CITY OF DAYTON, OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. STATE OF OHIO, Defendant-Appellant
C.A. CASE NO. 26643
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
August 7, 2015
2015-Ohio-3160
T.C. NO. 15CV1457 (Civil appeal from Common Pleas Court)
JOHN C. MUSTO, Atty, Reg. No. 0071512, Assistant City Attorney, 101 W. Third Street, P. O. Box 22, Dayton, Ohio 45401
HALLI BROWNFIELD WATSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0082466 and NICOLE M. KOPPITCH, Atty. Reg. No. 0082129, Assistant Attorneys General, Constitutional Offices Section, 30 E. Broad Street, 16th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
DONOVAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant State of Ohio (hereinafter “the State“) appeals a decision of the Montgomery Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, granting in part and denying in part a motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff-appellee City of Dayton (hereinafter “Dayton“). The State filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court on April 8, 2015.
{¶ 2} On March 18, 2015, Dayton filed a “Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction,” in which it challenged the constitutionality of Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 342 (hereinafter “S.B. No. 342“) on the grounds that it violates
{¶ 3} Thereafter, on March 23, 2015, both parties filed their respective motions for summary judgment. Dayton also requested a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction regarding enforcement of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342. While the trial court did not grant any preliminary relief requested by Dayton, it ordered an expedited summary judgment briefing schedule upon agreement by the parties.
{¶ 4} In addition to arguing that
{¶ 5} On April 2, 2015, the trial court issued a decision overruling the State‘s motion for summary judgment. In the same decision, the trial court granted Dayton‘s motion for summary judgment in part, concluding that while S.B. No. 342 was not unconstitutional in its entirety, certain provisions of the statute violated the home rule. Specifically, the trial court found that
{¶ 6} It is from this judgment that the State now appeals.
The Dayton Ordinance / R.C.G.O 70.21
{¶ 7} On June 12, 2002, Dayton enacted an ordinance authorizing an “automated traffic control photographic system” (ATCPS) for placement at intersections throughout the city. Initially, the system only provided for the enforcement of red light violations. Subsequently, on February 17, 2010, the system was modified to provide for the enforcement of speed violations as well. The ordinances are codified in Dayton R.C.G.O. 70.21. Dayton states that the purpose of the traffic law photo-monitoring system is to reduce the number of red light and speeding violations and automobile accidents in the city. Dayton also asserts that the system helps to conserve limited police resources. According to Dayton, there are currently over thirty-six speed and/or red light cameras operating throughout the city.
{¶ 8} Dayton maintains that the ordinance creates a system which is civil in nature, not criminal. The ordinance provides for civil enforcement imposing monetary fines upon the owners of vehicles that do not comply with posted speed limits or commit red light violations. Offenders who are recorded by the ATCPS are not issued criminal traffic citations, and offenses are not adjudicated by Dayton municipal courts. Offenders are not assessed points on their driving records, and Dayton has created and implemented an administrative hearing process presided over by an independent third party not employed by the Dayton Police Department. The ordinance states, however, that the “Dayton Police Department or its designee shall administer the ATCPS program.”
{¶ 9} Contained in the notice of liability sent to the offender are the following: 1) the images of the vehicle and its license plate; 2) the ownership records of the vehicle; 3) the nature of the violation (red light/speeding) and the date upon which the offense occurred; 4) the amount of the civil penalty imposed; and 5) a signed statement by a Dayton Police Officer stating that a violation had occurred based upon review of the recorded images and/or speed measurement readings. The recorded images and speed measurement readings taken from the ATCPS device are considered under the ordinance to be prima facie evidence of a violation. The ordinance further provides a means by which the owner of a vehicle can dispute a violation if he or she was not driving the vehicle at the time that the ATCPS recorded a violation. Owners choosing to appeal must
Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 342
{¶ 10} Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 was signed into law on December 19, 2014, and became effective shortly thereafter on March 23, 2015. The following Revised Code sections were enacted as a result of S.B. No. 342‘s passage:
{¶ 11} As previously noted, the trial court found
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} The final section ruled unconstitutional by the trial court,
Standard of Review
{¶ 14} As this Court has previously noted:
When reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court conducts a de novo review. Village of Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). “De Novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should have used, and we examine the evidence to determine whether as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial.” Harris v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25636, 2013–Ohio–5234, ¶ 11 (quoting Brewer v. Cleveland City Schools Bd. [o]f Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 383, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th Dist.1997) (citing Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187 (1980))). Therefore, the trial court‘s decision is not granted any deference by the reviewing appellate court. Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993).
{¶ 15} Because they are interrelated, the State‘s first and second assignments of error will be discussed together as follows:
{¶ 16} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AM.SUB.S.B. NO. 342 PURPORTS ONLY TO LIMIT MUNICIPAL POWERS AND IS NOT A GENERAL POLICE, SANITARY OR SIMILAR REGULATION.”
{¶ 18} In its first assignment, the State contends that the trial court erred when it found that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 purports only to limit municipal powers and is not a general police, sanitary, or similar regulation. In its second assignment, the State argues that the trial court erred when it found that portions of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 do not prescribe a rule of conduct on citizens generally. Essentially, the State asserts that the trial court erred when it found that specific sections of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 did not satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the general law test enunciated in Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus, thereby violating the home rule exception in the
{¶ 19} Initially, we recognize the “fundamental principle that a court must ‘presume the constitutionality of lawfully enacted legislation.’ ” Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942 N.E.2d 370, ¶ 6, citing Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993). Therefore, we begin with the presumption that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 (specifically,
{¶ 20} Under the Home Rule Amendment to the
{¶ 21} Neither party disputes that Dayton ordinance R.C.G.O. 70.21, enacting an automated photo-enforcement program, was lawfully enacted pursuant to its constitutionally protected home rule powers. Recently, in Walker v. Toledo, Ohio Sup. Ct. Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-5461, ¶ 3, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, that municipalities, such as Dayton, have home rule authority under
{¶ 22} Indeed, the sole issue before this Court is whether Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 qualifies as a general law. “A general law has been described as one which promotes statewide uniformity.” Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmstead, 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 244, 602 N.E.2d 1147 (1992). Furthermore, general laws are those “enact[ed] to safeguard the peace, health, morals, and safety, and to protect the property of the people of the state.” Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 83, 167 N.E. 158 (1929). “Once a matter has become of such general interest that it is necessary to make it subject to statewide control as to require uniform statewide regulation, the municipality can no longer legislate in the field so as to conflict with the state.” State ex rel. McElroy v. Akron, 173 Ohio St.3d 189, 194, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962).
{¶ 23} A statute qualifies as a general law if it satisfies four criteria. The statute must: 1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment; 2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state; 3) set forth police, sanitary or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to prescribe those regulations; and 4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. Mendenhall, at ¶ 20; Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus.
{¶ 24} The trial court found that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 satisfied the first two elements of the Canton general law test, namely that the statute is part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment which applied to all parts of the state and operated uniformly therein. We agree with the trial court in this respect; therefore, the first two elements of the Canton test are not at issue in the instant appeal.
{¶ 25} The trial court, however, found that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 failed to satisfy the third and fourth elements of the Canton test. Specifically, the trial court found that
Sets forth a police, sanitary, or similar regulation
{¶ 26} The third element of the Canton test requires that for a statute to be considered a general law, it must set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, instead of merely granting or limiting a municipality‘s power to create such regulations. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 regulates the statewide use of traffic cameras to record red light/speeding violations. The statute is a comprehensive legislative enactment which applies to all parts of the state and is operated uniformly throughout.
{¶ 27} As previously noted, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 contains several provisions, all of which establish various procedures and rules which regulate the use of traffic cameras and the enforcement of the subsequent civil citations. In addition to the provisions ruled unconstitutional by the trial court, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 enacted the following additional regulations:
R.C. 3937.411 – This section instructs insurers that they may not deny coverage and/or raise the insurance premium of any individual who receives a civil ticket based on a violation recorded by a traffic camera.
R.C. 4511.096(A) – This section contains a requirement that a law enforcement officer examine the evidence of an alleged violation recorded by a traffic camera in order to determine whether a violation has in fact occurred. If a violation is found to have occurred, the officermay use the vehicle‘s license plate number to identify the registered owner.
R.C. 4511.096(B) – This section states that the fact that a person is found to be the registered owner of the vehicle is prima facie evidence that the person was operating the vehicle at the time that the traffic violation occurred.
R.C. 4511.096(C) and (D) – These sections contain updated requirements for the standards with respect to the issuance of civil tickets for violations recorded by traffic cameras.
R.C. 4511.097 – This section explains what information should be included in the civil ticket issued to an offender for a violation recorded by a traffic camera and states that the local authority is required to send the ticket no later than thirty days after the violation. Significantly, this section mandates that the officer, required to be present byR.C. 4511.093(B)(1) whenever traffic cameras are in use, must include his name and badge number in the ticket sent to the offender.R.C. 4511.097(B)(7) .
R.C. 4511.098 – This section sets out the options for paying or challenging the civil ticket issued to a person for a violation recorded by a traffic camera.
R.C. 4511.099 – This section sets forth the procedure for a hearing, the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence), and affirmative defenses that apply if an alleged offender chooses to challenge a ticket issued based on the recorded image of a violation from a traffic camera.
R.C. 4511.0911 – This section contains requirements for the manufacturer of the traffic camera to provide to the local authority the maintenance record for each traffic camera used in the municipality, and an annual certificate of proper operation for each traffic camera.
{¶ 28}
{¶ 29} In Mendenhall, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the speed limit statute enacted in portions of
{¶ 30} Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that when considering whether a statute prohibiting regulation of properly licensed hazardous waste disposal facilities by a political subdivision was a valid general law, “[t]he section of law questioned *** should not be read and interpreted in isolation from the other sections [of the Revised Code Chapter] dealing with the state‘s control of the disposal of hazardous wastes. All such sections read in pari materia do not merely prohibit subdivisions of the state from regulation of these facilities. Conversely, the statutory scheme contained in this chapter is a comprehensive one enacted to insure that such facilities are designed, sited, and operated in the manner which best serves the statewide public interest.” Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 48, 442 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).
{¶ 31} Furthermore, in Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmstead, 65 Ohio St.3d 242, the Ohio Supreme Court found that a state statute regulating security personnel was a general law which prohibited municipalities from imposing license and/or registration fees on private investigators and security guards. The N. Olmstead court stated as follows:
Considered in isolation, such a provision may fail to qualify as a general law because it prohibits a municipality from exercising a local police power while not providing for uniform statewide regulation of the same subject matter. However, consideration of
R.C. 4749.09 alone is not dispositive of the present controversy.R.C. Chapter 4749 in its entirety does provide for uniform statewide regulation of security personnel ***. Accordingly,R.C. 4749.09 must be considered a general law of statewide application.
{¶ 32} In Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942 N.E.2d 370, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the state‘s regulation of firearms under
{¶ 33} The Ohio Supreme Court has unequivocally held that “sections within a chapter will not be considered in isolation when determining whether a general law exists.” Mendenhall, at ¶ 27. Read in pari material, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 creates a uniform, comprehensive, statewide statutory scheme regulating the use and implementation of traffic law photo-monitoring devices in Ohio. Similar to Ohio‘s speed statute,
{¶ 34} We note that in support of its finding that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 merely acts to limit municipal power in derogation of the third element of the Canton test, the trial court relied on the Ohio Supreme
{¶ 35} However, unlike the statute in question in Linndale which prohibited the local authorities from issuing certain traffic citations, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 permits a municipality to operate a traffic law photo-enforcement system. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 merely sets forth certain uniform statewide procedures and regulations to be followed if a municipality voluntarily decides to implement the use of traffic cameras. Moreover, the Linndale court stated that the statute in question was “not part of a uniform statewide regulation on the subject of traffic law enforcement.” Id. at 55. The statute in Linndale was found to only specifically affect “certain” municipalities in Ohio; as a result, the statute had no uniform statewide application and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. Conversely, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 does not target the enforcement of traffic laws in only certain select municipalities. Simply put, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 uniformly applies to all municipalities in Ohio who voluntarily choose to implement traffic cameras. Accordingly, Linndale is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
{¶ 36} In light of the foregoing analysis, we find that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 provides for a uniform, comprehensive, statewide statutory scheme regulating the use and implementation of traffic law photo-monitoring devices in Ohio, and was clearly not enacted to limit municipal legislative powers.
Prescribes a rule of conduct on citizens generally
{¶ 37} The final issue we must address is whether Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 “prescribe[s] a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Canton, syllabus. As we have emphasized, the statute in question cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. Upon review, we conclude and reiterate that the statutory scheme contained in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 is a comprehensive one enacted to insure that traffic law photo-enforcement is implemented and regulated in the manner which best serves the statewide public interest and its citizenry. See Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co., 2 Ohio St.3d 44, at 48.
{¶ 38}
{¶ 39} Thus, having satisfied the Canton test, we find that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 342 constitutes a “general law” and does not violate the Home Rule Amendment of the
{¶ 40} The State‘s first and second assignments of error are sustained.
{¶ 41} Both of the State‘s assignments of error having been sustained, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the permanent injunction is vacated.
FROELICH, P.J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
John C. Musto
Halli Brownfield Watson
Nicole M. Koppitch
Hon. Barbara P. Gorman