Anthоny WHEELER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-1806.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted July 20, 2012. Decided July 23, 2012.
681 F.3d 680
DLF‘s interpretation of the MOA is wrong. This section does two things. First, it binds DLF to the CBAs—the parties do not dispute that. Second, it establishes the type of employee covered under the CBA—i.e., an employee that does bargaining unit work. In other words, all this paragraph does is establish that for an employeе to be covered under the CBA, he or she must be an employee who does bargaining unit work; it does not limit the CBA‘s coverage to employees doing only bargaining unit work.
Our reading оf the MOA is harmonious with all of the CBAs’ terms. The CBAs explicitly state that DLF is to make contributions for “each hour worked” by an employee covered by the CBAs. And employees covеred by the CBAs are employees who are bargaining unit members—i.e., employees who perform work within the trade jurisdiction of the Cement Masons Union. The CBAs go on to describe in Sеction 2, Article III what sort of work is within the trade jurisdiction of the Union. DLF seizes on that language to argue that its contribution obligations only apply for work described in this section. Again, thаt is wrong. Section 2 of Article III merely describes the Cement Masons Union‘s trade activities for purposes of inter-union disputes over its jurisdictional claims. This section was not intended to, and does not, define bargaining unit work for purposes of fringe benefit contributions.
In short, there is no language in either the MOA or the CBAs that limits DLF‘s obligations to make fringe benefit contributions; the CBAs are clear that DLF is required to make contributions to the Funds for each hour worked by a covered employee such as Panifilio Mata.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons statеd above, we AFFIRM the district court‘s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WOOD and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge.
In September 2011, Anthony Wheeler filed a complaint alleging that prison officials and the prison‘s medical provider, Wexford Health Sources, have refused to provide effective care for his golf-ball-size hemorrhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain. Documents submitted with the complaint show that Wheeler is not fantasizing. (The complaint presents other grievances too, but this is the only one we need cоnsider on this appeal.)
District judges must screen prisoners’ complaints before or “as soon as practicable after” docketing to ensure that the targets of frivоlous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.
Contemporaneously with his complaint, Wheeler requested a preliminary injunction that would compel the defendants to arrange for the operation he thinks essential. He also asked the judge to recruit counsel to assist him. The distriсt judge did not act on either motion. On January 5, 2012, Wheeler filed a second motion for injunctive relief; the court did not address that one either. Nor did the court rule on Wheeler‘s rеnewed request for counsel, or either of his motions for the appointment of a medical expert.
On January 24 Wheeler filed his third motion for injunctive relief. In a brief order on March 28 the judge declined to afford relief. The court stated (emphasis in original): “Plaintiff‘s allegations fail to set forth specific facts demonstrating the likelihood Plaintiff will suffer immediate and irreparable harm before the Defendants can be heard. Moreover, Plaintiff‘s motions seek similar relief to that sought in his complaint, which is still awaiting preliminary review by this Court. Furthermore, federal courts must exercise equitable restraint when asked to take over the administration of a prison, something that is best left to correctional officers and their staff.” Wheeler has appealed, as
The district court‘s three grounds for denying Wheeler‘s motions are inadequate, individually and collectively. The judge was right to say that equitable relief depends on irreparable harm, even when constitutional rights are at stake. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88–92 (1974). To the extent the judge may have believed that pаin never constitutes irreparable injury, however, he was mistaken. See Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2004). To the extent that the judge believed that his delay in screening the complaint justifies denying relief (the aрparent import of the italicized clause in the first sentence, and the whole of the second sentence), he was very far wrong. A judge‘s failure to act earlier is a reason to act now, not a reason to deny an otherwise meritorious motion. Just as prison administrators must deal promptly with their charges’ serious medical problems, so fеderal judges must not leave litigants to bear pain indefinitely. As for the third reason: Wheeler did not ask the judge to “take over administration of a prison“; he asked the judge to ordеr the prison to honor his constitutional right to care for a serious medical condition. A prisoner‘s view of optimal medical treatment can be a weak ground for superseding the views of competent physicians, but prisoners are not invariably wrong. Judges regularly must decide whether physicians have ignored a serious medical problem (or, in tort litigation, whether physicians have committed malpractice).
Until evidence has been submitted, it is not possible to know whether Wheeler really is suffering irreparable hаrm and otherwise has a good claim for relief. (Irreparable injury is only one of the condi-
This complaint should have been screened before the end of September 2011. The district court must complete that task swiftly. On the day our mandate is received, the judge must authorize serviсe of process on all defendants involved in the treatment of Wheeler‘s hemorrhoids. The court must give these defendants a short time to respond to the motion for a preliminary injunction and promptly conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Wheeler is entitled to relief. Because the hearing may require evidence from mеdical experts, the district judge should give serious consideration to recruiting counsel to assist Wheeler. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Wheeler did himself no favors by filing a complaint naming 36 defendants, sеveral of whom (including the current and immediate past governors of Illinois) have no conceivable relation to his medical care. The more claims and defendаnts in a complaint, the longer screening will take. The more frivolous claims in a complaint, the more a judge is apt to infer (if only subconsciously) that the plaintiff is crying wolf with resрect to all of the claims.
The judge might have been justified in directing Wheeler to file separate complaints, each confined to one group of injuries and defеndants. A litigant cannot throw all of his grievances, against dozens of different parties, into one stewpot. Joinder that requires the inclusion of extra parties is limited to claims аrising from the same transaction or series of related transactions. See
The order under review is vacated, and the case is remanded with directions to proceed according to this opinion. The mandate will issue today.