Davis v. Diley Ridge Med. Ctr.Davis v. Diley Ridge Med. Ctr.
Rendered on May 29, 2025
On brief: Colley Shroyer & Abraham Co., L.P.A., and Daniel N. Abraham, for appellant. Argued: Daniel N. Abraham.
On brief: Arnold Todaro Welch & Foliano Co., L.P.A., and Frederick A. Sewards, for appellees. Argued: Frederick A. Sewards.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
DINGUS, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Linda Kay Davis (“Davis“), Executor of the Estate of Scott A. Davis, deceased, appeals a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Emily S. Seng, M.D., and Emergency Services, Inc., on Davis‘s action for negligence and wrongful death.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On the morning of September 13, 2019, Raymond Leiendecker came to the emergency department at Diley Ridge Medical Center complaining of suicidal thoughts, alcoholism, and homelessness, and stating that his psychiatric medications should be adjusted. He specifically wanted to be admitted for in-patient psychiatric treatment at Columbus Springs East, followed by treatment for alcoholism through the Salvation Army near Toledo, Ohio. Leiendecker told Dr. Seng, two nurses, and a social worker that he was considering harming himself, including committing suicide. He did not express any desire to harm others and, when asked, he denied having thoughts about harming others.
{¶ 3} Based on her interaction with Leiendecker, Dr. Seng concluded that involuntarily hospitalization was not medically necessary. Instead, she asked questions to determine what alternative strategies might be best for Leiendecker‘s current state. Dr. Seng inquired about Leiendecker‘s complaints of recent homelessness, lack of gas money, and failure to fill the psychiatric medications that were prescribed to him during a visit to the emergency department two days earlier. He became angry with the doctor‘s questions. A social worker‘s chart note indicated that Leiendecker left, “making accusations that he was not getting what he needed and was just going to leave.” (Murray Depo. at 44.) A nurse‘s chart note indicated that Leiendecker stated “I‘m just going to walk out of here and screw you guys.” (Kirkpatrick Depo. at 11.) He then stormed out of the hospital and drove away. No person associated with Diley Ridge attempted to prevent him from leaving. A few minutes later, Leiendecker intentionally drove his truck through the front entrance of the hospital, fatally injuring Scott A. Davis (“decedent“), a respiratory therapist who worked at Diley Ridge Medical Center.
{¶ 4} The decedent‘s estate filed a complaint for medical negligence and wrongful death against Dr. Seng, her employer Emergency Services, Inc. (“ESI“), and other parties. Relevant to this appeal, Davis alleged that Dr. Seng failed to recognize that Leiendecker posed a substantial risk of harm to himself and others, and failed to commit him to a psychiatric facility, thereby breaching her duty to prevent Leiendecker from harming others. Davis alleged that ESI was vicariously liable as Dr. Seng‘s employer based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
{¶ 5} Dr. Seng and ESI filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they were immune from liability for Leiendecker‘s harm to third parties based on
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 6} Appellant assigns the following three assignments of error for our review:
[I.] The trial court erred by granting summary judgment based on statutory immunity where the statutory immunity defense was waived.
[II.] The trial court erred by granting summary judgment based on statutory immunity under
R.C. 2305.51(B) where Dr. Seng was not a “mental health professional” providing treatment at a “mental health institution.”[III.] The trial court erred by granting summary judgment based on statutory immunity under the circumstances in this case.
III. Discussion
A. Standard of review
{¶ 7} Because this case was decided on summary judgment, we review the matter de novo. State ex rel. Yost v. Burns, 2022-Ohio-1326, ¶ 9. Davis‘s second assignment of error raises a question of statutory interpretation, which we also review de novo. See State v. Vanzandt, 2015-Ohio-236, ¶ 6. De novo review means the reviewing court independently analyses the record while giving no deference to the trial court‘s decision. Johnson v. Am. Italian Golf Assn. of Columbus, 2018-Ohio-2100, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).
B. Waiver
{¶ 8} In her first assignment of error, Davis argues that Dr. Seng and ESI waived the defense of statutory immunity by failing to assert it in a timely manner.
{¶ 10} Because Davis did not ask the trial court to determine whether Dr. Seng and ESI were untimely in asserting their defense, we will not make such a determination for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, we overrule Davis‘s first assignment of error.
C. Statutory immunity
{¶ 11} In her second assignment of error, Davis asserts that Dr. Seng and ESI are not immune from liability under
1. Immunity under R.C. 2305.51
{¶ 12} Davis‘s argument presents a question of statutory interpretation. When determining the proper application of a statute, our role is to discern the intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted. Vanzandt, 2015-Ohio-236, at ¶ 7. If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we must simply apply the statute as written without resorting to the rules of statutory construction. Id. We give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning unless they are defined by statute. See Daher v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 2018-Ohio-4462, ¶ 8. When a statute does define words and phrases, “such definition controls in the application of the statute.” Terteling Bros., Inc. v. Glander, 151 Ohio St. 236 (1949), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14}
A mental health professional or mental health organization may be held liable in damages in a civil action . . . for serious physical harm or death resulting from failing to predict, warn of, or take precautions to provide protection from the violent behavior of a mental health client or patient, only if the client or patient or a knowledgeable person has communicated to the professional or organization an explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm to or causing the death of one or more clearly identifiable potential victims, the professional or organization has reason to believe that the client or patient has the intent and ability to carry out the threat[.]
{¶ 15} Next,
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Revised Code, a physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, or hospital is not liable in damages in a civil action ... for doing either of the following:
(1) Failing to discharge or to allow a patient to leave the facility if the physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, or hospital believes in the good faith exercise of professional medical, advanced practice registered nursing, or physician assistant judgment according to appropriate standards of professional practice that the patient has a mental health condition that threatens the safety of the patient or others;
(2) Discharging a patient whom the physician, physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse, or hospital believes in the good faith exercise of professional medical, advanced practice registered nursing, or physician assistant judgment according to appropriate standards of professional practice not to have a mental health condition that threatens the safety of the patient or others.
{¶ 16} As a general matter, all of the “immunities from civil liability and disciplinary action conferred by [
2. Immunity related to “mental health services” under R.C. 2305.51(B)
{¶ 17} The immunity in
{¶ 18} All of the foregoing definitions turn on the meaning of “mental health service,” which is defined in
“Mental health service” means a service provided to an individual or group of individuals involving the application of medical, psychiatric, psychological, professional counseling, social work, marriage and family therapy, or nursing principles or procedures to either of the following:
(i) The assessment, diagnosis, prevention, treatment, or amelioration of mental, emotional, psychiatric, psychological, or psychosocial disorders or diseases, as described in the most recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American psychiatric association;
(ii) The assessment or improvement of mental, emotional, psychiatric, psychological, or psychosocial adjustment or functioning, regardless of whether there is a diagnosable, pre-existing disorder or disease.
{¶ 19} Davis argues that Dr. Seng is not a “mental health professional” because she is board certified in emergency medicine rather than in psychiatry or psychology. Davis further argues that Dr. Seng did not provide “mental health services” at a “mental health organization” because Leiendecker‘s goal was to receive mental health treatment at a psychiatric facility and not from Dr. Seng at Diley Ridge.3 The broad language of the statute does not support Davis‘s narrow interpretation.
{¶ 20} The definitions in
{¶ 21} The parties do not dispute that Dr. Seng is licensed to practice medicine in Ohio, and that she was authorized to assess mental health disorders and form treatment plans based on her assessments. Moreover, Dr. Seng testified in her deposition that she provided an average of six or more psychiatric evaluations per month as an emergency room physician, and that she had attended several continuing medical education lectures relating to the assessment of patients who present to an emergency department with psychiatric issues. The parties also do not dispute that Leiendecker came to Diley Ridge seeking psychiatric services, and that Dr. Seng assessed his mental health condition in order to form a treatment plan, albeit a treatment plan that did not ultimately include involuntary hospitalization. Under these specific facts, Dr. Seng falls within the definition of a “mental health professional” providing “mental health services,” Leiendecker constitutes a “mental health client or patient” receiving those mental health services, and ESI, as Dr. Seng‘s employer, falls within the definition of a “mental health organization.”
3. The plain meaning of “mental health professional” does not nullify other provisions within R.C. 2305.51
{¶ 22} Davis argues that notwithstanding the plain language of the definitions related to “mental health services” in
{¶ 23} Davis correctly notes that
(g) “Advanced practice registered nurse” has the same meaning as in section
4723.01 of the Revised Code .(h) “Hospital” has the same meaning as in section
2305.25 of the Revised Code .(i) “Physician” means an individual authorized under
Chapter 4731. of the Revised Code to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery.(j) “Physician assistant” has the same meaning as in section
4730.01 of the Revised Code .
{¶ 24} Because Dr. Seng and ESI did not claim immunity under
{¶ 25} Accordingly, the fact that Dr. Seng meets the definition of a “mental health professional” for purposes of
{¶ 26} In sum, to the extent that Dr. Seng and ESI could be held liable for Leiendecker‘s actions causing serious physical harm or death, the immunity provided in
{¶ 27} In her third assignment of error, Davis argues that summary judgment should not have been granted on her claims because questions of material fact remain regarding whether (1) Leiendecker‘s statements negated Dr. Seng‘s and ESI‘s immunity under
{¶ 28} Davis contends that even if Dr. Seng is a “mental health professional” as defined in
{¶ 29} Davis directs us to the provision in
[T]he client or patient or a knowledgeable person has communicated to the professional or organization an explicit threat of inflicting imminent and serious physical harm to or causing the death of one or more clearly identifiable potential victims[.]
{¶ 30} Davis argues that Dr. Seng and ESI are still potentially liable under
IV. Disposition
{¶ 32} Based on the foregoing, we overrule Davis‘s three assignments of error, and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.