Deaver v. JordanDeaver v. Jordan
NOTICE: This order was filed under
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County.
No. 18-F-57
Honorable Timothy R. Neubauer, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Wharton concurred in the judgment.
Justice Barberis dissented.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court properly entered judgment denying mother‘s request to prohibit father‘s parenting responsibility or parenting time with child.
¶ 2 The respondent, Meadow Jordan, appeals the circuit court‘s August 1, 2019, order granting the petitioner, Brandon Deaver, parenting time with the parties’ minor child, W.M.J. On appeal, Meadow argues that the court erroneously interpreted
¶ 3 Meadow was born on March 6, 2001, and was 15 years old when W.M.J. was born on May 4, 2016. On June 18, 2018, Brandon, W.M.J.‘s biological father, filed a petition to establish paternity, child support, and allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities. In his petition, Brandon sought an order recognizing his paternity of W.M.J., requiring Meadow to pay child support in an amount consistent with statutory guidelines, and awarding him sole decision-making responsibilities, primary residential custody, and reasonable parenting time.
¶ 4 On July 30, 2018, Meadow filed a motion for fact-finding hearing, asserting that Illinois law barred Brandon from seeking custody or visitation with W.M.J. because he fathered W.M.J. through an act of criminal sexual abuse. Meadow alleged that Brandon had not been charged criminally for his conduct and that she did not seek to have him charged criminally. Meadow alleged, however, that when W.M.J. was conceived, she was 14 years old, below the age of consent for sexual activity, and that Brandon was at least 17 years old. Meadow also alleged that continued contact with Brandon was causing her emotional distress and a feeling of victimization. Thereafter, on November 8, 2018, and February 8, 2019, Meadow filed amended motions for a fact-finding hearing, arguing that
¶ 5 On October 12, 2018, November 28, 2018, and February 25, 2019, Brandon filed corresponding answers to Meadow‘s motions for a fact-finding hearing. In his answers,
¶ 6 At a hearing held on October 18, 2018, Meadow, who was 17 years old at the time of the hearing, testified that she was 14 years old when W.M.J. was conceived. Meadow acknowledged that she had consented to a relationship between W.M.J. and Brandon for six months, when W.M.J. was approximately six months old until she was one year old. Meadow acknowledged that Brandon lived with her and Tamara during that six-month period. Meadow further acknowledged that she once took W.M.J. to meet Brandon after W.M.J. turned one year old. Meadow testified that Tamara thereafter “was going behind [her] back and taking [W.M.J.] to visits” with Brandon. When asked, “[D]o you consent to a relationship between [W.M.J.] and Brandon,” she answered, “As of now? No.”
¶ 7 At the hearing, Tamara testified that she married Meadow‘s father on January 17, 2004, that she adopted Meadow on January 18, 2011, and that Meadow‘s father died on August 13, 2015. Tamara testified that Meadow was living in her home when her husband died and that Meadow continued to live in her home until May 2018. Tamara
¶ 8 Tamara testified that Meadow and Brandon dated prior to W.M.J.‘s conception but were no longer dating when W.M.J. was born. Tamara testified, however, that when W.M.J. was three or four months old, Brandon began visiting W.M.J. at her and Meadow‘s home and visited W.M.J. almost every day for about a year. Tamara testified that Brandon visited at both her and Meadow‘s agreed invitation. Tamara testified that when W.M.J. was approximately 15 months old, Meadow and Brandon broke up again, and Meadow no longer wanted Brandon to visit W.M.J. Tamara testified that she cared for W.M.J. the majority of the time, when Meadow was attending school, working, or socializing with friends. Tamara testified that when caring for Meadow, she continued to allow Brandon to visit W.M.J., even though Meadow did not want him to visit, “[b]ecause [she] thought that he was the father and deserved that.” Tamara testified that Meadow knew Brandon was visiting W.M.J. while Meadow was working or doing other things and that Meadow never threatened to take W.M.J. from Tamara if she continued to allow Brandon parenting time with W.M.J.
¶ 9 Tamara confirmed that Meadow was 17 years old on the date of the hearing and that Meadow had not been emancipated from her. Tamara acknowledged that she
¶ 10 Following Tamara‘s testimony, the parties stipulated that Brandon and W.M.J. had an ongoing relationship for a period of time after W.M.J. was born and that for a period of time, Meadow consented to Brandon‘s parenting relationship with W.M.J.
¶ 11 Brandon testified that he was 21 years old at the time of the hearing. Brandon testified that he had previously dated Meadow, having met her at the skating rink, and had reestablished a relationship with Meadow when W.M.J. was about four months old. Brandon testified that he lived with Meadow, W.M.J., and Meadow‘s family for about one year. Brandon testified that he changed W.M.J.‘s diapers, fed her, and woke in the night with her. Brandon testified that after living with Meadow for approximately one year, he and Meadow ceased dating, but he continued to visit W.M.J. through Tamara, with whom he had a good relationship. Brandon testified that after W.M.J.‘s second birthday on May 4, 2018, he learned that Meadow was considering adoption for W.M.J. Brandon testified that he worked at a local tire factory and was prepared to financially provide for and parent W.M.J.
¶ 12 Throughout the proceedings, the circuit court entered orders allocating Brandon parenting time with W.M.J. On October 25, 2018, the circuit court entered an order awarding Brandon parenting time on specified days until December 14, 2018, at which
¶ 13 On August 1, 2019, the circuit court considered the evidence presented on October 18, 2018, and entered its order on Brandon‘s petition to establish paternity, child support, and an allocation of parenting time and decision-making responsibilities and on Meadow‘s petition for a fact-finding hearing. In its order, the circuit court concluded that Brandon was a person described in
¶ 14 The circuit court noted that Tamara had testified to the significant amount of time that Brandon had spent with W.M.J. when Meadow lived with her and that the parties had stipulated that Brandon had an ongoing relationship with W.M.J. The circuit court found that Meadow had allowed Brandon to exercise parenting time with W.M.J., when W.M.J. was a couple of months old until W.M.J. turned two years old. The circuit court accepted Brandon‘s unrefuted testimony that he was an active participant in W.M.J.‘s life until Meadow began dating someone else. The circuit court noted that even then, Brandon was allowed parenting time with W.M.J., when W.M.J. was in Tamara‘s care. The circuit court further noted that since turning 18, Meadow had consented to Brandon‘s ongoing relationship with W.M.J. pursuant to the parties’ agreed order for parenting time. The circuit court thus concluded that Meadow had consented to an allocation of parenting time for Brandon to exercise with W.M.J. In holding that Meadow had consented to an allocating of parenting time for Brandon, the circuit court noted:
“Legislative history suggests that one purpose of the statute is to protect a woman from being forced to remain in communication with a person who committed an act of sexual misconduct against her. In this case, that goal is not a necessary one where [Meadow‘s] conduct all along has indicated that she has no issues with [Brandon] that the statute is designed to address.”
¶ 16 On September 3, 2019, Meadow filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the circuit court failed to make a finding regarding whether W.M.J. was fathered by nonconsensual sexual penetration “due to the respective ages of the mother and father at the time of conception.” Meadow argued that it was of no concern how willing a particular minor might be about sexual activity, at the age of 14, she could not legally consent to sexual activity with Brandon, who was 17 years old when W.M.J. was conceived. Meadow argued that Brandon thus committed an act of nonconsensual sexual penetration pursuant to the Parentage Act. Meadow further argued that only she had the authority to consent to the allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time for Brandon and that Brandon slept on his rights for failing to file a petition until W.M.J. was two years old.
¶ 17 On September 26, 2019, Brandon filed a response to Meadow‘s motion to reconsider, arguing that the circuit court did not fail to make a finding as to whether W.M.J. had been fathered by nonconsensual sexual penetration where the circuit court had specifically stated, “‘this court holds that subsection (a) has been established.‘” In
¶ 18
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 As a preliminary matter, Brandon filed in this court a motion to dismiss Meadow‘s appeal, or alternatively, to strike Meadow‘s brief or portions of Meadow‘s statement of facts contained in her brief. Brandon claims in his motion that Meadow‘s brief violates various supreme court rules, including
¶ 20 This court acknowledges that “where the appellant‘s brief violates the requirements of our supreme court rules, the ‘appellate court has discretion to strike [that] brief and dismiss the appeal’ or disregard appellant‘s arguments.” Budzileni v. Department of Human Rights, 392 Ill. App. 3d 422, 440 (2009) (quoting Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 832, 845 (2001)). However, where supreme court rule violations are not so flagrant as to hinder our review, the striking of a brief in whole or in part may be unwarranted. Id. Although Meadow‘s brief as a whole, including the appendix and statements of facts, reveals a failure to fully comply with
¶ 21 On appeal, Meadow challenges the circuit court‘s order by arguing that the circuit court erred in finding that Tamara had legal authority to consent to parenting time on Meadow‘s behalf pursuant to
¶ 22 “[I]ssues of statutory construction are questions of law subject to de novo review.” People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 25. “When construing a statute, this court‘s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature‘s intent, keeping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statutory language itself, given its
¶ 23
“(a) This Section applies to a person who has been found to be the father of a child under this Act and who:
(1) has been convicted of or who has pled guilty or nolo contendere to a violation of Section 11-1.20 (criminal sexual assault), Section 11-1.30 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), Section 11-1.40 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), Section 11-1.50 (criminal sexual abuse), Section 11-1.60 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse), Section 11-11 (sexual relations within families), Section 12-13 (criminal sexual assault), Section 12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault), Section 12-14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child), Section 12-15 (criminal sexual abuse), or Section 12-16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse) of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012, or a similar statute in another jurisdiction, for his conduct in fathering that child; or
(2) at a fact-finding hearing, is found by clear and convincing evidence to have committed an act of non-consensual sexual penetration for his conduct in fathering that child.
(b) A person described in subsection (a) shall not be entitled to an allocation of any parental responsibilities or parenting time with that child without the consent of the child‘s mother or guardian. If the person described in subsection (a) is also the guardian of the child, he does not have the authority to consent to parenting time or the allocation of parental responsibilities under this Section. If the mother of the child is a minor, and the person described in subsection (a) is also the father or guardian of the mother, then he does not have the authority to consent to the allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time.
* * *
(f) A petition under this Section may be filed by the child‘s mother or guardian either as an affirmative petition in circuit court or as an affirmative defense in any proceeding filed by the person described in subsection (a) of this Section regarding the child.”
750 ILCS 46/622 (West 2018).
¶ 24 “Parental responsibilities” is defined in
¶ 25 In its order, the circuit court denied Meadow‘s request to prohibit an allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time for Brandon on the basis of
¶ 26 We note that this court may affirm a circuit court‘s decision on any basis that appears in the record before us. Father & Sons Home Improvement II, Inc. v. Stuart, 2016 IL App (1st) 143666, ¶ 27. In this case, we agree with the circuit court‘s conclusion that Meadow consented to the allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting time for Brandon. The plain language of
¶ 27 In this case, the evidence revealed that when W.M.J. was four months old, Meadow consented to an apportionment of parental responsibilities and parenting time for Brandon and that Brandon exercised his parental responsibilities and parenting time with W.M.J. thereafter. Thus, the evidence supported the circuit court‘s conclusion that Meadow consented to an allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting time for Brandon (
¶ 28 The plain language of
¶ 29 Because the circuit court‘s judgment may be affirmed on this basis, we need not address Meadow‘s argument regarding Tamara‘s authority to consent to the allocation of parental responsibilities or parenting time on her behalf. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, denying Meadow‘s request to prohibit the allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting time by Brandon pursuant to
¶ 30
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Jefferson County.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
¶ 34 I respectfully dissent and would reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 35 I find it appropriate to note the difficult nature of this case. By all accounts, it appears Meadow and Brandon had a relationship at some point during high school when Meadow was 14 and Brandon was 17. Following the birth of W.M.J., however, their relationship became contentious, and Meadow filed a motion for fact-finding hearing to bar Brandon from legally establishing parental responsibilities or parenting time with W.M.J. As the majority correctly states, the record demonstrates that Brandon spent time with W.M.J. and had established a relationship with the child.
¶ 36 At the fact-finding hearing on Meadow‘s motion, the circuit court found that Brandon‘s actions in fathering the minor child, although factually consensual, due to the age of the parties, nonetheless constituted criminal sexual abuse. Thus,
¶ 38 Accordingly, I believe the circuit court erred when it, first, erroneously found that Tamara could legally consent on behalf of Meadow, and, second, determined that Meadow was estopped from raising the affirmative defense set forth in
¶ 39 Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court.