People v. Isaacks

PEOPLE of Colorado, Petitioner, Christopher ISAACKS,

Nathaniel

Respondent.

No. 05SC87. Colorado,

Supreme Court of

En Banc.

April

Rehearing May Denied 2006.* ^[*] Justice COATS would grant petition; Justice EID does not participate.

H91 part agree- of the General, sentencing concessions as Suthers, Attorney Che- W. John General, Attorney Appel- ment. Hone, ryl Assistant Section, Den- Division, Justice Criminal late 3, 2003, plea hearing was held March On ver, for Petitioner. guilty to the con- pleaded Isaacks at which Public Kaplan, Colorado David S. a Plea charge. The Petition to Enter spiracy Griffin, Defender, Deputy State Elizabeth signed pres- in the Guilty, which Isaacks Defender, Denver, Respondent. Public that Isaacks had lawyer, of his stated ence his constitu- of and understood been advised RICE, Justice. including to remain rights, tional History and Procedural I. Facts determine to have silent and Na- Respondent, December On The guilt a reasonable doubt. Isaacks, in an alterca- involved was thaniel C. conspira- listed the elements of Petition also mother, brother, with his in his home tion felony menacing, and acknowl- cy to commit led Isaacks’s This altercation father. edged that police, who came father to call may accepts my plea I the Court [i]f According to Isaacks. and arrested house Department of Correc- sentenced to the Ar- Support of Warrantless the Affidavit year term of between tions for definite when Isaacks rest, started the altercation If finds months .... the Court and 18 objects the room. across began throw extraordinary aggravating circumstances home, to leave the started brother Isaacks’s greater it sentence me for term holding a saw Isaacks stayed when he but range ... to double presumptive than the threatening chest spoon to his mother’s term, making long a term as maximum ap- brother Isaaeks’s kill her. When years. as 3 him and the two attacked proached, Isaacks during the point fight. At one began to expressly that “I Finally, petition stated log over his a two-foot Isaacks held fight, my right by jury on all issues.” to trial waive La- to kill his brother. and threatened head for the appeared Issacks April On altercation, threw differ- Isaacks ter in the judged an- sentencing hearing. The trial Even- at his father. log across the room ent pre- Isaacks’s that he had reviewed nounced managed and father tually, Isaacks’s brother parties they if report and asked him, they kept him restrained to restrain to the re- any or corrections had additions Affidavit fur- police arrived. The until the lawyer replied, “Judge, we port. Isaacks’s both his Isaacks had bitten alleged that ther guess couple of additions —I do have a —or family at- while his and his brother mother continued, stating that He corrections.” him. tempted to restrain the assertion disagreed with Isaacks charged one count' was Isaacks being removed for his report that the reason 3—206(l)(a),(b), felony menacing, section 18— was that he had program from treatment (2005), third-degree two counts of C.R.S. objection was The second punched a wall. Pursuant to an assault, section 18-3-204.1 the statement tells me that that “Mr. Isaacks People moved parties, the agreement is not he’s resistant to treatment in here that exchange for charges in these to dismiss correct; moti- very interested and that he’s conspir- agreeing plead Isaacks’s into treatment and get himself back vated to felony menacing, 18-2- acy section to commit to do.” something that he wants that’s (b). 18-3-206(l)(a), 201(1), conspiracy rather, Next, judge rec- facts; the trial heard supported charge was not Is- parties. of the from each charge to take ommendations guilty to this pleaded Isaacks Isaacks, urged court to sentence counsel bargain. sacks’s advantage of prison. probation rather therefore, of a fac- Isaacks the establishment waived argued making argument, this counsel party made plea. Neither tual Therefore, except noted, present date. and the cited in offense the statutes 1. Unless otherwise noted, to the 2005 ver- we cite changed where otherwise opinion relevant have not of the Colorado Code. sion way the date of the commission between inappropriate because of prison Washington, Isaacks’s (2004), history and the fact that to Colorado’s minor criminal statuto- ry sentencing scheme and concluded that mental illness. from Defense coun- suffered aggravated sentencing under section 18-1.3- further asserted that sel Isaacks’s brother 401(6), (2005), constitutionally per- C.R.S. is fight; had struck the first blow in the this missible it when is based on “facts admitted directly contention contradicted the Affidavit Lopez, the defendant.” 113 P.3d at 716. Arrest, in Support of Warrantless which al- 303, Blakely, See at 124 S.Ct. 2531. leged fight. that Isaacks had started the The granted issue on which we certiorari in judge The trial sentenced Isaacks to “[wjhether the instant case is a defendant’s years Department three in the of Correc- failure to make corrections or additions to his tions. This sentence amounted to the twice presentence report when asked the court presumptive range maximum in the for the constitutes an admission of information not conspiracy felony offense of to commit me- related to the elements of the crime [that] nacing.2 judge aggravated The based the permits aggravated sentence under Blake- sentence on a number of factors contained ly Washington Lopez v. People.” v. First, presentence report. judge the We sentencing conclude that a court noted the seriousness and violent' nature may not usé a defendant’s to admissions day Isaacks’s conduct on the of the incident. aggravated sentence him in range the unless judge The also observed that the conviction knowingly, the defendant voluntarily and in conduct apparently “involve[d] which telligently waives his Sixth Amendment ongoing significant period has been for a have find the support facts that the Further, judge time.” the noted that aggravated Applying sentence. this rule to Isaacks had therapists seen nine and tried case, the instant we hold that a defendant’s medications, seven and concluded that “it’s object failure to presentence to facts in a well, say, try little difficult for me to let’s report does not constitute an admission for therapist a tenth eighth and an medication purposes Blakely Lopez unless the without a specific recommendation from defendant makes a constitutionally sufficient ” waiver of somebody .... his to a Finally, judge trial on the the consid- facts report. contained in the Because Isaacks did ered the fact history that Isaacks’s included Blakely rights waive his respect illegal drugs. the abuse of six presentence the in report facts the Blakely was decided while Isaacks’s case aggravate sentence, court used to appeal. was on direct In supplemental brief- sentence must be vacated. ing response Blakely, argued Isaacks opinion proceeds First, This as follows. that “the trial court Blakely violated v. explain we scope Blakely jury-trial Washington by imposing right by identifying the facts to which it aggravated range longer than that author- Second, applies. procedures we set forth the ized guilty plea People alone.” v. accompany must a sentencing court’s Isaacks, 03CA0967, No. slip op. at use of the defendant’s factual admissions for 2004) WL 2749072 (Colo.App. December sentencing aggravated Third, range. (citation omitted). appeals The court of apply we our conclusions to the facts of agreed, sentence, vacated Isaacks’s and re- Finally, Isaacks’s case. we set forth the manded to the resentencing. district court for appropriate relief for a sentence that violates People Id. at petitioned for certiora- Blakely. the dictates of ri, and we affirm. A. To Which Facts Does the Analysis II. Jury-Trial Right Apply? (Colo. Lopez In People, v. 113 P.3d 713 Washington holds that 2005), applied we holding criminal defendants have the 18-1-105(6), 2. The court relied on section "aggravating C.R.S. circumstances." For ease of refer- (2002), 18-1.3-401(6), predecessor ence, to section throughout opinion, this we cite to the judges which authorizes trial to increase sen- 18-1.3-401(6). 2005 version of section presumptive range tences based on “all the facts which the law simple jus- trial on makes of them race. As a matter of tice, punishment.” it procedural essential seems obvious that the safeguards designed 159 L.Ed.2d 403 protect Apprendi (internal quotation marks To un from pains apply unwarranted should holding consequences equally and its Jersey derstand to the two acts that New Colorado, necessary singled punishment. it is has out for Blakely, Ap review the facts of as well as 476, 120 Holmes, (quoting Id. S.Ct. 2348 O. Jersey, prendi v. New (M. ed.1963)). The Common Law 40 Howe n (2000), Blakely im later, years Four the Court predecessor. mediate applied Apprendi rule to the State of Apprendi, scheme, the Washington’s statutory sentencing Court considered Jersey a pleaded provided sentencing sentence of New man who which a ceiling for each guilty possession to two counts of of a fire of several classes of felonies and further purpose specified arm for an unlawful after he fired range” a “standard of sentences for particular several into the home of an African- bullets offenses within each class. 542 family recently American that had moved 124 U.S. S.Ct. (2004). previously neighborhood.

into a all-white pleaded guilty 403 The defendant 469-70, second-degree firearm, 530 at 120 New kidnaping U.S. S.Ct. 2348. with a a Jersey punishment felony. law authorized a B” sentencing ceiling “be “class The for years years” tween five and 10 for the of B Washington class felonies under law was possession years’ illegal imprisonment, fense of of a firearm for an ten and the standard 468, 120 purpose. at range second-degree Id. S.Ct. 2348. On one for kidnaping was 49-53 counts, the trial court imprisonment. sentenced the months’ Id. at 124 S.Ct. years’ imprisonment, defendant to twelve re

lying provided a “hate on crime” law that for Following plea, the defendant’s the trial upon finding by “extended” sentences a court him imprison- sentenced to 90 months’ by judge preponderance trial of the evi ment, which was sentencing ceiling below the committing dence that defendant “[t]he felonies, for B class but above the “standard purpose the crime acted with a to intimidate range” second-degree kidnaping for with a group or individual of individuals because firearm. at 124 U.S. race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sex imposed 2531. The court this sentence based 468-69, ethnicity.” ual orientation or Id. at finding Blakely on its that acted with “delib- 471, 120 S.Ct. 2348. cruelty” committing erate the offense. Id. The Court struck down this sen- Apprendi The Court struck down the in- tence, holding that the maximum “[ojther sentence, holding creased judge impose is not the sentence he conviction, prior any fact fact that facts, “may impose finding after additional penalty beyond increases the for a crime may impose but the maximum he without prescribed statutory maximum must be'sub- 303-04, findings.” additional at Id. jury, proved beyond mitted to a rea- (emphasis in original). S.Ct. 2531 sonable doubt.” 530 at explained 2348. The Court the reason for its Apprendi Blakely provide a clear an- holding as follows: question swer to the of what facts are cov- pains you by jury-trial if right: ‘The law threatens certain do ered The _’ things Jersey certain New threat- extends to all facts that are not re- or, Apprendi pains if ened with certain flected in a verdict in the case of a unlawfully possessed weapon plea bargain, beyond and with to all facts those that pains charged additional if he selected his victims establish the elements of the of- purpose awith to intimidate them because fense.3 As was the case for the defendant in Apprendi imposing judgment range prescribed 3. We note that do not ren- within the "impermissible judges by Apprendi, der it to exercise dis- statute.” 530 U.S. at taking (emphasis original). People into consideration various fac- See also cretion— Pate, (Colo.1994) (“It relating tors both is axio- to offense and offender—in 878 P.2d for a protections required are in order simple justice” dural matter of Apprendi, “it is a factual sentencing to use a defendant’s should court in Colorado that criminal defendants aggravated sen- purposes admissions procedural protections from receive the same by guided analysis in this tencing. are regard to We pains” without “unwarranted Apprendi conclusions by the the Court’s “pains” are authorized whether those Amend- principles familiar of Sixth presence of several an offense or definition of law. circumstances” under section “aggravating 18-1.3-401(6). in- This is the constitutional Apprendi observed Court holding that the by Blakely’s protected terest “in Amendments the Fourteenth and Sixth jury-trial right extends to “all the facts which a criminal defendant to ‘a disputably entitle punishment,” the law makes essential every is [he] determination Blakely, 542 at with which he is element of the crime (internal omitted), quotation marks ” Ap doubt.’ charged, a reasonable n Lopez application of to Colorado’s (em prendi, 530 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. 2348 Lopez, scheme. See added) (citations phasis Later (concluding aggravated-circum- opinion, the concluded that “when Court analysis by section 18- stances authorized is used to the term ‘sentence enhancement’ 1.3-401(6) fact-find- “may involve additional beyond an increase the maximum describe does, judge,” it ing by “[i]f the trial and sentence, statutory func it is the authorized Blakely applies”). the rule of greater of a equivalent tional of an element is consistent note that this conclusion We jury’s by the offense than the one covered holdings of other courts that with the several 19, Id. at 494 n. 120 S.Ct. verdict.” the issue. See State have considered (“On Lopez, also 113 P.3d at 722 2348. See Brown, 225, 947, 212 Ariz. 129 P.3d 953 sentencing factors the distinction between (2006) (“[W]e hold that the Sixth Amendment crimes, [in and elements of the Court Blake jury respect aggrava to an right to trial with rejected any remaining ly impliedly differ ] ting necessary impose a sentence factor to jury purposes of the trial re ence for the unless the defendant’s remains inviolate quirement.”). guilty necessarily aggrava the establishes Curtis, ....”); 126 ting factor State Wash. Appren- From these statements in (Div. 2005) 459, 1233, 2, App. 108 P.3d 1236 extrapolate it difficult to the rule di is not (concluding obligated that “the was to that, right jury generally, like the to trial jury beyond a prove to a reasonable doubt right jury determine the facts that to have facts”); exceptional State v. Ha sentence sentencing un aggravated form the basis for 155, (Minn.Ct.App. gen, 690 N.W.2d 158-59 18-1.3-401(6) der section is a fundamental 2004) (recognizing “the defendant’s constitu only knowingly, right that can be waived jury right tional to a trial on the voluntarily intelligently. Boykin v. and See issue[s]”). 1709, Alabama, 23 395 U.S. (1969) (holding guilty pleas 274 L.Ed.2d Required B. Is Before a Procedure What accompanied by knowing, volun must be May Sentencing Court Use a Defen- waiver); tary, People v. Nor dant’s Factual Admissions for Sen- (Colo.1985) (hold man, tencing Aggravated Range? in the ing jury trial must that waiver of the to by voluntary, Having Blakely provides accompanied knowing, determined that waiver). not, jury may trial court to trial on all intentional defendants facts therefore, by jury in a verdict or use admitted the defen “[flacts that are not included dant,” aggravate a guilty plea, Lopez, turn to the 113 P.3d at to essential to a we necessary right. unless the defendant procedures protect to defendant’s sentence voluntarily, intelligently proce- knowingly, Specifically, we must determine what by Assembly.”). judiciary power exclusive determined the General matic that the has the impose which fall within the limits sentences First, Apprendi’s jury-trial rights respect “pre with reference to the waives his maximum,” statutory those facts. scribed at added), (emphasis suggests language in aware that certain We are statutory punish maximum is the per read to Apprendi and could be offense, by particular ment fixed law for a a defendant’s factual mit trial courts to use bearing that all punish other facts on his sentence in the admissions to increase facts) (except prior-conviction are Apprendi, waiver. See absence of by Blakely jury-trial right. covered Sec (“Other at 530 U.S. ond, requiring a waiver before “facts ... conviction, any prior the fact of a fact admitted the defendant” be used to beyond penalty increases the for a crime increase the defendant’s sentence furthers statutory prescribed maximum must be sub goal Blakely, the central which ....”); Blakely, mitted defendant, system correct a “in which a (defining at 124 S.Ct. 2531 “the warning plea, no ‘statutory Apprendi purposes maximum’ for either his indictment or judge may routinely maximum sentence a would see his maximum [as] impose solely re on the years from as little as five balloon to as much facts or admitted verdict imprisonment....” as life flected (emphasis original)). We are defendant.’’ also aware that several federal circuits have Finally, express language ap- upheld sentencing enhancements under pears require constitutionally sufficient sentencing guidelines federal based on facts sentencing court can waiver before the con- admitted the defendant when the defen sider fact the facts that establish constitutionally suffi dant had not executed the elements of the offense for a bar- cient waiver of the trial on those gain. explaining holding, majority its See, Bartram, e.g., facts. States v. responded Breyer’s argument to Justice (4th Cir.2005) (rejecting 314-15 F.3d rule would “work to the detri- Blakely-Booker challenge to sen defendant’s “[bjecause plead guilty ment of criminal defendants who tence enhancement there was no case, by depriving opportunity them of the to ar- Amendment violation in this all Sixth gue sentencing judge.” Blakely, being guilty plea facts admitted under the or factors court”); expressly open majori- in States v. 542 U.S. at 124 S.Ct. 2531. The (6th Cir.2005) Murdock, 491, 501 398 F.3d ty’s response was that (where in defendant admitted to facts used nothing prevents waiving from defendant determining plea agreement sentence in and Apprendi rights. his When a defendant plea colloquy, concluding no “that there was pleads guilty, the State is free to seek ... Sixth Amendment violation this case judicial long sentence enhancements so as the district court’s determination of because stipulates to the rele- the defendant either supported by the amount of loss was facts judicial vant facts or consents to factfind- defendant”); admitted United States ing. appropriate procured, If waivers are (11th Shelton, 400 F.3d 1328-30 Cir. judicial may continue to offer fact- States 2005) (finding no constitutional error under finding as a matter of course to all defen- Blakely and Booker where defendant admit plead guilty. dants who ted, part during plea colloquy part and in during sentencing hearing, support to facts (internal 310, 124 citations Id. at S.Ct. 2531 ing drug- increase in offense level due to light of the Amendment Sixth quantity). above, language principles discussed this compels the conclusion that does not however, persuaded,

We are permit a court to use defen- permit sentencing does not courts use his sen- dant’s factual admissions to increase defendant,” admitted “facts the defendant first effectuates tence unless 542 U.S. voluntary, knowing, waiver of rights by the absence of a waiver of Blakely rights. defendant. This is so for several reasons. his fact, any sentencing con- party neither made Application to This Case C. agreement. part plea as Sec- cessions in the record There is no evidence ond, has not breached the Isaacks voluntarily, in knowingly, that Isaacks any way. upheld agreement in He his end right to have a telligently waived pleaded guilty to plea bargain when he presentence report facts in the determine the charge. find no conspiracy We therefore him in to sentence that the trial court used government to with- allowing Indeed, range. Isaacks aggravated agreement. draw from the year a full before sentenced Blakely, so he could Court handed down III. Conclusion voluntarily, in knowingly,

possibly have Blakely rights. See telligently waived his reasons, foregoing we affirm the For the (Colo. Curtis, 681 P.2d People v. appeals vacating of the court of decision 1984) (“A relinquish is an intentional waiver to the trial sentence and remand Isaacks’s right privilege.”); or Rice v. of a known resentencing presump- within the court for 270, 271, People, 193 Colo. range. tive (1977) (“Rules prescribing the manner by jury may to trial which the J., COATS, dissents. strictly interpreted in order are to be waived Boy right.”); preserve this fundamental EID, J., participate. does not Alabama, kin v. COATS, dissenting. Justice (“We cannot presume [the trial] a waiver agree I that a defendant must volun- While record.”). Therefore, Isaacks’s from silent tarily intelligently to have waive violated his aggravated-range find fact that increases his sen- Blakely rights, and it must be struck down. maximum, statutory tence other conviction, prior strongly disagree I than a Remedy D. majority’s understanding apparent with the appel proper procedure for an of what such a waiver entails. The record upon finding Blakely late court to follow literally awash with evidence that this case is is to remand the case to the trial court error calculatedly bargained for this the defendant resentencing presumptive within the plea, fully understanding agree- precise See, range. e.g. Hughes, range, in ing precise sentencing order (2005) (re 118, Wash.2d conse- to avoid the risk of more serious manding impose to now, hand, with directions quences; with deal in he range). within standard hopes in haggle continues to with the Court advantage. Al- gaining of some additional People suggest proper reme- though in sentences at the actual difference dy prosecution withdraw “is to allow the small, relatively majority here is the issue plea agreement.” We dis- its consent exacting as applies a standard for waiver so People, 29 agree. In Keller v. P.3d any pre-Blakely out of reach for sen- (2000), recognized we observed that “we have sug- I the standard tence. Because believe only allowing prosecution two bases for the majority only gested by the is not without plea agree- accepted to withdraw from an support, impact a legal but will also substan- (1) parties ment: where the have entered sentences, respectfully I dis- tial number of agreement provides for an plea into a that sent. sentence; illegal and where the defendant materially substantially has breached the reasoning voluntary, knowing, that a After plea agreement by her action or inaction.” jury sentencing intelligent waiver of is (internal Id. at 296 citations majority summarily concludes required, the Keller’s, supports in the record an of two circumstances is that no evidence Neither fact, defendant, First, by in par- waiver the present in the instant case. the effective the plea agreement not into a that a defendant sentenced before ties have “entered in illegal Supreme holding v. Wash- provides for an sentence.” Court’s

H97 296, 2531, mutually possible acceptable plea, 159 make ington, 542 U.S. (2004), possibly not make defendant waived a factual for the add- L.Ed.2d 403 could offense,' purposes plea. of his constitutional ed contrived for of the an waiver maj. clearly jury sentencing. op. at He therefore was on notice of the right See jury charge. right to a de- critical elements of that 1196. The constitutional sentence enhancement termination The record indicates that the defendant (and requirement therefore the for an factor by entering was advised that he was however, right), of that de- effective waiver giving up right jury to a trial. He was from the fact that a sentence enhance- rives advised of the elements of the offense and equivalent factor “is the functional only possible penalties. Not did the de- greater an element of a offense the one fendant, counsel, expressly with the advice of Maj. jury’s guilty covered verdict.” trial, jury waive his but in his Apprendi Jersey, v. New op. (quoting at 1194 petition, expressly written he indicated his n. understanding agreement that the court (2000)). governing The law L.Ed.2d 435 long him could sentence to a term as as 3 entry guilty pleas, and the concomitant years, extraordinary aggravating if it found trial, right'.to of the is not waiver circumstances. While the defendant nearly demanding regard so to the de- sentence, hoped clearly have for a lesser knowledge precise of the elements fendant’s advantageous accept found it conviction of pleads. of the offense to which he felony great a class 6 and a sentence as as 3 Supreme years, exchange The United States Court has the dismissal of all of long charges. that an not his other held effective does require litany that a formal ritualistic Although explanation it offers no real or legal read elements of offense be majority support, implicitly holds that Morgan, Henderson v. defendant. extraordinary admissions the defendant of aggravating judicial facts or his accession to (1976); Lonberger, see also Marshall v. 459 fact-finding could not be effec- 422, 436-37, 103 S.Ct. tive unless he knew of the trial (1983). enough It is that the defendant articulated and he understood the nature, given real notice of the true or waiving. full extent of the he was As substance, him, charge against op of the as noted, already understanding an' of such Henderson, posed to its elements. technical responsi- technical distinctions between the 426 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 2253. And and those of the court has bilities totality determination must be made in the required for an effective never been circumstances, including only the en plea. regard develop- But with to future presumption tire record but also the particular, ments the law explained defense counsel to the defendant against Court has warned reallocation of the charge. the nature of the Id. bargained parties, solely risks 2253; Drake, People see also v. anticipate because of their failure to those (Colo.1990). States, changes. Brady v. United 397 U.S. (1970) notes, 742, 757, majority

As the the record in this (“[Ajbsent only providency hearing misrepresentation imper- a or other case included not voluntary plea plea petition, signed also a written the missible conduct a but presence guilty intelligently light then defendant of his counsel. made plea pursuant agree- applicable to an law does not vulnerable was entered become judicial that presented exchange to the court. because later decisions indicate added, lesser, pleading guilty faulty premise.”); see class rested on felony, Bradley, v. 400 F.3d defendant benefited the dis- also United States (6th Cir.2005) (relying Brady’s. pending charges, including missal of all 464-65 on felony, potential six-year reject challenge to class 5 with a sen- rationale to defendant’s misdemeanors, tence, appellate rights, and two class 1 contained his waiver potential two-year guilty plea, light v. Book- sentences. In order to of United States charge against Bousley him.” nature of the

er, 543 U.S. Leach, States, (2005)); v. 417 F.3d States v. 523 U.S. United Cir.2005) (10th (1998). (holding that 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 “negate should not waiv- Blakely and Booker have though Isaacks not been Even rights, such as the ers of other constitutional anticipate that the law would soon able to by jury,” in on a trial reliance Brad- him to a determination entitle Sahlin, 399 F.3d ley); United States cf. (and undisput- easily apparently established Cir.2005) (1st. Brady (relying on .ra- ed) court, facts relied on agreement for uphold defendant’s tionale to behavior, extent of his erratic such as the mandatory guideline sentencing under the therapists had and medi- he seen number scheme, man- despite subsequent excision of success, they prescribed without cations had Booker). datory provision in abuse, history drug that fact was poten- regard to a failure to disclose With inconsequential to his decision. There can be evidence, impeachment tial charge that understood the no doubt he “does has noted the Constitution Court pled guilty penalty which he and the to which require complete knowledge of the rele- not himself, voluntarily subjecting and he circumstances, permits a vant but court bargained intelligently for those conse- accompanying accept guilty plea, with its quences he considered them to his because rights, constitutional de- waiver of various advantage. clearly got of his He the benefit misapprehension un- spite various forms of bargain. might der which a defendant labor.” United Ruiz, 622, 630, 122 States majority misappre- I Because believe the (noting L.Ed.2d 586 requirements hends the of an Brady recognized failure defendant’s misapplies guilty plea in this context and change regarding anticipate in the law case, respectfully them in this I to the record punishments misappre- relevant is one such dissent. hension). previously had charac- The Court Brady intelligent, as de- terized the

spite judicial indicating that at later decisions plea, the defendant

the time of his did

correctly every factor enter- assess relevant decision,

ing into his because “he was advised counsel,

by competent was in control of his faculties,

mental and was made aware of the

Case Details

Case Name: People v. Isaacks

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Apr 24, 2006

Citation: 133 P.3d 1190

Docket Number: 05SC87

Court Abbreviation: Colo.