{¶ 3} The trial court granted summary judgment to Citizens Bank on appellants' amended complaint and on counts one, two and nine (granting attorney fees.) Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration and found in favor of Citizens Bank on counts six and nine (setting the amount of attorney fees) on its counterclaim. The court stated that its entry was a final judgment, but did not certify that there was no just reason for delay.
{¶ 4} Appellants timely appealed. Noting that counts three, four, five, seven and eight of Citizens Bank's counterclaims remained pending and that the trial court did not certify that there was no just reason for delay, we found that we lacked jurisdiction. Hence, we dismissed the appeal. Oakley v. CitizensBank of Logan, Athens App. No. 03CA13,
{¶ 5} The trial court issued a judgment entry in which it noted that its previous journal entries failed to expressly dispose of all claims of all parties. The court made the express determination that "there is no just reason for delay" pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B). Appellants again timely appealed. We granted appellants' motion to consider appellants' and appellee's merit briefs filed in Athens App. 03CA13.
{¶ 7} To constitute a final appealable order, an order must meet the requirements of R.C.
{¶ 8} A final order is defined by R.C.
{¶ 9} An order which adjudicates one or more but fewer than all the claims presented in an action also must meet the requirements of Civ.R. 54(B) in order to be final and appealable.Noble at syllabus. Civ.R. 54(B) provides: "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action * * * or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no just reason for delay, any order or other form of decision, is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Civ.R.54(B) is designed to strike a reasonable balance between the policy against piecemeal appeals and the possible injustice sometimes created by the delay of appeals. Alexanderv. Buckeye Pipeline Co. (1977),
{¶ 10} For the purposes of Civ.R. 54(B) certification, the trial court makes a factual determination of whether or not an interlocutory appeal is consistent with the interests of sound judicial administration. Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co.
(1993),
{¶ 11} We focus our determination on whether the court's determination serves judicial economy at the trial level. BellDrilling Producing; Wisintainer at 355. We need not find that the trial court's certification is the most likely route to judicial economy, "but that it is one route which might lead there." Wisintainer at 355. While this is a very deferential standard, and appellate courts are reluctant to strike such a certification, "the trial court's use of the `magic language' of Civ.R. 54(B) does not, by itself, convert a final order into a final appealable order." (Emphasis sic.) Bell Drilling Producing, citing Ralston v. Scalia (Jan. 10, 1994), Stark App. No. CA-9344 (appeal dismissed for lack of final appealable order notwithstanding the presence of no just reason for delay language.)
{¶ 12} Our review of the record leads us to conclude this is one of those rare occasions when the trial court's certification is not justified. Counts seven and eight of Citizens Bank's counterclaim seek relief, like counts one, two and six, relating to appellants' failure to make payments on the $1,000,000 and $237,463.75 issued for the construction and irrigation of the golf course. We see no judicial benefit to the trial court in allowing piecemeal appellate review of these claims. We respect the trial court's determination that Citizens Bank's claims relating to the DryDock loans are separable from the golf course loans. However, we find no competent and credible evidence in the record supporting a finding that judicial economy would be furthered by permitting intermediate appeal on only some of the claims related to the golf course loans.
{¶ 13} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court improperly issued the Civ.R. 54(B) certification. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final appealable order.
Appeal dismissed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Athens County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Harsha, J. and Grey, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.