Patrick Dineen, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dorothea Pelfrey, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 21AP-547
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
June 16, 2022
[Cite as Dineen v. Pelfrey, 2022-Ohio-2035.]
SADLER, J.
(C.P.C. No. 20CV-5317) (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Rendered on June 16, 2022
On brief: Henderson Mokhtari & Weatherly, Al A. Mokhtari, for appellant. Argued: Al A. Mokhtari.
On brief: Ritzler, Coughlin & Paglia, Jonathon M. Angarola, for appellee. Argued: Jonathon M. Angarola.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
SADLER, J.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant, Patrick Dineen, M.D., appeals a judgment entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting two motions to compel filed by defendant-appellee, Dorothea Pelfrey, ordering appellant to sign authorizations for release of medical and billing records, and denying appellant‘s motions to strike, for a protective order, and for sanctions. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{2} Following an August 2018 motor vehicle accident involving appellant and appellee, appellant and his wife filed a complaint in August 2020 asserting claims of
[a]s a direct result of the crash, Plaintiff may have suffered significant injuries and/or an aggravation of pre-existing injuries to his body, causing physical pain, mental distress, anxiety, loss of enjoyment of life, physical impairmеnt and/or an inability to perform ordinary activities, which injuries may be permanent, as well as miscellaneous unreimbursed costs, expenses and losses.
(Compl. at 3.) On October 2, 2020, appellee filed an answer and served her first set of combined interrogatories and requests for production of documents on appellant. The interrogatories included multiple questions about diagnosis and treatment provided by medical practitioners, physicians, surgeons, and psychologists, and the documents requested by appellee included cоpies of “all hospital and medical records relating to the treatment received by [appellant]” and “copies of any reports [all medical professionals] have prepared to date.” (Oct. 2, 2020 Interrogs. and Req. for Produc. of Docs. at 10.)
{3} Appellant did not respond to the first set of interrogatories. Appellant did authorize certain medical providers (Physical Medical Associates, Columbus Internal Medicine, OhioHealth Riverside Radiology, and McConnell Heart Health Center) to release to appellee‘s lawyer medical treatment and billing records spanning August 28, 2018 (the accident) through August 2020. The parties then scheduled depositions for June 30, 2021.
{4} During appellant‘s deposition, appellant‘s counsel instructed appellant not to answer several questions, including: his hospitalizations over the past ten years excluding treatment for this accident; any emergency room or urgent care treatment he sought in the past ten years excluding treatment for this accident; any orthopedist treatment he sought in the last ten years excluding treatment fоr this accident; any pain management treatment he sought in the last ten years excluding treatment for this accident; any orthopedist treatment he sought in the last ten years excluding treatment for this accident; and what prescription medication he was on at the time of this accident. Appellant‘s counsel also instructed appellant not to answer questions about the circumstances surrounding a car accident in the early 1990‘s and whether he had been treated after that accident; whether he had been involved in any other motor vehicle accidents, prior to ten years before the deposition, aside from the instant accident and the accident in the 1990‘s; whether he had
{5} Shortly after the depositions, appellee filed a motion to compel appellant‘s participation in a second deposition. Within it, appellee explained that while appellant “claims he sustained a neck injury in this accident and first sought medical treatment after this accident on September 20, 2018,” appellee disputed proximate cause of the asserted injury and damages. (July 2, 2021 Mot. to Compel at 1.) Appellee argued that appellant‘s “recent medical history, his involvement in other court proceedings, his involvement in other motor vehicle accidents, and his state of mind at the time of this accident” were relevant “to whether the motor vehicle accident at issue proximately caused his neck injury.” (July 2, 2021 Mot. to Compel at 3.)
{6} Appellee additionally filed a motion to compel appellant to respond to appellee‘s written discovery requests and sign medical authorizations. Specificаlly, appellee asserted appellant had not responded to appellee‘s October 2, 2020 written discovery requests, including a set of interrogatories and production of documents, or appellee‘s July 9, 2021 request for authorizations to release medical records related to information gained in appellant‘s deposition.1
{7} Appellant filed a combined memorandum contra appellee‘s motions to compel, a motion to strike, a motion for a protective order, and a motion fоr sanctions. Within it, appellant argued the discovery deadline had passed, the “discovery each party actually needs for trial [had] already been completed,” that appellee was only entitled to discovery of matter causally and historically related to the injuries at issue, and that appellee fabricated a discovery dispute to improperly delay the case. (July 16, 2021 Memo. Contra at 2.) Appellee filed a reply contending the parties rescheduled the deposition to accommodate appellant‘s dog‘s health issues, and that appellant further caused delay by
{8} On October 11, 2021, the trial court filed an entry granting appellee‘s motions to compel a second deposition and to compel responses to written discovery and denying appellant‘s motions to strike, for a protective order, and for sanctions. According to the trial court, “[t]o this day, [appellant] has not responded to the written discovery and has not signed the authorizations to release medical and billing records from the providers with whom he obtained treatment after the accident” as discussed by appellant in his deposition. (Trial Court Entry at 2.) The trial court found that “the information requested in [appellee‘s] discovery requests is discoverable and thаt the discovery responses are necessary for [appellee] to thoroughly evaluate [appellant‘s] claims, prepare a proper defense, and conduct meaningful additional discovery. The need to conduct additional discovery can only be determined after reviewing [appellant‘s] outstanding overdue discovery responses, which further supports granting [appellee‘s] Motion to Compel.” (Trial Court Entry at 2-3.)
{9} In conjunction with granting appellee‘s motions to compel, the trial court ordered appellant to, within 14 days of the order, serve his answers to appellant‘s first set of interrogatories and request for production of documents, sign and return the authorizations for release of medical and billing records, and make himself available for a second deposition. The trial court warned that appellant‘s failure to comply with the orders could result in sanctions including dismissal of appellant‘s claims.
{10} Appellant filed a timely appeal. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing appellant sought interlocutory relief that is not final and appealable pursuant to
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{11} Appellant assigns three assignments of error for review:
- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE‘S MOTION TO COMPEL A SECOND DEPOSITION OF APPELLANT - THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE‘S MOTION TO COMPEL WRITTEN DISCOVERY RESPONSES AND SIGNED MEDICAL AUTHORIZATIONS
III. ANALYSIS
{12} We first consider whether the trial court‘s October 11, 2021 entry constitutes a final, appealable order. In her motion to dismiss, appellee contends that the entry appealed in this case is an interlocutory order not subject to review at this time under
{13} Generally, discovery orders are not subject to immediate appeal. In re Special Grand Jury Investigation, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-446, 2018-Ohio-760, ¶ 7. “However, an order compelling discovery of information alleged to be privileged or protected may be final and appealable if certain requirements of
{14}
[a]n order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
* * *
An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favоr of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
{16} In this case, the order at issue in part directs appellant to disclose information he claims is protected by the physician-patient privilege. The trial court found, without rеserve, the information requested in appellee‘s discovery requests (including diagnosis and treatment by medical professionals) to be discoverable, ordered appellant to sign and return the authorizations for release of medical records, and threatened sanctions for the failure to do so. In his brief on appeal, appellant argues orders compelling disclosure of information concerning physician-patient confidentiality, privileged under
{17} In similar circumstances to this case, this court has held “that a trial court order compelling disclosure of information concerning physician-patient confidentiality constitutes a final, appealable order.” Mason v. Booker, 185 Ohio App.3d 19, 2009-Ohio-6198, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing Talvan v. Siegel, 80 Ohio App.3d 781, 784 (1992). See, e.g., Gentile v. Duncan, 2013-Ohio-5540, 5 N.E.3d 100, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.) (concluding trial court‘s order granting appelleе‘s motion to compel appellant to execute medical release authorizations was a final, appealable order); Randall v. Cantwell Mach. Co., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-786, 2013-Ohio-2744, ¶ 8 (concluding, “to the extent that the decision orders appellant to grant an unaltered medical release that could lead to the production of privileged information and denies a protective order related to that information, it is a final, appealable order.“).
{19} Therefore, we do not find Chen determines this case and instead apply this court‘s precedent as stated in Mason, Gentile, and Randall. Doing so, we similarly conclude that the October 11, 2021, order at issue in this case is final and appealable under
{20} Appellant‘s assignments of error challenge the trial court‘s decision to deny his motion fоr a protective order and grant appellant‘s motions to compel. Because appellant‘s assignments of error all concern discovery of allegedly privileged information and are interrelated, we will address them together. Gentile at ¶ 8. Trial court orders concerning discovery, including protective orders, are generally reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 181, 2009-Ohio-2496, ¶ 13; Randall at ¶ 11. However, “[w]hether the information sought is confidential and privileged from disclosure is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” Schlotterer at ¶ 13.
{21} Generally, “[u]nless otherwisе limited by court order, * * * [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party‘s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”
{22}
{23} Here, appellant contends he testified in deposition that he sustained a neck injury as a result of this crash and that he had no prior neck “injury, issue, symptom, or * * * treatment” during the ten years before the motor vehicle accident. (Appellant‘s Brief at 15.) In appellant‘s view, the information the trial court ordered him to produce via written discovery, medical authorizations and a second deposition is both incumbent upon medical diagnosis and treatment and is not causally or historically related to the motor vehicle accident or the injuries he sustained in the accident. Appellant believes the trial court, by failing to set proper limits, has effectively permitted “an unmitigated fishing expedition” into appellee‘s confidential medical history. (Appellant‘s Brief at 15.)
{24} Appellee counters that appellant was required to answer questions during his deposition requesting non-privileged information and, under Vega v. Tivurcio, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-327, 2014-Ohio-4588, ¶ 29, could not refuse to do so based on relevancy. Appellee also contends appellant failed to meet his burden of showing privilege since he did not specify how the information requested is privileged, akin to Pietrangelo v. Hudson, 8th Dist. No. 107344, 2019-Ohio-1988 citing
{25} The cases raised by appellee are distinguishable. Vega concerned the plaintiff‘s right to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege at a pre-trial deposition. We found
{26} The two Eighth District cases, Heimberger and Pietrangelo, also diverge from this case in ways that undercut a dirеct comparison. In Heimberger, the Eighth District held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in compelling discovery considering the discovery requests at issue in that case. The court found all of the discovery requests except one related causally or historically to the physical and/or mental injuries alleged by the plaintiff since they included appropriate time parameters, and the one outlier seeking information for medical care “at any time” to nevertheless not violate the privilege since it only asked for names and contact information of doctors. Id. at ¶ 26-27. While the Eighth District also commented that the plaintiff did not comply with civil rules with respect to her assertion of privilege, it did so as an add-on “note” without further elaboration. Id. at ¶ 29. Moreover, the plaintiff in Heimberger, unlike the instant case, did not seek a protective order pertaining to medical records.
{27} In Pietrangelo, the plaintiff brought a negligence action against the defendant alleging injuries to his head, neck, and back. “After learning that [the plaintiff] had previously suffered injuries to the same areas for which he now claimed harm, [the defendant] sought [the plaintiff‘s] prior medical records” and the plaintiff refused to sign the release authorizations. Id. at ¶ 1. The plaintiff refused to comply without seeking a protective order or any other means to protect asserted privileged information. The Eighth District found the plaintiff had failed to articulate a factual basis by which the trial court could have concluded that a record was not properly discoverable and had not demonstrated the trial court erred in granting his motion to compel.
{28} Notably, Pietrangelo at ¶ 23 distinguishes itself from its earlier case, Wooten v. Westfield Ins. Co., 181 Ohio App.3d 59, 2009-Ohio-494 (8th Dist.), in which the Eighth District reversed and remanded a trial court‘s denial of a plaintiff‘s motion for a protective order where the defendant‘s request for the medical information was “a blanket one,”
{29} In the instant case, unlike Pietrangelo, appellant did not testify to having previous injuries to the same areas for which he now claimed harm (the neck injury), the information sought is not constrained to the claimed injury, and appellant did seek a protective order. These circumstances are more aligned with Wooten, where the trial court improperly issued a “blanket” order to compel production of medical information and denied the plaintiff‘s motion for a protective order.
{30} Similar to Wooten, this court has determined that a trial court errs in ordering broad access to a plaintiff‘s medical information withоut considering, upon request, whether the requested records are causally and historically related to the injuries at issue and without determining whether confidential and privileged information may need protected. See e.g., Mason at ¶ 22 (“We acknowledge that there are many methods for obtaining medical records and determining their relevance before requiring their disclosure in discovery. * * * A trial court may not, however, simply ignore the requirements of
{31} Here, the parties agree the case has narrowed to appellant‘s assertion of a neck injury allegedly caused by the parties’ motor vehicle accident. Nevertheless, the trial court summarily found all the information requested in appellee‘s discovery requests to be discoverable without considering the appropriate timeframe for discovery or imposing any
{32} Accordingly, we sustain appellant‘s three assignments of error to the extent indicated herein. The matter is remanded to the trial court to determine whether the records it ordered disclosed are causally or historically related to appellant‘s claimed injuries and to determine how to appropriately protect the information and records at issue in this case. Randall at ¶ 15, citing Mason (“[W]e recognize that the trial court is in the best position to determine the most appropriate method to protect privileged records in a particular case, but the court may not ignore the need to preserve the statutory physician-patient privilege.“); Mason at ¶ 22 (“[W]e intend no intrusion upon a trial court‘s authority to determine the most appropriate method fоr protecting privileged medical records in a given case.“). See also Ward at ¶ 32, citing
IV. CONCLUSION
{33} Having sustained appellant‘s three assignments of error, we reverse the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and remand the mattеr for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded.