WENDELL L. CRUSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL FINLEY, Defendant-Appellee.
Case No: 12CA2
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY
Filed: November 21, 2012
2012-Ohio-5465
Kline, J.
APPEARANCES:
Wendell L. Cruse, Huntington, WV, pro se Appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Ironton, Ohio, for Appellee.
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Wendell L. Cruse (hereinafter “Cruse”) appeals the judgment of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor Michael Finley (hereinafter “Finley”). On appeal, Cruse argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. We agree. Because the municipal court did not enter a final appealable order in the prior case between Cruse and Finley, the doctrine of res judicata cannot apply to the present case. Therefore, we find that Finley is not entitled to judgment on the basis of res judicata. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
{¶3} In a December 16, 2008 judgment entry, the municipal court decided in favor of Finley on the forcible-entry-and-detainer claim. Finley then retook possession of the apartment, but the claim for unpaid rent remained unresolved.
{¶4} On January 8, 2009, Cruse filed his answer to Finley‘s complaint. Cruse alleged that, in retaking the apartment, Finley had obtained thousands of dollars worth of Cruse‘s personal property. As a result, Cruse requested that “any property removed from 322 E. 4th Ave. Chesapeake, Ohio 45619 be held in storage at Defendant‘s cost, by the plaintiff, until Defendant can be released [from jail].” January 8, 2009 Answer at 4.
{¶5} The municipal court held a hearing on June 1, 2009. That same day, the municipal court entered judgment in favor of Finley on the claim for unpaid rent. The June 1, 2009 judgment entry does not, however, address Cruse‘s personal-property claims.
{¶6} On December 2, 2010, Cruse filed the present case against Finley. Cruse once again alleged that Finley had unlawfully taken Cruse‘s personal property when Finley regained possession of the apartment.
{¶8} Eventually, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Finley. In agreeing with Finley‘s res-judicata argument, the trial court found the following: “Defendant Finley‘s argument that res judicata bars this Court from taking up the issues of the Plaintiff Cruse‘s personal property from this eviction situation is correct. * * * Based upon the Court‘s ruling as to res judicata, the Court will not proceed to also discuss the issue of ‘uncontroverted facts and a secondary right to summary judgment.’” February 9, 2012 Judgment Entry at 2-3.
{¶9} Cruse appeals and asserts the following assignment of error: “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT RES JUDICATA BARRED THIS ACTION.”
II.
{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Cruse contends that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the basis of res judicata.
{¶11} “Because this case was decided upon summary judgment, we review this matter de novo, governed by the standard set forth in
{¶12} The burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists falls upon the party who moves for summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 294, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). However, once the movant supports his or her motion with appropriate evidentiary materials, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party‘s pleadings, but the party‘s response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in [
{¶13} “In reviewing whether an entry of summary judgment is appropriate, an appellate court must independently review the record and the inferences that can be drawn from it to determine if the opposing party can possibly prevail.” Grimes at ¶ 16. “Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court‘s decision in answering that legal question.” Morehead v. Conley, 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 412, 599 N.E.2d 786 (4th Dist.1991). Accord Grimes at ¶ 16.
{¶14} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Finley solely on the basis of res judicata. “Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘a valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.’”
“The party asserting res judicata must show the following four elements: (1) there was a prior valid judgment on the merits; (2) the second action involved the same parties as the first action; (3) the present action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the prior action; and (4) both actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” PNC Bank v. Richards, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-275, 2012-Ohio-1610, ¶ 10, quoting Reasoner v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-800, 2005-Ohio-468, ¶ 5.
Finally, “‘[t]he applicability of res judicata is a question of law that is subject to de novo review.’” Beneficial Ohio at ¶ 11, quoting Althof v. State, 4th Dist. No. 04CA16, 2006-Ohio-502, ¶ 13.
{¶15} Here, we find that res judicata does not apply because the Municipal Court Case lacks a final appealable order. Cruse asserted a counterclaim in his January 8, 2009 answer. This counterclaim remains pending, and the municipal court‘s June 1, 2009 judgment entry does not satisfy
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.
“An order which adjudicates one or more but fewer than all the claims presented in an action also must meet the requirements of
{¶17} Finley advanced two claims in the Municipal Court Case -- (1) a forcible-entry-and-detainer claim and (2) a claim for unpaid rent. See generally Haney v. Roberts, 130 Ohio App.3d 293, 298-299, 720 N.E.2d 101 (4th Dist.1998) (explaining that “a forcible entry and detainer action and a suit for damages arising from the landlord-tenant relationship remain two distinct causes of action”). The municipal court decided the forcible-entry-and-detainer claim on December 16, 2008, but Finley‘s claim for unpaid rent remained pending until June 1, 2009.
has obtained possession of over $10,000 worth of defendant‘s property, including but not limited to a brand new living room suite, dining room suite and bedroom suite, 2 flat screen television sets and various electronic items, including but not limited to, computers, two stereos and various art and antique items. Plaintiff also has possession of over $5,000 worth of defendant‘s clothing. January 8, 2009 Answer at 3-4.
Cruse‘s answer then requests “that the writ of restitution be rescinded or in the alternative, this court order‘s [sic] any property removed from 322 E. 4th Ave. Chesapeake, Ohio 45619 be held in storage at Defendant‘s cost, by the plaintiff, until Defendant can be released [from jail].”
{¶19} After a liberal reading of Cruse‘s January 8, 2009 Answer, we find that he asserted a counterclaim for replevin.2 See Millennia Hous. Mgt. v. Johnson, 8th Dist.
{¶20} Because there is no final appealable order in the Municipal Court Case, res judicata cannot apply to the present case. See Fifth Third Mtg. Co., 2009-Ohio-81, at ¶ 20. Therefore, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. Furthermore, because the trial court decided this case solely on the basis of res judicata, we will not consider whether summary judgment may be appropriate for another reason. “In light of the Ohio Supreme Court‘s determination in Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 360, 604 N.E.2d 138, we, as an appellate court, should not first consider an argument that the trial court did not address.” Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc., 4th Dist. No. 05CA6, 2005-Ohio-6766, ¶ 22.
{¶21} For the forgoing reasons, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Finley. As a result, we sustain Cruse‘s sole assignment of error, reverse the trial court‘s judgment, and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE REMANDED.
{¶22} Cruse‘s January 8, 2009 “answer” filed in the municipal court case alleges conversion by Finley of over $15,000 worth of personal property. Even if we consider the “answer” to include a counterclaim, those allegations on their face exceed the jurisdictional limit of the municipal court. Because the court had no jurisdiction, it did not have to address the part of the answer/counterclaim that was a nullity. So, there is no final appealable order issue in my view.
{¶23} However, because the municipal court did not and could not address the replevin/conversion issue, there can be no res judicata preclusion based on that case.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED AND THIS CAUSE BE REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellee shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only with Opinion.
McFarland, J.: Dissents.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.