GRAZYNA DRATEWSKA-ZATOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAN RUTHERFORD, Illinois State Treasurer, as ex officio Custodian of the Illinois Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund; MITCH WEISZ, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission; MITCH WEISZ, THOMAS TYRRELL, CHARLES DEVRIENDT, DAVID GORE, DANIEL DONOHOO, YOLAINE DAUPHIN, MICHAEL LATZ, KEVIN LAMBORN, RUTH WHITE, and MARIO BASURTO, in Their Official Capacities as Commissioners of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1-12-2699
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division
September 13, 2013
Rehearing denied October 23, 2013
2013 IL App (1st) 122699
Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie, Judge, presiding.
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.)
Plaintiff‘s complaint seeking a judgment against the Illinois State Treasurer for a workers’ compensation award entered against plaintiff‘s employer, which did not have insurance, and a writ of mandamus compelling payment from the Illinois Workers’ Benefit Fund was properly dismissed on the grounds that the claim against the Treasurer was barred by sovereign immunity and that plaintiff failed to establish a clear right to relief as to the mandamus claim.
Decision Under Review
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-L-51413; the Hon. Daniel T. Gillespie, Judge, presiding.
Affirmed.
Counsel on Appeal
Brian J. Wiehe and Matthew J. Belcher, both of Belcher Law Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Mary C. Labrec, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.
Panel
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hall and Lampkin concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1 Plaintiff Grazyna Dratewska-Zator (Dratewska-Zator) appeals an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing her amended complaint against defendants Illinois State Treasurer Dan Rutherford (Treasurer) in his capacity as ex officio custodian of the Illinois Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund (Fund), Mitch Weisz (Weisz) in his official capacity as Chairman (Chairman) of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission), and Weisz, Thomas Tyrrell, Charles Devriendt, David Gore, Daniel Donohoo, Yolaine Dauphin, Michael Latz, Kevin Lamborn, Ruth White and Mario Basurto in their official capacities as commissioners (Commissioners) of the Commission. On appeal, Dratewska-Zator argues: (1) her claim against the Treasurer for a judgment on the full amount of an award received from the Commission states a cause of action for which effective relief may be granted and is not barred by sovereign immunity; (2) her claims against the Chairman and the Commissioners for mandamus also state a cause of action; and (3) her claims are not barred by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 2 BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Dratewska-Zator‘s amended complaint, filed on April 12, 2012, alleged the following facts. In April 2006, Dratewska-Zator was involved in an accident compensable under the
¶ 4 On June 8, 2011, the Commission entered an award in favor of Dratewska-Zator.1 The Commission awarded Dratewska-Zator temporary total disability benefits totaling $2,904.38, while also ordering that the employer would receive a $500 credit for payments made prior to arbitration. The Commission in addition awarded a total of $17,141.52 in permanent partial disability payments. The Commission further awarded $35,470.86 for medical expenses in accordance with a fee schedule,2 as the employer did not dispute the nature of Dratewska-Zator‘s injury and there was no evidence her treatment was not reasonable and necessary. Neither the employer nor the Treasurer appealed the Commission‘s decision.
¶ 5 Dratewska-Zator notified the Commission of her award. The Commission subsequently sent Dratewska-Zator‘s counsel a letter dated October 31, 2011, purportedly accompanying payment from the Fund. The letter stated all claims for fiscal year 2011 were being paid at “100% of the claimed amount, after necessary adjustments,” including “any direct reimbursements made to the Department of Healthcare and Family Services.” The letter explained Dratewska-Zator was not entitled to reimbursement for her medical expenses because the cost of all of her medical treatment was paid by the Department of Healthcare and Family Services, which was directly reimbursed by the Fund.
¶ 6 Dratewska-Zator allegedly received a partial payment from the Fund in the amount of $16,641.52, which did not include payment for medical expenses or the award of temporary total disability benefits. In her appellate brief, Dratewska-Zator states she subsequently received the latter amount, leaving only the amount representing medical expenses in dispute.
¶ 7 On December 7, 2011, Dratewska-Zator filed suit against defendants in the circuit court. Dratewska-Zator‘s amended complaint is divided into three counts. Count I seeks entry of judgment against the Treasurer and Dratewska-Zator‘s employer for the amount awarded but not paid to Dratewska-Zator by the Commission, plus costs and attorney fees, pursuant to
¶ 8 On May 10, 2012, the Treasurer filed a hybrid motion to dismiss count I of the amended complaint pursuant to
¶ 9 On May 10, 2012, Dratewska-Zator‘s employer also filed a hybrid motion to dismiss count I of the amended complaint pursuant to
¶ 10 On June 14, 2012, the Chairman and Commissioners filed a combined hybrid motion to dismiss counts II and III of the amended complaint pursuant to
¶ 11 Dratewska-Zator responded to these motions, and following a hearing on September 11, 2012, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Dratewska-Zator‘s amended complaint with prejudice. On the same date, Dratewska-Zator filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. Dratewska-Zator subsequently filed a motion to proceed with her appeal against only the Treasurer, Chairman and Commissioner, as her employer had filed for bankruptcy. On December 7, 2012, this court granted Dratewska-Zator‘s motion to proceed.
¶ 12 DISCUSSION
¶ 13 On appeal, Dratewska-Zator contends the circuit court erred in dismissing her amended complaint pursuant to
¶ 14 When reviewing the legal sufficiency of a claim under
¶ 15 The purpose of a
¶ 16 When we review motions filed pursuant to
¶ 17 In this appeal, Dratewska-Zator argues: (1) her claim against the Treasurer for a judgment on the full amount of an award received from the Commission states a cause of action for which effective relief may be granted and is not barred by sovereign immunity; (2) her claims against the Chairman and the Commissioners for mandamus also state a cause of action; and (3) her claims are not barred by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The defendants respond: (1) count I is barred by sovereign immunity and does not state a claim against the Treasurer upon which effective relief may be granted; and (2) counts II and III do not state a claim against the Chairman and Commissioners because Dratewska-Zator cannot properly allege a clear right to relief. We first turn to consider whether Dratewska-Zator‘s claim against the Treasurer is defeated by sovereign immunity.
¶ 18 Count I
¶ 19
“Except as provided in the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, the Court of Claims Act, the State Officials and Employees Ethics Act, and Section 1.5 of this Act, the State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court.”
745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2012) .3
Thus, sovereign immunity was reestablished, with statutory exceptions. The exceptions to sovereign immunity do not have to be expressed in the acts listed in
¶ 20 Sovereign immunity “protects the State from interference in its performance of the functions of government and preserves its control over State coffers.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State Building Venture v. O‘Donnell, 239 Ill. 2d 151, 159 (2010). “The determination of whether an action is an action against the state depends on the issues raised and the relief sought.” Jinkins v. Lee, 209 Ill. 2d 320, 330 (2004). As to the issues raised, an action is against the State when there are:
” “(1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to have been breached was not owed to the public generally independent of the fact of State employment; and (3) where the complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily within that employee‘s normal and official functions of the State.” ” Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 309 (1990) (quoting Robb v. Sutton, 147 Ill. App. 3d 710, 716 (1986)).
“Regarding the relief sought, a court must also consider whether the relief sought is such that ‘a judgment for the plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability.’ ” Jinkins, 209 Ill. 2d at 330 (quoting Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1992)).
¶ 21 Two sections of the Act particularly address the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought in this matter. The cause of action alleged in count I is an application for entry of judgment under
“Except in the case of a claim against the State of Illinois, either party may present a certified copy of the award of the Arbitrator, or a certified copy of the decision of the
Commission when the same has become final, when no proceedings for review are pending, providing for the payment of compensation according to this Act, to the Circuit Court of the county in which such accident occurred or either of the parties are residents, whereupon the court shall enter a judgment in accordance therewith. In a case where the employer refuses to pay compensation according to such final award or such final decision upon which such judgment is entered the court shall in entering judgment thereon, tax as costs against him the reasonable costs and attorney fees in the arbitration proceedings and in the court entering the judgment for the person in whose favor the judgment is entered, which judgment and costs taxed as therein provided shall, until and unless set aside, have the same effect as though duly entered in an action duly tried and determined by the court, and shall with like effect, be entered and docketed. The Circuit Court shall have power at any time upon application to make any such judgment conform to any modification required by any subsequent decision of the Supreme Court upon appeal, or as the result of any subsequent proceedings for review, as provided in this Act. Judgment shall not be entered until 15 days’ notice of the time and place of the application for the entry of judgment shall be served upon the employer by filing such notice with the Commission, which Commission shall, in case it has on file the address of the employer or the name and address of its agent upon whom notices may be served, immediately send a copy of the notice to the employer or such designated agent.”
820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2004) .
The purpose of this section is to permit speedy entry of judgment. Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 73 Ill. 2d 259, 268 (1978). Accordingly, the circuit court‘s inquiry under
¶ 22 Dratewska-Zator seeks relief in the form of a judgment against the Treasurer because she ultimately seeks payment of her full award from the Fund, which was created by
“Penalties and fines collected pursuant to this paragraph (d) shall be deposited upon receipt into a special fund which shall be designated the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, of which the State Treasurer is ex-officio custodian, such special fund to be held and disbursed in accordance with this paragraph (d) for the purposes hereinafter stated in this paragraph (d), upon the final order of the Commission. The Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund shall be deposited the same as are State funds and any interest accruing thereon shall be added thereto every 6 months. The Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund is subject to audit the same as State funds and accounts and is protected by the general bond given by the State Treasurer. The Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund is considered always appropriated for the purposes of disbursements as provided in this paragraph, and shall be paid out and disbursed as herein provided and shall not at any time be appropriated or diverted to any other use or purpose. Moneys in the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund shall be used only for payment of workers’ compensation benefits for injured employees when the employer has failed to provide coverage as determined under this paragraph (d)
and has failed to pay the benefits due to the injured employee. The Commission shall have the right to obtain reimbursement from the employer for compensation obligations paid by the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund. Any such amounts obtained shall be deposited by the Commission into the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund. If an injured employee or his or her personal representative receives payment from the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund, the State of Illinois has the same rights under paragraph (b) of Section 5 that the employer who failed to pay the benefits due to the injured employee would have had if the employer had paid those benefits, and any moneys recovered by the State as a result of the State‘s exercise of its rights under paragraph (b) of Section 5 shall be deposited into the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund. The custodian of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund shall be joined with the employer as a party respondent in the application for adjustment of claim. After July 1, 2006, the Commission shall make disbursements from the Fund once each year to each eligible claimant. An eligible claimant is an injured worker who has within the previous fiscal year obtained a final award for benefits from the Commission against the employer and the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund and has notified the Commission within 90 days of receipt of such award. Within a reasonable time after the end of each fiscal year, the Commission shall make a disbursement to each eligible claimant. At the time of disbursement, if there are insufficient moneys in the Fund to pay all claims, each eligible claimant shall receive a pro-rata share, as determined by the Commission, of the available moneys in the Fund for that year. Payment from the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund to an eligible claimant pursuant to this provision shall discharge the obligations of the Injured Workers’ Benefit Fund regarding the award entered by the Commission.” 820 ILCS 305/4(d) (West Supp. 2005) .
As with a
¶ 23
¶ 24 Neither of the cases Dratewska-Zator cites, however, limits the exception in
¶ 25 Regarding the nature of the cause of action, Dratewska-Zator relies heavily upon Field v. Rollins, 156 Ill. App. 3d 786 (1987). In Fields, the employee whom the plaintiff-attorney represented was declared totally and permanently disabled and entitled to receive $296 per week for life. The employer was ordered to make the first 150 weeks of payments with the remaining payments to be made by the Treasurer in his capacity as custodian of the “Second Injury Fund.”5 The attorney was awarded fees of 20% of the amount due to the injured employee for 364 weeks of total permanent disability, but was unable to collect the balance when his client moved out of the jurisdiction. Id. at 787. Moreover, the client refused to authorize the Comptroller of the State of Illinois, who administered the Second Injury Fund, to deduct 20% from his periodic disability pension payments to satisfy the award of attorney fees. Id.
¶ 26 The attorney instituted garnishment proceedings against the Treasurer, and filed a complaint for mandamus, naming his client, the employer, the Chairman of the Industrial Commission, the Treasurer of the State of Illinois, and the Comptroller of the State of Illinois as defendants. Id. at 787-88. The circuit court dismissed both claims. Id. This court, ruling attorney fees approved by the Commission are on the same level as the award granted to the injured party, concluded the circuit court erred in dismissing the garnishment proceedings, and by logical extension erred in dismissing the complaint for mandamus. Id. at 789.
¶ 27 In this case, Dratewska-Zator argues this court should reach the same result as Fields, based on the similarities between the Second Injury Fund and the Fund at issue in this case. Compare
¶ 28 Examining Dratewska-Zator‘s cause of action in count I of the amended complaint against the criteria our supreme court endorsed in Healy, we find no allegations that the Treasurer acted beyond the scope of his authority. Indeed,
¶ 29 Turning to the relief sought, Dratewska-Zator argues the funds at issue are not state funds and do not implicate sovereign immunity. The Fund “shall be deposited the same as are State funds” and “is subject to audit the same as State funds and accounts.”
¶ 30 Assuming arguendo the Fund does not hold state funds, we also consider whether the relief sought would interfere with the State‘s performance of the functions of government. See State Building Venture, 239 Ill. 2d at 159; Jinkins, 209 Ill. 2d at 330. On this point, we recall the purpose of
¶ 31 Counts II and III
¶ 32 We next turn to consider whether counts II and III of the amended complaint, which seek mandamus, state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. ”Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, ‘the performance of official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.’ ” Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133 (1997) (quoting Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986)). “Despite the remedy‘s extraordinary nature, mandamus proceedings are governed by the same pleading rules that apply to actions at law.” Noyola, 179 Ill. 2d at 133. “For a complaint seeking mandamus to withstand a challenge to its legal sufficiency, it must allege facts which establish a clear right to the relief requested, a clear duty of the respondent to act, and clear authority in the respondent to comply with the writ.” Id.; see McFatridge v. Madigan, 2013 IL 113676, ¶ 17. Indeed, “[a] petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus to command an officer to perform a duty must show a clear right to the relief asked by allegation of specific facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bremen Community High School District No. 228 v. Cook County Comm‘n on Human Rights, 2012 IL App (1st) 112177, ¶ 16 (citing People ex rel. Thomas v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 40 Ill. App. 2d 308, 319 (1963)).
¶ 33 Dratewska-Zator argues her amended complaint sets forth facts demonstrating a clear right to the relief she requests, contending she has a right to a payment of the full amount of her award when the Fund had sufficient moneys to pay all claims made by eligible claimants. The Chairman and Commissioner respond Dratewska-Zator does not have a clear right to her award of medical expenses because her medical expenses have already been paid by the Commission. The Chairman and Commission argue an award to Dratewska-Zator would result in a windfall or double recovery. “The law in Illinois is that a plaintiff shall have only one recovery for an injury [citation]; double recovery is a result which has been condemned [citation].” Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 321-22 (1989); see Kim v. Alvey, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 657, 672 (2001) (double recovery is against public policy).
¶ 34 Dratewska-Zator argues the possibility of a windfall or double recovery does not warrant dismissal of her complaint. She relies upon case law holding a court may not review the Commission‘s decision or otherwise construe the Act, even if the decision appears too large on its face, in proceedings under
¶ 35 Dratewska-Zator also claims defendants are not entitled to a credit for medical expenses, relying on
“Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to give the employer or the insurance carrier the right to credit for any benefits or payments received by the employee other than compensation payments provided by this Act, and where the employee receives payments other than compensation payments, whether as full or partial salary, group insurance benefits, bonuses, annuities or any other payments, the employer or insurance carrier shall receive credit for each such payment only to the extent of the compensation that would have been payable during the period covered by such payment.”
820 ILCS 305/8(j)(2) (West 2004) .
The plain language of
¶ 36 Dratewska-Zator further argues there is no legal basis for the Commission to reimburse the Department of Healthcare and Family Services from the Fund. This argument, however, relates to whether the Chairman and Commission have a legal duty to pay the full award directly to Dratewska-Zator, not the issue of whether Dratewska-Zator has a clear right to a direct disbursement from the Fund representing medical expenses where the medical expenses paid by the Department of Healthcare and Family Services have been reimbursed by the Fund.
¶ 37 In this case, the Commission‘s letter attached to Dratewska-Zator‘s amended complaint states the cost of all of Dratewska-Zator‘s medical treatment was paid by the Department of Healthcare and Family Services, which was directly reimbursed by the Fund. The amended complaint fails to allege specific facts establishing Dratewska-Zator has any legal liability or obligation regarding the underlying medical expenses at issue. To the contrary, as previously discussed, Dratewska-Zator argues she has a clear right to a windfall. Given the long-standing rule against double recovery (Wilson, 131 Ill. 2d at 322), we disagree. Thus, we conclude Dratewska-Zator failed to allege facts establishing a clear right to direct disbursement from the Fund for medical expenses in the full amount of the Commission‘s award where the Commission has already paid her medical expenses from the Fund and she does not allege any remaining liability or obligation for medical expenses. Accordingly, we conclude the circuit court did not err in dismissing counts II and III of the amended complaint.6
¶ 39 In sum, we conclude the circuit court did not err in dismissing Dratewska-Zator‘s claim against the Treasurer, as the claim is barred by sovereign immunity. We also conclude the circuit court did not err in dismissing Dratewska-Zator‘s claims for mandamus against the Chairman and Commission, as Dratewska-Zator failed to allege facts establishing a clear right to the relief requested. For all of the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 40 Affirmed.