The trust was to provide the settlor with $114,000 per year and after twenty years, the trust was to terminate and the trust assets were to be distributed “into separate, equal shares, so as to provide one share for each child of the Grantor then living . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The court identified the relevant provisions of the trust.
Subsection one of Article XIII of the trust is entitled “Definitions” and provides: “Lineal Descendants: The term ‘lineal descendants’ used anywhere in this Trust Indenture shall mean child, grandchild, great-grandchild, etc., whether so related by blood or legal adoption, including any of the aforesaid born or adopted after the signing of this Trust Indenture. The grantor‘s only living child is David Eric Eder.” (Emphasis added.) Subsection six of Article I contemplates that the grantor may have other children at the time the trust terminated in twenty years.4 Specifically, subsection six provides in relevant part: “[u]pon the Termination Date, the Trustees shall divide the Trust Property, as it shall then exist, into separate, equal shares, so as to provide one share for each child of the Grantor then living . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Article XII of the trust instrument provides “[t]his trust is irrevocable and the Grantor shall have no right whatsoever to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust created hereunder, in whole or in part.” Article X, “Governing Law,” states that “Trust Indenture has been accepted by the Trustees and its validity, construction, and all rights thereunder shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.”
The court consulted our General Statutes as they pertain to adoption. Our statutory law permits the adoption of adults and provides that the adopted person shall be the legal child of the adoptive parent. See
The court concluded that pursuant to the trust and the statutory laws of this state, the Richter brothers are the settlor‘s children pursuant to the Massachusetts adoption decree.6 David Eder does not challenge the validity of the adoptions or that the Richter brothers are the settlor‘s children. Rather, his claim is that the settlor‘s adoption of the Richter brothers was a sham that altered the terms and purpose of the trust.7 We disagree.
II
THE ADOPTIONS
The court recognized that under
It has been stated that a sham or subterfuge adoption occurs “when an adult is adopted for the sole purpose of making him or her an heir and claimant to the estate of an ancestor under the terms of a testamentary instrument known and in existence at the time of the adoption . . . thwarts the intent of the ancestor whose property is being distributed and cheats the rightful heirs.” Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Ky. 1967).
The first sentence of Article XII of the trust provides “[t]his Trust Indenture is irrevocable and the grantor shall have no right whatsoever to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust created hereunder, in whole or in part.” The court determined that the settlor could not “change the operation of the trust by a sham adoption done solely for the purpose of creating beneficiaries [that] has the effect of reducing the benefits that would have otherwise accrued to a beneficiary absent the adoption.”
Generally, courts that disfavor adult adoptees from taking under a testamentary instrument consider the adoption an act of subterfuge. “It is of paramount importance that man be permitted to pass on his property at his death to those who represent the natural objects of his bounty. This is an ancient and precious right running from the dawn of civilization in an unbroken line down to the present day. Our adoption statutes are humanitarian in nature and of great importance to the welfare of the public. However, these statutes should not be given a construction that does violence to the above rule and to the extent that they violate the rule and prevent one from passing on his property in accord with his wishes, they must give way. Adoption of an adult for the purpose of bringing that person under the provisions of a preexisting testamentary instrument when he clearly was not intended to be so covered should not be permitted . . . .” Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., supra, 419 S.W.2d 343–44. In a number of cases, an adoption has been considered an act of subterfuge that defies the will of the grantor when a beneficiary of a trust or will adopted an adult, such as a spouse; see Matter of Trust Created by Belgard, 829 P.2d 457, 460 (Colo. App. 1991); a same sex partner; see Cross v. Cross, 177 Ill. App. 3d 588, 590–91, 126 Ill. Dec. 801, 532 N.E.2d 486 (1988), appeal denied, 126 Ill. 2d 558, 541 N.E.2d 1105 (1989); or the adult children of a much younger first spouse whom the beneficiary married late in life; see Dixon v. Weitekamp-Diller, 365 Ill. Dec. 732, 737–38, 979 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. 2012), appeal denied, 367 Ill. Dec. 618, 982 N.E.2d 768 (2013); that had the effect of enlarging the beneficiary class of lineal descendants.
The court cited and analyzed numerous cases from other jurisdictions involving trust or will contests involving the adoption of adults. “Adult adoptions in estates and trusts cases have been rife with controversy. This controversy has led to three lines of cases among the jurisdictions in deciding the effect of an adult adoption on the construction of a testamentary instrument. The oldest line presumes all adult adoptees to be included in class gifts to children. A second line presumes all adult adoptees to be excluded from class gifts to children. A third line takes the middle ground by allowing exceptions to presumptive inclusion or exclusion depending on particular circumstances.” (Footnotes
In resolving the appeal, the court adopted what it called the commonsense test articulated in Davis. “[C]ommon sense tells us that a donor would normally expect anyone partaking of his bounty to be a true family member and not just some willing adult adopted for the purpose of reducing or defeating a gift-over to others. . . . Common sense tells us that [the testator], by inserting adopted children in the class described as [the settlor‘s] issue, intended to include only individuals with some familial bond to her family—individuals to whom [the settlor] felt a familial bond of love and duty, such as adult stepchildren.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Courts generally recognize the public policy and humanitarian nature of adoption but also recognize that those humane purposes can be thwarted by an adoption of an adult for the mere purposes of bringing the adoptee within the class of beneficiaries. It has been stated that Kentucky‘s “adoption statutes are humanitarian in nature and of great importance to the welfare of the public. However, these statutes should not be given a construction that does violence to [the rule that prevents one from passing his or her property in accord with her or his wishes].” Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., supra, 419 S.W.2d 344.
In the present case, the court reasoned that the purpose of adoption laws would not be thwarted by barring a wife who had been adopted by her husband from taking under a trust thus depriving a clearly indicated alternate beneficiary from receiving trust proceeds. A settlor‘s intent, however, would not be thwarted if an adoptee who was a natural object of the adopter‘s affections in a parental relationship over the years was a trust beneficiary despite the fact that the adoption took place after the parental relationship commenced and when the adoptee was an adult. See, e.g., In re Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 311 Minn. 403, 250 N.W.2d 163, 164 (1977) (foster children adopted as adults).
On appeal to the Superior Court, David Eder contended that the settlor‘s adoption of the Richter brothers was a sham to amend the trust thereby reducing his share of the corpus when the trust terminated. The court concluded that, pursuant to the trust, David Eder‘s share could be reduced permissibly only if the settlor had another biological child or had adopted a child under circumstances in which the adoption could be viewed as (1) a natural expression of a desire to recognize a preexisting familial bond between the settlor and the Richter brothers, who at the time of the adoptions were adults and could be considered natural objects of the settlor‘s bounty and (2) a recognition of the settlor‘s and the Richter brothers’ desire to continue the bond. The court then turned to the facts of the case before it and made the following findings regarding the settlor‘s relationships with David Eder and with the Richter brothers.
After David Eder was born, the settlor had little involvement with him. David Eder never lived with the settlor in Massachusetts, only visited him for short periods of time, and periodically saw him at the home of the settlor‘s parents in Connecticut. David Eder lived with his mother and William Shure with whom he has a father-son relationship that continues to the present time. David Eder has a close relationship with his half brother Andrew Shure.
The settlor clearly has a family-like relationship with the Richter brothers. When he lived with Jill Richter, he was a father figure to them and made substantial contributions to their financial support. He
Jill Richter returned to England in 1985. The settlor visited Mischa Richter there six or eight times, traveled with him in Morocco for several weeks, and participated in his wedding in England. Mischa Richter‘s children call the settlor “grandpa.” Sacha Richter lives in Provincetown, and sees the settlor frequently or speaks to him by phone. The settlor also participated in Sacha Richter‘s wedding.
Other indicia of the settlor‘s relationship with the Richter brothers that were put into evidence include cards and letters the Richter brothers had sent to him when they were young men before the legal dispute with David Eder began. The court reasoned that there was no reason for the settlor to save the cards and letters if there were no close relationship between him and the Richter brothers. After the Richter brothers left the settlor‘s home in 1985, he provided financial support for books, rent, and parking tickets when they were in college. The settlor put into evidence a record of the checks he wrote to the Richter brothers. Between 1991 and 2001, Mischa Richter received two checks; one in the amount of $20,000 was to help with the purchase of property in London. Between 1995 and 2005, the settlor wrote sixteen checks to Sacha Richter totaling $40,134 for a variety of purposes; one check was for $20,000 to help purchase a home in Provincetown. In addition to writing checks for the Richter brothers, the settlor gave them cash. The court found that the settlor made the monetary gifts before 2009 when the settlor had a falling out with David Eder and are indicia of a familial bond between the settlor and the Richter brothers. The court concluded that the Richter brothers were the natural objects of the settlor‘s natural bounty.
The court found that the settlor‘s financial gifts to the Richter brothers continued after he adopted them. The court concluded that such gifts were further evidence of the continuing close relationship between the settlor and the Richter brothers.9 The court concluded that the settlor gave the funds to the Richter brothers because they were in need of them, which underscored the court‘s finding that they were the natural objects of his bounty and confirmed the familial relationship that had existed for years and was independent of a desire to harm David Eder.10 The court found that the settlor‘s problems with David Eder
Eder‘s wealth.11 The court reasoned that common sense, as described in Davis v. Neilson, supra, 871 S.W.2d 38, seemed to dictate the adoptions were not a sham or subterfuge just to hurt David Eder, but were consistent with the settlor‘s affectionate and long-term relationship with the Richter brothers.12
III
CLAIMS ON APPEAL
David Eder claims that the court erred, as a matter of law, by holding that the intent of the settlor in adopting two adults was not relevant to determining whether the adoptions were a sham. We disagree.
David Eder‘s claims on appeal are grounded in the principle of the law stated by the Illinois Court of Appeals. “The adoption of an adult solely for the purpose of making him an heir of an ancestor under the terms of a testamentary instrument known and in existence at the time of the adoption is an act of subterfuge. . . . This practice does great violence to the intent and purpose of our adoption laws, and should not be permitted. . . . We cannot condone such a use of the adoption process.” (Citations omitted.) Cross v. Cross, supra, 532 N.E.2d 488–89. In support of his argument, David Eder cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions that are factually distinguishable. In those cases, it was a different generational beneficiary of a trust settled by an ancestor who adopted an adult in order to enlarge the class of beneficiaries. The various courts of appeal declined to permit an adult adoptee to be a part of the beneficiary class.13 These cases are distinct from the facts in the present case in that it is the settlor who adopted two adults that brought them into the class of remainder beneficiaries of the trust. The trust itself defined the beneficiaries as the settlor‘s then living children, be they biological or adopted.
The laws of the state of Connecticut permit adopted children to take under a will or trust unless the testamentary instrument explicitly excludes them. See
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Superior Court properly affirmed the Probate Court‘s decree that the corpus of the trust is to be distributed to the settlor‘s then living children, his biological son and his adopted children. The decree is consistent with the intent of the trust and the laws of this state.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.