DAVID TORRES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
NUMBER 13-24-00129-CR
COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
August 7, 2025
Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 148TH DISTRICT COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña
Appellant David Torres appeals his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years of age, a first-degree felony. See
I. BACKGROUND
On June 2, 2022, a Nueces County grand jury indicted Torres with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 years of age (Count 1), and two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (Counts 2 and 3). See
The evidence adduced at trial showed that Torres was the “significant other” of E.M.‘s grandmother, whom E.M. considered as her mother. At the close of evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Count 1, and the State dismissed Counts 2 and 3. During the punishment phase of trial, the State asked E.M., “What are you asking this jury for?” Trial counsel objected before E.M. responded, but the trial court overruled the objection. E.M. answered: “Forty-five years.” Trial counsel renewed his objection to this testimony as not “appropriate,” asking that the trial court strike the response and grant a mistrial. The trial court overruled trial counsel‘s objection, and the jury sentenced Torres to fifty years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
We review a trial court‘s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Matew v. State, 655 S.W.3d 291, 300 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022, pet. ref‘d) (citing Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. (citation omitted); see Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (noting that an abuse of discretion occurs “only when the trial judge‘s decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree” (citation omitted)).
For non-constitutional error, as asserted here, we apply
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
As to victim impact testimony, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that relevancy depends upon whether the testimony has “some bearing on the defendant‘s ‘personal responsibility and moral guilt.‘” Stavinoha v. State, 808 S.W.2d 76, 78–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Stated differently, the relevance of victim impact testimony in a non-capital felony case requires that such testimony have a “close, direct link to the circumstances of the case.” Brooks v. State, 961 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); see also Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (“We recognize that this standard does not draw a bright and easy line for determining when evidence concerning the victim is admissible and when it is not. Trial judges should exercise their sound discretion in permitting some evidence about the victim‘s character and the impact on others’ lives while limiting the amount and scope of such testimony.“).
III. DISCUSSION
Torres argues that E.M.‘s testimony that she wanted him to be sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment was admitted erroneously and had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury‘s decision to sentence him to fifty years’ imprisonment. See King, 953 S.W.2d at 271. In support of this argument, Torres relies mainly on the decision in Sattiewhite v. State, wherein the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that “[t]he argument that a witness may recommend a particular punishment to the trier of fact has been soundly rejected.” 786 S.W.2d 271, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
Sattiewhite, however, is inapposite. The holding of Sattiewhite is limited to situations where a party asks for a sentencing recommendation from an expert witness. See id. (warning against a “battle of the experts“). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has subsequently affirmed the limited holding of Sattiewhite. See Fryer v. State, 68 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Our analysis in Sattiewhite, then, focused specifically on the unsuitability of expert testimony on the issue of appropriate punishment.“); see also Taylor v. State, 109 S.W.3d 443, 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“A punishment recommendation from a non-victim—especially an expert—entails a situation significantly different from a recommendation from the victim, who, at least arguably, was
Regardless, we find that Torres‘s claim fails because he cannot show substantial harm on this record. See King, 953 S.W.2d at 271. In Hines, for example, the appellant was convicted of sexual assault of a child, and the child testified that she “would like the maximum sentence,” which was twenty years’ imprisonment. 396 S.W.3d at 710. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded that because the jury sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment, the appellant could not show substantial harm:
It likely came as no surprise to the jury that the complainant thought appellant should receive a sentence in at least the range stated. . . . The jury assessed a punishment of twelve years in prison, which was well below the maximum sentence the complainant stated he would like to see given and which was different than the ‘formula’ complainant suggested that would have resulted in a sentence of eight years. Appellant argues without legal citation that, because the twelve-year sentence assessed lies between eight and twenty, the jury obviously was influenced by the complainant‘s testimony. However, other than the fact that the sentence fell somewhere between the two numbers mentioned by the complainant, there is no indication that the jury reached its verdict based on the complainant‘s stated wishes. The complainant‘s testimony on this point was brief, and the prosecutor made no specific request of the jury and did not refer to the
complainant‘s testimony about sentencing in the State‘s closing argument. On this record, the trial court‘s alleged error in permitting the complainant to testify as to the punishment he would like appellant to receive had no more than a very slight effect on the jury‘s determination of punishment. Consequently, presuming there was error, such error was harmless. We overrule appellant‘s second issue.
Id. at 711 (citations omitted).
Here, the record contains only one reference to the complained-of recommended sentence of forty-five years’ imprisonment, which E.M. briefly provided at the end of her direct examination during the punishment phase of trial. The State did not further refer or otherwise reinforce E.M.‘s recommended sentence. Rather, during closing, the State based its retribution argument on the “effects” the crime had on E.M., including her “mental health problems,” “anxiety,” and her need to take medications. The State concluded its closing by asking the jury to sentence Torres to “anywhere between 40 and 50 years in prison.” The jury sentenced Torres to fifty years’ imprisonment. Based on “everything in the record” before us, Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355, as in Hines, we conclude that any error committed by the trial court was harmless because the “alleged error in permitting the complainant to testify as to the punishment [s]he would like appellant to receive had no more than a very slight effect on the jury‘s determination of punishment.” 396 S.W.3d at 711; see King, 953 S.W.2d at 271; Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365. We overrule Torres‘s sole issue.
For all the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice
Do not publish.
Delivered and filed on the
7th day of August, 2025.