History
  • No items yet
midpage
Mosley v. State
983 S.W.2d 249
Tex. Crim. App.
1998
Check Treatment

*1 DaRoyce MOSLEY, Appellant, Lamont

The STATE of Texas.

No. 72281 Texas, Appeals

Court Criminal

En Banc.

July *2 Attorney, Savage,

C. Patrice Asst. District Paul, Atty., Longview, State’s Aus- Matthew tin, for State.

OPINION ON COURT’S MOTION *3 FOR REHEARING* KELLER, Judge, opinion delivered the McCORMICK, P.J., Court, and in which WOMACK, MANSFIELD, and HOLLAND Jj. Joined. prior opinions Our are withdrawn. October 1995 of Appellant was convicted in capital Tex. Penal Code murder. 19.03(a)(2).1 jury’s § an- Pursuant special issues set forth in Texas swers to the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 2(b) 2(e), §§ judge the trial sentenced § appellant 2(g).2 to death. Article 37.071 appeal Direct to this Court is automatic. 2(h). § Article 37.071 raises points through of error numbered 176.3 We will affirm.

A. OF THE SUFFICIENCY EVIDENCE 1. Guilt point of error con legally tends that insufficient guilt per his the indictment: to establish in tentionally causing the death of Patricia Col- committing ter while in the course of robbery attempting to commit the of Sandra Specifically, appellant Cash. asserts that the prove State failed to his intent to cause the death of Patricia Colter. light in the most favorable to the

Viewed verdict, the evidence at trial established following: approximately p.m. At on 11:45 21, 1994, Cash, July night Sandra wait- Lounge Kilgore, ress at was clos- Katie’s ing up evening placing for night’s cash, receipts, including about into a $308 Orr, Cynthia Hujar Antonio, appel- money. San tackle box Katie’s used for Four lant. keeping customers and were her remained * opinion Editor’s Note: The was ordered to be 2. Unless otherwise indicated all future references published part. to Articles refer to Code of Criminal Procedure. 19.03(a)(2) provides person 1.§ that a commits capital murder when he commits murder under points of 3. There are no error numbered 75-77. 19.02(b)(1) § person intentionally and "the com- adopt appellant’s numbering for of ref- We ease committing mits the murder in attempting the course erence. robbery” (ellipsis to commit ... in- serted). company. Cash looked out evening police the window and arrested the next after the walking up saw men joked two that she received information from various sources. gave would have to make the men mad because Ricky police Wheat one of their first already everything up.” she had “closed Ricky leads. lived across street from Suddenly, open the door was kicked and two Lounge Katie's testified eve- they men in ski masks came in and stated 21, 1994, brothers, ning July he and his were rob there to them. Both men were Napoleon, guys Darrell and and some other brandishing guns. The man that burst sitting yard drinking in the front beer. said, through the door first “Give me the Don, friend, Ray up his walked stated you money, bitch.” slid the tack- white Cash money there was some in the and he area man, le box towards this first her shot Ray accompanied had to have it. Don was anyway. As Cash shielded her face with her by Marcus and a man identified as later *4 hands, hit the shot her the wrist and went Ricky appellant. Ray pistol noted Don a had through her hand. She was then shot stayed on him at the time. The three men fell to stomach and she the floor. Cash about five minutes and then walked off. gunfire, hearing remembered more but could Ricky eventually thirty went inside. About remember little else after she was shot. returned, later, Ray minutes Don and stated However, state, in this shock-induced Cash he had shot someone over at and Katie’s managed still call to refused, Ricky Napoleon needed a ride. but police emergency When the and medical agreed. appellant Marcus and then came (EMS) thereafter, shortly services arrived walking up from the direction an aban- they discovered the bodies of the four cus- building. Napoleon doned and Darrell then Colter, Patricia and Don, tomers: Duane Luva Marcus, gave Ray appellant and a ride. Cash, Congleton, Alvin Waller. Ricky box testified men had a tackle survivor, was removed EMS and taken to he had not noticed the first time the men had hospital. Cash had nine holes her by. come body approximately from to three four bul- stating appellant After first was in- lets, of which were her two recovered from at crime, Christopher with volved “Kaboo” police hospital; recovered a third Smith, appellant’s best friend and Marcus’s behind the bar bullet from where Cash was cousin, gave police. also information to the wrist, heel, shot. Cash had wounds to her 21, 1994, evening July appellant On the breast, right cavity. and abdominal Howev- a planned gank told Kaboo he to “make er, the most serious wound her went across night.4 move” Katie’s that Later body, upper perforating lungs going both evening, appellant gun. Kaboo saw with a thereby her through spinal leaving cord her Appellant got gun he stated from Ka- permanently paralyzed from the chest down. Rossum, neighbor, Stanley boo’s and was All three recovered bullets were fired from going recog- use it rob Katie’s. Kaboo gun. the same gun belonging Ap- nized the to Rossum. autopsies, At the the medical examiner left, pellant but when he returned later he determined Patricia and Duane Colter each stated, Ray “We it.” Don and Marcus did gunshot a single died from to the back wound shortly came into Kaboo’s room thereafter. of the head. Both bullets were recovered Congleton from the victims. also a died from Appellant hap- told Kaboo some of what head, gunshot wound to the back of the pened robbery Appel- during at Katie’s. the bullet exited and was not recovered at Ray lady lant stated that Don had shot the autopsy. gunshot Waller received three appellant behind the counter and had told to the head wounds —two and one to his pool get people from underneath the thigh. Any one the three wounds would Appellant complied, said he told the table. have been fatal. slow, they moving shot people were too Smith, he had been Appellant, Ray Appellant Marcus Don them. never stated uncle) robbery Mosley (appellant’s way. separately doing forced into "gank testified that a 4. Kaboo move” means to rob or steal. he did so. The began grandparents be there when brought box and

Appellant then in a grandparents his money Appellant police arranged divid- to have counting the inside. himself, Kaboo, money evenly between ed come in. Don, Marcus, receiving seven- Ray each arrived, appellant grandparents Once his had not Although Kaboo

ty-seven dollars. confession, was made into gave an oral which he took helped robbery, he testified with confession, ap- a written statement. money “just [he] because a share of the planned been the offense had pellant stated then dis- Appellant and Kaboo wanted it.”5 days He further stated couple of before. buy a new car the appellant’s plans cussed crime, he time to commit the that once it was day proceeds of an insurance next and, although he participate; did not want check he had received. offense, he did not during the his car the next appellant purchased After borrowing a anyone. admit to shoot He did day, They went to he to see Kaboo. went Rossum, Mar- Stanley but claimed gun from seventy- spent appellant the mall where his they him once were inside cus took shoes, shirt, cologne, seven dollars them he had Appellant also told Katie’s. they to Taco Bell. shorts. Afterwards went during the offense wearing toboggan been taken his told Kaboo had it into the woods hear Nate and had thrown buy car. grandfather with him to When Wheat’s house. grandfather went out to eat and his *5 Agent Larry morning, Special next afterwards, grandfather told his he appellant Alcohol, Tobacco, and Smith of the Bureau crime, seeing in the but after was involved appellant if he Firearms6 asked face, grandfather’s the shocked look on his police he willing to show him and the where Also, just playing. him he appellant told was agreed toboggan. Appellant had thrown mall, returning appellant from the had an area next to an and directed Smith to brother, Franceosa, up and Mar- picked his building near Katie’s where abandoned police pulled cus. The them over and arrest- Ap- glove a were recovered. toboggan and police ed Marcus. The were unaware wearing the he had been pellant admitted appellant’s involvement at this time. Howev- robbery. advised glove during the Smith er, police occupants asked all the that could be him there were scientific tests they might voluntarily to the car if come if it had been glove run on the to determine questions. station to answer some Ev- police if firing gun. He then asked worn when eryone agreed. driving them to the While state- appellant anything to add to the had station, appellant seemed police Kaboo stated already given. point, At this ments he had it on his con- nervous and scared “like was people four at Ka- appellant stated he shot occupants agreed science.” The of the car girl Ray Don shot the behind tie’s and they say anything police. would not to the he had used a .380 bar. He further admitted day. changed Kaboo his mind the next from someone pistol automatic he borrowed station, police Once at the stated Stanley. Appellant agreed to make named robbery he had no involvement in the and day af- statement later that another written However, evening appel- later that murders. getting ter some rest. lant was arrested due to information received later gave his final confession Appellant informed he was under from Marcus. When day. Appellant stated that the idea arrest, out, that appellant cried “Oh what have I up because he committing the crime came my going life. I’m to done. I’ve ruined felt like Ray Don and Marcus that he told my jail.” Appellant life in spend the rest Appellant said “doing something devious.” people in stated he shot two of the Katie’s. anything before and he had never done bad agreed questions then to answer more He crime, something Ray Don doing his he felt like bad. requested about Investigation eventually of Alco- eral Bureau of and Bureau 5. Kaboo returned his share hol, Tobacco, money police. and Firearms also assisted in the investigation. Kilgore Department, Along Police Tex- with the Office, Rangers, County Sheriffs the Fed- suggested robbing lady, Katie’s. He further stat- I looked around and Marcus left had although July ed he told them on Katie’s. doing any- that he did not feel like it Police pistol recovered .380 automatic

more, along anyway he went with it Stanley which had been returned to Rossum. Stanley. Ray gun borrowed a from Don had gun Ballistic tests showed this was same gun. also obtained a then de- used to fire the bullets recovered from the scribed the crime: Colter, Colter, bodies of Patricia Duane Ray Don everybody went first and told Alvin Waller.7 bullets recovered from get They sitting up down. still were in Sandra Cash were fired from a different and I people chairs heard shot. The Bevel, weapon.8 Tom pattern blood-stain ex- looked at me and it scared me and I shot a reconstruetor, pert and crime also testified lady at the table. I was five about feet impact spatter due the location of from her and I shot her in the back evidence, other opinion his was that there lady got up Ray head. Another ran. weapons two used two different Don Ray told me kill them. Don told shooters, shooting one vic- four deceased get me to shoot them or shot. When I shooting one surviving tims and victim. Don, Ray

looked pointing was the He further stated that Patricia both gun He at me. said this after I had al- execution-style Duane Colter were shot in an ready lady. I shot first Then shot a manner. man sitting lady that was the first I In reviewing sufficiency question, shot. I don’t know where I shot the man light must view the in the most at. I about the same I distance was favorable the verdict and determine lady. By when I shot this time the whether rational trier of fact could have lady gotten pool that ran had under the found the essential elements the crime lady get table. I out told beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Vir said, pool Ray under table. Don *6 307, 319, ginia, 2781, 443 U.S. 61 99 S.Ct. that, “Fuck shoot Then shot her.” I the (1979); State, 560 L.Ed.2d v. Mason 905 lady pool the under table twice in the head. 570, (Tex.Crim.App.1995), 574 S.W.2d cert. pool I bent down next to and table shot denied, 1051, 717, 516 U.S. 116 S.Ct. 133 Ray her twice. Then Don was behind (1996). 670 The jury L.Ed.2d the exclu bar and had shot behind I there. came judge credibility sive of the of witnesses and pool around table and another weight given testimony. of the to be their by man was The got up bar. man State, (Tex.Crim.App.), 316, Barnes v. 876 S.W.2d 321 coming was me with pool towards a stick. 861, t. 513 U.S. 115 cer said, Ray boy, Don “Shoot him shoot him.” (1994). 174, Likewise, S.Ct. 130 110 L.Ed.2d just my away I turned head and shot three reconciliation of in conflicts the evidence times. The man fell after I had shot three province jury. within the exclusive gotten Ray money times. Don had State, 305, (Tex. Losada v. 721 S.W.2d 309 biga box from behind the bar. box Crim.App.1986). was dark colored. Then we out ran Ray light ran across street. Don started in the most Viewed favorable to the verdict, hollering asking me where Marcus was appellant shows kept telling planned at. I I didn’t robbery him know. Then brought with him up we saw deadly weapon, Marcus come behind us after pistol,9 .380 automatic Highway Ray accomplish we crossed 135. Don jury may asked order to the task. The Marcus where he had been infer and Marcus the intent to kill from the use aof trying deadly weapon told him had been to break in a unless would not be reason- Ray bodily car. Marcus went into Katie’s when able to infer that death or serious injury weap- Don and I went in. I After shot first could result from the of the use previously, weapon. As deadly 7. stated no bullets were recovered 9. A firearm is as a defined Tex- Congleton. body 1.07(a)(17)(A). from the of Luva § as Penal Code weapon This never second was recovered.

255 Cir.1992). (3rd (Tex. 870, State, Beyer, F.2d 1215 See 873 v. 983 on. Ross v. (5th Whitley, 39 F.3d 607 Godsey v. 719 S.W.2d also James v. Crim.App.1992); Further, Cir.1994). 578, (Tex.Crim.App.1986). 581-82 Colter was

the evidence shows that Patricia Supreme Court has The United States shot the head from a distance in the back of particular pattern fact never addressed the probably Applying less than five feet. leading Supreme Court The two before us. case, we Jacksoncviteria. to the facts of this are Rose v. in this area of the law cases find a have found rational trier fact could 2993, 545, Mitchell, 61 443 U.S. 99 S.Ct. beyond appellant a reasonable doubt (1979) Hobby United L.Ed.2d intentionally caused the death of the Patricia 3093, 339, States, 104 S.Ct. 468 U.S. Colter. Point error 126 is overruled. (1984). Rose, the Court as- In L.Ed.2d deciding that discrimination sumed “without B. GRAND JURY CHALLENGE only the selection of .fore- regard 60, point of error con requires subsequent man that a conviction Gregg County’s tends that method of select aside, just proved if the discrimination set as ing grand juries the foremen of its violates grand the entire had tainted the selection of Equal Protection Clause of the Four 551-552, 443 U.S. at n. venire.” argues teenth Amendment. He that the sta however, Hobby, S.Ct. 2993. In the Court significant disparity tistical evidence shows a assumption to make such an concern- refused proportion persons between of black grand jury ing the selection of a federal serving grand jury pro foreman and 104 S.Ct. 3093. foreman. 468 U.S. portion persons Gregg of black who reside in several relevant factors dis- Court found County. argues, He based Rose v. (1) tinguishing the two cases: the claim Mitchell, brought Rose was members of the class (1979), disparity L.Ed.2d that this estab (black allegedly excluded from ser- persons) discrimination, prima lished a facie case of Hobby vice as foreman while involved white argues prima and he further that this facie allegedly male who was not a member case not rebutted State. (black women), persons excluded classes (2) equal protection an claim Rose involved adversely He concedes that we have held process Hobby while involved a due position to his Rousseau (3) claim, the foreman fundamental fairness (Tex.Crim.App.), 687-688 cert. *7 independently from a in Rose was selected denied, 919, 313, 510 U.S. 114 S.Ct. 126 jurors potential grand list of in addition to (1993) L.Ed.2d 260 due to the ministerial grand the other members of the while possessed by nature of the duties the fore Hobby the foreman in was selected from man, argues but he that Rousseau was chosen, jurors already grand that had been wrongly support position, decided. In of this (4) possessed the foreman in Rose sub points to Rousseau’s failure to cite au decision-making powers in stantive addition thority holding for its and to federal circuit possessed by ordinary grand jury to those Contrary pronouncement cases. to our in Rousseau, Hobby pos members while the foreman in the Fifth and Third Circuits have only Hobby, ministerial duties. sessed that a both held defendant advance a 347-349, Recently, U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 3093. equal protection claim viable based Supreme Court has extended Powers’s10 discriminatory grand jury selection of a fore standing concept third-party of in the Bats man where foreman has minis even Puckett, Jury setting. on11 context to the Grand terial duties. Johnson v. 929 F.2d (5th Cir.), Louisiana, 392, 898, 112 523 U.S. Campbell cert. U.S. (1998).12 Hence, 274, (1991); 1419, S.Ct. 116 L.Ed.2d 226 Ramseur S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 551 Ohio, law, that, 499 U.S. 111 S.Ct. under Louisiana the fore- Powers v. 12.We note (1991). 113 L.Ed.2d 411 grand jury. person separately is selected from Hence, Campbell, Campbell 118 S.Ct. at 1422. Kentucky, 11. Batson v. (3). factor was similar to Rose under (1986). 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1) longer we assume that will factor no a under Article 30.01 of the Texas Code of Procedure, relevant distinction between the situations presiding Criminal over the Hobby. found in Rose and trial because of complaining one wit- nesses, Falco, Officer was within the third present case falls in between Rose and (the degree consanguinity judge’s neph- Rose, Hobby. Like this case involves an ew). And, equal protection Hobby, claim. as in the foreman in this case was selected from § disqualifies judge Article 5 a grand jurors already chosen, that had been when he is within degree related the third possessed only and the foreman ministerial case, “party.” a only par In a criminal in duties addition to his normal duties as a ties are State and the defendant. It is grand juror. Although recognize we the ex possible not or marriage to have ties of blood authority istence adverse from some feder Judge Khoury’s to “the State.” Therefore circuits, al we nevertheless conclude that the relation Officer Falco did not render the present governed by fact situation be should judge Judge Khoury party. related to a was Hobby.13 Appellant’s equal protection own disqualified not pro under the constitutional by impartial interests are satisfied selec vision. grand jury. tion of members That decision-making selection ensures that Article disqualifies judge 30.01 a process by is not tainted racial degree discrimina when he is related within the third injured.” tion. Because the foreman’s additional “party accused or the Article ministerial, merely they duties are do not “party injured” 30.01’s language appears to appellant’s right grand jury to a (complain intended include the victim probable go ant), determination of cause to for we so hold. Officer Falco is not the — prosecution. with a See Campbell, ward victim the present Judge Khoury case. at -, U.S. 118 S.Ct. at 1425. Nor do we disqualified virtue of Article any significant that appellant think has inter 30.01. Points of error 105 and 106 over are ensuring nondiscriminatory est in selec ruled. persons perform tion of who ministerial contend, example, duties. One would not Suppress 8. Motion to that a defendant’s conviction should be re points appel error 38 and discriminatory versed because selec lant contends that his own statements file-stamps tion who clerk court docu erroneously admitted the trial court ments, bailiff the courtroom Appel violation of 2.122 Articles and 38.22. trial, during court coordinator who ar argument support lant makes no of his ranges hearings and trials on the docket. contention; hence, reject Article 38.22 course, discriminatory Of it is true that inadequately contention briefed. jurors impedes rights grand selection 74(f)(for rule, Tex.R.App. Former P. current might potentially who serve as foreman. 38.1(h)). argues see Rule He that Article But, examples positions the above list of 2.122 expressly powers limits the of federal *8 with ministerial duties indicates that arrest, agents felony in a state to case necessarily criminal case not defendant’s is a search, interpret and seizure. We a statute good forum to address such discrimination. plain meaning accordance with the its Hence, holding we reaffirm our in Rousseau. ambiguous words unless the are or the words Point error overruled. plain Boy meaning to results. leads absurd kin v. 785-786 & C. GUILT/INNOCENCE pro n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Article 2.122 disqualification

7. Judicial part: vides in relevant (a) points In and following of error 105 criminal investi- named Khoury Judge disqualified, gators contends that was be the United States shall not Constitution, officers, peace § 11 under Texas Article 5 deemed shall but have persuasive, authority. binding 13. Federal are circuit cases not issues arrest, 9. Evidence seizure as search and powers the laws of the under felony offenses through of error 22 points of Texas: State court im the trial appellant contends (1) Bureau Agents of the Federal Special testimo Kevon Johnson’s properly excluded Investigation; allegedly made ny concerning a statement all Mosley Ray Don had killed Ray Don Alcohol, (4) Tobacco and Agents of Special that ex Appellant contends of the victims. Firearms stat testimony violates various clusion of this as restrict- interprets this statute Howev provisions. utory and constitutional authority peace of federal officers ing the er, assuming deciding that exclusion without searches, arrests, acts of specific error, testimony we find of Johnson’s was that, interroga- because He claims seizures. be harmless.14 error to of the authorized tion is not listed as one jury’s pres- proof outside the On offer of acts, conduct peace officers cannot federal ence, as follows: Johnson testified investiga- in state criminal interrogations [Ray he indicate Q. Don] And did who tions. Lounge? shooting in Katie’s did the misreads the stat- Appellant’s argument A. Himself. the nature of in- ute and misunderstands Statutory terrogation. authorization DaRoyce Q. Okay. Did he indicate suspect, a and such required to detain any shooting in Katie’s Mosley did likely interrogation make detention will Lounge? But, “interrogation” is not much easier. didn’t, No, sir, just sir. He said A. he statutory legal requires act that autho- a just DaRoyce there. was Anyone, including private citi- rization. zens, suspect, criminal question can a Q. Ray he is the one And so Don said and, statutory prescriptions to the absent persons all in Katie’s who killed legally contrary, suspect a is not re- Lounge. quired questions, to answer whether private citizens or law enforcement say that he killed all A. He didn’t 2.13, personnel. listing Article the duties just shooting people. He said he did the officers, peace refers powers of state just DaRoyce was there. duty power of an officer to (Bracketed inserted). ellipsis material questioning arrest but does not refer testimony Similar was offered before power possessed by peace officer. jury by Kevin Williams: place exist that limits While statutes [Ray talking about how Don] A. He was ability to conduct an interro- police officer’s shooting. he in there and he started went (such 38.22), gation as Article Article 2.122 is saying how he did it and And then he was interroga- No reference to not one of them. all this stuff. in Article 2.122. tion is made While “only” after the statute contains the word arrest, powers “shall have the phrase Q. Okay. say about Da- What did offenses,” felony and seizure as to search say DaRoyce did? Royee? did he What clearly “felony of- “only” modifies

word go in. He A. He said he was seared fenses,” do indicating that federal officers in and stuff like go said he scared to arrest, search, and sei- powers of have the that. Hence, federal offi- zure for misdemeanors. *9 Q. Okay. interrogations in state in- may conduct cers go something or 39 are A. He had to make him Points of error 38 and vestigations. like that. overruled. Tex.R.App. statutory alleges and constitu- able doubt” standard found in P. Appellant both

14. 44.2(a). the error is We will assume tional violations. "beyond apply the a reason- constitutional 258

Q. Okay. say Did he appellant’s that the one tribute to punish- he’s or conviction shooting that did the Ray was? ment. Points through Don of error 22 29 are —that overruled. A. he’s He said the one did the that Jury arguments shooting. 78,

(Bracketed point In inserted). appellant of error con ellipses material and that tends State Moreover, improperly struck at appellant testimony offered of appellant over the of shoulders counsel. The four other reported witnesses who state- following during argument: occurred State’s by Ray ments Don that he killed all the Lounge. victims in Katie’s [PROSECUTOR]: There is one route traveling to the truth. It is on the main light other testimony Ray about your you road. That will to proper take admitting victims, killing Don’s to all of the you stay destination. But must on the likely an additional witness attempted main road. The defense has to that matter is small. have in the We held road, get you you. off the main to divert erroneous admission of evidence that context They stay you don’t want on the to main of other admission similar can they road because where that know will State, Livingston render error harmless. v. you. take 311, (Tex.Crim.App.1987), 739 334 S.W.2d 2858, cert. CQUNSEL]: Honor, [DEFENSE Your (1988). Although L.Ed.2d 895 the rule object I’ll to improper this comment on may always apply not in the to same fashion object counsel and testifying. to counsel evidence, the erroneous exclusion of we find COURT: Overruled. the admission of evidence similar to you They to take [PROSECUTOR]: want may, what the appellant wished to un offer road, roads, a a side series of rabbit side circumstances, der mitigate some against trails, and a you rabbit trail that will lead harm he have otherwise suffered. to a dead-end. The is not truth there. Here, testimony appear Johnson’s does not Appellant contends prosecutor’s that the ar- or powerful be different more than that of gument improper constituted an attack on actually other witnesses testified. We honesty. defense counsels’ find in present case that similar testimony mitigates from other witnesses “This Court maintains against harmfulness error. Fur for arguments concern final that result ther, the evidence that killed the uninvited and unsubstantiated accusation of very strong. four victims is improper admit conduct directed at defendant’s State, ted in police killing attorney.” his confession to the Orona v. 791 S.W.2d using four victims. He also (Tex.Crim.App.1990). judges admitted to Trial pistol .380 that was linked responsibility preventing to three should assume victims He made type argument. killed. similar statements Wilson concerning partic his friend Kaboo (Tex.Crim.App.1996). his S.W.2d In its ipation form, in the murder and gun. egregious argument his use of the most this kind It has been noted that a can may confession involve accusations of manufactured ev especially strong idence, Orona, guilt. evidence of Garcia or an S.W.2d at at tempt obligations to contrast the ethical (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(plurality opinion). attorneys, Wilson, prosecutors and defense only appellant’s State had not confession 58 - 60. The comments in personnel, law milder, enforcement also had merely case are indicat his guilt admission of to a ing attorneys friend. Given the defense would at strength of State’s case presence tempt argument jury’s and the use to divert testimony of other concerning Ray Don’s ad attention obscure the issues. We have missions as the guilt perpetrator, sole in the past indicated that such mild com beyond erroneous, find a reasonable doubt that the ex long ments not be so as testimony they clusion of interpreted Johnson’s did con- can be an attack on

259 honesty counsel’s been held fense have never arguments by the defense counsel. made 188, In- to constitutional violation. 190 to amount v. 480 S.W.2d Gorman comments de have characterized such (Tex.Crim.App,1972)(Prosecutor said of stead we permissible areas of falling let him outside the fense counsel: “Don’t smokescreen Wilson, you enough”). 59. We you, has 938 S.W.2d at argument. smoke-screened However, brought holding that has “other been such comments constitute find that 44.2(b). precedent indi question by into more recent purview the Rule errors” within cating legitimate arguments by defense that 44.2(b) “Any other that: provides Rule permits counsel cannot serve as a basis for defect, error, that irregularity, variance ting prosecutorial comments “cast as rights must be does not affect substantial veracity.” persion on defense counsel’s directly rule is taken disregarded.” The (Tex.Crim.App.), 330, v. 357 Dinkins Criminal Procedure Federal Rule of from 832, denied, t. cer 52(a) change. See Notes without substantive (1995)(Prosecutor S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 59 Hence, Comments, P. Tex.R.App. stated that counsel to mis defense “wants 44.2(b), federal construing the of Rule impact you by saying_”). lead a little bit provide especially to appear caselaw it Although impossible to articulate is rule guidance. applying the federal useful argu- precise regarding rule these kinds of cases, federal courts improper argument to ment, say prosecutor runs it is fair to that a (1) severity look three factors: generally striking of improperly a risk at a defendant (the magnitude prej of the of the misconduct argu- over the shoulder of counsel when the (2) remarks), prosecutor’s effect the udicial ment is made in terms of counsel defense adopted to cure the misconduct measures personally argument explicitly the when (the cautionary by efficacy instruction impugns counsel’s In the defense character. (3) certainty judge), and the of conviction case, present argument referred to coun- (the strength of the misconduct absent and, although saying so personally sel not conviction). United supporting explicitly, suggested that counsel wanted (2nd Millar, F.3d Cir. v. States will divert truth. We Palmer, 1996); 37 F.3d United States was argument assume inappropriate.15 (5th Cir.1994). 1080, 1085 those in the that the similar to found

Assuming trial court should Comments objection, by several appellant’s present have sustained we must case have been addressed Tenth the error rever circuit court decisions. The determine whether warrants federal a defense claim that sal. Error reversible if it harmless. addressed not Circuit on de past, improperly In the determined commented prosecutor the harmfulness stating that type by by counsel the defendant’s conducting of error a harm fense 81(b)(2) analysis attorney attempted “has ... under confuse Tex.R.App. former P. issue, your eyes.” asking United there is throw sand whether a “reasonable Texas, F.2d Oil Co.

possibility” improper argument Wilshire States (10th Cir.), n. 15 cert. might have contributed to Wil conviction. (1970). son, However, 27 L.Ed.2d 59 938 S.W.2d at 61. U.S. improper, finding the remarks proce advent of the of appellate new rules While dure, they preju if held “even analysis con the court proper harm to be promptly removed depends ducted in their kind of error dicial Id. jury.” errors, For court’s instruction volved. the old the trial constitutional 81(b)(2) ease, prosecutor made remains, Rule In a First Circuit standard now 44.2(a). attor about the defense Tex.R.App. statements P. various But nonconstitu as, “they like to scramble tional errors want governed neys, are stan such a new dard, 44.2(b). heads, you,” “[t]hey wanted Although formulated in Rule confuse your head,” let concern, “[d]o improper your comments on de confuse analysis. 15. More supporting harm inappropri authorities with the connection below, ateness comments are discussed *11 attorneys matters, here you, intimidate ladies and immaterial to because he wants gentlemen you. up States v. Ortiz-Arri confuse to He wants throw —United (1st Cir.1993), goitia, 996 F.2d smoke cert. screen. S.Ct. 37 F.3d at 1086. The Fifth Circuit com- (1994). L.Ed.2d 45 trial judge overruled mented that “the context of the instant state- objections ap to these comments. Id. The merely ments prosecutor reveals that the pellate court “not persuaded was that these outlined his of strategy.” view the defense prejudicial comments were so to require as that, given Id. The court further explained But, added, Id. reversal.” at 441. the court testimony witnesses, prose- the of certain the “We not ... why, do understand nu after did cutor’s comment not amount to a mis- court, warnings merous prose from this the charaeterization. Id. cuting attorneys persist ... spiking their arguments with put comments that their We turn now to the test three-factor dis- inserted). (ellipses cases at risk.” Id. cussed in Millar and From Palmer. the discussion, above we that the com- conclude While First and Tenth Circuits have mildly inap- ments in case were type found this of argument clearly be to propriate. directly Such comments do not reversible), improper (though not the Second attorneys lying, accuse the defense of expressed and Fifth Circuits have less cer- suggest the comments do not evi- tainty impropriety about the such criti- Dinkins, dence was See also manufactured. Millar, cisms of defense counsel. In (similar 894 S.W.2d at not as comments prosecutor argued that defense of egregious an accusation that defense coun- case was evidence). most, sel manufactured At “hog wash” and that the defense counsel may comments indicate that the defense be had created a prose- “smoke screen.” The jury’s to attempting distort the view of the urged cutor also jury members of the to argument. through clever Such a ask themselves whether defense counsel inject does comment not new facts into the trying was to “confuse” them or “lead record, position and the is in to evalu- astray.” them prosecutor’s ate truthfulness asser- at 79 F.3d 343-344. The Second Circuit tion. Such a comment if even backfire mildly held: “The comments inappro jury disagrees prosecutor’s with the as- that, priate, clearly if do not rise sessment defense counsels’ actions. We severity level of require sufficient to rever actions, prosecutor’s not condone do sal.” Id. 344. The court contrasted severity relatively the misconduct is case before it an with earlier case it had small. The first test factor the harm does prosecutor, argu reversed when the during very weigh heavily appellant’s favor. ment, pros differentiated the ethical roles attorneys regard ecutors and defense with factor, Turning the second find that we finding (contrasting the truth. Id. fact, no curative action was taken. In Friedman, United States v. 909 F.2d 709 prosecutor apparently reemphasized the (2d Cir.1990)(prosecutor argued: “while statements after the court trial overruled people go investigate some ... out drug Nevertheless, objection. appellant’s we find prosecute dealers and drug try dealers and heavily that the third weighs factor favor brought justice, to see them are there of the State. State appellant’s had own them, off, try others who defend get them par- confession and his to a third admissions perhaps high even origi fees.”)(ellipsis ty. The also led the to a confession State nal)). Palmer, prosecutor argued: gun to be confirmed ballistics tests you weapon Defense counsel wants to focus murder for at least three of the discrepancies: including these little [Palmer] victims of the incident the victim away, away. ten feet was he fifteen feet named in the Given the indictment. mild- Did steps way go strength he take two and then ness of the comments and the case, straight north or did run north. He State’s find the error to harm- you little, tiny, wants to focus on those less. Point error 78 is overruled. *12 inserted). Hence, concluded the Court

D. al PUNISHMENT victim about the about “that evidence through 1 points appellant In of error on the victim’s of the murder impact the that trial court erred in admit- contends the as to jury’s the decision family relevant to is concerning good the character ting evidence penalty should argues that or not the death of victims the offense. He whether un- evidence is (empha- victim character inadmissible Id. at S.Ct. 2597 111 imposed.” precedents. der United States Texas added). rule rejecting per se While sis argues the trial additional- He also that court impact evi- excluding victim character ly admitting evidence the charac- erred dence, recognize did the Supreme the Court Colter be- ter of victims other than Patricia “unduly prejudicial that evidence” possibility the victims were not named cause other held the Due be introduced and that could and were extrane- the indictment therefore provide a mechanism Clause would Process of- ous offense victims. The “extraneous Id. circumstances. at relief under those for the trial fense” contention was made to suggested S.Ct. 2597. Court 111 Hence, been argument court. that has not prejudice might exist when that undue P. preserved Tex.R.App. Former review. jury encourage designed is “a evidence 52(a)(now 33.1(a)(2)(A)). rule as- defendants whose victims were find that his argument concerning As for victim deserving community are more to their sets evidence, appellant character contends whose are than those victims punishment precedents States and Texas treat United worthy.” Id. 111 to be less at perceived “impact” “character” different^ evidence 2597. S.Ct. ly. generally recog- “Impact” evidence is concerning nized evidence the effect (Tex. In Ford others, death particular- victim’s will have on held admissible testimo Crim.App.1996), we ly family the victim’s members. “Character” crime ny from survivors of the and from generally recognized evidence as evidence concerning the of the father effect decedent’s concerning good possessed by qualities Id. at on their lives. 115-116. crime that, im- victim. contends while (Tex.Crim. Smith v. admissible, pact evidence is evi- character majority of this held that App.1996), a court dence is not.16 testimony concerning good char the victim’s However, Supreme never Court has Id. at (plurality acter is inadmissible. distinguished types between the two of evi- (Overstreet, Id. at 104 J. concur opinion); That importance dence. Court noted concurred in Smith ring). judges Three having the trier fact “of the evidence opinion. concurring opin And in a without specific harm caused the defendant.” ion, Judge opined that victim char Mansfield Tennessee, Payne 808, 825, Id. at evidence should be admissible. acter (1991). S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d testimony He 104-107. noted coworker’s noted vic- Court that information about the concerning the dedication her stu victim’s humanizing tim can be factor important an Id. He also noted victim’s dents. just decision-making essential for in a death- testimony concerning victim’s sister’s penalty “[Tjurning trial: into victim animals, degree in edu her love ‘faceless of a stranger penalty phase at the cation, membership in national and her capital trial’... full deprives the State of the Judge Id. at 106-107. Mansfield guard. moral force prevent of its evidence and that such evidence was relevant contended having infor- before it all the Birky was—that she was “who Miss show necessary mation proper to determine the (ci- just a name” than Id. punishment more [capital] for a murder.” omitted, ellipsis tation failed and bracketed materi- had show impact and character evidence of presuppose analysis

16. We Victim in our defen- others. that the contesting dant the admission is aware at time he com- of victim defendant which a unaware, necessarily and character evidence was at the time relevant to his fu- the crime mits crime, of the of the victims’ character or culpability. dangerousness moral ture impact that the victims’ will have on deaths unfairly prejudicial under Texas Rule admissibility Crimi- Rule 403 limits of such evi- the. nal of Evidence 403. dence predominantly when the evidence en- courages comparisons great- based If Smith were the final word on the sub- er morality lesser worth or of the victim. ject, argument appellant’s that all victim When focus of the evidence shifts from character evidence is inadmissible would humanizing illustrating the victim and have some But recently, force. more *13 by harm caused the defendant measuring to decided Johnson v. 1997 WL — - compared the worth of the victim to other (Tex.Crim.App.1997). In Johnson, society then the four members State exceeds members of Court this held permissible testimony. the bounds of impact victim We evidence was admissible recognize but victim character evidence that this standard not was not. Id. at does draw a - *4, bright But, easy at (plurality opinion). for determining in a line when concurring opinion joined by concerning three other evidence the victim is admissible judges (Keller, Price, Holland, JJ.), Pre- judges and when it is not. Trial should siding Judge opined McCormick that no dis- exercise their sound permitting discretion in tinction impact existed between and charac- some evidence about the victim’s character ter evidence and that all such evidence was impact the on others’ limiting lives while statutory admissible as relevant to the miti- scope the amount testimony. of such - gation *16, special issue. at Id. at determining Considerations in whether testi- (McCormick, concurring). P.J. a separate In mony should be excluded under Rule 403 concurring opinion, Judge Mansfield con- testimony, should include the nature of the tended that both victim character and victim the relationship between the witness and the impact long evidence were so admissible as victim, testimony the to amount of be intro- only family (parents, close grand- members duced, availability testimony and the of other parents, spouses, siblings) permitted relating impact to victim and character. - testify. *18, (Mansfield, Id. at at J. And, mitigating evidence introduced concurring). Judge Mansfield contended may defendant also be considered evaluat- that such evidence would be relevant and ing may subsequently whether the State of- subject would not be to exclusion under Rule fer testimony. victim-related however, 403. Id. opinion, Earlier his opined that Rule might play a role in Judge We find Mansfield’s concern limiting admission impact of victim and vic- placed upon Johnson that limits be who tim general. character evidence in Id. at one, may testify to a we be valid do not *17, at-. limiting believe that an absolute rule testimo ny family degree members within certain Hence, majority Court distantly of relationship is viable. More re approved has the introduction of victim char members, friends, family lated close co (as acter qualification evidence—four without case, issue) may, provide legiti given workers in a mitigation special relates to the testimony. depend mate only if That will family one close testify. members relationship personal closeness in jurisprudence Our in this area has been volved, testimony, and the nature of confusing somewhat inconsistent and availability provide vic opportunity times. We take this other witnesses to announce consistent, always testimony. if not tim-related do note that vic We clear-cut rule impact testimony followed in tim impact future cases: Both victim and character admissible, strangers, including victim character evidence those learned about are who mitigation issue, in the context of case in the media and those who did so as victim, uniqueness participants investigation, to show in a criminal will defendant, ever, rarely, harm caused and as rebut if Rule 403. be admissible under Janecka, mitigating tal to defendant’s evidence.17 See 937 S.W.2d at 473. case, mitigating defense and the State defendant introduced evidence. The agreement permitting any objection entered into an the State defendant waived related testimony timing to introduce victim-related before the of the introduction of the State's evidence. time, example, victim for to a determination of future

At the same we caution that issue, dangerousness. mitigation on the impact become and character evidence hand, whether, considering other after asks unfairly prejudicial through sheer volume. evidence, mitigating cir- all cumulative, technically if an undue Even sufficient imposing a life cumstances exist to warrant type amount of this of evidence can result penalty. of the death See sentence instead Hence, prejudice unfair under Rule 403. added). 2(e)(emphasis § Miti- Article 37.071 encourage place appropriate courts to trial gating is defined as that which “a evidence amount, kind, limits and source of juror may regard reducing the defen- impact victim and character evidence. blameworthiness.” Article dant’s moral 2(f)(4). Finally, § that victim we observe 37.071 Victim-related evidence is mitigating and character is relevant circum- relevant show mitigation im- insofar as it relates to the stances are not “sufficient” to warrant *14 irrelevant, patently posing issue. Such evidence is a life sentence.18 Such evidence State, case, Relying upon Eldridge pose” penalty. present v. 940 S.W.2d the death how- 646, 1996), ever, (Tex.Crim.App. aggravating v. involves circumstances used to 653-654 McFarland State, 482, jury (Tex.Crim.App.1996), 928 S.W.2d 518 determine whether the should "decline to ce 1119, 966, impose” penalty, language rt. 519 U.S. 117 S.Ct. 136 the death and Wolfe’s State, (1997), L.Ed.2d 851 and Lawton v. 913 about “limits” is not directed to that situation. 542, (Tex.Crim.App.1995), S.W.2d 557 de ni The difference between the two situations is cert. 88, ed, 826, by Supreme 519 U.S. S.Ct. 136 L.Ed.2d 44 illustrated Court's discussion of 117 (1996), Judge Meyers aggravating eligibility contends that the difference between the and selec- mitigation special requirements penalty in All is irrelevant tion a death case. McFarland, Eldridge, constitutionally required issue. But and Lawton did that is narrow instead, directly aggravating question; address that those discretion is one factor sentencer’s argument applies cases focused on a defendant’s that that to a subclass of defendants convicted 967, California, required Tuilaepa the United States Constitution a burden of murder. v. 512 U.S. 971-72, 2630, 2634-35, proof regarding aggravating circumstances. 114 S.Ct. 129 L.Ed.2d But, 750, (1994). mitigation requirement See above citations. issue 759 This of at least require jury narrowing, aggravating does not aggravating to consider or find one factor is sometimes circumstances, hence, "eligibility” requirement. no bur known as Id. That proof upon required. eligibility requirement by den of the State was See is satisfied in Texas aggravating above citations. While language indicating have some these cases factors contained within the ele- offense, mitigation question dangerousness that the ments of the the future circumstances, issue, sometimes, aggravating does not involve special “non-Penry” other language properly such should be special findings partic- viewed sim Without issues. on those ply observing factors, require that the issue does not their aggravating ular a death sentence cannot not, consideration. Such an observation does imposed. eligibility requirement be satisfied, Once the however, preclude permitting jury to consid only remaining requirement is a aggravating making er factors in its evaluation. permitting “selection” decision: the sentence to any language We disavow in those cases that exercise an “individualized” determination of suggests otherwise. whether a defendant should in fact receive a State, 270, Relying upon v. 917 S.W.2d death sentence "on the basis of the character Wolfe 1996), (Tex.Crim.App. Judge Meyers 278 con the individual and the circumstances of 971-74, 2634-36, permitting aggrava tends that consideration crime.” Id. at 114 S.Ct. at ting mitigation circumstances within the issue L.Ed.2d at 759-760. This "selection” decision unconstitutionally open-ended. Judge expansive enough it makes "must be to accommodate rel- Meyers apparently language mitigating that believes evant evidence so as to assure an Wolfe's dangerousness culpability,” to the effect that future and other assessment of the defendant's id at 972-74, 2635-36, jury’s issues "limit” the discretion to consider 114 S.Ct. at 129 L.Ed.2d at 760, aggravating aggravating Supreme precluded factors means that cir but the Court has never place mitigation spe aggravating part cumstances have no in the the use of circumstances as passage upon by Judge process cial issue. But the relied of an individualized determination of Meyers immediately quotation culpability. process hardly follows a from the con- Such could be Supreme opinion Penry Lynaugh, equation Court’s in sidered "individualized” if half of the (relevant circumstances) aggravating 106 L.Ed.2d were ex- (1989). Wolfe, recognize simply See S.W.2d at 278. That cluded. We in the case quotation requirement jury may aggravating refers to the that “a sen- that the consider factors in impose determining tencer’s discretion to the death sentence” In its selection decision. whether to (emphasis original). dispense mercy be narrowed. Id. to a defendant after it has al- passage regarding ready favor, eligibility “limits” on consider found the factors in the State's Wolfe not, be, ing aggravating jury required circumstances should be read as and should not covering aggravating mitigating circumstances used to "im- to look at evidence in a vacuum. wholly Q. would be irrelevant if part personality affir Was that of her that matively waived submission and reliance she well people? did upon mitigation special Although issue. sir, A. Yes people she had that ask we held have that the former “deliberate her station. [waitress] special ness” by issue could not be waived (Bracketed inserted). ellipsis material defendant, even request, affirmative complains Kap- also about Trida Powell v. 314-318 Colter, pan’s testimony regarding Patricia (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(plurality opinion); Id. Colter, (Tricia’s Duane and Alvin (Clinton, Waller concurring), mitigation J. mother, stepfather, respectively): Powell, and father distinguishable. issue is explained required “Article 37.071 Well, Daddy Mamma and still loved each find, doubt, beyond that a a reasonable other, they like were best was— that appellant committed murder with ‘delib friends. And when Mamma met Duane— erateness’ before could be sentenced his was—Mamma was—Mamma was issue, death.” Id. at part, 316. The “de they just they just whole life. And — capital murder punishable fine[d] death.” Daddy all friends. lived a trailer behind Id. mitigation But the issue carries no bur my going mother’s house. He was den of proof be must carried through a tough place time and needed a State before a death can im sentence go. my And so mother had a travel posed. Penry house, stayed trailer behind her and he *15 denied, (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. time, just slept there. And of a lot he (1995). 133 L.Ed.2d 408 in the extra bedroom the other at end issue, instead, upon jury confers abil the trailer where Mamma and Duane were. ity dispense mercy, to even after it has found They really just good all friends. eligible a defendant penalty. for death they hardly anywhere And went without McFarland, Hence, See S.W.2d They just very each other. were all close. a defendant can waive reliance complains empha- And about the issue, mitigation submission and if portion following testimony sized of the does, victim and character evidence concerning Tricia Duane Colter: would be irrelevant and hence inadmissible. must, however,

Such a waiver be affirmative very was special person Duane a to me. I express. already was grown. sixteen. I was But my when mother met him and introduced mind, With these considerations in us, everything, I was kind of shocked we turn to the case. Appellant com him, but the more I was around more testimony plains about the of three witnesses you help just you just just but couldn’t who — were related to the victims. Helen just love to so sweet. him death. He niece, Wrag, Congleton’s Luva testified that kid, big He He was you was like a know. her aunt just great. ... happy person. was a people. She liked Q. Did she a stranger? ever meet added).19 (Emphasis also com- Appellant A. sir. emphasized portion No of the plains about the did, contrary, culpability, does not hold to the but if it a concerns defendant’s moral Wolfe it Supreme extent, would be with inconsistent Court good character is limited victim’s precedent. culpability relevant determination. Arm Finally, Judge Meyers Armstrong contends that course, was, applica strong decided before (Tex.Crim.App. mitigation capital tion of the issue cases 1985) precludes the introduction of a victim’s Moreover, Texas. con the extent good character to rebut of the defen admissibility flict dence, of victim-related evi with good Armstrong, dant’s character. But in Armstrong was sub silentio overruled support evidence was introduced in of the future Johnson. dangerousness special issue. See Id. That there logical types is no evi link between two brief, that, appellant quotes 19. We his note danger dence within the framework the future emphasized portion passage. of this issue not the same ousness does mean holds true mitigation mitigation for issue. issue humanizing the vic- concerning to serve the function testimony following from Trida com- drawing unwarranted tims rather than Patricia Colter: other members them and parisons between my supporter. She My mother was sole just three society. introduced The State through so had been much her life concerning testimony give witnesses to going to anything I felt that she was like entire, incident, and the four victims going to be go through, have to that I was testimony takes of these witnesses combined go through it there her and I could with reporter’s pages in the court up a mere 34 times, you her. There was some with of this testi- find that admission record. We know, my away and when we would move Rule 403. mony not violate did Grandmother, stay brother would afraid, always it. I was I couldn’t stand that the State argues also know, her you something might happen to judgment comparative made a improperly strong enough pull or she wouldn’t be closing argument. How the victims in about think, through something. And so I would argu ever, object to the appellant did not kid, just but I you know —I was error with preserve trial. He cannot ment at think, know, there, I could—I you if I was by objecting to evidence argument respect it, know, through you I help could her argument simply because the evidence could, through. you pull know her And Tex.R.App. subject matter. address similar married, got like I then whenever I it was 52(a)(now 33.1(a)(2)(A)); rule Anderson P. just prove wanted to to her that I was a State, (Tex.Crim.App. big myself and girl and I could take care of — U.S. -, 1996), S.Ct. cert. know, you need not need not she think — (1997)(argument er 138 L.Ed.2d money spend all of her on me. She was parole preserved regard to ror with everybody. always buying things And for issue). charge parole requesting know, kept you just I I would think if — through 4 are overruled. of error 1 Points else, buy everybody she wouldn’t stuff *16 point of error know, you buy she could it for herself in exclud that the trial court erred contends bp always thought But I there to I would testimony expert defense Dr. Jedli ing from take care of her and she would be there to In an regarding dangerousness. future ka my right take care of me. And she was the follow proof, appellant proffered offer of my arm. She was backbone. testimony he admitted: ing wanted added).20 (Emphasis (1) do percent of convicted murderers 98 Finally, appellant contends that the trial any crimes within commit more violent permitted court Robert Waller to read a years after release. poem provides about the victims. He no (2) eligible parole An inmate becomes in poem record references and we find no years. after 40 capital on a life sentence testimony. portion do find a of testimo- We (3) crimes over Very people few commit ny in which Robert read an earlier “victim 60; statistical differ- age no measurable impact” statement that he had made concern- crime rates for 60- ence exists between father, mother, ing the effects that his 60-year-olds year-old convicts and murder stepfather had on his life. previous not committed a who have argument appellant’s find that We crime.21 above evidence should have been excluded to (4) likely prison are less to kill Murderers unpersuasive. be While the evidence relates burglars are. guards than degree to some to the character of the vic- (5) danger- guard is not a Being prison tims, heavily impact it is intertwined with the occupation. ous family of the victims’ loss on members. (6) Moreover, penalty is not cost effective. appears the evidence in this case death that, brief, testimony appellant quotes that was admitted note in his 21. We do note We Jeanty, psychia- passage, expert emphasized portions of defense Louis-Victor trist, age. decrease with placing ellipsis violence tends to an between them. (7) punishment There is no evidence that the death phase capital aof murder trial. penalty Court, has Supreme Tennessee, an additional deterrent effect The Payne v. imprisonment. 2597, 115 over 111 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), held (8) Eighth Amendment is not a There is a difference as far as future per bar se to the admission of evidence of the dangerousness is concerned between serial personal victim’s characteristics or the im single multiple killers and transaction mur- pact of his death on his loved ones. derers. any testimony Dr. Jedlika did not offer con testimony quite poignant- [T]he illustrated cerning peculiar appel characteristics ly Payne’s killing some of the harm (7) (5), (6), lant. merely Items constitute caused; nothing had there is unfair about validity penalty attacks on the of the death allowing jury to bear mind are, reason, scheme and for that irrelevant to harm the same time as it considers the jury’s factfinding task. Rachal v. mitigating evidence introduced defen- (Tex.Crim.App.), S.W.2d cert. dant ... legitimately [A] state con- — -, U.S. clude that evidence about the victim and (1996). (2) given L.Ed.2d 639 Item about murder on the point in its instructions. See family jury’s victim’s- is relevant (1), (8) (3), (4), error 103 below. Items decision as to or not the death whether may be expert relevant in the context of penalty imposed. should There no testimony concerning the specific character differently reason to treat such evidence background istics and of the defendant and than other evidence is relevant treated. their effect on dangerousness. future Mat Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2609. (Tex.Crim. son Rachal,

App.1991); at 817. But I. Categories Impact/Character of Victim testimony none of Dr. Jedlika’s related to appellant’s Evidence background; characteristics and questions, hypothetical no or otherwise were Payne pre- Supreme Court did not regarding person asked ap whether a cisely im- define what constitutes victim pellant’s pose characteristics future Yet, paei/charaeter evidence. order to Hence, danger. general testimony relat question answer the to the extent such ing to recidivism was not shown to be rele necessary evidence should be admissible it appellant. vant Point error 109 is to do so. overruled. *17 judgment of the is trial court AF- impact Victim evidence is of the évidence FIRMED. complainant effect the of had death has family on For his her and friends. exam MANSFIELD, concurring J. filed a ple, Payne grandmother in v. Tennessee the opinion. surviving of the child victim testified at the punishment to the effect on the phase as MEYERS, J. a dissenting opinion filed in younger of mother and child the loss his joined. which BAIRD J. sister. She further as to how testified OVERSTREET, dissenting J. filed a (who severely during the child was wounded opinion. sister, on both of attack his mother and died) whom often for his mother cried PRICE, J. concurs in the Court’s baby his sis happened asked about what judgment. ter. on We have not been consistent wheth MANSFIELD, Judge, on concurring er is See impact victim evidence admissible. rehearing. court’s own motion for State, v. (Tex.Crim.App. Ford S.W.2d 1996) (Mansfield, J., Prior opinion concurring); For withdrawn. several Smith v. years struggled this Court has (Tex.Crim.App.1996) determine 919 S.W.2d 96 (Mansfield, J., to what degree impact/char- concurring); so-called “victim Johnson — S.W.2d - (Tex.Crim. acter” at evidence should admissible 1997 WL J., present (Mansfield, rights; is not an issue in con- such (plurality op.) App.1997) case. curring). major category of victim-relat- The second Johnson, I my concurring opinion evidence. is victim character ed evidence

stated: personal attrib- pertains evidence This pro- due of the In order to avoid violation victim, e.g., generous was utes of the she to mini- rights cess defendant activities, good awas involved in charitable irrelevant mize the risk admission mother, and well-liked or was successful (I impact duly note that victim evidence evi- of such community. purpose nature, highly emotional is its evidence the victim jury that is to inform dence on significant impact likely to have a name; she was he or just more than only close jury), my opinion is such. had worth as unique individual family (parents, grandparents, members Tennessee, at Payne See siblings) should be allowed spouses and into permitted put 2609. The defendant testify character as to the victim’s and/or punishment a at evidence before has had on them. effect the victim’s death of his nearly range of evidence unlimited case, the mothers of the present In the mitigating background as character as to the effect the loss victims testified under penalty of the death against imposition as what their sons has had on them well Procedure, Article Criminal Texas Code of they young men were. Such evi- kind of 2(e). 37.071, char- § Evidence of the victim’s members, dence, testimony family of close is, my opinion, background acter and 402, and is is relevant under Rules 401 and mitiga- of the in the context equally relevant under Rule prejudicial not excludable as impact victim special issue. As with tion evidence, admissibility of victim character — and 403. subject to Rules Johnson, slip op. at -. evidence supra, majori- case, agree I with the In the re- testimony of three witnesses ty majority allowing agree I with the good the victims’ victims as to lated to the family testify members to as to close deaths on the effect of their character and had on them effect the death victim impact/character relevant victim them was be, cases, overly restrictive. in certain and 402. Further- Rules 401 evidence under Certainly, the effect of the victim’s death more, needlessly cumu- was not the evidence friend, lifelong colleague, work or romantic outweigh lative, effect prejudicial did its nor partner may be more traumatic in some well value, requiring its exclusion probative its family instances than on a close member. Accordingly trial court Rule 403. under testify mere- allowing Not these individual to allowing its discretion not abuse did blood, they I ly because are not related testimony. admission convinced, unjust. am now would be There- comments, join opinion I these With fore, should be admis- victim the Court. the context of the issues sible within *18 evidence, trial, and, any capital a like other OVERSTREET, dissenting Judge, on subject of Criminal should be to Texas Rules rehearing. for court’s own motion vic- and 402. Under Rule 403 Evidence 401 rehearing on granted the Court needlessly cu- Because impact evidence which is tim motion, is with- my prior opinion mulative, is out- its own probative or whose value brief, the reading appellant’s After prejudice drawn. weighed by danger the of undue Court, concurring the of this majority opinion subject by the trial be to exclusion would dissenting opinions, I am court, review, and the opinions, subject, on to an abuse by raised the issues firm belief Certainly, long pa- the standard. discretion the briefing. As require additional impact testifying of witnesses as to the rade Texas for criminal resort could, of last court death on them in some of the victim’s disposition matters, not render should instances, prejudicial sobe cumulative and so majority by the suggested as of the issues implicate process the as to defendant’s due 268

opinion.1 Supreme The United States generally Court at punish Evidence is admissible upheld capital in various decisions has the ment in cases in if it constitu- Texas is “rele tionality “special the Texas vant” to issues” for capital murder the consideration laws. by the requirement jury. Tex.Code Crim. Implicit is Proc. art. meaningful ap- 37.071; State, 607, 939 pellate S.W.2d 620 review those cases wherein the McDuff v. (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(“[a]dmissibility vic [of penalty death has been assessed. It should impact tim by evidence] is determined the be to all that appellant, indigent obvious an Evidence, terms of the Rules of Criminal inmate, working death row is under unrea- particularly whether such evidence is rele imposed by sonable inflexible time restraints issues”); statutory vant special Bell v. this Court in this case. 35, (1996)(“[d]uring the justice Even a strained sense of demands punishment trial, phase of a capital murder briefing. we reorder such Issues as the may presented any evidence be on matter of the trial judge appellant’s actions toward the trial answering court deems relevant to lawyers African-American the creation — issues”), denied, special the cert. U.S. of a and racially charged hostile courtroom -, 90, (1997); 118 S.Ct. 139 L.Ed.2d 46 atmosphere potential have far ranging conse- Banda 890 S.W.2d quences regarding disposition of this phase (1994)(“[d]uring punishment of a case. trial, capital pre- murder evidence any sented on matter the court deems injustice rushing Rather than as the answering issues”), relevant special majority doing, intent seems I or- denied, cert. U.S. 115 S.Ct. der appellate per counsel to rebrief Tex. (1995); Broxton, 132 L.Ed.2d parte Ex 38.9, R.App.Pro. formerly Tex.R.App.Pro. Afterwards, 74(p). can provide Court (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(extraneous “to offense evidence admissible constitutionally required process due prove special extent relevant [it is] by providing law meaningful review. Be- issues), cert. majority otherwise, cause the chooses to do I (1995).1 2584, 132 L.Ed.2d Evidence is strongly dissent. “any tendency “relevant” if it has to make the existence fact that is of conse- MEYERS, Judge, dissenting on court’s quence to the determination of action own motion for rehearing. probable more probable or less than it would be without the evidence.” Tex.R.Crim. Evid. “consistent, majority The sets out a if not And, 401. relevant evidence admissi- “[a]ll always impact clear-cut rule”: victim ble, constitution, except provided by by as vietim character evidence are admissible at statute, by rules of other [the evidence] punishment capital trials. murder Consis- rules_” Tex.R. Cr. Evid. 402. tency clarity certainly are goals laudable in appellate jurisprudence. says But The majority impact the law victim and victim should come first. problem character relevant to follow- majority’s ing mitigation “consistent special and clear-cut” rule is issue: that victim and victim character evi- previous special [if answered simply dence is mitigation relevant to the affirmative, jury is issue in the in- prescribed issue Leg- Texas following structed to issue:] answer islature. dissent to [w]hether, I the Court’s failure to all taking into consideration judicial restraint; evidence, exercise legis- I decline to including the circumstances offense, late. character defendant’s majority appellant’s punishment by judge dismisses 64 of whether *19 is “assessed” one-third, points, over 36.99%—well as inade- jury, “any evidence be offered as to matter quately briefed. sentencing"). Capi- the court relevant to deems punishment jurors punish- tal ment,” do not "assess cases, distinguished non-capital This is specific but are asked to make fact-find- "any where evidence is admissible as to matter thus, ings; evidence must be relevant to the sentencing.” the court deems relevant to Tex. those fact issues. 3(a) (regardless § Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07 of mitigation special of the issue plain language background, personal the moral defendant, way Legisla- the with the of the there is a and inconsistent culpability special the ture has issues. mitigating circumstance or cir- structured sufficient of cumstances warrant that sentence nar- special issues serve the The first two imprisonment than a deáth sen- life rather defining death rowing the class of function imposed. tence be only thus are issues eligible persons and the Majority op. (observing See at 262 victim relevant. aggravating to which evidence is as it evidence “is relevant insofar relates 2(b). § The Crim.App. art. 37.071 Tex.Code issue”). Therefore, mitigation to the if evi- however, issue, mitigation compels or the dence about victim’s character might rea- inquire there be some whether impact of the crime on the victim’s relatives Aggra- sparing defendant’s life. son for any tendency to or close friends has make to this vating has no relevance evidence probable that a sufficient miti- more or less 2(e). § question. Id. at gating circumstance or circumstances will just opinion an over eight-one In rendered imprisonment warrant a sentence of life rath- nearly year rehearing ago, one with denied sentence, er a death then such evidence than date, the stated un- year ago to this Court is admissible. not aggravating is equivocally that evidence majority appears explana- The to offer two special El- mitigation relevant issue. to the as to how victim evidence is relevant to tions (Tex. dridge v. 653-54 first, mitigation issue. At There, ar- Crim.App.1996). the defendant majority says impact victim and character gued mitigation issue unconstitution- ... evidence are “admissible to show the as to assigned] “it no burden al because victim, uniqueness by of the the harm caused per- aggravating circumstances.” We defendant, and as rebuttal to defen- by argument: plexed Majority mitigating op. at dant’s evidence.” appellant It is what means unclear “uniqueness 262. But the of the victim [and] this; only speculate. might can He the harm caused the defendant” are mere- aggravating circum- referring to the ly descriptions of what victim character and 37.071 stances considered under Article Thus, impact victim evidence are. the ma- 2(b), dangerousness. § But i.e. future jority holds victim character and victim dangerousness as to future burden impact are evidence admissible to show vic- State_ to the Al- expressly assigned impact. tim character and victim This circu- ternatively, appellant might mean holding says lar nothing about how it is that balancing of aggravating there ais such evidence is “relevant” to the mitigation mitigating circumstances inherent special issue under the Rules of Criminal 2(e) § requirement Article 37.071 Evidence. consideration of a defendant’s individual explanation, majority says In further culpa- personal moral circumstances relevant to “victim-related evidence is show bility. how explain does not mitigating circumstances are not 2(e) aggravating § calls implicitly for imposing ‘sufficient’ to warrant a life sen- language the plain when circumstances Majority op. at 263. tence.” other does not. statute words, evidence of the victim’s character on the crime victim’s family does importantly, friends and tends to make more or More 2(e) necessarily § call explain why probable mitigating that the defendant’s less non-statutory ag- enough not be to warrant a life consideration evidence will necessary problem gravating evidence when the sentence. most obvious already has tak- reasoning narrowing junction in new been aggra- that it factors 2(b). face, § (apart en its vating aggravating from the care under On 2(b) § only part is the finding of a Article support evidence offered 37.071 aggravating repeatedly involves evidence. danger), future which we have statute that dangerousness is com- contrary future unequivocally said is issue of *20 270

pletely independent special of the issue narrow a sentencer’s to discretion consider 2(e). § The capital jury might under is told relevant that evidence that cause it to it special cannot answer the issue impose until it decline toit the death sentence.” unanimously “yes,” has the answered first 302, Lynaugh, 327, Penry v. 492 U.S. beyond a At point, reasonable doubt. 2934, S.Ct. 256.... L.Ed.2d The fu- whether, it is instructed to determine dangerousness special ture issue and oth- spite finding beyond of its a reasonable issues, non-Penry special er along with doubt represent that specifically enumerated murder situa- continuing society, threat the circum- capital murder, tions which constitute appellant’s stances of crime and life none- jury’s limit ag- discretion consider i.e., leniency, theless call for a life sen- above, gravating As noted it is factors. purpose special tence. The of the second appropriate jury’s to limit a discretion appellant’s issue from perspective is not to concerning mitigating factors. rebut the affirmative to the answer first State, (Tex. Wolfe Rather, purpose issue. is to Thus, Crim.App.1996). mitigation if the is determine whether the individual circum- sue of aggravating allows for consideration appellant’s stances of background case and evidence, unconstitutionally open-ended. it is life, call sparing though his even In McFarland v. 928 S.W.2d 482 jury may has found that be a continuing denied, (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cert. 2(e) society. § threat to Because does not (1997),2 136 L.Ed.2d 851 contemplate aggravating factors, its si- rejected we argument the defendant’s that lence as to burden proof aggrava- State should shoulder burden of ting does not make constitution- factors proving aggravating factors under Article ally infirm. 2(e), § 37.071 simply because that issue added). (emphasis Id. at 653-54 The Court aggrava “does not involve consideration clearly could not have stated more its view ting factors”: “plain language” under the of section 2(e) § But the special issue under does not 2(e), aggravating evidence is not relevant. aggravating involve consideration of fac- eight-one In another opinion, this one necessary narrowing tors. The function sponsored by majority the author of the to- already has care been taken of under day, emphasized jury’s the Court 2(b). Thus, § proof there is no burden aggravating discretion to consider 2(b) aggravation assign § as to at the (and been, must be narrowed per has stage proceedings. of the dangerousness future issue and defining Id. at 518. penalty crimes for which the death Lawton imposed), while discretion to consider mit- — (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. (and U.S. igating evidence open-ended should be -, (1996), is, issue): S.Ct. 136 L.Ed.2d statutory per Penry again rejected argument once an [Ajppellant argues that the failure of the mitigation assign should a burden issue Penry statutory assign issue a bur- [ ] proof aggravating “as to mitigating proof permits den of open-ended discretion circumstances,” because that issue “does not Eighth violation Amendment.... aggravating ask the to consider evi “open-ended” objection was leveled at dence.” itself, Penry and the United States Su- preme responded: Court majority neatly “disavows” now carefully

“In contrast to the language opinions. They argue defined such in these standards that must Supreme precluded narrow sentencer’s “the Court has never sentence, impose discretion to aggravating the death use part circumstances ability Constitution limits a process State’s anof individualized determina- points gar- 2. Two supported by judges. of error in McFarland ion on this seven issue vote, only plurality opin- nered Court's *21 work, good been a day had “recognize missed say culpability” tion of and “we” father, every- nice to had been husband jury may aggravating ... fac- consider races, and including of different others They one miss tors in its selection decision.” Armstrong, 718 enjoyed many friends. had point. precedent Court does Supreme The State reh’g). (op. on at 696-97 circum- S.W.2d prohibit aggravating consideration and elicited issue; family picture also introduced mitigation stances in the context of the said children. of the We rather, ages the names and statute language of the plain following correctly stated the the defendant not allow for passed by legislature does rule; to rewrite legislature option it. has the The statute; not.3 this Court does in the the State competent for It is never slain person that the prove first instance disavowed, caselaw, today Apart from this evi- inoffensive. Such peaceable majority’s disturbing aspect to the the other when in rebuttal dence becomes admissible that it is a direct invitation reasoning is in behalf testified to opposite has been analysis. But comparative worth conduct a defense, the defendant or when of the majority says permissible. this is not ground justify the homicide on the seeks to prob- Majority op. at 262. This is also made the deceased. of threats majority’s holding that victim lem with the the defendant’s evidence is relevant to rebut submission). original (opinion on Id. at mitigating Id. at 262. admission of evidence. testified that defense witnesses But the fact majority suggests by offering evi- The reputation not raise an did to the defendant’s circumstances, character or dence of his own character of the reputation or issue as to places into issue the victim’s the defendant this Id. at 696. We reaffirmed deceased. proper circumstances. But re- character or rehearing, emphasizing “the State holding on mitiga- buttal evidence in the context of the deceased’s may not introduce evidence go should to the defendant’s char- tion issue character has unless that good character acter circumstances not the victim’s. We in issue the defen- placed somehow been Armstrong, su- recognized principle (op. reh’g)(emphasis Id. at 697 dant.”4 There, pra. after defense witnesses testified added). punishment good repu- at to the defendant’s majority says Finally, the the defendant being peaceful law-abiding, tation for affirmatively waive “reliance and submis- testify, can State called the deceased’s wife issue, rebuttal, mitigation thus avoid peace- sion” of the that the deceased had been a impact and character presentation of victim hardworking ful and man. She testified she Majority submis- nearly op. at 264. But had been married evidence. deceased jury is mitigation issue to the twenty-two years and five children. She sion of the had legislatively mandated: further testified that the deceased had never Armstrong distinguishable majority says majority authority support no its 4. The 3. The cites dangerous- holding. authority which involved the future When faced with that case because result, issue, compel majority mitigation a different issue: ness not the predictably responds by overruling it. Proc Cf. logical two link between the there is no That State, tor and Lemell v. 967 S.W.2d 840 framework of the within the types of evidence 1998)(overruling contrary (Tex.Crim.App. cases dangerousness issue does not mean future State, holding); Malik v. 953 S.W.2d 234 mitigation issue. true for the holds same (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(overruling “Benson/Boozer moral mitigation concerns a defendant’s issue cases); McJunkins, parte line of Ex 954 S.W.2d extent, the victim's to a limited culpability, and (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)(recalling mandate in or culpability deter- relevant to good character Sims, parte der to overrule Ex 868 S.W.2d 803 1993)); mination. (Tex.Crim.App. Guzman added). (emphasis opinion 263 fn. 18 Majority 1997)(DuBose State, (Tex.Crim.App. S.W.2d 85 And how is mean? extent” 1996), does "a limited What (Tex.Crim.App. 915 S.W.2d 493 State v. culpability Carter, to a relevant 1996) character the victim’s (Tex.Crim.App. 915 S.W.2d 501 opinion majority's illus- (Tex.Crim.App. Arcila v. 834 S.W.2d determination? 1992) overruled); Wilson, the rele- is to articulate parte Ex difficult trates how suggesting a (Tex.Crim.App. without 1997)(overruling parte of victim Ex Jar vance ren, 1994)). analysis. (Tex.Crim.App. 891 S.W.2d 935 comparative worth *22 jury instance, The court shall instruct the that if the For a defendant who has evidence jury finding returns an affirmative to each of forego mental proffering retardation can (b) issue submitted under Subsection that evidence rather than bear the risk of the article, this following it shall answer the responding State with evidence of the bril- [mitigation] issue[.] liance and character of the victim. I still App. don’t understand 37.071(e). regard- how this evidence art. The ma- Tex.Code crim. ing the victim “tends jority to make it more says mitigation or less distinguish- issue probable” (which that this able defendant’s mental retar- special from other issues we have waived) dation will warrant a held cannot sentence of life.... be because the mitiga- tion issue impose does not proof burden of Judge subject Clinton’s words re- on the State and it inures to the benefit of among main the most sensical: Majority defendant. opinion at 264. meaningfully Before we can approach The statute exception makes no on these question of admissibility of “victim im- State, grounds. In Powell v. 897 S.W.2d pact” evidence, evidence under the rules of (Tex.Crim.App.1994), we held the defen- clearly we must define the issue. It does dant could spe- not waive submission of the analysis facilitate the to ask whether a cial issue on deliberateness: category whole of evidence is admissible Before the sentence death can be im- under impact.” the rubric of “victim In- posed upon appellant jury must affirma- stead, the trial court proffered must take tively appellant’s determine that lethal comes, inquiring as it on a case- conduct “deliberate.” Art. by-case basis whether that evidence is rel- 37.071(b)- [Ajppellant could not con- any evant to of the special issues in Article sent to a sentence of death that was not 37.071, which serves to circumscribe and authorized, fact, contrary and in define the parameters litigation of the statutory Casias, mandate. See also punishment phase capital of a murder (Defendant may S.W.2d at 263 not waive Upon objection trial. an to the relevance requirement that he be at sentenc- any might evidence that be described as ing). impact,” ask, “victim the trial court must The fact the State does not bear a any as it other evidence: Does it burden on mitigation issue does not probable tend to make more or less transform the mandate that the trial court special issues should be an- “shall instruct” on providing the issue into way swered one or the other? Tex.R.Cr. “may that it plain instruct” on it. The lan- Evid., Rules 401 & 402. If the court con- guage requires of the statute that the issue relevant, cludes it is upon objection further and, be submitted if the other are issues be called to decide: Is the affirmatively, answered jury that the consid- probative substantially value outweighed er and answer it. majority’s holding danger prejudice? of unfair Tex. contrary otherwise is to the face of the stat- R.Cr.Evid., Rule 403.[5] ute and encourages defendants to decline to Ford v. 919 S.W.2d mitigating offer evidence in an pre- effort to (Clinton, J., (Tex.Crim.App.1996) dissenting). offering clude the State from impact victim might character evidence. And this Because the evidence at issue here is not issue, advisable in inviting order to avoid mitigation special relevant to the engage comparative analysis. worth trial court erred to admit it.6 Its admission majority’s allegiance rings 5. The recognized Rule 403 Court some of the evidence as light hollow in pre- its failure to culpability. address the relevant to the defendant's moral Id. liminary question mitigation relevance Rules 401 under at 620. But the issue does not evidence, and 402. permit any aggravating mitigating, culpability, that bears on the moral defendant’s joined I opinion the Court’s such evidence as would "warrant that a McDuff 1997), (Tex.Crim.App. imprisonment in ret sentence of life rather than a Nonetheless, rospect, concurring. imposed.” should have shown as been death sentence be testimony by At issue was the victim’s sister particular admission of such evidence in that about the on her life. The effect of the murder case was harmless. right affected a substantial not harmless.7 Tex.R.App.

thus was Proc.

44.2. This case should be remanded for a hearing. I punishment

new dissent.

BAIRD, J., joins. *23 Merrill, Jr., Dallas,

Roy appellant. L. FLOYD, Appellant, Randall J. Berdanier, DA, Pamela Sullivan Assist. Dallas, Paul, Austin, Atty., Matthew State’s v. for the State. The STATE of Texas. 397-96, Nos. 398-96. Texas,

Court of Criminal Appeals of OPINION En Banc. McCORMICK, P.J., opinion delivered the 16, Dec. 1998. Court, MANSFIELD, joined by

KELLER, WOMACK, HOLLAND and JJ. separately indicted vio lating Floyd the Texas Securities Act.1 656, (Tex.App . -Texar 1996)(Cause 06-95-00069-CR); kana No. 06-95-00070-CR, Floyd slip No. op. 5, (Tex.App.-Texarkana, January delivered 1996)(not published). Appellant entered into plea bargain agreement in each case where pled charges nolo contendere to the agreed probation years to a term of for ten and a fine of The trial court found $300.00. appellant’s sufficient evidence to substantiate guilt, adjudication guilt deferred an placed appellant community supervision years for ten with a fine of in both $800.00 cases.

Appellant complained for the first time in his Amended Motion for New Trial that the support evidence was insufficient the trial finding guilt prosecu- court’s because the by tion was barred statute limitations. 1989, 733, 9, opinion Leg., 7. As this is a dissent rather than an 71st ch. section 1989 Tex. Court, opinion 3292, 23, for the I will not labor 1991, to set out by May Gen.Laws amended ofAct my analysis. harm nd 565, 9, Leg., ch. section 1991 Tex.Gen.Laws 2005, 15, 1995, May amended Acts of 74®* 581-29, May 1. art. Act of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. 16, Leg., ch. section 1995 Tex.Gen.Laws th 30, 1983, Leg., ch. section May Tex.Gen.Laws amended Act of

Case Details

Case Name: Mosley v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jul 1, 1998
Citation: 983 S.W.2d 249
Docket Number: 72281
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.