ALTHEA DINAN v. ANNE PATTEN ET AL.
(SC 19204)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued September 17, 2014—officially released June 16, 2015
Palmer, Zarella, McDonald, Espinosa, Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js.
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Michael P. Kaelin, with whom was William N.
Jeffrey A. Cooper filed a brief as amicus curiae.
Kelley Galica Peck, Richard A. Marone and Marilyn B. Fagelson filed a brief for the Connecticut Bar Association as amicus curiae.
ESPINOSA, J. The present case requires us to consider the method by which
The record reveals the following relevant facts as found by the trial court, and procedural history. The plaintiff’s husband, Albert A. Garofalo (decedent), died on July 21, 2000. Prior to his marriage to the plaintiff, the decedent executed a codicil to his preexisting will, thereby republishing his will, which had devised nothing to the plaintiff. Dinan v. Marchand, 279 Conn. 558, 560, 903 A.2d 201 (2006). The beneficiaries to the will were Patten, who is the decedent’s daughter, and her three children, Nicole M. Toth, Aaron M. Toth and Alexis P. Toth. On October 27, 2000, the plaintiff timely elected her statutory share pursuant to the spousal share statute,
On May 2, 2008, the plaintiff requested that her statutory share be set out. See
In its decision, the Probate Court first concluded that the statutory share should be calculated based on the value of the estate after the deduction of federal and state estate taxes. The court relied on the definition of the statutory share in the spousal share statute as ‘‘a life estate of one-third in value of all the property passing under the will, real and personal, legally or equitably owned by the deceased spouse at the time of his or her death, after the payment of all debts and charges against the estate. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which tried the matter de novo. See In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 199, 796 A.2d 1141 (2002) (‘‘[a]s a general matter, when a decision of the Probate Court is appealed to the Superior Court, a trial de novo is conducted’’). The court first rejected the defendant’s claim that, because the plaintiff had contested the decedent’s will before requesting that her share be set out, she was barred from recovering her statutory share by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel, election of remedies and laches. Turning to the substantive issues, the trial court reversed in part the decree of the Probate Court, only as to that court’s ruling that the value of the estate after the deduction of taxes should serve as the basis for the statutory share.5 The court disagreed with the Probate Court’s conclusion that estate taxes constituted ‘‘charges’’ against the estate pursuant to the spousal share statute.
For simplicity, before we set forth our rationale as to each of the five issues presented in the appeal and the cross appeal, we first summarize our holdings as to all of those issues, in the order in which we will discuss them. We hold that the trial court properly concluded that: (1) the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and election of remedies do not bar the plaintiff from seeking her statutory share; (2) because state and federal estate taxes are not ‘‘debts and charges against the estate’’ pursuant to the spousal share statute, the statutory share should be calculated prior to the subtraction of taxes from the value of the estate;
I
THE DOCTRINES OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND ELECTION OF REMEDIES
The defendant argues that the trial court improperly rejected her claim that the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and election of remedies bar the plaintiff from claiming her statutory share because the plaintiff contested the decedent’s will before she requested that her statutory share be set out.7 As to all of these doctrines, the defendant relies on the fact that, between 2000 and 2006, the plaintiff challenged the validity of the decedent’s will, on the basis that it was the product of undue influence, until this court ultimately rejected her claim, affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See Dinan v. Marchand, supra, 279 Conn. 562. In 2008, only after she had lost her appeal, the plaintiff requested that the administrator set out her statutory share. As we explain herein, the defendant has failed to satisfy her burden under any of these doctrines. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff is not barred from seeking to recover her statutory share.
Waiver
The defendant claims that the plaintiff waived her right to recover her statutory share by first pursuing her challenge to the decedent’s will. ‘‘Waiver is a question of fact. . . . [W]here the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous. . . . Therefore, the trial court’s conclusions must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Dept. of Public Health, 272 Conn. 617, 622–23, 866 A.2d 582 (2005).
‘‘Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . Waiver does not have to be express, but may consist of acts or conduct from which waiver may be implied.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) MSO, LLC v. DeSimone, 313 Conn. 54, 64, 94 A.3d 1189 (2014). ‘‘In other words, waiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do so.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 58, 970 A.2d 656, cert. denied sub nom. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. New York Times Corp., 558 U.S. 991, 130 S. Ct. 500, 175 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2009). ‘‘Waiver is based upon a species of the principle of estoppel and where applicable it will be enforced as the estoppel would be enforced. . . . Estoppel has its roots in equity and stems from the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 272 Conn. 623. ‘‘As a general rule, both statutory and constitutional rights and privileges may be waived.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pereira v. State Board of Education, 304 Conn. 1, 40, 37 A.3d 625 (2012).
The defendant’s claim fails because the plaintiff timely elected her statutory share within the 150 day time period specified in
B
Estoppel and Election of Remedies
The defendant claims that the plaintiff is barred both by the doctrines of estoppel and election of remedies. Under the doctrine of election of remedies, the defendant contends that the intestate share that the plaintiff would have received had her challenge to the will succeeded is mutually exclusive of the remedy provided by the spousal share statute, because the right to a statutory share presumes the existence of a valid will. The defendant further claims that the trial court incorrectly relied on this court’s decision in DelVecchio v. DelVecchio, 146 Conn. 188, 196, 148 A.2d 554 (1959), to conclude that the choice between a statutory share and an intestate one is an election of rights rather than remedies. The defendant also claims that the plaintiff’s decision to contest the decedent’s will before requesting that the administrator set out her statutory share caused the administrator to fail to set out the statutory share, thus estopping the plaintiff from recovering the statutory share.
The doctrines of estoppel and election of remedies both require the defendant to prove detrimental reliance.8 We have explained that ‘‘any claim of estoppel is predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury. . . . It is the burden of the party asserting a claim of estoppel to establish the existence of the elements essential to an estoppel . . . and whether that burden has been satisfied in a particular case is an issue of fact. . . . The trial court’s factual determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v. Walsh, 218 Conn. 681, 699, 590 A.2d 957 (1991). As for election of remedies, the party relying on the doctrine is required to show
Because the trial court’s factual finding that there was ‘‘little to no support in the record for a conclusion that the [defendant and the administrator] changed their position in detrimental reliance on the plaintiff’s decision to contest the will’’ was not clearly erroneous, we conclude that the plaintiff’s action is not barred by either the doctrine of estoppel or the doctrine of election of remedies. ‘‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murtha v. Hartford, 303 Conn. 1, 12–13, 35 A.3d 177 (2011). In making its finding that there was little or no support in the record to support the defendant’s claim that there had been a change in position based on the plaintiff’s decision to contest the will, the court relied on the fact that, although the defendant claimed that the failure to set out the statutory share was based on the plaintiff’s pursuit of her challenge to the will, the defendant and the administrator contend that they were not required to set out the share until the plaintiff requested that they do so. The defendant has therefore admitted that she and the administrator did not believe they were required to set out the share until the plaintiff requested that it be set out. Given that concession, the trial court’s conclusion that the link between the failure to set out the share and the ongoing litigation was ‘‘tenuous, at best’’ is not clearly erroneous.
II
TAXES
In her cross appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiff’s statutory share must be calculated on the basis of the value of the estate before the deduction of federal and state estate taxes. The defendant contends that estate taxes constitute ‘‘charges against the estate’’ pursuant to the spousal share statute, and, therefore, that the plain language of the statute requires that the statutory share be calculated after the deduction of estate taxes from the value of the estate. The amici argue in their briefs;
The question of whether the phrase ‘‘debts and charges against the estate’’ in
Neither ‘‘debts’’ nor ‘‘charges’’ is defined in the spousal share statute, and nothing in the statute’s language clarifies whether estate taxes qualify as debts or charges against the estate. Nor has this court previously undertaken to construe those terms. Moreover, our review of the use of the terms ‘‘debts’’ and ‘‘charges’’ in related statutes does not resolve the apparent ambiguity. For example,
Other statutes, however, consistently treat estate taxes as distinct from debts or charges. See, e.g.,
Connecticut’s proration statute, however, when understood in conjunction with the state and federal marital deductions, clarifies that the surviving spouse’s statutory share must be calculated prior to the deduction of any estate taxes. Specifically,
Under both federal and state estate tax provisions, a surviving spouse is entitled to a marital deduction with respect to her statutory share. The federal marital deduction is set forth in
We addressed the effect of the proration and marital deduction statutes on the taxation of an estate in New York Trust Co. v. Doubleday, 144 Conn. 134, 128 A.2d 192 (1956). In that case, the decedent’s will divided the residue of the estate into five equal shares, and provided that the decedent’s widow would receive one of those shares. Id., 137. The will provided that all estate taxes, including those attributable to specific devises, would be paid from the residuary estate. Id. In order to resolve a disagreement between the beneficiaries as to how the tax burden should be allocated among them in light of the proration and marital deduction statutes, the executors brought an action for construction of the will. Id., 137–38. Specifically, the surviving spouse contended that because she was entitled to the marital deduction, the proration statute required that no portion of the burden of the estate taxes should be allocated to her,
This court began its analysis with the observation that the proration statute was enacted in 1945. Id., 139. The court explained that ‘‘[p]rior to that time, the burden of federal and state estate taxes rested on the estate as a whole and, in the absence of a directive in the will to the contrary—a situation which through ignorance, thoughtlessness or carelessness often prevailed—the taxes were paid out of the residuary estate. . . . This created many instances of hardship upon and injustice to widows and children, who, as the natural objects of a testator’s bounty, were customarily the residuary legatees and, as such, were frequently saddled with the entire tax, while other beneficiaries, more distantly related to the testator or not related at all, paid no taxes at all. The proration statute was contrived to circumvent these instances of hardship and injustice. It is not a taxing statute. . . . It assumes that a tax either has been or will be paid in conformity with the tax law and then undertakes to determine upon whom the ultimate burden of the tax shall be placed. In short, it takes over where the tax statute leaves off.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 140. The proration statute, therefore, had shifted the previous presumption. After its passage, a will’s silence regarding the allocation of the tax burden would trigger the operation of the proration statute to equitably prorate the tax burden among all the legatees, including those who had been left specific devises.
In Doubleday, because the testator had specified that all estate taxes should be paid from the residuary, this court concluded that the will prevented the proration statute from requiring equitable proration as to the specific devises. Adhering to the principle, however, that because of its burden shifting effect, ‘‘a testamentary directive against the prorating of taxes must be clear and unambiguous,’’ we declined to read the will’s tax provision broadly, and concluded that it did not prevent the proration statute from applying as to the allocation of the tax burden among the residuary legatees. Id., 141–42. We recognized that, but for the marital deduction, the required outcome would be a simple matter—the proration statute would require that the tax burden be borne equally by the five residuary legatees.
The proration statute specifically requires, however, that in determining the net estate for purposes of making the proration, allowance must be made for any deductions allowed by the statute imposing the tax.
Our reasoning in Doubleday applies equally to the plaintiff’s statutory share in the present case. The purpose of the marital deduction is to benefit the surviving spouse, and allowing other persons with an interest in the estate to share in that benefit would be contrary to that purpose, and, therefore, would also contravene the legislature’s intent in the proration statute.9 We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff’s statutory share must be calculated based on the pretax value of the estate.
III
TIMING OF VALUATION
We next address the plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the value of the statutory share should be calculated based on the value of the estate as of the date of distribution, rather than the value of the estate at the time of the decedent’s death. The plaintiff argues that her interest properly is calculated based on the value of the decedent’s estate at the time of his death, not the time of distribution. The plaintiff relies on the language in the spousal share statute, which defines the interest created by the statutory share as ‘‘a life estate of one-third in value of all the property passing under the will, real and personal, legally or equitably owned by the deceased spouse at the time of his or her death, after the payment of all debts and charges against the estate.’’ (Emphasis added.)
The question of whether the statutory share created by the spousal share statute is one based on the value of the estate at the time of death or at the time of distribution presents a question of statutory interpretation. We are therefore guided by the same principles that governed our analysis in part II of this opinion. See Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, supra, 298 Conn. 197–98. Accordingly, as dictated by
The statutory language provides conflicting evidence of legislative intent. We first observe that the surviving spouse’s statutory share is limited to a life estate in the real and personal property ‘‘passing under the will . . . .’’ This court previously has interpreted that phrase to exclude assets such as a trust savings account, because in such an account the transfer of ownership from the decedent to the beneficiary is not effected by way of a will but by virtue of the terms of the account itself, which specifies that upon the depositor/trustee’s death, the funds would be payable to the named beneficiary. Dalia v. Lawrence, 226 Conn. 51, 57, 627 A.2d 392 (1993). We have not considered whether the phrase ‘‘passing under the will’’ suggests a specific time of valuation of the decedent’s estate for the purpose of determining the amount of a spouse’s statutory share, by, for instance, requiring that the estate be valued as of the time that ownership of the property has transferred.
One logical measure of the transfer of ownership is when title to the property vests in the beneficiaries. The statutory share is based on both the real and personal property ‘‘passing under the will.’’ Legal and equitable title to real and personal property vests in the beneficiaries at different times. See Gray v. Goddard, 90 Conn. 561, 568, 98 A. 126 (1916) (‘‘[t]he legal title to real property upon the death of the owner vests immediately in the heir or legatee, while the legal title to personal property passes to the executor or administrator, and such property is to be used for the payment of debts and the remainder distributed to the heirs’’). Accordingly, because
The plaintiff contends that the phrase ‘‘in value . . .
Another phrase in the spousal share statute, however, suggests a specific time frame for valuing the estate. That phrase specifically provides that the statutory share is calculated ‘‘after the payment of all debts and charges against the estate.’’11
The spousal share statute, which allows the court to appoint distributors to set out the statutory share;
There is, however, contrary language in the spousal share statute. Conflicting evidence of legislative intent is provided by subsection (d) of
We begin by observing that there are three alternative theories by which a surviving spouse may claim entitlement to a share in the decedent’s estate. The availability of those entitlements depends on the facts of the case. The first two are available only if there is a will. If there is a will and if the surviving spouse has been named as a beneficiary of the will, he or she may elect to inherit under the will, or, in the alternative, the surviving spouse may elect to take the statutory share pursuant to the spousal share statute. The spousal share statute specifically provides that these two entitlements are mutually exclusive. If a surviving spouse elects to take his or her share pursuant to the will, that share is taken in lieu of the statutory share, and vice versa.
If a surviving spouse elects to take his or her share under the will, our law is clear. This court has long adhered to the rule that ‘‘distribution is to be made according to the value of the property at the time of
This court has explained the equitable principles underlying this rule. In Clement v. Brainard, 46 Conn. 174, 175–76 (1878), the dispute centered on the timing of the valuation of the residue of the testator’s estate, for purposes of calculating the two-fifths share that the testator had left to his grandchildren. The court rejected a claim that the estate’s value should be determined based on the value reported in a supplemental interim accounting. Id., 178. The appropriate timing of valuation, the court held, was at the time of distribution. Id., 180. As a practical matter, the court observed, because the testator’s will granted an annuity to his sister during her natural life, the amount of the residue could not be determined until her death, an event that had not yet occurred at the time of the supplemental interim accounting. Id., 179. More importantly, the court concluded that it would be ‘‘unreasonable and unjust, as well as repugnant to the provisions of the will and of the law, to decree the payment to the petitioners, before distribution, of their share of the estate in money.’’ Id., 180. The court explained that between the date of the supplemental interim accounting and the date when the distribution would be made, ‘‘the estate might have greatly depreciated in value without any fault on the part of the [fiduciary]. And if such was the fact, it would be highly inequitable to compel him to bear the loss occasioned by the depreciation. On the other hand, if the property appreciated in value during the period mentioned, the petitioners would be entitled to and should have the benefit of the appreciation.’’ Id.; see also Chase National Bank v. Schleussner, 117 Conn. 370, 375–76, 167 A. 808 (1933) (‘‘Determination of the net estate, if made by distributors appointed by the Court of Probate, would be based upon the value of the assets comprising the estate as found by them at the time the distribution was made; Platt v. Platt, 42 Conn. 330, 346 [1875]; and it is significant that in one case where the power to divide an estate was left by a testator to his widow and she died before completing it, we held that distributors appointed to complete the division should proceed upon the values as existing when they made it. Walker v. Upson, [74 Conn. 128, 131, 49 A. 904 (1901)].’’).
This court has applied the same rule to the distribution of an intestate share of an estate. Walker v. Upson, supra, 74 Conn. 131 (portion of estate passing by intestacy distributed per stirpes according to value of intestate estate at time of distribution). The statutory
In light of the requirement in
We cannot discern any reasonable basis for valuating a surviving spouse’s statutory share at a different time than a surviving spouse’s intestate and testate shares. Like those shares, the statutory share of a surviving spouse must be calculated on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of distribution in order to avoid ‘‘unreasonable and unjust’’ results. Clement v. Brainard, supra, 46 Conn. 180. At the time of the decedent’s death, it cannot be known how long it will take until the estate settles and the testate shares are distributed. It also would be impossible accurately to predict at the time of the decedent’s death whether and how much the value of the decedent’s estate will appreciate or depreciate. Accordingly, because the value of all other
The plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. She contends that the policy principles underlying the creation of the surviving spouse’s right to a statutory share justify a conclusion that the statutory share should be calculated based on the value of the estate at the time of the decedent’s death. It is true that the spousal share statute has its origins in Connecticut’s modified form of the right of dower,13 which, we have explained, had the primary purpose of preventing husbands from entirely or substantially disinheriting their wives by will, and, in such cases, to make ‘‘suitable provision . . . for the maintenance and comfortable support of widows, after the decease of their husbands . . . .’’ Brown’s Appeal, 72 Conn. 148, 153, 44 A. 22 (1899). The surviving spouse’s statutory share first appeared in our law in 1877, when the legislature passed chapter 114 of the 1877 Public Acts (act). As we have explained, that act effected radical changes in the property rights of married women, including the abolition of the widow’s right of dower, which was replaced with the gender neutral, surviving spouse’s right to elect against the decedent’s will. Public Acts 1877, c. 114; see Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 25–36, 63 A. 285 (1906) (describing passage and effect of act). After the passage of the act, both husbands and wives who survived their spouses were entitled to the same statutory rights to the decedent’s estate. See General Statutes (1887 Rev.) § 623.14
This court has recognized that the purpose of the statutory share, like the former right to dower, is ‘‘for the protection of the surviving spouse in making suitable provision for his [or her] maintenance and support . . . .’’ Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, supra, 110 Conn. 48. The plaintiff incorrectly infers, however, that the best and only way to provide for that protection is to determine the statutory share on the basis of the estate’s value at the time of the decedent’s death. As we have
The plaintiff also contends that determining the value of the surviving spouse’s statutory share on the basis of the estate’s value at the time of distribution improperly leaves the estate open to manipulation to defeat the statutory share of the surviving spouse.16 That claim fails to account both for the laws governing a fiduciary’s duty to the estate and the authority of the Probate Court to oversee the settlement of an estate. First, the fiduciary charged with management of the estate’s assets during the settlement of the estate owes a duty of loyalty to the estate. That duty requires the fiduciary to represent the rights of both beneficiaries and a surviving spouse who elects against the will. See Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, 268 Conn. 441, 455, 844 A.2d 836 (2004) (‘‘[a]n executrix has a fiduciary responsibility to maintain an undivided loyalty to the estate . . . and must diligently represent the rights of the heirs and distributees and also those of creditors’’ [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); Hall v. Schoenwetter, 239 Conn. 553, 559, 686 A.2d 980 (1996) (‘‘an executrix must remain loyal to the estate that she is administering and must not act out of self-interest or for the interests of parties other than the heirs, distributees, and creditors of the estate’’). If the fiduciary acts in breach of that duty, the surviving spouse may bring an action on that basis. See Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, supra, 455.
Second, the Probate Court has broad powers to oversee the settlement of estates. For example, pursuant to
IV
INCOME DUE ON THE STATUTORY SHARE
The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improperly concluded that, with respect to the period prior to the date of distribution, she was entitled to the average yield of one third of the estate during that time. The plaintiff contends that because the estate has not earned a positive income since the decedent’s death, she is entitled instead to a ‘‘reasonable rate of return’’ for the period between the decedent’s death and the date when the statutory share is set out. We disagree. This court has directly addressed this issue in Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, supra, 110 Conn. 48, in which we expressly held that as to a surviving spouse’s statutory share, ‘‘[t]he rate of the income from the date of death to the actual setting out of the third will be the average yield of the estate for this period.’’ Although the plaintiff notes that the estate that was at issue in Greims actually earned a positive income, we did not predicate our holding on that fact, or in any way suggest that our holding was limited to the factual circumstances of the case.
V
APPOINTMENT OF DISTRIBUTORS
Finally, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the Probate Court did not abuse its discretion in appointing distributors. The plaintiff does not cite to any authority for her claim that the appointment of distributors constituted an abuse of discretion, but merely asserts that because, in her view, the duties of the distributors in the present case would be ‘‘far from ‘statutory and ministerial,’ ’’ the court should not have appointed the distributors. The spousal share statute clearly grants the Probate Court the authority to act within its discretion to appoint distributors.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.