TREVELLE DINHAM v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
(AC 41625)
Keller, Elgo and Harper, Js.
July 2, 2019
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Syllabus
The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, sought a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the habeas petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for the failure to state a claim on which habeas relief could be granted, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. On appeal, he claimed, inter alia, that the habeas court improperly dismissed his claims that the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, misconstrued and misapplied the statute (
- The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improperly dismissed his claim that, when he pleaded guilty in 2012 to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, he relied on governmental representations that he would receive risk reduction credits to advance his parole eligibility date and reduce the total length of his sentence: although the petitioner claimed in his appellate brief that he had pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, which carried a twenty-eight year term of imprisonment, rather than murder, which carried a twenty-five year term of imprisonment, on the basis of representations by either the trial court or the prosecutor that, if he pleaded guilty to the manslaughter charge, he would be eligible to earn risk reduction credits that would advance his parole eligibility date and would reduce the total length of his sentence to under twenty-five years, the petitioner failed to plead in his amended habeas petition any factual basis on which his claim relied, as the petitioner only broadly alleged that he had a liberty interest in being able to rely on governmental representations when deciding how to resolve his pending criminal case, without any factual allegations of what the representations were or who made them; accordingly, the habeas court did not err in dismissing the petitioner‘s claim for failure to state a claim on which habeas relief could be granted.
- The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner‘s claim that the respondent misconstrued and misapplied P.A. 13-247, P.A. 13-3 and P.A. 15-216, which was based on his claim that those public acts amending the applicable statutes were substantive rather than procedural in nature and, therefore, should not apply retroactively to him; the petitioner‘s claim related to P.A. 13-247 was not ripe for adjudication because the petitioner had not yet been denied a hearing and, thus, it was impossible to determine whether a hearing would take place in the future, and with respect to P.A. 13-3 and P.A. 15-216, the petitioner had to assert a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke the habeas court‘s subject matter jurisdiction, which he failed to do, as he did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in certain benefits, such as good time credits, risk reduction credits, and early parole consideration, because the statutory scheme pursuant to which the respondent was authorized to award those benefits was discretionary in nature, and, therefore, the habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner‘s claims.
- The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improperly dismissed certain counts in his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for the failure to state a claim on which habeas relief could be granted, which was based on his assertion that his claims established a cognizable liberty interest by alleging that the respondent, through his customary practices, had created a liberty interest: there is no liberty interest in earning risk reduction credit or having it applied to further an inmate‘s parole eligibility date due to the discretionary nature of the respective statutory schemes, there is no liberty interest in parole or the procedure by which parole is granted or denied, and it would be contrary to our case law to hold in the present case that the petitioner has a vested liberty interest in earning future risk reduction credits, in having those credits utilized to advance his parole eligibility date, and in having a mandatory parole suitability hearing, when those interests were not assured by statute, judicial decree, or regulation; moreover, the legislature has made it clear in its amendments to
§§ 54-125a and18-98e that the respondent is no longer authorized to utilize risk reduction credits to advance an inmate‘s parole eligibility date and that he may no longer issue risk reduction credits to inmates such as the petitioner, and this court will not interfere with the legislature‘s clear mandate.
Argued February 5—officially released July 2, 2019
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the court, Hon. Edward J. Mullarkey, judge trial referee, sua sponte, rendered judgment dismissing the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this
Vishal K. Garg, for the appellant (petitioner).
Opinion
HARPER, J. The petitioner, Trevelle Dinham, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the court improperly dismissed his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for the failure to state a claim upon which habeas relief can be granted. Specifically, the petitioner argues that the court improperly dismissed his claims that (1) he relied on “governmental representations” that he would receive risk reduction credit when he pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, (2) the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, misconstrued and misapplied several statutes pertaining to the petitioner receiving a parole suitability hearing, earning risk reduction credit in the future, and applying risk reduction credit toward the advancement of the petitioner‘s parole eligibility date, and (3) the respondent‘s customary practices have created a vested liberty interest in receiving a parole suitability hearing, earning future risk reduction credits, and applying risk reduction credits to advance his parole eligibility date. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On April 2, 2012, the petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of
Before addressing the petitioner‘s individual claims, we first set forth the standards of review and relevant legal principles applicable to the petitioner‘s appeal. “Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction. . . . The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pentland v. Commissioner of Correction, 176 Conn. App. 779, 784-85, 169 A.3d 851, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 978, 174 A.3d 800 (2017). “[I]n order to invoke successfully the jurisdiction of the habeas court, a petitioner must allege an interest sufficient to give rise to habeas relief. . . . We have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, 326 Conn. 357, 368, 163 A.3d 597 (2017). “With respect to the habeas court‘s jurisdiction, [t]he scope of relief available through a petition for habeas corpus is limited. In order to invoke the trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction in a habeas action, a petitioner must allege that he is illegally confined or has been deprived of his liberty. . . . In other words, a petitioner must allege an interest sufficient to give rise to habeas relief. . . . In order to . . . qualify as a constitutionally protected liberty [interest] . . . the interest must be one that is assured either by statute, judicial decree, or regulation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boria v. Commissioner of Correction, 186 Conn. App. 332, 342, 199 A.3d 1127 (2018).
“Likewise, [w]hether a habeas court properly dismissed a petition pursuant to
Pursuant to No. 04-234 of the 2004 Public Acts, codified at
As to risk reduction credits, our Supreme Court has summarized the relevant statutes as follows: “In July, 2011 . . .
“Under the 2011 amendments to
“Effective July 1, 2013, the legislature again amended
I
The petitioner‘s first argument is that the court improperly dismissed his claims that, when he pleaded guilty in 2012 to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, he relied on “governmental representations”10 that he would receive risk reduction credits to advance his parole eligibility date and reduce the total length of his sentence.11 Specifically, the petitioner claims in his appellate brief that he pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, which carried a twenty-eight year term of imprisonment, rather than murder, which carried a twenty-five year term of imprisonment, because either the court or the prosecutor represented that, if he pleaded guilty to the manslaughter charge, he would be eligible to earn risk reduction credits that would advance his parole eligibility date and would reduce the total length of his sentence to under twenty-five years. The petitioner, relying on Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971),12 argues that his operative petition states a cognizable liberty interest by virtue of his “right to rely on governmental representations,” which confers subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Moreover, he asserts that the facts pleaded in his petition state a claim upon which habeas relief can be granted. We disagree.
II
The petitioner next argues that the court improperly dismissed several counts of his operative habeas petition, which allege that three public acts amending
As to the petitioner‘s claim regarding P.A. 13-247, even though it is unclear on what basis the court relied in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the petition had failed to state a claim upon which habeas relief could be granted, our plenary review leads us to conclude that, as argued by the respondent in his principal brief, there is another basis for finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, namely, that the petitioner‘s
Turning to P.A. 13-3 and P.A. 15-216, in his appellate brief, the petitioner cites to Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002), for the proposition that this court must hold that the public acts relevant to his claim are substantive in nature and, therefore, cannot be applied retroactively to him.17 In Johnson, our Supreme Court determined that the petitioner had made a cognizable ex post facto claim, which invoked the habeas court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. Id., 818-19. An ex post facto claim, however, is not dependent on the existence of a cognizable liberty interest. See Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462, 471, 196 A.3d 789 (2018) (“[t]he presence or absence of an affirmative, enforceable right is not relevant . . . to the ex post facto prohibition, which forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, 281 Conn. 241, 261, 914 A.2d 1034 (2007).
In the present case, the petitioner has stated that his claim is not an ex post facto claim but, rather, a statutory interpretation claim. Accordingly, Johnson is materially distinguishable from the present case. Citing to Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 326 Conn. 387-88, the petitioner asserts that his claim is not controlled by the question of whether he has alleged a cognizable liberty interest in receiving risk reduction credit. In essence, the petitioner asks for this court to reach the merits of his claim without him first alleging a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to establish a basis for the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction. Such a reading of Perez would run contrary to our jurisprudence, which has consistently held that “[i]n order to invoke the trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction in a habeas action, a petitioner must allege that he is illegally confined or has been deprived of his liberty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boria v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 186 Conn. App. 342. Accordingly, the petitioner must assert a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke the habeas court‘s subject matter jurisdiction.
“Our appellate courts have concluded, consistently, that an inmate does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in certain benefits—such as good time credits, risk reduction credits, and early parole consideration—if the statutory scheme pursuant to which the [respondent] is authorized to award those benefits is discretionary in nature.” Green v. Commissioner of Correction, 184 Conn. App. 76, 86–87, 194 A.3d 857, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 933, 195 A.3d 383 (2018); see Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 326 Conn. 370-73 (no liberty interest in risk reduction credits or application of risk reduction credits to advance parole eligibility date); see also Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, 186 Conn. App. 506, 514, 200 A.3d 701 (2018), cert. denied, 331 Conn. 901, 201 A.3d 402 (2019), and cases cited therein. Because the petitioner has failed to assert a cognizable liberty interest in his claims, we conclude that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over them.
III
Finally, the petitioner claims that the court improp-erly dismissed five counts in his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for the failure to state a claim upon which habeas relief can be granted because his claims established a cognizable liberty interest by alleging that the respondent, through his customary practices, has created a liberty interest.11 We are not persuaded.
As previously mentioned, our Supreme Court has held that, “[i]n order to . . . qualify as a constitutionally protected liberty [interest] . . . the interest must be one that is assured either by statute, judicial decree, or regulation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boria v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 186 Conn. App. 342. There is no liberty
The petitioner primarily relies on two federal cases to support the proposition that the respondent‘s customary practices created a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over his petition. First, he cites to Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-88, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1980), in which the United States Supreme Court held that an inmate had a cognizable liberty interest in not being transferred to a mental health facility for treatment. Specifically, the court found that such a liberty interest was created from an expectation based on Nebraska statutes and the prison‘s practice that an inmate would not be transferred unless he suffered from a mental disease or defect that could not be treated at the prison. Id., 489-90. Importantly, the court also factored into its conclusion the stigma created by an involuntary confinement to a mental health institution, which it opined could negatively impact the inmate. Id., 492.
Second, the petitioner cites to Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 47 (7th Cir. 1978), in which the plaintiffs claimed that, on the basis of prison policy and customs, they were entitled to earn good time credit during their segregation from the general prison population. The court acknowledged that, absent a liberty interest protected by the United States constitution, it must look primarily to state law to determine if a liberty interest was created. Id., 45-46. In addition to state statutes and prison administrative regulations, the court determined that a liberty interest may also be found in official policies or practices if a prisoner could show “some restriction upon the prison officials’ discretion to remove the benefit sought.” Id., 46-48. In light of new evidence that four prison directives provided guidelines for denying good time credit in the event a prisoner was segregated from the general prison population, the court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the directives created a state law entitlement. Id., 47.
A key distinction between the cases relied on by the petitioner and the present case is that, when looking to our state law, the legislature has barred the respondent from awarding further risk reduction credits to the petitioner or from applying the credits the petitioner has earned to advance his parole eligibility date. Indeed, the legislature has made it clear in its amendments to
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.