2020 IL App (5th) 200084-U
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Meadow (born 2001) was 14 at the time W.M.J. was conceived; Brandon was about 17. Child born May 4, 2016.
- Brandon filed a 2018 petition to establish paternity, child support, and seek parenting time and decision-making. Meadow moved for a fact-finding hearing under §622 of the Parentage Act, claiming Brandon fathered the child by criminal sexual abuse due to the parents’ ages.
- Evidence showed Meadow initially allowed Brandon significant contact with the child (Brandon lived with the family and regularly cared for W.M.J. for a period); Meadow later objected and sought to bar him. Tamara (Meadow’s adoptive mother and guardian) testified she consented to Brandon’s visits and facilitated them.
- The circuit court found Brandon met §622(a) (i.e., fathering the child qualified as sexual abuse because of ages) but concluded Meadow had consented to an allocation of parenting time and that Tamara had also consented on Meadow’s behalf; the court therefore denied Meadow’s request to bar parental responsibilities/parenting time.
- The appellate court affirmed, relying on the alternative ground that Meadow had consented to an allocation of parental responsibilities/parenting time; the court therefore did not decide whether Tamara had authority to consent for Meadow. Justice Barberis dissented, arguing the statute forbids allocation absent the mother’s consent and that the court erred by relying on guardian consent or estoppel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Meadow) | Defendant's Argument (Brandon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a guardian (Tamara) may validly consent under §622(b) to an allocation of parenting time on behalf of a minor mother | Tamara lacked authority to consent for Meadow; only the mother may consent and Meadow did not consent | Tamara (as guardian) and Meadow previously had consented; consent/estoppel permitted allocation | Court did not resolve guardian-authority question; affirmed on alternative ground that Meadow herself had consented to the allocation |
| Whether Meadow’s prior acquiescence estops her from invoking §622(b) to bar parenting time | Prior acquiescence does not negate statutory protection; Meadow revoked consent and the §622 bar should apply | Meadow previously consented to an allocation when the child was an infant and later agreed to orders; §622(b) requires consent to the allocation and Meadow’s past consent precludes retroactive bar | Court held Meadow had consented to an allocation; §622(b) requires consent to the allocation (not ongoing consent), so prohibition did not apply |
| Whether Brandon qualifies as a “person described in subsection (a)” of §622 (i.e., committed non-consensual sexual penetration because of ages) | Meadow contended §622(a)(2) was established because of statutory age-based nonconsent | Brandon admitted sexual relations but argued factual consensuality and other defenses; court nonetheless found §622(a) established | Circuit court found §622(a) established (parties did not contest that finding on appeal) but that did not bar allocation because of proven consent |
| Whether the appeal should be dismissed or brief struck for Supreme Court Rule violations | Meadow’s brief noncompliance should not bar review | Brandon urged dismissal/striking as sanction for briefing and record defects | Appellate court declined dismissal/striking as disproportionate; disregarded offending portions and reached merits |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510 (discussing statutory-construction principles)
- J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182 (2007) (Parentage Act / child-best-interest purpose)
- Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217 (2010) (appellate waiver rule for unargued points)
- Budzileni v. Department of Human Rights, 392 Ill. App. 3d 422 (2009) (discretion re: striking noncompliant briefs)
- Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 832 (2001) (appellate discretion to sanction for briefing violations)