Lead Opinion
¶ 1. The workers’ compensation structure in Vermont is meant to provide employees with reliable compensation for work-related injuries while limiting employer liability to legitimate harm arising out of, and in the course of, employment. Claimant Henri Cyr worked for McDermott’s, Inc., a hauling company that transports milk in bulk from farms to creameries. He was employed as a part-time mechanic’s helper, keeping the maintenance garage clean and occasionally servicing trucks. After accidentally drinking a caustic agent used to clean the milk trucks, he suffered severe internal chemical burns. He filed a claim for workers’ compensation under Title 21, chapter 9 of the Vermont Statutes. The Commissioner of Labor granted summary judgment to employer, finding claimant was intoxicated at the time his injury occurred and, thus, compensation was not allowed under 21 V.S.A. § 649. On appeal, claimant contends the Commissioner misapplied § 649. We conclude that the Commissioner erred in failing to address the threshold question of whether there was a valid claim for workers’ compensation and in barring the claim under § 649. We reverse the Commissioner’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2. In reviewing the facts of this case, we take them in the light most favorable to claimant, the nonmoving party below. See Thompson v. Hi Tech Motor Sports, Inc.,
¶ 3. During the course of his emergency-room treatment, hospital staff conducted blood work and a urinalysis. Although claimant denied that he was intoxicated when he drank from the Mountain Dew bottle, an expert for employer reviewed claimant’s medical records and concluded that claimant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) at the time he drank the caustic substance was approximately 0.15 to 0.16, roughly double the legal limit for operating a motor vehicle. 23 V.S.A. § 1204(a)(2) (listing 0.08 BAC as creating a presumption of intoxication). In rebuttal, claimant produced the affidavits of two witnesses — the neighbor who called the ambulance and the treating EMT — both stating that claimant was not exhibiting signs of intoxication around the time he ingested the caustic substance. Based on the evidence presented, the Commissioner determined that claimant was legally intoxicated when he drank from the Mountain Dew bottle. Thе issue of claimant’s BAC is undisputed.
¶ 4. On June 7, 2006, claimant filed a Notice of Injury and Claim for Compensation. Employer initially denied the claim on June 27 because claimant’s injury did not “aris[e] out of employment” nor was it “sustained in [the] course and scope of employment.” On October 30, employer again denied the claim on the same basis and added that “claimant was intoxicated at the time
Compensation shall not be allowed for an injury caused by an employee’s wilful intention to injure himself, herself, or another or by or during his or her intoxication or by an employеe’s failure to use a safety appliance provided for his or her use. The burden of proof shall be upon the employer if he or she claims the benefit of the provisions of this section.
21 V.S.A. § 649.
¶ 5. On appeal, claimant argues that a compensable injury occurred when he was given the bottle containing a caustic chemical at work, and, thus, the Commissioner erred in looking to the exemptions in § 649, there being no allegation that he was intoxicated when he received the bottle. He further argues that, even if his injury occurred when he drank from the bottle, his rebuttal evidence put the fact of his contemporaneous intoxication in dispute.
¶ 6. For our review, the Commissioner certified only the issue of whether claimant’s claim was barred by § 649. See 21
I.
¶ 7. Our Workers’ Compensation Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 601-711, requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment.” 21 V.S.A. § 618. As remedial legislation, the Act is interpreted broadly to achieve the goal of affording coverage to as many workers as possible. In re Chatham Woods Holdings, LLC,
¶ 8. The principle, and initial, requirement for compensation eligibility is found in 21 V.S.A. § 618, which conditions the payment of compensation to a worker on a finding that the claimed personal injury arose out of and in the course of employment. See State v. Great Ne. Prods., Inc.,
¶ 9. It is the claimant, as plaintiff in the action, who shoulders the burden of proving that both the elements of compensation eligibility are met in the first instance. Miller v. IBM Corp.,
¶ 10. The question of “arising out of or in the course of’ employment has been well litigated. In Vermont, we subscribe to the “positional-risk doctrine” which mandates that “an employee’s injury arises out of employment ‘if it would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of the employment placed the claimant in the position where claimant was injured.’ ” Miller,
¶ 11. Under positional-risk analysis, courts recognize that even when an injury occurs away from the workplace, its cause can be distinct in both time and space. For example, in Daniello v. Machise Express Co. an employee was splashed with jet fuel during the course of his work and, upon returning home, suffered severe burns when he struck a match in order to light his trash incinerator.
¶ 12. Consequently, we find that claimant was put in a “positional-risk” situation when he was given the bottle containing the industrial cleaning agent at work which put the mechanism of his injury in motion. His consumption of the caustic chemicals, several days later, followed logically from his receipt of the bottle of what he understood was a soft drink. Thus, for the purposes of determining whether his injury arose out of his employment, we hold that, but for his employment, the instrument of his injury would never hаve arrived in his hands. Therefore, it arose out of his employment.
¶ 13. The second half of the inquiry — whether claimant’s injury was within the course of employment — generally “tests work-connection as to time, place and activity; that is, it demands that the injury be shown to have arisen within the time and space boundaries of the employment, and in the course of an activity whose purpose is related to the employment.” 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 12.01, at 12-1 (2009). This is largely a fact-intensive analysis, one we cannot undertake upon the record before us. We thus remand the case to
II.
¶ 14. Because it is possible that an analysis of § 649 will arise on remand, we turn now to the certified question and an examination of this exception to the general compensation scheme. Rather than undertake the threshold analysis required under § 618, the Commissioner relied solely on § 649 to grant judgment in employer’s favor and deny claimant recovery. This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo, employing the same standard used in the court below. Letourneau v. A.N. Deringer/Wausau Ins. Co.,
¶ 15. The manner in which we interpret statutes is well established. “[T]he bedrock rule of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to thе intent of the Legislature.” Delta Psi Fraternity v. City of Burlington,
¶ 16. Section 649 includes three separate categories of misconduct that can bar an injured workеr’s recovery. Beyond excluding injuries “caused ... by or during . . . intoxication,” the statute provides employers with a defense for injuries caused by an employee’s “wilful intention to injure himself, herself, or another,” and injuries caused by an “employee’s failure to use a safety appliance provided for his or her use.” These latter two exemptions are forms of malfeasance, and including the intoxication provision amidst them suggests that the Legislature viewed workplace intoxication as another form of misconduct for which an employee could not receive injury compensation, regardless of whether an injury was caused because of the intoxication or merely caused during the intоxication.
¶ 17. Our interpretation of this statute centers on the term “cause,” as this word modifies the two scenarios in which the intoxication exemption of § 649 may apply. When used in a statute, “cause” is generally understood to mean proximate cause. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
¶ 18. While it may seem at odds with the “no fault” regime of workers’ compensation to include a heavily litigated tort
¶ 19. As explained above, in workers’ compensation cases, we recognize that even when an injury occurs away from the workplace, its cause can be distinct in both time and space. Here, we find that claimant’s injury arose out of his employment when he accepted the bottle containing the caustic chemicals. That act put the mechanism of injury in motion. This is not to suggest that his injury was inevitable once he received the bottle or that no superseding, intervening factor — such as intoxication — could have prevented his injury or altered its mechanism. However, no one suggests he was intoxicated at that time.
¶ 20. Our resolution of this issue makes it unnecessary to address the balance of the parties’ arguments. We reverse and remand to the Commissioner for a determination of whether claimant’s injury occurred in the course of his employment.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
After the Commissioner granted summary judgment to employer, claimant filed a motion for reconsideration and proffеred new expert evidence that purportedly put the fact of his BAC in issue. The Commissioner refused to consider the new evidence, viewing it as being untimely filed without cause, and claimant does not directly contest that ruling on appeal. We therefore treat the fact of claimant’s BAC as undisputed for purposes of reciting the facts of the case. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Powers,
Claimant also argues that § 649 is unconstitutional on several grounds, a contention that employer disputes on the merits and because of the narrow question the Commissioner certified for our review. Given our ruling in this case, we do not address these arguments.
Employer makes no claim that claimant drank from the Mountain Dew bottle because of his state of intоxication on May 2, 2006. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine how it could so claim when the witnesses who were with claimant either before or immediately after he ingested the caustic chemical — a neighbor and the attending EMT — submitted affidavits to the Commissioner testifying to claimant’s apparent sobriety.
Dissenting Opinion
¶ 21. dissenting. This case is an example of the adage: “Exceptional cases must not be permitted to beget bad law.” Downer v. Battles,
¶ 22. At the outset, it is important to acknowledge two underlying considerations, which, although they permeate the case, are not directly addressed by the majority. The first is that the facts of this case are unusual and extreme. The injury claimant suffered can be described as nothing other than horrific. No one can read these facts without feeling sympathy for claimant. Moreover, the circumstances in which he suffered this injury are atypical in that although claimant consumed alcohol prior to the injury, he did so at home and his alcohol use was not a cause of the injury which also happened at home.
¶ 23. The second underlying issue is that Vermont’s intoxication exemption is unique. As noted, Vermont’s workers’ compensation statute disallows compensation for “an injury caused ... by or during [an employee’s] intoxication.” 21 V.S.A. § 649. In contrast, although most states’ workers’ compensation statutes exempt or reduce coverage based on a defense of intoxicаtion, these provisions all require some causal relationship between an employee’s
¶24. These two underlying considerations combine to create a difficult situation. Claimant has suffered a horrible injury, and we must determine whether the facts of his injury meet the standards set out in the workers’ compensation statute without the benefit of precedent or case law construing analogous provisions from other states. Plainly, our statute does not require a causal connection between an employee’s intoxication and his injury. Under our statute therefore some claimants may be denied coverage for an injury that, absent the claimants’ unrelated intoxication, would have resulted in coverage. This is one such case. While this result may appear unfair,
¶ 25. My decision rests on the language of the statute, which states that “[cjompensation shall not be allowed for an injury caused ... by or during [an employee’s] intoxication.” 21 V.S.A. § 649. Our interpretation of a statute is foremost guided by the language the Legislature employed. “We presume that the Legislature intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the language, and if the meaning of that language is plain on its face, we normally ascertain legislative intent solely from the statutory language.” In re Handy,
¶ 26. In the arena of workers’ compensation, we must interpret the provisions of the statute with two important overall policy considerations in mind. First, the statute’s directive that “[a]ll process and procedure under the provisions of this chapter shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be.” 21 V.S.A. § 602. Second, we must be mindful that “our workers’ compensation statute is ‘remedial in nature and must be liberally construed to provide injured employees with benefits unless the law is clear to the contrary.’ ” Murray v. Luzenac Corp.,
¶ 27. The Commissioner has interpreted the during language of § 649 to mean that “the fact of a Claimant’s intoxication at the time of injury is an absolute bar to recovery, even if there is no causal relationship between the two.” Thus, in this case, the Commissioner determined that claimant could receive no benefits because he was intoxicated at the time the injury took place — when he drank from the bottle.
¶ 28. The majority rejects the Commissioner’s interpretation as at odds with the statute’s overall remedial purpose and instead holds that intoxication must proximately cause the injury for there to be no coverage. The majority concludes that claimant’s injury arose out of his workplace act of taking the bottle home, and therefore a proximate cause of claimant’s injury was also when defendant brought the bottle home. Because claimant was not intoxicated at the time he brought the bottle home, the majority reasons, § 649 does not bar coverage.
¶ 29. I have two problems with this interpretation. First, it conflаtes the concepts of whether an injury arose out of a claimant’s employment, 21 V.S.A. § 618(a)(1), and whether intoxication proximately caused an injury, id. § 649; and, second, it gives the same meaning to the caused by and caused during language in the statute. On the first point, I agree that under our positional-risk doctrine claimant’s injury arose out of his employ
¶ 30. In this case, although claimant’s injury was initially caused by his act of bringing the bottle home and thus arose out of his employment, claimant’s injury was also caused by his act of drinking from thе bottle. Our cases involving proximate cause recognize that there can be “more than one act of negligence, each a proximate cause, [that] may combine to produce an injury.” Tufts v. Wyand,
¶ 31. On the second point, the majority’s construction of the statute essentially reads “during” out of the statute. I believe the Legislature inserted the word “during” for a reason, and I cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation which makes this language meaningless. See Racine,
¶ 32. The majority’s sole attempt to define “during” is its statement that this language means “an employer must affirmatively show that intoxication played a role in causing the injury, either actively — ‘caused by’ — or passively — ‘caused during.’ ” Ante, ¶ 18. I fail to understand how the concept of passive
¶ 33. If the question before us was whether the Legislature intended to bar recovery for injuries caused solely by intoxication, rather than those in which intoxication was merely a contributing cause, this distinction may have some relevance. That is not, however, the question presented to us in this case. The statute excepts from coverage injuries caused during intoxication, and I believe we must implement this plain language. Under the undisputed facts of this casе, claimant cannot recover compensation for his injuries. The facts demonstrate that claimant was intoxicated during the time he drank from the bottle and caused his injury.
Other states’ statutes vary in the description and degree of causation that an employer must demonstrate; such phrasing includes proximate cause, sole cause, major cause, and substantial cause. 1 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 36.03[1], at 36-19 to 36-21 (2009).
Indeed, Professor Larson strongly criticizes statutes that require no causal link between intoxication and injury, observing that:
[Tjhis type of statute is as foreign to compensation principle as anything could be. It can only be described аs a sort of special penal prohibition measure applicable exclusively to employees. Other people may be punished for drunkenness by small fines or a night in jail, but if it can be proved that a worker was intoxicated when blinded by an explosion on the premises, although the worker would have been blinded just the same if sober, the penalty is the loss of compensation rights, not to mention common-law rights, running into many thousands of dollars. Such statutes, whether phrased in their present form by inadvertence or intent, are preposterous, and should be speedily amended before they work some such staggering injustice.
Larson, supra, § 36.03[2], at 36-22.1-36-23. Despite this strong criticism, however,
The Commissioner has adopted 23 V.S.A. § 1204(a)(2) as the standard for intoxication, and therefore presumes that a worker with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more is intoxicated. See Brailsford v. Time Capsules & Wausau Ins. Co., Op. No. 12-00WC (Vt. Dep’t of Labor May 17, 2000), available at http://www. labor.vermont.gov/Default.aspx?tabid=957. I do not address the question of whether this is a permissible presumption because claimant stipulated that his alcohol concentration was above 0.08 and did not challenge the Commissioner’s adoption of this standard.
I note that the Commissioner’s interpretation is not exactly consistent with the statutory language. The Commissioner excludes compensation for an injury that occurs during intoxication, whereas the statutory language excludes coverage for injuries that are caused during intoxication. Thus, the Commissioner’s interpretation focuses on whether an employee was intoxicated at the time of injury, but the statute directs that the focus should be on whether an employee was intoxicated during the cause of the injury. This distinction is not critical in most cases because most of the time an injury is caused and occurs at the same time. In some cases,