Doe v. DamronDoe v. Damron
BACKGROUND
A.
While plaintiff Jane Doe and defendant Scott Damron were married, the couple travelled together to California on two occasions. In Riverside, according to Doe, Damron forcibly groped her on a sidewalk, attempted to force her to perform oral sex on him in the street, and then raped, battered, and strangled her in
The couple travelled to California a second time to attend a conference in Anaheim and to vacation in northern California. Doe alleges that, during this trip, Damron grabbed her, shoved her to the floor, strangled her, and bruised her neck.
According to Doe, Damron also assaulted her numerous times in Georgia. However, apart from the Riverside incident, Damron denies ever assaulting Doe.
B.
During marital dissolution proceedings in Georgia, Doe alleged that Damron abused her, and she filed claims against him for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Doe later dismissed these claims without prejudice. The Georgia court granted the couple a divorce, finding that the marriage was irretrievably broken.
C.
In the instant case, Doe asserts causes of action against Damron for domestic violence (
DISCUSSION
A.
As an initial matter, we reject Doe‘s argument that Damron is precluded from re-litigating the question of personal jurisdiction because the issue was already decided in his criminal case. (See, e.g., DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824-825 [collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of the identical issue by a party bound by the prior judgment].) The record does not establish the same basis for jurisdiction in the two cases. Damron was present in California when he was served with the criminal complaint. (See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin (1990) 495 U.S. 604, 610-614, 619 (lead opn. of Scalia, J.) [presence in the forum when served generally suffices for jurisdiction].) In the civil case, however, Damron was not personally served in California with Doe‘s complaint. Accordingly, Doe cannot invoke collateral estoppel.
B.
Doe maintains that the trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Damron. We agree.
California grants its courts the power to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-state parties to the maximum extent that the state and federal constitutions allow. (
The minimum contacts doctrine serves two goals. First, it protects interstate federalism: a state that has no legitimate interest in a lawsuit should not encroach on states that do. (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) __ U.S. __, __ [141 S.Ct. 1017, 1025] (Ford).) Second, it treats defendants fairly. When individuals or companies conduct activities in (or direct actions toward) a state, they may reasonably expect to be held to account in the state‘s courts for related misconduct. (Ibid.) But it is unfair for a state to exercise jurisdiction over a party whose only contacts with the state were ” ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated.’ ” (Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 486 (Burger King).)
The nature and strength of a defendant‘s contacts with a state determine the type of jurisdiction a court may assert—general or specific. General (also called all-purpose) jurisdiction means that a defendant‘s contacts with a state are sufficiently extensive that the “defendant is ‘essentially at home,’ ” and the court may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant regardless of whether the claims relate to the forum state. (Ford, supra, __ U.S. at p. __ [141 S.Ct. at p. 1024].) Specific (case-linked) jurisdiction means the defendant is less closely connected to the forum state, and the court may only exercise jurisdiction if the claims arise from or relate to the defendant‘s contacts with the
The plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant‘s actions have created the requisite minimum contacts. (Zehia v. Superior Court (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 543, 552 (Zehia).) If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate jurisdiction would nonetheless be unreasonable. (Ibid.)
Our review is de novo, based on undisputed facts and the trial court‘s factual findings. (Zehia, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 552.) The trial court assumed that Doe established minimum contacts and thus made no findings on that point. Several facts are undisputed. Damron and Doe travelled together on at least two trips to California. Although Damron denies that he assaulted Doe on other occasions, he admitted that he assaulted and injured her in California when he pled guilty to willfully inflicting corporal injury on her on the Riverside trip (
2.
We now examine Damron‘s actions to determine whether they constitute minimum contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction.
To support specific jurisdiction, we look for a relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation.
These requirements are met when a tort claim is based on the actions of a defendant who traveled to a state and, while there, injured the plaintiff. (See Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 103, 111, 114; Kaiser Aetna v. Deal (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 896, 901 (Kaiser Aetna).) The defendant‘s actions—traveling to the state, tortiously injuring the plaintiff—took place in the forum state, and the lawsuit arose from those actions. (Compare Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 288-289 [no meaningful connection to Nevada where defendant did not travel to Nevada or commit tortious acts there].)
Our Supreme Court has held that a court may properly exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident who was sued in tort for a dog bite. (Owens v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1959) 52 Cal.2d 822, 830-832.) The suit arose from the defendant‘s ownership and possession of the offending dog while in the state—nothing more was required to satisfy due process. (Id. at p. 830.) The Owens court explained: “it is reasonable and fair to require a defendant whose voluntary acts have given rise to a cause of action in a state to litigate his responsibility for that conduct at the place where it occurred.” (Id. at p. 831; see also Kaiser Aetna, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 901; Rest.2d, Conf. of Laws, § 36, subd. (1) [“A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who has done . . . an act in the state with respect to any claim in tort arising from the act.“].)
Given Owens and Hess, Damron‘s actions easily satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. If a negligent car accident or dog bite suffices, surely an assault does, too. In no way could Damron‘s intentional tort in California be described as a ”
3.
Lastly, we consider whether, notwithstanding sufficient contacts with the state, Damron has presented “a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 477; but see Rest.2d, Conf. of Laws, § 36, subd. (1) [jurisdiction is reasonable for an in-state tort as a matter of law].)
First, Damron posits that “California has no interest in adjudicating alleged domestic violence allegations where the entire domestic relationship was in Georgia.” (Italics omitted.) (See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 776-777 (Keeton) [state interests are relevant to the reasonableness of jurisdiction].) Damron misses the point. The issue is not California‘s interest in regulating a domestic relationship in Georgia. The issue is California‘s interest in regulating tortious conduct in California. That interest is beyond dispute. ” ’ “[T]orts involve wrongful conduct which a state seeks to deter, and against which it attempts to afford protection.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 776; see also Rest.2d, Conf. of Laws, § 36, comment (c).)
Second, contrary to Damron‘s suggestion, the state‘s interest extends to non-resident victims. (See Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Limited v. Aero Law Group (9th Cir. 2018) 905 F.3d 597, 608 [a state “does have an interest in torts allegedly committed [against non-residents] within its borders (namely, preventing them).“].) California law protects people from domestic violence, holds abusers to account, and provides a remedy for victims of spousal abuse that occurs in the state—
Finally, Damron argues that it would be unfair to adjudicate the case in California because it would be inconvenient and burdensome. Despite sufficient contacts with a forum state, a defendant may prevail by demonstrating that litigating the case in a foreign state would be ” ‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient’ ” that it would put him at a ” ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to his opponent.” (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 478.) Damron submitted a declaration asserting, with scant details, that California is a “seriously inconvenient forum” and that “it will be an extreme financial burden” for him to have to defend suit here. The trial court noted that Damron has identified at least 20 individuals in Georgia that “are or may be” witnesses in the case. Damron says his witnesses in Georgia could testify to Doe‘s “erratic behavior and her jealous rages.” His Georgia attorney declared, again with no specifics, that “all documents[] [and] any alleged medical records or therapist records are all in Georgia,” and it would be expensive to “procure certified copies, subpoena documents, etc.”
We are not persuaded. To be sure, both parties would suffer inconvenience, expense, and burdens. Both live in Georgia. Both have retained counsel in California. While Damron has
We have considered Damron‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, the trial court shall deny Damron‘s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction.
BURNS, J.
We concur:
JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.