Stеphen Rice, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Cherish Lewis, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 11CA3451
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY
Filed: May 14, 2012
[Cite as Rice v. Lewis, 2012-Ohio-2588.]
Kline, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Holly P. Regoli, Law Offices of Holly P. Regoli, Lancaster, Ohio; and Gregory P. Barwell, E. Joel Wesp, and Quinn M. Schmiege, Wesp/Barwell/Pierre-Louis, L.L.C., Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant.
Rebecca L. Bennett, Portsmouth, Ohio, for Appellees.
Kline, J.:
{¶1} Cherish Lewis (hereinafter “Lewis“) appeals the judgment of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, which designated Stephen A. Rice (hereinafter “Rice“) as the residential parent and legal custodian of their minor child. On aрpeal, Lewis advances various arguments about the propriety of the trial court‘s judgment. We will not, however, address these arguments. Instead, for the following reasons, we find that no final appealable order exists. First, the trial court‘s August 26, 2011 Judgment Entry does not meet the requirements of
I.
{¶2} This matter is before this court for a third time. See Rice v. Lewis, 4th Dist. No. 08CA3238, 2009-Ohio-1823 (hereinafter “Rice I“); Rice v. Lewis, 4th Dist. App. No. 09CA3307, 2010-Ohio-1077 (hereinafter “Rice II“). Because Rice I and Rice II recount many of the facts of this case, we will not repeat those facts here. Instead, we will discuss only the facts pertinent to this particular appeal.
{¶3} Lewis and Rice are the biological parents of the minor child (hereinafter the “Child“), and Regina Kelley (hereinafter “Kelley“) is Rice‘s mother. (The trial court permitted Kelley to intervene as a party. See Rice I at ¶ 6.) In Rice I, we reversed an order that designated Rice as the Child‘s residential parent. Rice I at ¶ 94-95. And in Rice II, we vacated all of the orders that resulted from a July 24, 2009 hearing. Rice II at ¶ 62.
{¶4} After Riсe I and Rice II, the trial court had to resolve (1) custody of the Child and (2) various other issues raised by the parties. For example, Lewis requested another evidentiary hearing on the best interest of the Child. Then, on June 8, 2010, Lewis filed a motion to terminate Kelley‘s companionship time with the Child. And finally, on April 12, 2011, Lewis filed a motion for parenting time. (According to Lewis‘s motion, she had not seen the Child in “more than a year.“)
{¶5} The trial court did not hold another evidentiary hearing before resolving the custody issue. Instead, in an August 26, 2011 Judgment Entry, the trial court stated the following:
The Court hereby adopts and approves the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusion[s] of Law as submitted by [Rice] in this matter, and it shall become an order of the Court.
* * *
Based on the foregoing, it is the FINDING and ORDER of the Court that it is in the best interest of the minor child that [Rice] be and is hereby designated as the residential parent and legal custodian of the [Child,] and the same is GRANTED.
{¶7} On September 2, 2011, the trial court issued a judgmеnt entry that addresses Lewis‘s parenting time and various other issues. The September 2, 2011 entry does not, however, address the issue of custody.
{¶8} Lewis appeals from the August 26, 2011 Judgment Entry, and she asserts the following two assignments of error: I. “The trial court‘s August 26, 2011 order should be set aside because the trial court defied this Appellate Court‘s remand order in Case No. 08CA3238 by failing to correctly and thoroughly weigh the
II.
{¶9} “Ohio law provides that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review the final orders or judgments of inferior courts in their district.” Caplinger v. Raines, 4th Dist. No. 02CA2683, 2003-Ohio-2586, ¶ 2, citing
{¶10}
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and whether arising out of the same or separate transactions, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just rеason for delay.
Therefore, “[a]n order which adjudicates one or more but fewer than all the claims presented in an action also must meet the requirements of
{¶11} We discussed
Civ.R. 54(B) is intended “to strike a reasonable balance between the рolicy against piecemeal appeals and the possible injustice sometimes created by the delay of appeals.” [Bell Drilling & Producing Co. v. Kilbarger Constr., Inc., 4th Dist. No. 96CA23, 1997 WL 361025, *3 (June 26, 1997).] ” * * *Civ.R. 54(B) certification demonstrates that the trial court has determined that an order, albeit interlocutory, should be immediately appealable, in order to further the efficient administration of justice and to avoidpiecemeal litigation or injustice attributable to delayed appeals.” Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., [122 Ohio St.3d 83, 2009-Ohio-1971, 909 N.E.2d 88,] ¶ 11.
(Omission sic.) Bumgarner at ¶ 5.
{¶12} We find that
{¶13} “Because the judgment appellants are appealing failed to adjudicate every claim and/or dispose of all parties, we must look to seе if the trial court certified that there was no just reason for delay. A review of the trial court‘s entry reveals that it did not.” Bumgarner at ¶ 6. Accordingly, the August 26, 2011 entry is not a final appealable order. See id.; Tina B. v. Richard T., 6th Dist. No. L-95-328, 1996 WL 913169, *5 (May 28, 1996) (“When an action involves multiple claims for relief, suсh as in this case in which appellant‘s motion requests judgment on the closely related issues of custody and child support, a trial court‘s judgment which adjudicates less than all of the claims is not a final appealable order.“); compаre Sites v. Sites, 4th Dist. No. 09CA19, 2010-Ohio-2748, ¶ 30, fn. 2 (“Because the trial court‘s decision * * * includes appropriate
{¶14} We also find that the September 21, 2011 entry is not a final appealable order. Here, the September 2, 2011 entry does not (1) address the issue of custody, (2) discuss Kelley‘s rights and responsibilities, or (3) include
{¶15} “Since interlocutory orders are subject to modification, the trial court may reconsider them at any time.” Javidan-Nejad v. Navadeh, 8th Dist. No. 95406, 2011-Ohio-2283, ¶ 62. As a result, the trial court may still reconsider either the August 26, 2011 Judgment Entry or the September 2, 2011 Judgment Entry. (For example, the
{¶16} In conclusion, we find that no final appealable order exists in the present case. As a result, we must dismiss Lewis‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment & Opinion.
Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
For the Court
BY:
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.