DUANE OMAR BURNETT, et al. v. THE UNITED STATES
No. 16-995L
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
Filed October 9, 2018
GRIGGSBY, Judge
Rails-to-Trails; Fifth Amendment Takings; National Trails System Act; Missouri Property Law; Fee Simple; Easement; Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU); Summary Judgment; RCFC 56.
Lila Jones, Attorney of Record, Edward C. Thomas, Laura Duncan, Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC; Theodore L. Hunt, Of Counsel, Associate General Counsel, Surface Transportation Board, Washington, DC, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRIGGSBY, Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs are landowners of property located adjacent to a railroad line owned by the Missouri Central Railroad Company (“MCRR“) and they have brought this rails-to-trails action against the United States pursuant to the National Trails Systems Act,
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary judgment on liability and the government has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on standing and title issues, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC“). For the reasons
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A. Factual Background
This “rails-to-trails” case is one of several cases pending before the Court involving an alleged takings of real property situated along a 144.3 mile rail corridor located in Cass, Pettis, Benton, Morgan, Miller, Cole, Osage, Maries, Gasconade, and Franklin Counties in the State of Missouri. Pl. Mem. at 1; Def. Ex. 2; Pl. Ex. C.
1. The National Trails System Act
As background, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, and the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 477-78, grant the Interstate Commerce Commission, now the Surface Transportation Board (“STB“), exclusive authority over the construction, operation and abandonment of the Nation‘s rail lines. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 321 (1981). In order for a railroad company to terminate rail service, the railroad company must obtain the consent of the STB. See Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1209 (2007). To obtain consent, the railroad company may apply for permission to discontinue service, seek permission to terminate through abandonment proceedings, or file a request for an exemption from abandonment proceedings. See
In 1983, Congress amended the National Trails System Act to include an alternative process for railroad companies to abandon rail lines.
In order for a rail line to be “railbanked,” the railroad company must first file an abandonment application under
The NITU or CITU affords the railroad company 180 days in which to negotiate a railbanking and interim trail use agreement with the third party.
2. The Rock Island Line
The railroad line at issue in this case is a 144.3 mile long rail corridor commonly known as the Rock Island Line (the “Rock Island Line“). Def. Ex. 2 at 22; Pl. Ex. C at 22. This rail corridor extends across the center of the State of Missouri, from Pettis County to Franklin County. Def. Ex. 2 at 22; Pl. Ex. C at 22.
On November 18, 2014, MCRR filed a verified notice of exemption with the STB to abandon its interest in the Rock Island Line. Def. Ex. 3; Pl. Ex. B. On December 16, 2014, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (“MDNR“) filed a request for the issuance of a NITU to allow the department to negotiate with MCRR for the acquisition of the rail corridor for use as a trail under the National Trails Systems Act. Def. Ex. 4; Pl. Ex. D.
The STB issued the NITU on February 25, 2015. Def. Ex. 5; Pl. Ex. A. Although the original NITU would have expired 180 days thereafter, the MCRR has requested and received multiple extensions of the NITU. Def. Ex. 6; Pl. Ex. E. The current expiration date of the NITU is February 21, 2019. Def. Ex. 6; Pl. Ex. E. And so, to date, no railbanking and interim-trail-use agreement is in place with respect to the Rock Island Line. See Def. Ex. 6; Pl. Ex. E.
3. The Disputed Parcels
This takings matter involves 29 claims related to 38 plaintiffs and 29 parcels located along the Rock Island Line. See generally 4th Am. Compl. Eighteen claims—involving 23 plaintiffs—are addressed in the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. See generally Pl. Mot.; Pl. Mem.; Def. Mot.3
The relevant claims are described in the table below:
| Claim No. | Plaintiffs | Parcel No. | County |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Robert J. Atkins | 25-1-11.0-1-099-061.000 | Franklin |
| 2 | Belle Community Fair, Inc. | 01-4.0-20-003-02-0003.00 | Maries |
| 3 | Duane Omar & Darlene E. Burnett | 16-1.0-11-000-000-011.002 | Gasconade |
| 5 | Roscoe Charles & Daisy M. Durbin | 01-4.0-20-003-05-0001.00 | Maries |
| 6 | J. Juanita Griggs | 01-5.0-21-002-09-0005.00 | Maries |
| Claim No. | Plaintiffs | Parcel No. | County |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7 | Howard & Marie O. Holaway | 24-2-03.0-0-000-003.000 | Franklin |
| 10 | Estate of Patricia Kinkead | 25-1-01.0-3-002-046.000 | Franklin |
| 11 | Sonny & Charlotte Lemons | 195015000000000200 | Osage |
| 12 | Wayne M. & Gloria Misner | 14-9.0-29-004-001.001.000 | Gasconade |
| 13a | Tami Luehr Morton | 25-1-01.0-3-002-042.000 | Franklin |
| 13b | Tami Luehr Morton | 25-1-01.0-3-002-043.100 | Franklin |
| 17a | Oral D. Seymour | 02-6.0-23-000-00-0010.00 | Maries |
| 19 | Martin Five Ltd. Partnership | 25-1-11.0-1-001-074.000 | Franklin |
| 20 | Everett Turner | 01-4.0-20-001-24-0005.00 | Maries |
| 21 | James Daren Zumwalt | 19-6.0-14-000-00-0011.00 | Osage |
| 22a | Value Investments, LLC, Estate of John H. & Temple Lee Vance | 25-1-11.0-1-004-095.000 | Franklin |
| 22b | Value Investments, LLC, Estate of John H. & Temple Lee Vance | 25-1-11.0-1-004-096.000 | Franklin |
| 23 | JHV Holdings, LLC | 25-1-11.0-1-004-149.000 | Franklin |
B. Procedural Background
On August 12, 2016, plaintiffs filed the complaint. See generally Compl. On August 15, 2016; April 4, 2017; May 15, 2017; and February 20, 2018, plaintiffs filed amended complaints. See generally 1st Am. Compl.; 2d Am. Compl.; 3d Am. Compl.; 4th Am. Compl.
On March 16, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on liability. See generally Pl. Mot. On April 16, 2018, the government filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on standing and title issues. See generally Def. Mot. On May 30, 2018, plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their motion for summary judgment and a response and opposition to the government‘s cross-motion for summary judgment. See generally Pl. Resp. On July 13, 2018, the government filed a reply in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment. See generally Def. Reply.
These matters having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending motions.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Jurisdiction
The Tucker Act grants this Court jurisdiction over Fifth Amendment takings claims brought against the United States. See
B. Summary Judgment
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and evidentiary materials filed in a case reveal that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Biery v. United States, 753 F.3d 1279, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A dispute is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A fact is “material” if it could “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .” Id.
In resolving motions for summary judgment, the Court will not make credibility determinations and will draw all inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). In doing so, the Court does not weigh the evidence presented, but instead must “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 756 (1978) (“[A trial] court generally cannot grant summary judgment based on its assessment of the credibility of the evidence presented . . . .“); see also Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 151, 154 (2004). And so, the Court may only grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party . . . .” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
The above standard applies when the Court considers cross-motions for summary judgment. See Principal Life Ins. Co. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 82, 89 (2014); see also Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010). And so, when both parties move for summary judgment, “the court must evaluate each party‘s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Abbey v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 430, 436 (2011) (quoting Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
C. Fifth Amendment Takings And “Rails-to-Trails” Cases
A Fifth Amendment takings occurs in rails-to-trails cases when the government, through the issuance of a CITU or NITU, destroys an individual‘s state law reversionary interest in property underlying a railroad right-of-way. Ladd v. United States, 630 F.3d 1015, 1023-24 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1373 (“The issuance of the NITU is the only event that must occur to ‘entitle the plaintiff to institute an action.’ Accrual is not delayed until a trail use agreement is executed or the trail operator takes physical possession of the right-of-way.“) (internal citations omitted); Caldwell I, 391 F.3d at 1233-34. “[O]nly persons with a valid property interest at the time of the taking are entitled to compensation.” Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
To determine whether a Fifth Amendment takings has occurred in a rails-to-trails case, the Court follows a three-part analysis established by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Ellamae Phillips Co. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (”Preseault II“)). First, the Court must determine who owned the land at issue at the time of the takings, and specifically, whether the railroad company owned the land in fee simple or held only an easement. Id. Second, if the railroad company owned only an easement, the Court must determine whether the terms of the easement are limited to use for railroad purposes, or whether the terms include use as a public recreational trail. Id. Third, if the railroad company‘s easement is broad enough to encompass recreational trail use, the Court must determine whether the easement terminated prior to the alleged takings, so that the property owner held a fee simple estate unencumbered by easement at the time of the takings. Id.
D. Missouri Property Law
To determine whether the railroad company held an easement, or held the property in fee simple at the time of the takings, the Court looks to the law of the state in which the property is located. Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1540. Because the Rock Island Line is located in the State of Missouri, Missouri law applies in this case. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 20-21 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
Under Missouri law, the “cardinal rule” for deed interpretation is “to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give that intention effect.” Hinshaw v. M-C-M Props., LLC, 450
In this regard, a single deed can contain multiple forms of conveyances depending upon the language applied to each tract. See Clevenger v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 210 S.W. 867, 868 (Mo. 1919). Missouri courts have consistently applied three factors to determine whether a tract of land is passed to a railroad in fee simple, as an easement, or if it is subject to later reversion to the grantor or her heirs: “(1) whether the deed includes language conveying a ‘right of way,’ (2) the amount of consideration, and (3) language in the deed limiting the use of the land for railroad purposes.” Moore v. Mo. Friends of the Wabash Trace Nature Trail, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 681, 685-86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
In addition, it is well-settled under Missouri law that when a railroad acquires a right-of-way, it acquires merely an easement over the land and not an interest in fee simple. Schuermann Enters., Inc. v. St. Louis County, 436 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Mo. 1969) (“[W]here the interest conveyed is limited to right of way or for right of way the estate conveyed is an easement only.“); see also Brown v. Weare, 152 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Mo. 1941) (“The law is settled in this state that where a railroad acquires a right of way whether by condemnation, by voluntary grant or by a conveyance in fee upon a valuable consideration the railroad takes but a mere easement over the land and not the fee.“). And so, Missouri courts have held that the conveyance of a right-of-way indicates an “intention to part with less than the fee.” Powell v. St. Louis County, 446 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Mo. 1969).
The Missouri Revised Statute also provides that railroad corporations have the ability to “take and hold” voluntary grants of real estate.
Every corporation formed under this chapter shall, in addition to the powers herein conferred, have power: . . . (2) [t]o take and hold such voluntary grants of real estate and other property as shall be made to it to aid in the construction, maintenance and accommodation of its railroads; but the real estate received by voluntary grant shall be held and used for the purpose of such grant only. . . .
In this regard, Missouri courts have held that a lack of valuable consideration indicates the conveyance of an easement rather than a conveyance in fee simple absolute. See id. But, Missouri courts have recognized that any “sum of money in excess of one cent, one dime, or one dollar . . . is a valuable consideration within the meaning of the law of conveyancing.” See id.; see also Allaben v. Shelbourne, 212 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Mo. 1948); City of Columbia v. Baurichter, 729 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“The stated consideration therein was nominal, $1, not a sum that would suggest purchase of a fee simple interest . . . .“). Valuable consideration can also be non-monetary in nature, and may encompass benefits such as the construction of a building. See Bayless v. Gonz, 684 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“The deed also states the grant was made for valuable consideration, namely: five dollars and the location of a depot. Either of these constitutes valuable consideration.“).
Missouri courts have also recognized that the use of the words “[g]rant, [b]argain and [s]ell” in a deed is indicative of a fee simple title. Nixon v. Franklin, 289 S.W.2d 82, 88 (Mo. 1956); see also
With regards to the scope of an easement, Missouri courts have also recognized that any language limiting the scope of an easement must be expressly mentioned within the deed. See Powell, 446 S.W.2d at 822. If a limitation on the scope of an easement is to be imposed, then “it must ‘be necessarily implied in the terms of the grant,’ an express limitation not being involved.” Id. (holding that, in the absence of limiting language, the deed imposed “no limitation upon the grantees’ use of the property“). Given this,
[I]f the grant or conveyance contains words of restriction and limitation to the clear effect that the right of way granted thereby shall be used only for certain specific railroad purposes, it can lawfully be used only for those purposes which fall within
the scope of the provision, and for none other.
Rombauer v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 34 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on liability and title issues on four key issues: (1) whether MCRR owns the property at issue in this dispute in fee simple, or holds only an easement; (2) whether certain plaintiffs own in fee simple parcels that are adjacent to the Rock Island Line; (3) if MCRR owns only an easement, whether the easement is limited to use for railroad purposes, or is broad enough to encompass public recreational trail use; and (4) whether the Court can determine at this time if there has been a temporary or permanent takings of plaintiffs’ property. Pl. Mem. at 10-30; Def. Mot. at 9-41.
In their motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiffs argue that the undisputed material facts in this matter establish that they own a fee simple interest in the property in dispute. Pl. Mem. at 10-15. Plaintiffs further argue that the scope of the easements acquired by MCRR with respect to this property is limited to use for railroad purposes and that public recreational trail use falls beyond the scope of these easements. Id. at 15-30. In addition, plaintiffs contend that the Court can resolve the issue of whether a temporary or permanent takings of their property has occurred and that the issuance of the NITU constitutes a permanent takings of their property. Pl. Resp. at 13-15. And so, plaintiffs request that the Court find the government liable for a takings of their property. Id. at 16.
In its cross-motion, the government argues that there can be no takings of plaintiffs’ property because the undisputed material facts in this matter show that MCRR owns the rail corridor located adjacent to certain plaintiffs’ property. Def. Mot. at 12-16. The government further argues that plaintiffs Wayne and Gloria Misner have not shown that they own property located adjacent to the rail corridor. Id. at 20-22. In addition, the government contends that, to the extent that MCRR does not own the relevant property in fee simple, the source deeds for the remaining claims in dispute convey easements to MCRR that are broad enough to encompass public recreational trail use and railbanking. Id. at 22-40. Lastly, the government contends that the Court cannot yet determine whether a temporary or permanent takings has occurred in this case, because, among other things, there is no trail use agreement in place and the MCRR has not consummated abandonment. Id. at 40; Def. Reply at 14-15. And so, the government requests
For the reasons discussed below, the undisputed material facts in this matter show that MCRR owns in fee simple the property associated with claims 1 (Atkins); 10 (Kinkead); 13a and b (Morton); 19 (Martin Five Ltd. Partnership); 22a and b (Value Investments LLC, Estate of John H. and Temple Lee Vance); and 23 (JHV Holdings, LLC). The undisputed material facts also show that plaintiffs Wayne and Gloria Misner (claim 12) did not own property located adjacent to the rail corridor at the time of the issuance of the NITU.
In addition, the undisputed material facts show that the relevant source deeds for the remaining nine claims—claims 2 (Belle Community Fair); 3 (Burnett); 5 (Durbin); 6 (Griggs); 7 (Holaway); 11 (Lemons); 17a (Seymour); 20 (Turner); and 21 (Zumwalt)—convey easements to MCRR that are broad enough to encompass public recreational trail use. And so, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on liability and GRANTS the government‘s cross-motion for summary judgment on standing and title issues.
A. MCRR Owns A Fee Simple Interest In The Parcels Associated With Claims 1, 10, 13a, 13b, 19, 22a, 22b, And 23
As an initial matter, the undisputed material facts in this matter show that MCRR owns in fee simple the property at issue with respect to plaintiffs’ claims 1 (Atkins); 10 (Kinkead); 13a and b (Morton); 19 (Martin Five Ltd. Partnership); 22a and b (Value Investments LLC, Estate of John H. and Temple Lee Vance); and 23 (JHV Holdings, LLC). And so, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment and GRANTS the government‘s cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to these claims.
1. MCRR Owns The Rail Corridor Adjacent To The Parcels For Claims 10, 13a, and 13b
A careful reading of the source deed relevant to the parcels associated with plaintiffs’ claims 10 (Kinkead) and 13a and b (Morton) makes clear that MCRR owns these parcels in fee simple. The parties agree that the applicable source deed for these claims is Peppard 30/508 and that Missouri property law applies in this case.4 Def. Mot. at 12-13; Pl. Mem. at 19. And so, the
The Peppard 30/508 Deed contains the following conveyance language:
Witnesseth, that the said party of the First Part, in consideration of one dollar and the building, maintaining and operating of a Railroad by the said party of the Second Part, its successors and assigns do by these presents grant bargain and sell, convey and confirm unto the said party of the Second Part, its successors and assigns . . . a strip of land one hundred feet in width . . . having an equal and uniform width of fifty feet on each side of the centre [sic] line of said Railroad as it shall be located.
Def. Ex. 7 at 4 (emphasis added). The Court reads this language to convey a fee simple interest to MCRR for several reasons.
First, the language in the aforementioned granting clause states that the owners do “grant bargain and sell” to the railroad. Id. This language conveys a fee simple interest to the railroad under Missouri law.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has long recognized that the words “grant, bargain and sell” evidence the conveyance of a fee simple interest, unless such a conveyance is expressly restricted by other language in the deed. See University City v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 149 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Mo. 1941) (holding that the words “grant, bargain and sell” by statute were made to import a conveyance in fee simple with warranties, unless expressly restrained by other language in the instrument); Nixon v. Franklin, 289 S.W.2d 82, 88 (Mo. 1956) (holding that the words “Grant, Bargain and Sell” by force of statute have been held to import the vesting of a fee simple title). The Court does not find—and plaintiffs do not identify—any language in the Peppard 30/508 Deed that would expressly restrict the conveyance of a fee simple interest to the railroad in this case.5 See generally Pl. Mem. at 27-28; Pl. Resp. at 2. In fact, the granting clause for the Peppard 30/508 Deed also states that “it being expressly understood and agreed . . .
The Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that the Peppard 30/508 Deed conveys only an easement to MCRR, because the conveyance lacks valuable consideration and is, thus, a voluntary grant under Missouri law. Pl. Mem. 19-21. The Peppard 30/508 Deed describes the consideration given as “one dollar and the building, maintaining and operating of a Railroad.” Pl. Mem. at 19-21; Def. Exs. 7-8, 10. This language clearly provides valuable consideration under Missouri law. See Bayless, 684 S.W.2d at 513; Brown, 152 S.W.2d at 653. In fact, Missouri courts have recognized that any consideration “in excess of one cent, one dime, or one dollar . . . is a valuable consideration within the meaning of the law of conveyancing.” See Brown, 152 S.W.2d at 653. Missouri courts have similarly recognized that consideration may be non-monetary in nature and may include the construction of a building or depot under Missouri law, which is the case here. See Bayless, 684 S.W.2d at 513. And so, here, the combination of one dollar and “the building, maintaining and operating of a Railroad” as the consideration given in the Peppard 30/508 Deed is valuable consideration that is sufficient to convey a fee simple interest to the railroad under Missouri law.
The Court‘s reading of the Peppard 30/508 Deed to convey a fee simple interest to MCRR is further reinforced by the habendum clause in this deed. This clause states that:
To Have and to Hold the premises aforesaid, with all and singular the rights, privileges, appurtenances and immunities thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining unto the said party of the Second Part and unto its successors and assigns forever.
Def. Ex. 7. In Bayless v. Gonz, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that very similar language reflects “the language of the fee simple warranty deed.” Bayless, 684 S.W.2d at 513 (holding that language stating “to have and to hold the same together with all singular rights, immunities, privileges and appurtenances to the same” conveys a fee simple interest). And so, in light of the plain language contained in the Peppard 30/508 Deed‘s granting and habendum clauses, the Court reads the Peppard 30/508 Deed to convey a fee simple interest in the parcels associated with claims 10 and 13a and b.
The undisputed material facts in this matter also show that MCRR owns a fee simple interest in the parcels associated with plaintiffs’ claims 1 (Atkins); 19 (Martin Five Ltd. Partnership); 22a and b (Value Investments, LLC, Estate of John H. and Temple Lee Vance); and 23 (JHV Holdings, LLC). The parties disagree about which deeds are the applicable source deeds for these parcels. Def. Mot. at 15-17; Pl. Mem. at 16-19. And so, the Court begins the analysis of these claims by first determining the applicable source deeds for each of these parcels.
In this regard, the government argues that the source deeds for all of these claims are the Fitzgerald 30/501 and Fitzgerald 30/500 Deeds. Def. Mot. at 15. Plaintiffs counter that, in addition to these two deeds, four other deeds are also relevant to their claims: the Armstrong 53/345; Fitzgerald 53/333; Fitzgerald 53/335; and Fitzgerald 53/497 Deeds. Pl. Mem. at 19.6 The Court agrees with the government that the applicable source deeds for these claims are the Fitzgerald 30/501 and 30/500 Deeds.
A careful review of the Fitzgerald 30/501 and 30/500 Deeds makes clear that these deeds pre-date the four deeds relied upon by plaintiffs by more than a decade. The Fitzgerald 30/501 and 30/500 Deeds were executed in 1886. Def. Exs. 8, 10 (providing deeds dated August 11, 1886). But, the deeds relied upon by the plaintiffs were executed in 1900. Def. Exs. 11-14 (providing deeds dated in September and November 1900). A review of the Armstrong 53/345; Fitzgerald 53/333; Fitzgerald 53/335; and Fitzgerald 53/497 Deeds also shows that these later deeds convey property that is located within the same geographical area first conveyed to the railroad in 1886 under the Fitzgerald 30/501 and 30/500 Deeds. Compare Def. Ex. 8 (providing the Fitzgerald 30/501 Deed, granting a “strip of land” in “Sections Eleven (11), Twelve (12), and one (1) Township no. forty two Range no. four W. County of Franklin and State of Missouri” to the Railroad), and Def. Ex. 10 (providing the Fitzgerald 30/500 Deed, conveying a “strip of
Having determined that the Fitzgerald 30/500 and Fitzgerald 30/501 Deeds are the applicable source deeds for these claims, the Court must next determine whether these deeds convey a fee simple interest to the railroad. In this regard, it is notable that the Fitzgerald 30/500 and Fitzgerald 30/501 Deeds contain the exact same granting clause language contained in the Peppard 30/508 Deed discussed above. Def. Exs. 8, 10. These two deeds also contain the same habendum clause discussed above with regards to the Peppard 30/508 Deed. Id. Given this, the plain language of these deeds shows that the deeds convey a fee simple interest in the parcels associated with plaintiffs’ claims 1, 10, 13a and b, 19, 22a and b, and 23 to the railroad. And so, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and GRANTS the government‘s cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to these claims.
B. Plaintiffs Wayne And Gloria Misner Have Not Shown That Their Parcel Is Adjacent To The Rail Corridor
The undisputed material facts in this matter also show that plaintiffs Wayne and Gloria Misner (claim 12) did not own property located adjacent to the rail corridor at issue on the date of the issuance of the NITU. And so, the Court must deny these plaintiffs’ takings claim.
The undisputed material facts show that Wayne and Gloria Misner did not own property located adjacent to the portion of the rail corridor that is covered by the NITU, because MCRR was not the owner of the portion of the rail corridor located adjacent to their property at the time of the issuance of the NITU. In this regard, plaintiffs do not dispute that the Misners’ parcel is located next to a parcel of land known as the ICC Valuation Parcel 13—property located to the northwest of the rail corridor. Pl. Resp. at 4; see also Def. Mot. at 20-22. There is also no dispute that MCRR‘s predecessor-in-interest—Union Pacific Railroad Company—quitclaimed the ICC Valuation Parcel 13 to another company—GRC Holdings—in 1999. Def. Mot. at 21; see Pl. Resp. at Ex. Q; Def. Ex. 24 at 9.
It is similarly without dispute that GRC Holdings did not convey the ICC Valuation Parcel 13 to MCRR when MCRR acquired the rail corridor in 1999.7 Def. Mot. at 21; Pl. Resp. at 4; see also Def. Ex. 25 at 2, 27. And so, there is no genuine dispute in this case that MCRR did not acquire an ownership interest in the ICC Valuation Parcel 13 when the railroad acquired the rail corridor in 1999. Because MCRR did not own the ICC Valuation Parcel 13 on the date of the issuance of NITU, this parcel is not covered by the NITU. See generally Def. Ex. 5. And so, the undisputed material facts here show that Wayne and Gloria Misner do not own property located adjacent to the rail corridor that is at issue in this case.
The Court is also unpersuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that the Misners’ parcel is located adjacent to the rail corridor at issue in this case because MCRR is a corporate subsidiary of the actual owner of the ICC Valuation Parcel 13—GRC Holdings. Pl. Resp. at 4. Even if a corporate relationship between MCRR and GRC Holdings exists, plaintiffs fail to explain why the Court should consider MCRR and GRC Holdings to be the same entity for the purpose of determining who owns the portion of the rail corridor located adjacent to the Misners’ parcel.
C. The Remaining Claims (2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 17a, 20, and 21) Involve Easements Broad Enough To Encompass Public Recreational Trail Use
Lastly, the undisputed material facts in this case show that MCRR holds easements that are broad enough to encompass public recreational trail use with respect to the remaining nine claims in dispute.
With respect to the remaining nine claims, the parties agree that the Backues 14/199, Dreysse 14/146, Francis 27/251, Luster 16/606, C.C. Linke 16/607, Ridenhour 14/215, Stock 27/3, and Strehlmann 53/421 Deeds are the applicable source deeds for these claims. Pl. Mem. at 16-18; Def. Mot. at 26-27. The parties also agree that these deeds convey easements to MCRR under Missouri law, because the amount of consideration given is only one dollar. Pl. Mem. at 16-18; Def. Mot. at 25-27; see Moore, 991 S.W.2d at 687 (holding that a lack of valuable consideration indicates the conveyance of an easement rather than a conveyance in fee simple absolute); see also Def. Exs. 29, 31, 33-38 (stating that the conveyances are “in consideration of One Dollar[]“); Pl. Resp. at 8-13. And so, the remaining issue for the Court to resolve with respect to these claims is whether the scope of the easements conveyed to MCRR includes use as a public recreational trail. See Ellamae Phillips Co., 564 F.3d at 1373 (stating that if the railroad company owned only an easement, the Court must determine whether the terms of the easements are limited to use for railroad purposes, or whether the terms include use as a public recreational trail). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that it does.
First, Missouri law does not require that the property conveyed to MCRR through a voluntary grant be used only for railroad purposes.8 In their motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiffs argue that all of the easements conveyed to MCRR must be limited to use for railroad purposes, because Missouri courts have never found a deed to a railroad to be any broader than a railroad purpose deed. Pl. Mem. at 25-26. To support this argument, plaintiffs point to the Missouri Constitution, which states, in relevant part, that “‘[t]he fee of land taken for railroad purposes without consent of the owner thereof shall remain in such owner subject to the use for which it is taken.‘” Id. at 25 (quoting
Plaintiffs’ argument is misguided. While the Missouri Constitution does provide that a railroad obtains an easement that may only be used for railroad purposes when it obtains real estate through condemnation, this constitutional provision does not address other circumstances where a railroad obtains an easement.
Plaintiffs correctly observe that the Missouri statute that governs voluntary grants of real estate “to aid in the construction, maintenance and accommodation of its railroads” provides that “the real estate received by voluntary grant shall be held and used for the purpose of such
2. The Source Deeds Convey Easements That Are Broad Enough To Encompass Trail Use And Railbanking
A review of the source deeds applicable to the remaining nine claims also makes clear that the primary conveyances to the railroad in these deeds are broad enough to encompass public recreational trail use. In fact, each of the source deeds contains essentially identical granting and habendum clauses that demonstrate that the easements conveyed to MCRR were not limited to use for railroad purposes.10
Notes
Every corporation formed under this chapter shall, in addition to the powers herein conferred, have power: . . . (2) [t]o take and hold such voluntary grants of real estate and other property as shall be made to it to aid in the construction, maintenance and accommodation of its railroads; but the real estate received by voluntary grant shall be held and used for the purpose of such grant only. . . .