TRAVONN DAVIS, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
No. 17-CF-1376
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
December 21, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
(Argued January 18, 2022 Decided December 21, 2023)
Paul R.
Ethan L. Carroll, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Michael R. Sherwin, Acting United States Attorney at the time, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne Grealy Curt, and Brittany Keil, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before EASTERLY and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and THOMPSON,* Senior Judge.
* Senior Judge Thompson was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of argument. On October 4, 2021, she was appointed as a Senior Judge but continued to serve as an Associate Judge until February 17, 2022. See
Opinion for the court by Associate Judge Easterly.
Dissenting Opinion by Senior Judge Thompson at page 46.
EASTERLY, Associate Judge: Travonn Davis challenges the denial of his motion to suppress inculpating data from the GPS monitor he was required to wear by the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (“CSOSA“) while he was on supervised release for a prior offense. Mr. Davis‘s motion to suppress was litigated in the trial court before this court issued its decision in United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464 (D.C. 2019). In Jackson, this court recognized that (1) requiring an individual to be subject to GPS monitoring is a search under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 472, and (2) such a search of an individual on probation may be upheld as constitutional under the special needs doctrine, which allows reasonable regulations to substitute for the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment where special needs exist, id. at 472-81 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)). But neither Jackson nor this court‘s subsequent decision in Atchison v. United States, 257 A.3d 524 (D.C. 2021) (extending the special needs rationale employed in Jackson to evaluate GPS monitoring of probationers to supervised releasees) considered if CSOSA‘s regulation authorizing electronic monitoring is lawful under the D.C. Code and therefore could be considered a “reasonable” basis for these searches under a special needs analysis. In their briefs to this court, the parties address this issue: Mr. Davis asserts that CSOSA‘s imposition of a GPS monitor on Mr. Davis could not be upheld as a special needs search under Jackson, inter alia, because the regulation underlying this practice falls outside the agency‘s statutory authority; the government argues, inter alia, that CSOSA‘s regulation is lawful and thus a reasonable foundation for a special needs search.
Critically, CSOSA is not the only federal agency with statutory authority over D.C. supervised releasees. The United States Parole Commission has primary authority, and CSOSA carries out its responsibilities vis-a-vis supervised releasees “on behalf of” the Parole Commission, not as an independent actor.
Considering CSOSA‘s bounded statutory authority, the procedural protections the Parole Commission otherwise affords against warrantless searches of people on supervised release, and our evolved understanding that electronic monitoring constitutes a search deserving of Fourth Amendment protection, we conclude that CSOSA‘s regulation authorizing its officers to discretionarily and unilaterally impose such monitoring,
I. Facts and Procedural Background
In 2012, Mr. Davis was sentenced and incarcerated for armed robbery, and in 2013, he began a five-year period of supervised release in connection with that incarceration. The conditions of his release, set by the Parole Commission, did not include GPS monitoring or searches of his person at CSOSA‘s discretion, nor was Mr. Davis required to comply with a curfew or house arrest. Apart from being a day late to report for an office visit in May 2016, it appears Mr. Davis was fully compliant with the conditions of his supervised release until he was arrested and charged with misdemeanor assault on a police officer (“APO“) on June 29, 2016. Although no probable-cause finding in support of the arrest was made and no prosecution followed, his Community Supervision Officer (“CSO“) from CSOSA placed Mr. Davis on GPS monitoring two weeks later as a “sanction” following this arrest. Under CSOSA regulations, an officer may unilaterally order such monitoring for “a specified” period of time. See
With the exception of a few weeks in August during which his GPS monitor was removed in relation to another arrest, Mr. Davis remained on GPS monitoring for the next three months until November 29, 2016, when his CSO discharged him from GPS monitoring twelve days after his misdemeanor APO charge was dismissed.
During the periods when Mr. Davis was required to be on GPS monitoring, he was forbidden from removing the GPS tracking device, required to charge the device for an hour twice every day (once in the morning and once in the evening), during which
Meanwhile, on November 19, 2016, two days after the misdemeanor APO charge was dismissed but ten days before Mr. Davis‘s CSO discharged him from GPS monitoring, MPD responded to a report of an armed carjacking in southeast D.C. MPD subsequently searched the location records of all people on CSOSA GPS monitoring to identify those who were near the site at the time of the incident and thereby linked Mr. Davis to the time and place of the carjacking and to the area where MPD later recovered the car. Based on this connection, Mr. Davis was indicted on a number of related charges in April 2017.
Mr. Davis moved to suppress the GPS data, asserting that its collection violated his Fourth Amendment rights.2 The government, which had the burden to defend the challenged warrantless search, see infra Part II.B., argued in response that (1) Mr. Davis had consented to the search (an argument it has since abandoned) and (2) the warrantless search of Mr. Davis was reasonable under a general totality-of-the-circumstances analysis (the same argument it made in Superior Court to oppose suppression in United States v. Jackson, No. 2015-CF3-2512, in which a challenge was raised to warrantless CSOSA GPS monitoring in the context of probation and which led to this court‘s decision in Jackson, 214 A.3d at 464). The government did not invoke the special needs doctrine. In fact, in its argument defending CSOSA‘s sharing of the GPS monitoring data, see supra note 2, the government expressly disclaimed reliance on the special needs doctrine.
At the suppression hearing, the trial court sua sponte requested supplemental briefing from the parties on “the authority of CSOSA to require GPS monitoring.” The court explained that supervised release was different from probation, it had looked at the statutory framework, and it was aware that “the Parole Commission has the authority under our Code to exercise the authority of the [c]ourt” over supervised releasees. But, the court observed, “CSOSA is the one here that... imposed the GPS monitoring.” Referencing the operative statutes, the court asked whether CSOSA “can... just do that?” and if the government‘s position was that it could, whether that authority came from a statute or elsewhere. The court‘s “focus” was “what entitles CSOSA to impose the GPS monitoring condition?” In its supplemental opposition, the government renewed its constitutional defense of CSOSA‘s installation of the GPS monitor, arguing the imposition of GPS monitoring passed a general reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment based on the totality of the circumstances, citing inter alia United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), and Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). In response to the court‘s question about CSOSA‘s authority, the government
The trial court orally denied the motion to suppress at a subsequent hearing, relying exclusively on the government‘s totality-of-the-circumstances argument. The court concluded that, given the “diminished expectation of privacy” of people on supervised release and the government‘s “substantial” interest in enforcing compliance and deterring new offenses, CSOSA‘s actions were reasonable, such that no violation of the Fourth Amendment had occurred. Mr. Davis consequently entered a conditional plea of guilty on the charges of armed robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm, on stipulated facts and subject to his appeal of the denial of his suppression motion.
Mr. Davis timely appealed, and this court, on Mr. Davis‘s request, stayed briefing in his case for the resolution of the appeal in Jackson. Following the resolution of Jackson and this court‘s determination that CSOSA‘s warrantless GPS monitoring of a probationer could be upheld under the special needs doctrine, see Jackson, 214 A.3d at 467, the parties filed their briefs and addressed Jackson‘s special needs analysis. After the parties filed their briefs but before the case was argued, this court decided Atchison, in which we extended the application of Jackson‘s special needs rationale to GPS monitoring of probationers to supervised releasees. 257 A.3d at 530.
II. Analysis
We focus on Mr. Davis‘s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the GPS data, because CSOSA‘s regulations permitting GPS monitoring exceeded the agency‘s legal authority, and, without lawful regulations, the government‘s GPS search cannot be deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment special needs doctrine. This presents a purely legal question, which we review de novo. See Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 221 (D.C. 2001). We conclude the special needs test is not satisfied and decline the government‘s invitation to look beyond that test to a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis under Knights and Samson.
A. The Fourth Amendment, GPS Monitoring, the Special Needs Doctrine, and the Limits of Our Prior Decisions
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures....”
In the context of criminal investigations, searches undertaken without a judicial warrant based on probable cause are generally considered unreasonable. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). But there are several exceptions to this general probable cause requirement, including one for searches conducted to serve “special needs[] beyond the normal need for law enforcement....” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (internal quotations marks omitted). In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that the operation of a state probation system could be a “special need” because probationers as a class have reduced liberty interests and because probation restrictions aim to promote rehabilitation and prevent harm to the community. Id. at 874-75. But the Court in Griffin cautioned that, although a “special need” like probation “permit[s] a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large[,] [t]hat permissible degree is not unlimited.” Id. at 875.
The key in Griffin was that the search in question “was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment‘s reasonableness requirement under well-established principles,” such that the regulation effectively stands in for the warrant typically required. Id. at 873. To assess the reasonableness of a search-authorizing regulation, the court weighs the governmental interest served by the regulation (and how effectively the regulation serves that interest) against the intrusion on the liberty interests of the class of people subject to the regulation. See, e.g., Acton, 515 U.S. at 654-64 (balancing the nature of the privacy interest, the character of the intrusion on that interest, the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of the means in question of addressing that governmental concern); see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (explaining this is a “context-specific inquiry” in which the court “examin[es] closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the parties“). This test is now referred to as a “special needs” analysis. See, e.g., Jackson, 214 A.3d at 475.
In Jackson, the government successfully appealed a trial court order suppressing GPS tracking data collected by CSOSA and acquired by the MPD on the grounds
To the extent the government (or the dissent, see Post at 68-71) seeks to suggest that this court has already resolved the legitimacy of CSOSA‘s administrative sanctions regulations, we cannot agree. The government quotes Jackson, 214 A.3d at 476, quoting a portion of Hunt, 109 A.3d at 621, that described CSOSA‘s regulations, and then asserts that this court in Jackson and Hunt “recognized... the term ‘intermediate sanctions’ [referenced in
Accordingly the legitimacy of CSOSA‘s regulations authorizing GPS monitoring as an administrative sanction is an open question.
B. Preservation
Before we can address this question, we must resolve our standard of review. The government argues we must review only for plain error Mr. Davis‘s challenge to CSOSA‘s authority to impose GPS monitoring as an administrative sanction because he did not challenge a special needs justification for the installment of his GPS device before the trial court. We disagree. After Mr. Davis raised a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search via GPS monitoring by CSOSA in Superior Court, the burden was on the government to establish its actions complied with the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (recognizing that “[i]t is the State‘s burden to demonstrate” that a search or seizure falls under an exception to the warrant requirement); see also Bennett v. United States, 26 A.3d 745, 751 (D.C. 2011) (“Where a defendant shows that a warrantless search or seizure produced evidence that the government seeks to introduce at trial... the burden is on the government to... justify[] the search based on facts that could bring it within certain recognized, limited exceptions to the warrant requirement” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The government did not make a special needs argument at this juncture and thus did not cite to CSOSA‘s regulations to justify GPS monitoring of Mr. Davis thereunder.4 See supra Part I.
Recognizing that pressing for forfeiture would present its own complications where this court adopted the special needs rationale for GPS searches during the pendency of this appeal, Mr. Davis has not sought to argue the government has forfeited reliance on a special needs framework. Given the unusual posture of the case, and the fact that this court directed the parties to address the post-trial doctrinal development in Jackson in their briefs, which both did amply, we decline to hold either party strictly to the issues raised at the suppression hearing. Cf. Parker v. United States, 254 A.3d 1138, 1144 (D.C. 2021) (recognizing that a development of the law may constitute an “exceptional circumstance” permitting this court to exercise its discretion and excuse any waiver of an issue at trial). We thus turn to the question presented.
C. Analyzing CSOSA‘s Electronic Monitoring Regulation Under the Special Needs Test
To assess the reasonableness of CSOSA‘s regulation that authorized the search of Mr. Davis, we first examine the origins and statutory structure of the District‘s supervised release system. We next consider the agency‘s regulation regarding GPS monitoring in the context of Fourth Amendment doctrine. We conclude, based on these considerations, that CSOSA‘s regulation authorizing warrantless searches of releasees via GPS monitoring exceeds its statutory authority. Because the government can have no legitimate interest in the implementation of an unlawful regulation, the regulation was necessarily unreasonable under a Fourth Amendment special needs framework, as was the search of Mr. Davis.
1. The Authorized Roles of the Parole Commission and CSOSA to Oversee Supervised Releasees
In 1997, Congress passed the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act, which mandated that the District abolish its parole system and instead implement a system of determinate sentences and supervised release under the authority of the United States Parole Commission. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 11231-33, 111 Stat. 712, 745-51. The Parole Commission, a federal agency then primarily tasked with overseeing a dwindling number
§ 11233(c)(2).6 The Revitalization Act also established a new federal agency, CSOSA, to which the Act designated the “supervision... [of] offenders on probation, parole, and supervised release... on behalf of the court or agency having jurisdiction over the offender being supervised.” Id. § 11233(c)(1). In allocating these duties, the Act specified that the “United States Parole Commission shall have and exercise the same authority as is vested in the United States district courts” under
As in the Revitalization Act, section 24-133 in pertinent part directs that CSOSA carry out its supervisory responsibilities “on behalf of the... agency having jurisdiction over” the supervised releasee,
as is vested in the United States district courts by paragraphs (d) through (i) of
The federal circuits have affirmed that the federal district courts possess exclusive authority to impose or modify terms or conditions of release and “may not delegate to the Probation Department decisionmaking authority which would make a defendant‘s liberty itself contingent
Concomitantly, as in the Revitalization Act, CSOSA‘s authority under
In other words, in the federal system there is a clear delineation between the adjudicatory authority, given to the federal district courts, and the administrative and supervisory authority, given to the federal probation office. With the enactment of legislation that was codified as
The government acknowledges
The term “intermediate sanctions” appears in two places in the Revitalization Act: in the provisions authorizing the Director of CSOSA to “develop and operate” them, Revitalization Act § 11233(b)(2)(E) (codified as
transmit to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia recommended rules
and principles for determining the sentence to be imposed, including . . . [w]hether to impose a sentence of probation, a term of imprisonment and/or fine, and the amount or length thereof, and including intermediate sanctions in appropriate cases.
(emphasis added). We presume that the term “intermediate sanctions” in the Revitalization Act had the same meaning in both places it was used, see Edwards v. United States, 583 A.2d 661, 664 (D.C. 1990) (acknowledging the “presumption that identical words used in the same or related legislation were intended to have the same meaning“), and, as the initial reference clearly described sentencing options between incarceration or probation or a fine for courts, the latter reference did so as well.9 Thus, section 11233(b)(2)(E) of the Revitalization Act authorized the Director of CSOSA to “develop and operate” these intermediate sentencing options for the courts. It did not confer power on the CSOSA Director through the agency‘s officers to unilaterally impose administrative penalties on a supervised releasee upon a perceived violation of their conditions of release.
The Revitalization Act‘s understanding of the term “intermediate sanctions” persisted in subsequent related legislation enacted by the Council. One year after Congress passed the Revitalization Act, the Council passed the Advisory Commission on Sentencing Establishment Act of 1998, which created a successor Commission to the Truth in Sentencing Commission. D.C. Law 12-167, 45 D.C. Reg. 5180. This new Commission was again directed to make recommendations regarding felony sentences to ensure that, inter alia, they “provide[d] for use of intermediate sanctions in appropriate cases.” D.C. Council, Report on Bill 12-550 at 6 (May 13, 1998). And three years after the Revitalization Act, the D.C. Council enacted the SRAA, see supra note 7, to resolve questions about the supervised release system left unanswered by the Revitalization Act itself. See D.C. Council, Report on Bill No. 13-696 at 2 (May 25, 2000). Here too, the Council appeared to adhere to an understanding of “intermediate sanctions” as sentencing options for courts; the committee report expressed a desire to give judges something other than “in/out” choices of pure incarceration and pure probation, such as work release, mandatory placement in a treatment center, or community corrections. Id. at 13-14 (explaining “[i]deally the [c]ourt would have the authority to impose a sanction which is more restrictive than probation but less restrictive than incarceration“).
This understanding of “intermediate sanctions” is muddied somewhat by the fact that Congress amended
Where does this leave us? We accept that Congressional reenactment of a statutory provision can, where there is “a showing of both congressional awareness and express congressional approval of an administrative interpretation of that provision,” change the prior meaning of statutory language. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 872 F.2d 1048, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Sawyer Prop. Mgmt. of Md., Inc. v. D. C. Rental Hous. Comm‘n, 877 A.2d 96, 108 (D.C. 2005) (“At best the reenactment of statutes is a nebulous foundation for statutory construction, and before a mere reenactment can be given conclusive effect as a [legislative] adoption of an administrative interpretation, it must be shown that [the legislature] was conscious that it was doing so.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although we see no indication in the legislative history that Congress was consciously discarding its previous understanding of “intermediate sanctions” in
It is “well[-]established,” however, that administrative sanctions are distinct from the conditions of release that the Parole Commission alone imposes. Hunt, 109 A.3d at 623. Recognizing our obligation to read
2. Warrantless Searches of People on Supervised Release
In the federal system, the division of authority between the courts and the probation office holds for warrantless searches, including GPS monitoring, which the courts alone can impose as a discretionary condition of release. See
Consistent with federal courts’ treatment of searches generally and GPS monitoring in particular as conditions of release, the Parole Commission treats the condition of warrantless searches as one imposed on supervised releasees only at its discretion. Compliance with warrantless searches is not a standard condition under the Commission‘s regulations. See
The Parole Commission‘s Rules and Procedures Manual (2010), which is posted on the Commission‘s website,13 underscores that the Commission regards unilateral searches of releasees to be beyond the discretion of CSOSA and its officers.14 According
Consonantly, CSOSA does not, in its own regulations, claim the general authority to search those under its supervision at its discretion, without a warrant or other authorization. But CSOSA‘s regulations provide that, if a releasee‘s supervision officer “has reason to believe” the releasee has failed to abide by the conditions of their release, the releasee “will be in violation of the conditions” and the officer “may then impose administrative sanctions.”
3. The Reasonableness of CSOSA‘s Electronic Monitoring Regulation
We assess the reasonableness of CSOSA‘s electronic monitoring regulation against the statutory backdrop discussed above and in the context of its origins. Historically, location monitoring of people on parole, probation, or supervised release was limited to radio-frequency (RF) technology, which was used “principally for home detention applications.” Harold I. Heaton, GPS Monitoring Practices in Community Supervision and the Potential Impact of Advanced Analytics 1, Nat‘l Inst. of Just. (2016). Like GPS monitoring, RF technology requires the physical attachment of a tracking device to a person. But unlike GPS, its use is limited to confirming a person‘s presence at or absence from a particular location or a limited range therefrom, during specific hours. See Federal Location Monitoring, United States Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/supervision/federal-location-monitoring; https://perma.cc/HE66-N3T9 (last visited May 11, 2023). In 2001, CSOSA promulgated a regulation authorizing its administrative sanctions program and included “[e]lectronic monitoring for a specified period of time” as one of the available sanctions. See Community Supervision: Administrative Sanction Schedule, 66 Fed. Reg. 48336, 48338 (Sept. 20, 2001) (codified at
Two years after this regulation was promulgated, in 2003, CSOSA adopted GPS tracking technology for supervisory purposes. CSOSA, GPS and Offender Supervision in Washington, D.C., D.C. Public Safety Radio (May 31, 2013), https://media.csosa.gov/podcast/transcripts/gps-and-offender-supervision-in-washington-d-c-dc-public-safety-radio/; https://perma.cc/N7JL-VWX8. The agency‘s reach into the lives of those whom it supervised in this manner thus extended enormously. CSOSA‘s GPS monitoring system “tracks and records the movements of the GPS devices in one-minute increments, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.” Jackson, 214 A.3d at 470. As the agency began using this more intrusive mode of surveillance, however, no corresponding amendment to its regulations ensued. Rather, CSOSA continued to rely on its preexisting regulation authorizing it to impose “electronic monitoring” as an administrative sanction. See Community Supervision: Administrative Sanctions, 68 Fed. Reg. 19738, 19738 (Apr. 22, 2003) (codified at
In the 2010s, the Supreme Court made clear in a series of decisions that GPS monitoring was a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections because of a person‘s privacy interests in both their physical person and their movements. See supra Part II.A. Neither CSOSA‘s nor the Parole Commission‘s rules and regulations appear to have been amended to reflect this shift in the constitutional landscape. CSOSA appears to have continued to treat location monitoring, including around-the-clock, everywhere-you-go GPS tracking, as a sanction subject to its discretion, while the Parole Commission treated all other Fourth Amendment searches as conditions
We conclude that this regulatory scheme allowing CSOSA to unilaterally order GPS searches is unlawful under the statutory scheme which entrusts the Parole Commission with the equivalent power of a federal trial court to impose conditions of release (including the condition that a person subject themselves to search), and is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
On one side of the balance of interests, it is well established that 24-hour GPS surveillance represents a “serious intrusion on personal privacy,” both from the trespass on the person and “the government‘s prolonged, minute-by-minute tracking and recording of all of a person‘s movements and whereabouts.” Jackson, 214 A.3d at 477. In the CSOSA system, those movements and whereabouts are stored indefinitely and made available to multiple government agencies, meaning the scope of the privacy intrusion reaches far beyond a person‘s individual supervision officer. See supra Part I. Further, GPS monitoring also encroaches upon a releasee‘s liberty interests: the maintenance of the tracking device imposes daily or even continuous restrictions on the releasee‘s actions, see id., and failing to comply with these restrictions can lead to additional restrictions all the way up to re-incarceration, cf. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833-34 (2002) (weighing the lack of law enforcement or disciplinary consequences from a special needs search in favor of the search‘s reasonableness).
On the other side of the balance, the government has no counterweight; it cannot have a significant interest in one of its agencies conducting Fourth Amendment searches in excess of the agency‘s statutory authority. Cf. Moore v. Gaither, 767 A.2d 278, 284 (D.C. 2001) (“[A] regulation may properly govern only those matters that the statute authorizes it to govern . . . .“). As we have held
previously, CSOSA need not obtain a warrant every time it wishes to search a person on supervised release. Atchison, 257 A.3d at 531. But, as laid out here, the statutory division of authority demands that such conduct be authorized by the U.S. Parole Commission, which by its own regulations offers substantive and procedural safeguards to ensure searches are conducted only when appropriate, as a formal condition of release. See supra Part II.C.2.
Needless to say, the Parole Commission‘s broad (and pre-Grady) regulatory directive that releasees comply with CSOSA‘s graduated sanctions program,
In reaching our conclusion that GPS monitoring as a search may only be ordered by the Commission, just as it may only be ordered by a court in the federal supervised release system, we are not, as the dissent charges us, “nullifying”
* * *
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that CSOSA‘s electronic monitoring regulation is not a reasonable regulation on which a special needs search may be based. In light of this conclusion, we do not reach Mr. Davis‘s other special needs arguments that even under CSOSA‘s electronic monitoring regulation he should not have been eligible for GPS monitoring as a “high risk” releasee, see Jackson, 214 A.3d at 479 (stating that the fact that CSOSA “reasonably limit[ed] its use [of GPS tracking] to high-risk” probationers weighed “heavily in favor of the search‘s reasonableness“), and that the extended duration of his GPS monitoring exceeded that which was authorized under CSOSA‘s electronic monitoring regulation.
D. Knights and Samson Are Inapplicable
Finally, while acknowledging that our precedents indicate that this court may assess this case under a special needs framework, the government argues that
In so arguing, the government leaves out a key circumstance distinguishing these cases. In Knights and Samson, law enforcement officers were expressly authorized by statute or a court to search probationers and parolees, respectively, without a warrant. In Samson, the Supreme Court stressed that a California statute required parolees “to submit to suspicionless searches by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time.” 547 U.S. at 852 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a probation order imposed by a judge in Knights allowed “any probation officer or law enforcement officer” to “search [Mr. Knights] at any[]time, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause.” 534 U.S. at 114, 119-120. These explicit authorizations specifically permitting law enforcement officers to search parolees and probationers at any time were what provided the grounds for the searches. Therefore, the court did not need to assess the reasonableness of any regulation governing the law enforcement agencies in question; the explicit authorizations, not the regulations, were what stood in for the standard warrant requirement.
Here, CSOSA had no such explicit authorization to search Mr. Davis, through a Commission-imposed condition or otherwise, and as we explained herein it lacked the authority to conduct the search in absence of the Parole Commission‘s approval. Had the Commission imposed a special condition of release on Mr. Davis authorizing warrantless searches generally or GPS monitoring specifically, Mr. Davis would be more similarly situated to Mr. Knights and it would likely then be appropriate to assess whether, under the totality of the circumstances, CSOSA‘s search of Mr. Davis was reasonable. But in the absence of such a condition, Mr. Davis‘s expectation of privacy was not diminished to the same extent that Mr. Knights‘s and Mr. Samson‘s were. We conclude that it would be inappropriate to apply the logic of Knights and Samson in this case.
E. Conclusion
CSOSA possesses significant authority to monitor the actions of people on supervised release. But given the statutory landscape surrounding its operations and the constitutional constraints on warrantless searches, its regulations may not reasonably authorize its officers to impose electronic monitoring in the form of GPS tracking on supervised releasees absent the express authorization of the Parole Commission and its procedures that protect against other Fourth Amendment searches of releasees’ persons. Therefore, the GPS data collected from Mr. Davis should have been suppressed under a special needs analysis. We thus reverse the denial of Mr. Davis‘s suppression motion, vacate Mr. Davis‘s conditional guilty plea, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
My colleagues in the majority now conclude that the GPS data collected from appellant should have been suppressed. They do so primarily based on their acceptance of arguments by appellant that in my view are demonstrably wrong and that, in any event, should have been subjected to plain-error review and rejected on the ground that there was no obvious error in the Superior Court ruling denying appellant‘s motion to suppress.
The majority opinion accepts appellant‘s argument that CSOSA‘s regulation (
A. The statutory background
Through the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 (the “Revitalization Act” or the “Act“), part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 11231-33, 111 Stat. 712, 745-51, Congress established
Under
intermediate sanctions for sentenced offenders,” it requires the Director to “develop and operate intermediate [sanctions] sanctions and incentives.” Id. at 10 (brackets and italics indicating that the word “sanctions” was stricken and the phrase “sanctions and incentives” was added). Thus, in enacting the legislation, Congress re-enacted the CSOSA Director‘s mandate with an express understanding that this mandate included “specific statutory authority to punish sentenced offenders.” Id. at 2.
My colleagues in the majority accord little weight to this important point about the understanding expressed by the 114th Congress when it amended
Further, Congress did not legislate in a vacuum when it amended the CSOSA authorizing statute to re-enact the agency‘s sanctions mandate and to add a mandate to develop and operate an incentives program. In promulgating its final rule entitled “Community Supervision: Administrative Sanctions” in 2003, CSOSA had explained that the “purpose of imposing sanctions is to enable CSOSA staff to respond as swiftly, certainly, and consistently as practicable to non-compliant behavior,” 68 Fed. Reg. 19738, 19738 (Apr. 22, 2003), and stated that its sanctions “present the community supervision officer with a range of corrective actions (see § 810.3) which can be applied short of court or USPC approval.” Id. (emphasis added). During congressional hearings on District of Columbia appropriations for fiscal year (FY) 2005, Congress had been advised of CSOSA‘s interpretation that “[o]ffenders who are under parole or supervised release supervision may be placed on GPS monitoring at CSOSA‘s discretion” (emphasis added).4 Congress
And it was not only in appropriations hearings that Congress was apprised of the sanctions CSOSA was employing. The then-CSOSA Director told a congressional oversight committee in 2008 that CSOSA had placed more than 2,000 high-risk offenders on GPS monitoring since FY 2004.7 The then-Acting Director of CSOSA told the same oversight committee in 2009 that “CSOSA imposes increasingly restrictive penalties on offenders for violating their release conditions” and that the sanctions “can involve . . . GPS monitoring.”8 The Acting Director went on to answer questions about the effectiveness of GPS.9 These statements from 2009 were made during an oversight hearing in which the subcommittee was specifically focused on “the policies and practices of . . . the Parole Commission or the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency,” the effectiveness of the agencies’ carrying out of their criminal justice responsibilities, and “the use of graduated
sanctions.”10 Testimony directed the subcommittee‘s attention to issues such as “the matter of the [Parole] Commission‘s continued existence.”11
“Where an agency‘s statutory construction has been fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress, and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.” N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). That legal principle applies here with respect to CSOSA‘s construction of its mandate under
that Congress intended to authorize and did authorize CSOSA to operate a program of sanctions (such as the requirement to wear a GPS monitor) for a supervised releasee‘s failure to comply with conditions of supervised release.
B. The administrative sanction regulations
Consistent with the foregoing statutory authority, Parole Commission regulations direct releasees supervised by CSOSA to comply with CSOSA-imposed sanctions. Specifically,
(vi) Comply with a graduated sanction. If you are supervised by CSOSA, you must comply with the sanction(s) imposed by the supervision officer and as established by an approved schedule of graduated sanctions. We may decide to begin revocation proceedings for you even if the supervision officer has earlier imposed a graduated sanction for your alleged violation of a release condition.
Thus, in effect, the Parole Commission has in effect adopted CSOSA‘s schedule of graduated sanctions as a Parole Commission requirement. CSOSA‘s own regulations explain that a supervised releasee “will be in violation of the conditions of [their] supervision” and “administrative sanctions” may be imposed “if [their] CSO has reason to believe that [they] are failing to abide by the general or specific conditions of release or [they] are engaging in criminal activity.”
Although my colleagues are willing to “assume for purposes of t[he majority] opinion” that CSOSA may have some authority to “administratively sanction,” ante at 29 (brackets removed) (emphasis omitted), they conclude that “[CSOSA‘s] regulations may not reasonably authorize its officers to impose electronic monitoring in the form of GPS tracking on supervised releasees absent [on each occasion, I presume] the express authorization of the Parole Commission.” Ante at 44.13 My
“any condition [of supervised release] that affects a significant liberty interest . . . must be imposed by the [entity to whose authority a releasee is subject].” United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 696 (10th Cir. 2011)). But a common thread in those cases is that they discussed release conditions that substantially restricted an offender‘s travel and where he or she could be at particular times. See id. (citing a requirement that the offender participate in residential treatment); United States v. Fiume, 643 F. App‘x 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that “[h]ome detention is a [] condition that is significantly more onerous than GPS monitoring” and citing U.S. Sentencing Guideline 5F1.2 specifying that home detention as a condition of probation or supervised release may be imposed “only as a substitute for imprisonment“); United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a probation officer may not make the decision to order inpatient treatment); United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (impermissible to delegate to the probation officer the decision whether the offender had to participate in a mental health program); United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1078-1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (improper delegation to probation officer to determine whether the defendant would undergo counseling).
As to GPS monitoring as a condition of release, courts have recognized that when it is required for the entire supervision period and applies without exception, without any determination particular to the offender, it “imposes a significant limitation on liberty.” Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 195 (Mass. 2009). But the rationales of these cases do not explain why relatively short-term GPS monitoring—such as the 90-day period of monitoring for which appellant‘s CSO referred him, imposed only as a sanction for his violation of conditions of release set by the Parole Commission—is so significant a limitation on liberty that it may not be imposed as an administrative sanction. There can be no doubt that GPS monitoring “is intrusive,” i.e., “a serious intrusion on personal privacy,” United States v. Jackson, 214 A.3d 464, 476-77 (D.C. 2019), and that it constitutes a restriction on a releasee‘s liberty. But, as we observed in Jackson, GPS tracking data is reviewed by CSOSA “solely to determine whether supervisees were present at crime scenes or prohibited locations, or were violating curfews,” a limited use that makes CSOSA‘s GPS monitoring “far less of an intrusion on a supervisee‘s privacy than, for example,
C. The majority‘s interpretation of D.C. Code § 24-133(b)(2)(F) .
I now turn to a textual analysis of why I believe the opinion for the court is wrong about the meaning of the pertinent statutory language. My colleagues in the majority suggest, ante at 26-27, that CSOSA‘s statutory responsibility to “[d]evelop and operate intermediate sanctions . . . programs,”
judges might impose, just as the Truth in Sentencing Commission, through a separate provision of the Revitalization Act, was charged with making “recommendations [to the Superior Court] for determining the sentence to be imposed,” including “[w]hether to impose . . . intermediate sanctions in appropriate cases.”15
Contrary to my colleagues’ suggestion, this interpretation does not amount to an unlawful delegation by the Parole Commission of statutory responsibility with respect to D.C. offenders on supervised release. To be sure, as discussed above, the Parole Commission has directed in its regulations that CSOSA supervisees must “comply with the sanction(s) imposed by the supervision officer and as established by an approved schedule of graduated sanctions.”
D. The majority‘s interpretation of D.C. Code § 24-133(d) .
Like appellant‘s brief on appeal, the majority opinion highlights
Similarly here, it would be an odd construction of
I note in addition that with respect to other language in the D.C. Code similar to the “shall have and exercise the same powers and authority as” clause of
E. The fact that GPS monitoring is a search.
The additional rationale on which the majority opinion rests its conclusion is that CSOSA‘s electronic monitoring regulation is ultra vires is that (1) as this court recognized in Jackson, GPS monitoring is a search and (2) Parole Commission policy is that probation/supervision officers have no authority to order warrantless searches of releasees. Ante at 37-38.
Our opinion in Jackson acknowledged that “when the government ‘attaches a device to a person‘s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual‘s movements,’ it conducts a search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 214 A.3d at 472 (quoting Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 309 (2015)). We explained that “[w]e determine whether a search is reasonable by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual‘s reasonable expectation of privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
We held in Jackson that GPS monitoring on Mr. Jackson, a probationer, without judicial authorization was justified as a reasonable intrusion on Mr. Jackson‘s privacy to meet “special needs,” id. at 471, and was constitutional because “his reasonable expectation of privacy as a convicted offender on probation was diminished and was outweighed by the strong governmental interests in effective probation supervision to deter and detect further criminal activity on his part and encourage his rehabilitation.” Id. at 467. We referred to CSOSA‘s regulations as “the counterpart to the regulation at issue in Griffin [v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)].” Id. at 475. And in Atchison v. United States, 257 A.3d 524 (D.C. 2021), finding no meaningful distinction between probation and supervised release, we held that the reasoning of Jackson governs in supervised release cases as well. Id. at 531.
This court‘s recognition that a releasee under supervision “must expect considerable supervisory intrusion on his privacy,” Jackson, 214 A.3d at 478, undermines my colleagues’ conclusion that temporary GPS monitoring as a sanction could not lawfully be imposed on appellant as an administrative sanction. “Like the Supreme Court
What is left of my colleagues’ search rationale for overturning CSOSA‘s authority to impose GPS monitoring is their reliance on a pre-Grady Parole Commission Rules & Procedures Manual that states in its section 2.204-18(a) that “[s]earches by Supervision Officers are disfavored.” Ante at 33-35. Nothing in the record tells us whether this June 30, 2010, document, accessible on the internet but not cited by the trial court, was the USPC policy at the time appellant‘s GPS device was put on, whether it reflects USPC policy in the wake of the Supreme Court‘s 2015 opinion in Grady, or whether USPC has reconsidered its policy or modified its guidance in recognition that GPS monitoring constitutes a search.24 What can be said is that the further discussion of the issue in the same section of the Rules & Procedures Manual seems to include within its scope only searches that present issues such as whether CSOs are “authorized to restrain third parties during a search” (according to the 2010 Manual, they are not), whether “it is reasonably foreseeable that a third party or the releasee himself may present a danger,” what should be done with seized items, and whether the contemplated scope of the search will result in other than minor damage to the property to be searched.
F. Appellant‘s arguments are properly subject to plain-error review.
The foregoing point, about an argument not developed in the trial court, brings me to my final argument in dissent, which is that, for the most part, appellant‘s arguments in this appeal should be subject to review only for plain error. That is because, before the Superior Court, appellant never argued that CSOSA‘s imposition of GPS monitoring was statutorily invalid because it falls outside the scope of CSOSA‘s duty described in
In his opening brief in support of his motion to suppress, appellant argued that CSOSA‘s requiring him to wear a GPS
In its supplemental brief, the government told the court that CSOSA had “the legal authority to place [appellant] on GPS monitoring” and was authorized “to impose it as an ‘intermediate sanction’ to ‘encourage compliance with release conditions.‘” As support, the government cited
This court‘s opinion in Nesbeth v. United States, 870 A.2d 1193 (D.C. 2005), is instructive. Defendant Nesbeth, who had been convicted of marijuana possession, argued on appeal that his conviction violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA“). See id. at 1194. We reviewed the claim only for plain error, agreeing with the government that Nesbeth had never adequately presented the statutory claim to the trial judge. Id. at 1196. We noted that in the trial court, Nesbeth had argued that his use of marijuana “was essential to the free exercise of his religion, his right under the First Amendment.” Id. (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). Particularly analogous to the situation in the instant case, “[w]hen the judge asked him for case law from this jurisdiction or the Supreme Court supporting the religious defense, he again asserted ‘the First Amendment.‘” Id. Then, “[a]s the trial progressed, the judge twice informed him of binding decisional law rejecting his constitutional free exercise claim.” Id. Still, Nesbeth “never once mentioned the RFRA to the trial judge.” Id. We noted that “[o]n neither occasion did [Nesbeth] attempt to clarify that instead he was making a statutory argument[.]” Id. Citing our regularly applied rule that ““[p]oints not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party‘s thesis
Here similarly, Judge Beck‘s specific request to the parties to address whether CSOSA‘s power to impose GPS tracking was “authority given by statute,” followed by appellant‘s failure to address with specificity the statutory provisions (sections
Appellant cannot show plain error as to his argument that CSOSA GPS monitoring of appellant as a sanction for violating his conditions of release exceeded CSOSA‘s statutory authority under
For all the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the judgment reversing the Superior Court‘s denial of appellant‘s motion to suppress.
Notes
Because the legitimacy of CSOSA‘s authority under a special needs rationale was unexplored, Jackson leaves unanswered how CSOSA‘s regulation authorizing imposition of a GPS monitor on a probationer squares with
Citing
