Delano Marco MEDINA, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
Supreme Court Case No. 21SC765
Supreme Court of Colorado
September 11, 2023
535 P.3d 82
Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Grant R. Fevurly, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.
CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), the United States Supreme Court upheld a defendant‘s guilty plea even though the defendant maintained his innocence while entering the plea. In so doing, the Court noted that such a scenario (now commonly known as an Alford plea) is functionally identical to a no-contest plea when the defendant “intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id. at 37, 91 S.Ct. 160.
¶2 Similarly, Delano Marco Medina pleaded guilty to felony menacing even though he maintained his innocence of that charge. He did so in exchange for the dismissal of several other criminal cases. The trial court found that Medina‘s plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. But because Medina agreed to waive the establishment of a factual basis for menacing under
¶3 We must now determine whether an Alford plea requires that the trial court make a finding of strong evidence of actual guilt to pass constitutional muster. We conclude that there is no such requirement. Rather, we hold that a defendant may enter an Alford plea while nonetheless waiving the establishment of a factual basis for the charge under
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶4 Medina‘s wife reported that Medina had threatened her and held a knife to her throat during an argument. The People charged Medina in Lake County with felony menacing (committed with the use of a real or simulated weapon), a class 5 felony. At the time, Medina faced prosecution in five other Lake County cases, as well as one Boulder County case. The court set a $10,000 cash or surety bond in the menacing case; bond amounts were also set in the other cases.
¶5 Medina later agreed to plead guilty to felony menacing in this case. In exchange, the People agreed to dismiss all charges in the five other Lake County cases.1 The parties further agreed that after Medina received his Boulder County sentence, he would receive a consecutive one-year sentence for menacing. Medina signed a copy of the guilty plea, which stated both: “I acknowledge that there is factual basis for my guilty plea” and “I waive establishment of a factual basis for the charge.”
¶6 Before the plea colloquy, Medina‘s attorney (“plea counsel“) told the trial court that Medina “steadfastly maintains that the menacing would not be a provable case.” Plea counsel added, however, that Medina “does not have a defense” to “other cases, in particular a bond violation.” Accordingly, plea counsel said that Medina was choosing to plead guilty to felony menacing, “even though in his heart of hearts he does not believe he‘s guilty of that,” so Medina could “take advantage of the plea bargain.” And “to that extent,” plea counsel stated, Medina “would be waiving proof of a factual basis.”
¶7 The trial court acknowledged that because Medina maintained his innocence, he was entering an Alford plea. The court asked Medina if he had read the plea agreement, understood everything he read, and signed it. Medina said that he had. The court warned Medina that he would be “giving up some serious rights” by pleading guilty, which the court then described in turn before asking if Medina understood that he would be waiving each right. Medina said that he understood. The trial court explained the elements of felony menacing and asked whether Medina understood that if he went to trial, the People would need to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Medina said that he understood. The trial court asked if Medina understood that “[o]nce you plead guilty, this is a final decision. You cannot come back at another time, change your mind, plead not guilty and have a trial.” Again, Medina said that he understood. At that point, the trial court asked Medina how he chose to plead, and Medina pleaded guilty.
¶8 Accordingly, the trial court found that Medina‘s plea was “freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given.” The court also found that Medina had “waived the factual basis” for the menacing charge and understood that he was waiving his rights by pleading guilty. The trial court therefore accepted Medina‘s guilty plea and scheduled a sentencing hearing. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court then dismissed the five other Lake County cases. With the other cases dismissed, Medina posted the $10,000 surety bond in this case and was released from custody.
¶9 Medina failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Almost a year later, Medina appeared in custody once again, represented by a new attorney (“sentencing counsel“). The People asked the court to enter the one-year sentence for felony menacing that Medina had agreed to previously. Sentencing counsel, however, sought to withdraw the plea, arguing that Medina had believed he could withdraw an Alford plea if he discovered new evidence and that new evidence had since come to light.2 The trial court denied Medina‘s request to withdraw his plea, stating that “there‘s no evidence before me that [Medina‘s] plea was not freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently done.” And so, the court imposed the one-year sentence that Medina had stipulated to previously, and Medina was given 165 days of presentence confinement credit for a total sentence of 200
¶10 Almost three years later, Medina filed a motion for postconviction relief. As relevant here, Medina argued that there was no factual basis for the plea, rendering his conviction invalid under Alford. At a hearing, plea counsel testified that Medina had “waived the factual basis” for menacing because (1) “he may have been guilty of some of the other charges” and “wanted to take the plea agreement,” and (2) he would be able to post bond once the other Lake County cases were dismissed. Medina also testified and acknowledged that he “was guilty of” the other Lake County cases, but he maintained that he was innocent of menacing. Under cross-examination, Medina conceded that pleading guilty to menacing “was my choice” and that “[n]obody forced me.”
¶11 The postconviction court denied Medina‘s motion. It found that the record “reflect[ed] that [Medina] waived a factual basis for the purpose of availing himself of the plea bargain in the case“; specifically, Medina did so because he wanted to avoid prosecution in the other Lake County cases and post bond. The court found it “[p]articularly persuasive” that Medina had pleaded guilty knowing he would obtain the benefits of an “incredibly favorable” plea bargain, including the dismissal of five other cases and a stipulated one-year sentence. Moreover, the court found that the record provided sufficient grounds “to determine that there was a strong factual basis for the offense.” Accordingly, the court ruled that Medina‘s plea was knowing and voluntary; it also ruled that “[t]here was a factual basis for the plea sufficient to meet the Alford requirements.”
¶12 Medina appealed, arguing that under Alford, his plea was invalid because the trial court allowed him to waive proof of a factual basis.3 People v. Medina, 2021 COA 124, ¶ 14, 501 P.3d 834, 837. A division of the court of appeals first noted that
¶13 Faced with these competing views, the division stated that Colorado “has treated an Alford plea like any other guilty plea” and that
¶14 Medina petitioned for certiorari review, and we granted his petition.4
II. Standard of Review
¶15 “The constitutional validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo.” Brooks v. People, 2019 CO 75M, ¶ 6, 448 P.3d 310, 312. We defer to the trial court‘s factual findings, however, if they are supported by the record. Id. Likewise, in
III. Analysis
¶16 We begin by discussing the general requirements for a valid guilty plea. We then turn to Alford, which upheld the validity of guilty pleas accompanied by a protestation of innocence when the defendant “intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” 400 U.S. at 37, 91 S.Ct. 160. After surveying decisions that have interpreted this language, we determine that a factual-basis finding is not a constitutional prerequisite for an Alford plea, but rather a procedural tool that courts may use to evaluate whether the plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent (and therefore comports with due process). Thus, we hold that a defendant may enter an Alford plea while nonetheless waiving the establishment of a factual basis for the charge under
A. Guilty Pleas
¶17 Because a guilty plea involves a defendant‘s waiver of important constitutional rights, it “is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.‘” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). A plea is invalid if “a defendant ‘does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections he is waiving,’ or ‘has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.‘” People v. Dist. Ct., 868 P.2d 400, 403 (Colo. 1994) (citation omitted) (quoting Lacy v. People, 775 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1989)).
¶18 However, “[n]o formalistic litany is required before a court may accept a plea of guilty.” Id. “Nor does due process generally require that the record demonstrate an adequate factual basis for the plea.” Lacy, 775 P.2d at 5. Instead, the record “must simply show that the defendant entered his guilty plea voluntarily and understandingly.” Id.
¶19 Alongside these constitutional requirements, we have adopted rules governing the procedures by which a defendant may plead guilty.
¶20 With these standards in mind, we turn to the type of guilty plea at issue here: a plea accompanied by a protestation of innocence, also called an Alford plea.
B. Alford Pleas
¶21 In Alford, the United States Supreme Court confronted whether the Constitution permits a defendant to plead guilty even when the defendant maintains factual innocence. 400 U.S. at 34, 91 S.Ct. 160. The Court answered yes. Id. at 37, 91 S.Ct. 160.
¶22 Alford was charged with first degree murder. Id. at 26, 91 S.Ct. 160. At the time, North Carolina law provided that first degree murder must be punished with the death penalty unless the jury recommended life imprisonment. Id. at 27 n.1, 91 S.Ct. 160. And while Alford insisted that he was innocent, several witnesses incriminated him. Id. at 27, 91 S.Ct. 160. So, Alford decided to plead guilty to second degree murder, which was not a death-penalty-eligible crime. Id. at 27–28 & n.1, 91 S.Ct. 160. Before accepting his plea, the trial court heard testimony suggesting that Alford had committed the murder. Id. at 28, 91 S.Ct. 160. Alford also testified, saying that while he maintained his innocence, he wished to plead guilty to avoid the death penalty. Id. The court accepted Alford‘s plea and sentenced him to prison. Id. at 29, 91 S.Ct. 160.
¶23 Alford later challenged his conviction, arguing (in part) that his plea was invalid because he maintained his innocence. See id. at 31, 91 S.Ct. 160. The Supreme Court stated that the standard for assessing a guilty plea‘s validity “was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Id. The Court acknowledged that ordinarily, a conviction on a guilty plea “is justified by the defendant‘s admission that he committed the crime charged against him and his consent that judgment be entered without a trial of any kind.” Id. at 32, 91 S.Ct. 160.
¶24 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that a defendant who maintains innocence “might reasonably conclude a jury would be convinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty.” Id. at 33, 91 S.Ct. 160 (quoting McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
¶25 The Court noted that it had already allowed lower courts to impose a prison sentence upon a plea of nolo contendere—even though a defendant doesn‘t expressly admit guilt in such a plea.5 Id. at 35-36, 91 S.Ct. 160 (citing Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 457, 47 S.Ct. 127, 71 L.Ed. 347 (1926)). “Implicit” in that logic, the Court determined, “is a recognition that the Constitution does not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence.” Id. at 36, 91 S.Ct. 160. So “while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty.” Id. at 37, 91 S.Ct. 160.
¶26 Returning to Alford‘s case, the Court stated that it couldn‘t “perceive any material difference” between a nolo contendere plea and a plea accompanied by a protestation of innocence “when, as in the instant case, a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id. (emphasis added). In so doing, the Court noted that some courts “properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea.” Id. at 38 n.10, 91 S.Ct. 160 (collecting
¶27 Colorado permits defendants to make the same choice. See People v. Birdsong, 958 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Colo. 1998). At bottom, though, “[a]n Alford plea is a guilty plea.” Id.; see also United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1995) (“An Alford-type guilty plea is a guilty plea in all material respects.“). So, in other contexts, we have declined to differentiate an Alford plea from any other guilty plea. People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 758 (Colo. 2001) (holding that “an Alford plea is no different from a guilty plea” when analyzing whether a defendant may withdraw the plea); Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1127 (holding that the trial court‘s “obligations to advise the defendant were no greater” for an Alford plea “than with any other guilty plea“). Nor do our procedural rules differentiate an Alford plea from any other guilty plea. See
¶28 Left unresolved in our decisions, however, is whether an Alford plea must be supported by a finding that there is strong evidence of actual guilt, or whether a defendant may instead waive that finding. See Lacy, 775 P.2d at 5 & n.7 (holding that due process generally does not require that the record demonstrate an adequate factual basis for a plea but declining to address whether the same is true for Alford pleas); In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897, 905 n.8 (Colo. 2002) (suggesting in dicta that “the trial judge should inquire into factual guilt” when a defendant protests innocence). We turn to that issue now.
C. Strong Evidence of Actual Guilt
¶29 Medina argues that the “strong evidence of actual guilt” discussed in Alford is a nonwaivable, constitutional prerequisite for all Alford pleas, meaning that an Alford plea violates due process unless it is supported by a factual-basis finding. In response, the People argue that the requirement for courts to make a factual-basis finding is a product of procedural rules, not the Constitution, and that Colorado‘s
¶30 Other appellate courts are split on this issue. Compare Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that strong evidence of guilt is not a constitutional prerequisite for an Alford plea), with Willett v. Georgia, 608 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a factual basis must support an Alford plea).
¶31 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit holds that strong evidence of actual guilt is not constitutionally required, even in the context of an Alford plea. Higgason, 984 F.2d at 208. Instead, the standard for assessing whether an Alford plea is constitutional remains the same as with any other guilty plea: The plea must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Id. (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S.Ct. 160). According to the Seventh Circuit, “[p]utting a factual basis for the plea on the record has become familiar as a result of statutes and rules, not as a result of constitutional compulsion.” Id. The Higgason court recognized that
¶32 The Sixth Circuit has similarly concluded that the factual-basis requirement “is not a requirement of the Constitution, but rather a requirement created by rules and
¶33 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that courts are constitutionally obligated to inquire into the factual basis of an Alford plea before accepting one. Willett, 608 F.2d at 540. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit focused on a footnote in Alford, which said that various courts “properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea.” Id. (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.10, 91 S.Ct. 160). Extrapolating from that language, the Fifth Circuit held that “a judicial finding of some factual basis for [the] defendant‘s guilt is an essential part of the constitutionally-required finding of a voluntary and intelligent decision to plead guilty” in the context of an Alford plea. Id. Other federal circuits have similarly concluded that evidence of guilt must support an Alford plea. See United States ex rel. Dunn v. Casscles, 494 F.2d 397, 399 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Mackins, 218 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 659 (4th Cir. 2007); White Hawk v. Solem, 693 F.2d 825, 829 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Vidal, 561 F.3d 1113, 1119 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lefever, 343 F. App‘x 595, 597 (11th Cir. 2009). Even these courts, however, disagree as to whether “strong” evidence is necessary, as opposed to less stringent proof. Compare White Hawk, 693 F.2d at 829 (requiring a “strong factual basis“), with United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[A]ny
¶34 State courts are similarly split. Some have held that a factual-basis finding is constitutionally required for Alford pleas. See, e.g., Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 625 P.2d 414, 415-16 (Idaho 1981); State v. Smith, 61 Haw. 522, 606 P.2d 86, 88-89 (Haw. 1980); State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977). But others treat the issue as a matter of state procedural law, not a federal constitutional requirement. See, e.g., People v. Barker, 83 Ill.2d 319, 47 Ill.Dec. 399, 415 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ill. 1980) (relying on state procedural rule modeled after
¶35 Among these competing views, we find the Seventh Circuit‘s approach most persuasive. Although a finding of strong evidence of actual guilt can show that an Alford plea comports with due process, it is not a constitutional prerequisite for every such plea. Higgason, 984 F.2d at 208. Instead, “[t]he Constitution‘s standard ‘was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice.‘” Id. (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S.Ct. 160).
¶36 While the Supreme Court noted that evidence of Alford‘s guilt “provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered,” Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, 91 S.Ct. 160, the Court didn‘t state that strong evidence of guilt alone can provide those means, Higgason, 984 F.2d at 207 (” ‘If A then B’ does not imply ‘if not-A then not-B.’ “). To the contrary, inquiring into factual guilt is simply one way that courts may assess whether an Alford plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent—not the only way.
¶37
¶38 This treatment comports with our previous recognition that “[a]n Alford plea is a guilty plea.” Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1127. We have long recognized that “an Alford plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea” and have declined to impose different standards when assessing either. Schneider, 25 P.3d at 759; see also Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1127. And while we have (until today) reserved ruling on whether a factual-basis finding must support an Alford plea, we have nonetheless held that due process does not “generally require that the record demonstrate an adequate factual basis” for guilty pleas. Lacy, 775 P.2d at 5. Because we have declined to differentiate between Alford pleas and other guilty pleas generally, we decline to do so in this context as well.
¶39 Moreover, the determination that a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case. See id. at 6. While a defendant‘s choice to plead guilty may be influenced by the factual basis for the charge, it may equally be influenced by other considerations. For instance, by pleading guilty to menacing, Medina was able to achieve the global disposition of several other criminal cases for which he had no defense. Cf. People v. Isaacks, 133 P.3d 1190, 1191 (Colo. 2006) (discussing a defendant who was charged with menacing but instead pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge that “was not supported by facts” so he could take advantage of a plea bargain); People v. Maestas, 224 P.3d 405, 408-09 (Colo. App. 2009) (discussing a defendant who pleaded guilty to a charge of second degree assault as part of a plea agreement, even though it was “undisputed that there was no factual basis” for the charge). Like Alford, Medina “now argues in effect that the State should not have allowed him this choice.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 38-39, 91 S.Ct. 160. But that‘s not what the Constitution demands. So long as the defendant‘s choice to plead guilty is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, the Constitution‘s mandate is met. Higgason, 984 F.2d at 208 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S.Ct. 160).
¶40 Thus, we hold that a defendant may enter an Alford plea while nonetheless waiving the establishment of a factual basis for the charge under
D. Application
¶41 We now turn to Medina‘s plea. Medina faced prosecution in several other cases when he was charged with menacing. So, Medina had a choice to make. He could plead guilty
¶42 Medina chose the former option. He signed a plea that waived proof of a factual basis for the menacing charge, and his counsel told the trial court that Medina was doing so to take advantage of his plea agreement. The trial court explained the consequences of the guilty plea to Medina, stopping several times to ensure that Medina understood. Each time, Medina said that he did. In Medina‘s words, “it was my choice” to plead guilty, and “[n]obody forced me.” On that record, the postconviction court ruled that Medina waived proof of a factual basis and voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pleaded guilty to take advantage of his “incredibly favorable” plea bargain.
¶43 In this appeal, Medina‘s sole argument is that the trial court was constitutionally required to find that there was strong evidence of actual guilt, even though Medina waived proof of a factual basis. As we have discussed, there is no such requirement. Thus, the postconviction court did not err.
IV. Conclusion
¶44 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the division‘s judgment, albeit on slightly different grounds.
Notes
We granted certiorari to review the following issue:Whether a guilty plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), but without strong evidence of guilt, violates due process.
Whether a guilty plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), but without strong evidence of guilt, violates due process.