191 Conn. App. 84
Conn. App. Ct.2019Background
- In 2012 Dinham pleaded guilty to first‑degree manslaughter with a firearm and was sentenced to 28 years in prison.
- He filed an amended habeas petition (18 counts) challenging, inter alia, reliance on alleged governmental representations about risk reduction credits (RRC), and the retroactive application/interpretation of several public acts affecting parole suitability hearings and RRC.
- Relevant statutory changes: 2011 changes allowed discretionary RRC and permitted earned RRC to advance parole eligibility; 2013 P.A. 13‑3 and P.A. 13‑247 removed use of RRC to advance parole eligibility and made parole suitability hearings discretionary; 2015 P.A. 15‑216 barred certain violent offenders (including Dinham) from earning future RRC.
- The habeas court dismissed the amended petition sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The court certified the appeal on jurisdiction and failure‑to‑state grounds.
- On appeal Dinham argued (1) he relied on governmental representations about earning RRC when pleading guilty; (2) the public acts are substantive and cannot be applied to him retroactively; and (3) customary practices created a vested liberty interest in RRC and mandatory parole proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dinham) | Defendant's Argument (Commissioner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Reliance on governmental representations when pleading guilty | Dinham says he pleaded to manslaughter (28 yrs) rather than murder (25 yrs) because prosecutor or court represented he would be eligible for RRC that would advance parole and shorten sentence | Commissioner says petition lacks factual allegations identifying the representations or who made them; Santobello claim not pleaded with required detail | Dismissal affirmed: amended petition failed to plead facts showing what representations were made or by whom; claim fails to state a habeas claim |
| 2. Ripeness of challenge to P.A. 13‑247 (discretionary parole suitability hearings) | Dinham contends P.A. 13‑247 is substantive and should not apply retroactively; present interpretation affects him now | Commissioner argues claim is not ripe because Dinham has not been denied a hearing and the future denial is speculative | Dismissal affirmed as to P.A. 13‑247: claim is not ripe for adjudication |
| 3. Retroactivity of P.A. 13‑3 and P.A. 15‑216 (eliminating credit to advance parole; barring future RRC) | Dinham argues these acts are substantive (not procedural) and cannot be applied to him | Commissioner and court note petitioner must allege a cognizable liberty interest to invoke habeas jurisdiction; statutory schemes are discretionary so no protected liberty interest exists | Dismissal affirmed: Dinham failed to allege a constitutionally protected liberty interest; habeas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction |
| 4. Creation of vested liberty interest by customary practice or policies | Dinham contends customary practices created an enforceable expectation in RRC, application of RRC toward parole, and mandatory suitability hearings | Commissioner contends no such vested interest exists because statutes and subsequent amendments remove any assurance; judiciary should not usurp legislative prerogatives | Dismissal affirmed: no liberty interest arises from practices when statute/regulation does not assure the benefit; courts will not override legislative mandates |
Key Cases Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (plea inducements by prosecutor that form part of the bargain must be fulfilled)
- Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, 326 Conn. 357 (2017) (no vested liberty interest in RRC or their application to advance parole; ripeness issues for discretionary parole hearings)
- Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (liberty interest may arise where state law and practice create reasonable expectations; due process protections required for certain transfers)
- Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804 (2001) (ex post facto analysis and when statutory changes give rise to cognizable claims)
- Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1978) (state policies or directives may create an enforceable entitlement if they sufficiently restrict official discretion)