DAVID ROBERT BENTZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARTHASARATHI GHOSH, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-1697
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
Submitted October 31, 2017; Decided November 20, 2017
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge; JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge; DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION; To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 13-cv-573-NJR-DGW. Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Judge.
O R D E R
David Bentz, an Illinois inmate who suffers pain from untreated cavities in his teeth, appeals from the entry of summary judgment against him in this suit under
In late 2011 Bentz was transferred to Menard Correctional Center, where, he alleged, an unidentified dentist refused to treat his teeth and another dentist, Dr. Robert Stelfox, pronounced his teeth fine without examining them. Bentz attached to his complaint an emergency grievance that he had filed with Menard‘s warden saying that he had been denied treatment for an abscessed tooth. The warden decided that this grievance did not present an emergency and took no action. In his complaint Bentz also alleged that five Menard correctional officers and a lieutenant did nothing to help after he told them that he had tooth pain, showed them his swollen jaw, and asked for medical attention.
Bentz filed this suit asserting violations of the Eighth Amendment and claims under Illinois law for negligence and conspiracy to violate his rights. He sought damages and injunctive relief, including “immediately arrang[ing] for [his] abscessed tooth and chronic pain to be addressed.”
District Judge Patrick Murphy screened Bentz‘s complaint,
The case was reassigned to District Judge Nancy Rosenstengel, who dismissed the negligence claims against some of the defendants, concluding that the nonmedical defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity. She also dismissed Bentz‘s medical-malpractice claim against Luce because he failed to attach to his complaint an affidavit stating he had consulted a physician as required by
Discovery ensued, and the following facts, construed in the light most favorable to Bentz, were introduced. In December 2009 a prison dentist at Graham Correctional Center told Bentz that he needed three fillings. One month later Bentz was transferred to Stateville. In October 2011 Bentz asked Dr. Ghosh, Statesville‘s medical director, for pain medication and a dental referral because his tooth was “bothering him” and causing problems eating, and he had pain in his tooth and visible swelling of his jaw. Dr. Ghosh denied medication but referred him to a dentist; dental assistant Luce scheduled Bentz for an appointment one week later. Bentz received x-rays, and a dentist (not named in this action) told him that he would be scheduled to receive a filling in one tooth. Luce scheduled Bentz for the next available appointment four months later, but that appointment was postponed (for reasons not reflected in the record), and in May 2011 Bentz received a dental exam from a dentist who again took x-rays but provided no fillings. He was scheduled for another appointment to receive fillings three months later, but by then he was transferred to Pontiac.
After a three-month stay at Pontiac, where he unsuccessfully sought pain medication for his tooth from Pontiac‘s medical director, Bentz was transferred in November 2011 to Menard. In May 2013 he reported to Dr. Robert Stelfox, a prison dentist, with a swollen jaw; Bentz told Dr. Stelfox that he had an abscessed tooth and needed pain medication and treatment. Without examining Bentz‘s teeth, Dr. Stelfox responded that there was nothing wrong with them. Weeks later Bentz sent the warden an emergency grievance, saying that for four weeks he had been trying to obtain
Dr. Tilden, Dr. Stelfox, and Menard‘s warden moved for summary judgment on the ground that Bentz had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required under the Prison Reform Litigation Act. A magistrate judge held a hearing on the exhaustion issue in accordance with Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). Bentz testified that he had grieved twice against Dr. Tilden about treatment during one exam but only in a later grievance (not produced by the parties) did he mention inadequate dental care. The magistrate judge agreed with the defendants’ position regarding exhaustion. As he explained, Bentz‘s testimony that he had filed a grievance against Dr. Tilden was not credible, Bentz had not filed a grievance about the warden, and Bentz did not timely appeal the denial of his emergency grievance against Dr. Stelfox.
Judge Rosenstengel adopted the magistrate judge‘s recommendation and entered summary judgment for Dr. Tilden, Dr. Stelfox, and Menard‘s warden. Judge Rosenstengel accepted the magistrate judge‘s adverse credibility finding; according to her, it “simply does not make any sense” that Bentz would file two grievances weeks apart complaining that Dr. Tilden had treated him inadequately in the same exam and Bentz failed to offer “specifics” about the contents of his second grievance. The judge also agreed that Bentz did not exhaust his administrative remedies against Dr. Stelfox because he filed suit before receiving a final determination from the Administrative Review Board. And the judge agreed that Bentz had not filed a grievance complaining about the conduct of Menard‘s warden.
Months later Dr. Ghosh and dental assistant Luce moved for summary judgment, contending that Bentz‘s deliberate-indifference claims were unsubstantiated. Dr. Ghosh argued that Bentz‘s negligence claim failed as a matter of law.
The district judge eventually determined that Bentz‘s deliberate-indifference claims were unsupported and granted Dr. Ghosh‘s and Luce‘s motions for summary judgment. She concluded that there was no evidence that Dr. Ghosh knew that Bentz was suffering significant or debilitating pain when he denied Bentz pain medication: indeed, “Ghosh responded appropriately in ensuring [that] a request was submitted for [p]laintiff to be seen by a dentist who could properly evaluate his dental condition.”
On appeal Bentz first challenges the entry of summary judgment for Dr. Ghosh, contending that he created a triable issue of deliberate indifference by offering evidence that Dr. Ghosh, in refusing to provide him pain medication, overlooked his swollen jaw and ignored his complaint of pain that caused him problems eating.
To establish a claim of deliberate indifference, Bentz must show both that his condition was objectively serious and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that condition. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994); King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012). The parties do not dispute that Bentz‘s tooth decay and related pain may constitute a serious medical condition. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Tooth decay can constitute an objectively serious medical condition because of pain and the risk of infection.“). Medical doctors, like Dr. Ghosh, may be found deliberately indifferent if they discount, without investigating, a prisoner‘s symptoms of a serious medical need. See Rivera v. Gupta, 836 F.3d 839, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2016). A few days’ delay in addressing a painful but readily treatable condition can support a claim of deliberate indifference. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 830 (7th Cir. 2009) (deciding that state employees could be found deliberately indifferent from a four-day delay in treating a prisoner who complained that his IV needle was causing him serious pain); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830–31 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a prisoner stated a deliberate-indifference claim by alleging a two-day delay in treating a dislocated finger that caused unnecessary pain and permanent disfigurement).
We conclude that a fact question exists concerning whether Dr. Ghosh was aware that Bentz‘s pain was significant. Dr. Ghosh said in his affidavit that Bentz never mentioned pain during the appointment, but Bentz testified at his deposition that he complained about pain from his tooth and related swelling (a sign of infection). Bentz said in his verified complaint that this swelling was obvious and that he mentioned it to
Bentz next challenges the entry of summary judgment for Dr. Stelfox, contending generally that he exhausted available administrative remedies before filing suit, even though he sued before the Administrative Review Board acted on his appeal of the emergency grievance. Bentz asserts further, with regard to the merits, that a jury reasonably could conclude from his testimony that Dr. Stelfox did nothing in response to his complaints of an abscessed tooth and swollen jaw.
As a preliminary matter, Bentz, contrary to the district court‘s conclusion, exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to his claims against Dr. Stelfox. Bentz sued the doctor only after the warden had rejected his emergency grievance, and an Illinois inmate who asks the warden to handle a grievance on an emergency basis need not resubmit that complaint as a normal grievance after the warden concludes that the grievance does not present an emergency. Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
As for the merits, a jury reasonably could find that Dr. Stelfox was deliberately indifferent to Bentz‘s serious medical needs based on Bentz‘s testimony that the doctor ignored his pain complaints and his tooth abscess. Dentists know that “a patient who has reported an abscess . . . needs prompt medical treatment” because if the report is correct, the tooth will “get worse the longer treatment [is] delayed” and the patient will “suffer acutely until the abscess [is] treated.” Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2015). “A dentist demonstrates deliberate indifference by failing to treat the patient promptly, thus prolonging the patient‘s pain, while knowing that the patient may well be in serious pain that is treatable.” Id. at 940. Bentz testified at the Pavey
Next Bentz generally challenges the entry of summary judgment to Dr. Tilden on exhaustion grounds and insists that Judge Rosenstengel should have believed his testimony that he filed a grievance about Dr. Tilden‘s dental care and received no response. But Bentz does not meaningfully challenge the district judge‘s decision to accept the magistrate judge‘s finding that his testimony was not credible. See
Bentz also asserts that the entry of summary judgment for dental assistant Luce was erroneous because he presented evidence that she was aware of his tooth pain and need for care but never ensured that he received treatment. The district judge correctly concluded, however, that no jury could reasonably find that Luce‘s actions constituted deliberate indifference. Bentz has not disputed Luce‘s statement in her affidavit that her duties were limited to scheduling appointments and assisting the dentist, and the constitution does not compel Luce to do the dentist‘s job of treating Bentz. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009).
Bentz contests the entry of summary judgment to Menard‘s warden, but he does not articulate a basis for disturbing the district judge‘s ruling that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against the warden. See
Bentz next challenges the dismissal at screening of his deliberate-indifference claims against the nonmedical defendants. He contends that his alleged statements to them about his chronic pain and swelling supported an inference that they knew his pain was serious.
The district court properly dismissed most of these claims (i.e., complaints of chronic tooth pain that could be minor), but Bentz stated a plausible claim against correctional officers Sadler and Lair. A prisoner states an Eighth Amendment claim against nonmedical prison officials if he alleges that they recklessly disregarded a substantial risk of serious pain to the prisoner. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865–66
Bentz next challenges the dismissal of his state-law negligence claims, asserting generally that his claims must be reinstated against the medical defendants and specifically that his negligence claim must be reinstated against Saddler and Lair because they are not entitled to sovereign immunity. We agree with only his latter argument. In dismissing the negligence claims against these two, the district judge relied only on the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity, but that doctrine will not apply to state-law claims against state officials who allegedly violate statutory or constitutional law. See Murphy v. Smith, 844 F.3d 653, 660 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Leetaru v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 32 N.E.3d 583 (Ill. 2015)), cert. granted, No. 16-1067 (Aug. 25, 2017). In his appellate brief, Bentz has not developed an argument that the negligence claims against Dr. Ghosh and Dr. Stelfox were erroneously dismissed. See
Bentz generally challenges the dismissal of his conspiracy claim, but he failed to allege any plausible agreement among the defendants to deprive him of rights. See
Bentz next generally contests the dismissal of the unidentified defendants (medical staff at the three prisons). The judge did not abuse her discretion, however, because a dismissal under
Lastly, Bentz challenges the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction ordering Menard‘s warden to address his pain, and he maintains that the district judge, by concluding that he offered no evidence of irreparable harm, overlooked testimony that he would experience tooth pain if prison staff continued to deny him treatment. Irreparable harm means an injury that money cannot repair. See D.U. v. Rhoades,
We VACATE the entry of summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claims against Dr. Ghosh and Dr. Stelfox and the orders dismissing the Eighth Amendment and negligence claims against Sadler and Lair. We also VACATE the denial of Bentz‘s initial request for a preliminary injunction. We AFFIRM the judgment with respect to the conspiracy claim against all defendants and the claims against Dr. Tilden, Luce, Berner, Bishop, Bledsoe, Evielsizer, Franklin, Hosselton, Tourville, Wooldridge, and the unidentified defendants. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
