Cravotta v. County of Sacramento
2:22-cv-00167
E.D. Cal.
Aug 15, 2025
Check Treatment
Docket

ANTHONY CRAVOTTA II, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-00167-DJC-AC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 14, 2025

ORDER

Plaintiff Anthony Cravotta II, a former pretrial detainee in county jail, alleges he was brutally assaulted by his cellmate Lemar Burleson after he had been found mentally incompetent to stand trial and was awaiting transfer to a state hospital. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the assault, he sustained catastrophic brain injuries. Plaintiff brings six causes of action in his operative Fourth Amended Complaint stemming from his detention at the jail and the assault.

Defendants, who oversee, operate, and provide mental health services at the jail, have moved to dismiss certain of Plaintiff‘s claims arguing they are insufficiently pled. Defendants have also moved to strike several of Plaintiff‘s allegations. Having considered the Parties’ arguments and briefings, the Court will dismiss and strike Plaintiff‘s claims in part.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is well known to the Parties and is also set forth in the Court‘s prior Order granting dismissal in part of Plaintiff‘s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 83 at 2–5), as well as the Court‘s Order granting dismissal in part of Plaintiff‘s Third Amended Complaint (Dismissal Order (ECF No. 122) at 5-6, 17-19, 28-29.) The Court will address Plaintiff‘s allegations as to specific Defendants as required below.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought this action on January 26, 2022, filing his Third Amended Complaint on June 3, 2024, for (1) deliberate indifference/special relationship/failure-to-protect under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; (3) violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; (4) failure to summon medical care under California Government Code section 845.6; (5) violations of the Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1; and (6) negligence against Defendants the County of Sacramento ( “County“), Sacramento County Sheriff‘s Department (“Sheriff‘s Department“), the Regents of the University of California (“Regents“), the State of California, the California Department of State Hospitals, Sheriff Scott Jones, Christopher Sturgis, Christina Albright-Mundy, Jacob Saesee, Daisy Rollon, Bradley Whiting, Jacquelyn Blevins, Ramandeep Singh, Andrea Haynes, Moises Paredes, Ronnie Mclean, Justin Higley, Takuya Noda, Bennett Preston, Nicole Garces-Barrella, Diane Oran, Jaclyn DeCarlo, and Melissa Turner. (ECF No. 98 ¶¶ 172-222.) The Court subsequently dismissed the first through sixth causes of action in part with leave to amend. (Dismissal Order at 31-32.) The Court also dismissed the first cause of action against Defendants Paredes and McLean, fourth cause of action against Defendants Paredes, McLean, Haynes, and Higley, and sixth cause of action against Defendants Paredes and McLean without leave to amend. (Id.)

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Plaintiff filed his operative Fourth Amended Complaint on March 14, 2025, asserting the same six causes of action for deliberate indifference, violations of the Rehabilitation Act, violations of the ADA, failure to summon medical care, violations of the Bane Act, and negligence against the County, the Sheriff‘s Department, the Regents, the State of California, the California Department of State Hospitals, Sheriff Jones, and Defendants Saesee, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Higley, Noda, Preston, and Turner. (Fourth Am. Compl. (“FAC“) (ECF No. 124) ¶¶ 7-23, 160–204.) Plaintiff no longer asserts claims against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Paredes, McLean, Garcelles-Barrella, Oran, or DeCarlo in his Fourth Amended Complaint.

Under submission now are two separate motions to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a motion to strike brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f):

  • The Regents and Defendant Turner (collectively, “Regents Defendants“) move to dismiss Plaintiff‘s first cause of action against Defendant Turner; fifth cause of action against the Regents Defendants; and sixth cause of action against Defendant Turner. (Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 127) at 2.)
  • The County, Sheriff‘s Department, Sheriff Jones, and Defendants Saesee, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Higley, and Noda (collectively, “County Defendants“) move to dismiss Plaintiff‘s first cause of action against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Defendant Noda; fourth cause of action against the County, Sheriff‘s Department, Sheriff Jones, and Defendant Noda; fifth cause of action against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Paredes, McLean, and Defendant Noda; and sixth cause of action against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Defendant Noda. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 130) at 2-3.)
  • The County Defendants move to strike references to Defendants Haynes and Higley from the fourth and fifth causes of action, and references to

Paredes and McLean from the first, fourth, and sixth causes of action. (County Defs.’ Mot. Strike (ECF No. 131) at 2.)

Following the Motion to Strike, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Partial Dismissal of Fourth Claim voluntarily dismissing Defendants Haynes and Higley from the fourth cause of action. (ECF No. 133.) All of the motions were subsequently submitted without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) on June 25, 2025. (ECF No. 143.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion to Strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may strike “any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as a delaying tactic.” . When considering a motion to strike, the court views the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will “resolve[ ] any doubt as to the relevance of the challenged allegations or sufficiency of a defense” in the nonmoving party‘s favor. Id. Ultimately, the decision as to whether to strike allegations “lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id.

II. Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” . The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (quoting ). That said, if the complaint‘s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted.

. A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” . However, this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. . In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of elements alone do not suffice. Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be freely given where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment . . . .” ; . Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” (quoting ).

DISCUSSION

I. County Defendants’ Motion to Strike

The County Defendants move to strike “impertinent and immaterial” references to Defendants Haynes and Higley, and former defendants Paredes and McLean, in the Fourth Amended Complaint based on the Court‘s prior dismissal of claims against those Defendants. (County Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 2-6.) In particular, the County Defendants move to strike references to Defendants Haynes and Higley from paragraphs 178, 180, 182, 183, and 184 in the fourth cause of action, and paragraph 191 in the fifth cause of action. (Id. at 5-6.) They also move to strike references to Paredes and McLean from paragraph 165 in the first cause of action, paragraphs 182

and 184 in the fourth cause of action, and paragraphs 200, 202, and 204 in the sixth cause of action. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff has voluntarily stricken Defendants Haynes and Higley from his fourth cause of action for failure to summon medical care. (ECF No. 133.) Thus, the County Defendants’ Motion to Strike on that basis is moot. The Court will, however, strike the reference to Defendants Haynes and Higley in paragraph 191 of Plaintiff‘s fifth cause of action under the Bane Act, which premises Defendants Haynes and Higley‘s Bane Act liability on their failure to summon medical care. (See FAC ¶ 191.) As Plaintiff no longer brings a claim against Defendants Haynes and Higley for failure to summon medical care, he cannot premise his Bane Act claim on that basis.

However, the Court declines to strike the allegations as to Paredes and McLean from paragraphs 165, 182, 184, 200, 202, and 204 in the Fourth Amended Complaint. It is clear in the Fourth Amended Complaint that Plaintiff no longer asserts any causes of action against those officers per this Court‘s prior order. (See FAC ¶¶ 7-23, 160, 178, 197; Dismissal Order at 24-25, 28.) While Plaintiff still references Paredes and McLean in the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff argues his allegations concerning those officers are relevant to establishing background information and context for his claims against the remaining Defendants. (Opp‘n Mot. Strike (ECF No. 140) at 2–5.) The County Defendants do not rebut Plaintiff‘s contention that the allegations are at least arguably relevant to Plaintiff‘s remaining claims. (See Reply Mot. Strike (ECF No. 141) at 3-4.) As the County Defendants have not demonstrated why the allegations against Paredes and McLean are clearly irrelevant or prejudicial, the Court declines to strike them from the Fourth Amended Complaint.

In short, the Court will grant the County Defendants’ Motion to Strike in part and strike the reference to Defendants Haynes and Higley from paragraph 191 in the Fourth Amended Complaint only.

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II. The Regents Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Relevant Factual Allegations

On November 11, 2020, Plaintiff was arrested and booked on felony charges at the Sacramento County Main Jail. (FAC ¶¶ 36–37.) Jail staff initially classified Plaintiff for specialized housing in the Jail Psychiatric Services (“JPS“) unit based on Plaintiff‘s documented mental health history and his behavior. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 45, 48.) For example, on November 16, 2020, Plaintiff‘s jail mental health notes indicated: “FOSS I“; “Altered Thought Process“; “Serious Mental Illness“; “Schizoaffective [D]isorder“; “2P Pre-Admit“; and “Unspecified intellectual disabilities.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff was also frequently observed “taking a ‘boxer‘s stance’ or ‘fighting position’ with ‘fists in the air’ and expressing a need to ‘defend’ himself from ‘threats,’ including ‘invisible’ and ‘visible enemies.‘” (Id. ¶ 44.) His jail mental health notes stated he had “a history of Schizoaffective Disorder . . . he is clearly psychotic . . . [and is] gravely disabled.” (Id. ¶ 47.)

On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff was discharged from the jail‘s JPS unit to general population for outpatient psychiatric (“OPP“) housing. (Id. ¶ 51.) While Plaintiff was housed in OPP housing, mental health professionals employed by the Regents, who contract with the County and Sheriff‘s Department to provide psychiatric and mental health services at the jail, conducted several mental health appointments with Plaintiff, during which they documented that Plaintiff presented as “delusional and continu[ed] to be disorganized“; that he “stated that someone is hitting him inside his cell, however, upon further explanation stated ‘I get an electric shock‘“; that he complained he sometimes missed meals because people were trying to hit him; and that he complained that “[t]he officers are in my head and they hit me in my head,” but confirmed he was not being hit by his cellmate or anyone else in his pod. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 53-54, 65.) In March of 2021, Plaintiff‘s mental health notes also indicated he reported his cellmate had attacked him at the end of February or early March, but that nothing had happened since then. (Id. ¶ 62.)

Subsequently, on April 5, 2021, Plaintiff was found incompetent to stand trial and was ordered to be transferred to a state hospital pending restoration of his competency. (Id. ¶¶ 63-64.) A “state hospital hold” notation was placed in Plaintiff‘s jail records. (Id. ¶ 64.)

On September 9, 2021, Burleson was booked into the jail. (Id. ¶ 72.) Burleson, who had previously been incarcerated, had a documented history of mental illness, “was frequently documented by jail staff as assaultive” towards other inmates/cellmates, and had stated he “wanted to kill white people” and “threatened to assault any inmate he is housed with.” (Id. ¶¶ 73-74.) On September 20, 2021, jail staff classified Burleson and housed him in general population with OPP housing. (Id. ¶ 75.) Burleson was not referred for mental health services, connected with JPS staff, or prescribed any mood-stabilizing medications “despite his documented history of mental illness.” (Id. ¶ 79.)

On September 23, 2021, jail staff removed Plaintiff from his assigned cell because he “stated his cellmate Rodriguez, Jesus X-5187464 (224) was being violent towards him.” (Id. ¶ 80.) Plaintiff was reassigned to share a cell with Burleson that same day. (Id. ¶¶ 81-82.) On September 24, 2021, Defendant Turner, a licensed clinical social worker employed by the Regents, conducted a mental health appointment with Plaintiff during which he stated he had a new cellmate and “[i]t‘s not working out too well.” (Id. ¶¶ 20, 86.) Defendant Turner asked Plaintiff to elaborate, but he refused, stating he would rather talk to his lawyer about it. (Id. ¶ 86.) Plaintiff also denied any physical or sexual contact with his cellmate but stated if he got physical “I‘ll have to defend myself.” (Id.) Defendant Turner did not report Plaintiff‘s concerns about Burleson to any jail staff. (Id. ¶ 87.) However, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Turner had access to Plaintiff and Burleson‘s records, and that if she had reviewed the records, she would have learned that Plaintiff and Burleson were both severely mentally ill, that Plaintiff was reportedly the victim of two prior assaults by cellmates during his incarceration, that Burleson had a history of violence against

other inmates, and that Burleson had not received any medication despite his assaultive history. (Id. ¶¶ 88-89.) Plaintiff alleges a reasonable official in Defendant Turner‘s position would have investigated the risk to Plaintiff under the circumstances and reported it. (Id. ¶ 90.) On September 26, 2021, Plaintiff was brutally assaulted by Burleson in their shared cell. (Id. ¶ 93.)

B. First Cause of Action for Deliberate Indifference

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. 14 § 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a right of action for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by persons acting under color of state law. Pretrial detainees have the right to be free from violence from other inmates, and prison officials therefore have a duty to protect them from such violence. . To state a plausible claim for failure to protect under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” .

To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonably available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in those circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of the defendant‘s conduct obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff‘s injuries. . The third element requires that the defendant‘s conduct be objectively unreasonable. Id. The mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Rather, the plaintiff must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff brings a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Turner, alleging Defendant Turner failed to protect Plaintiff by neglecting to review Plaintiff and Burleson‘s jail records in response to Plaintiff‘s concerns voiced during his appointment in order to assess any risk posed by Burleson, and then failing to report that risk to jail staff who had the ability to “move monitor or otherwise account for Plaintiff . . . and . . . Burleson.” (FAC ¶¶ 91, 162.) The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff‘s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Turner, reasoning that Plaintiff‘s allegations did not “plausibly establish that Defendant Turner could have appreciated that Plaintiff was at a serious risk of harm based on his comments” because it was “unclear from the Third Amended Complaint whether Defendant Turner, as an employee of the Regents, had access to Burleson‘s records and thus could have recognized the specific threat that Burleson posed to Plaintiff” and because Plaintiff declined to elaborate further when Defendant Turner asked Plaintiff about his comment that “[i]t‘s not working out too well.” (Dismissal Order at 10.) Defendant Turner urges the Court to dismiss this claim again because “[e]ven if, as Plaintiff alleges, Turner had access to [Plaintiff and Burleson‘s] records, there are no allegations to support an inference that a reasonable person in Turner‘s position would have or should have reviewed those records” as “Plaintiff‘s statements were insufficient to put a reasonable person in Turner‘s position on notice that Plaintiff was at substantial risk of serious harm.” (Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 14.)

The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiff has insufficiently pled deliberate indifference. Plaintiff argues that his statements concerning Burleson were sufficient to put Defendant Turner on notice that she should investigate and report potential risks to Plaintiff, her mental health patient, to jail staff, which she failed to do. However, the record shows that Defendant Turner did attempt to investigate Plaintiff‘s statements by asking Plaintiff to elaborate on why he was concerned about his situation with his cellmate. In response, Plaintiff declined to clarify his statements beyond speculating that if Burleson became physical “I‘ll have to defend myself.”

Plaintiff also denied, however, that any physical or sexual contact had occurred thus far. Taken together, these statements do not implicate any deliberate indifference on Defendant Turner‘s part, as Defendant Turner specifically asked about Plaintiff‘s concerns, and Plaintiff declined to provide any further details clearly indicating an imminent attack. Otherwise stated, Plaintiff‘s statements neither indicated a “high degree of risk” to his safety, nor that the potential consequence of Defendant Turner‘s failure to further investigate or report his statements to jail staff were “obvious.” While Defendant Turner could have gone above and beyond to review Plaintiff and Burleson‘s records, given the vagueness of Plaintiff‘s statements Defendant Turner‘s failure to do so was not objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff‘s first cause of action against Defendant Turner for deliberate indifference with leave to amend.

C. Fifth Cause of Action under the Bane Act

The Bane Act “protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by threats, intimidation or coercion.‘” (quoting ). When a Bane Act claim is based on alleged federal constitutional violations, plaintiffs may rely on the same allegations to prove both that the defendant deprived them of a constitutional right and threatened, intimidated, or coerced them. See (“[T]he Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional violation alleged.“). But the claim must also rest on factual allegations that would allow an inference the defendant had a specific intent to violate the plaintiff‘s rights. See id. “[S]pecific intent” may be shown by demonstrating that the defendant “acted . . . ‘in reckless disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibitions or guarantees.‘” , as modified (Nov. 17, 2017) (citation omitted); (“[A] reckless disregard for a

person‘s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.“).

As to the specific intent inquiry, courts have held that if a plaintiff adequately pleads a claim for deliberate indifference, which requires a pleading of reckless disregard, then he has sufficiently alleged the intent required for a Bane Act claim. See (finding coercive act element of Bane Act claim satisfied by allegation of prison official‘s deliberate indifference to serious medical needs); see also (holding that because deliberate indifference “has been associated with affirmatively culpable conduct, . . . a prisoner who successfully proves that prison officials acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights . . . adequately states a claim for relief under the Bane Act“).

Here, Plaintiff pleads his Bane Act claim against Defendant Turner based on her alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff‘s safety in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution. (FAC ¶ 187.) Plaintiff also pleads a Bane Act claim against the Regents based on theories of supervisory and vicarious liability. (Id. ¶¶ 188, 194.) However, as held above, Plaintiff has failed to plead deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Turner. See Section II.B supra. Thus, those allegations cannot support Plaintiff‘s Bane Act claim here.

Plaintiff argues that he had pled a Bane Act claim premised on violations of both the United States and California Constitutions, and that the Regents Defendants have failed to specifically seek dismissal of Plaintiff‘s Bane Act claim based on violations of Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution, weighing against dismissal. (Opp‘n Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 129) at 7-8.) Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution, much like the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that a “person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law.” However, Plaintiff argues the analysis of Article I, Section 7(a) “is not necessarily duplicative of the Fourteenth Amendment, where ‘the California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of independent force, and [] the rights embodied in and protected by the state Constitution are not invariably identical to the rights contained in the federal Constitution.‘” (Opp‘n Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 8 (quoting ).) While that may be, the fact remains that, in order to state a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant had a specific intent to interfere with the plaintiff‘s rights, and that the interference was carried out by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” Civ. Code § 52.1(b); . Here, for the reasons discussed in Section II.B supra, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege Defendant Turner had a specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his rights under the California Constitution.

Given that Plaintiff has failed to allege either deliberate indifference or other evidence of Defendant Turner‘s reckless disregard for Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff‘s Bane Act claim against Defendant Turner as well as the Regents with leave to amend.

D. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence

In California, a cause of action for negligence requires (1) a legal duty to use reasonable care; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) proximate cause between the breach and (4) the plaintiff‘s injury. . This standard requires a much lower level of culpability than deliberate indifference. See .

Here, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant Turner is liable for negligence based on several theories, “including by inadequately supervising, monitoring, and responding to [Plaintiff]‘s safety and/or medical needs, in violation of the United States and California Constitutions, federal and state laws, regulations, policies, standards, general orders, procedures, training, national and local standards, and/or California Civil Code § 1714(a).” (FAC ¶ 199.) Defendant Turner argues that Plaintiff‘s claim fails

because Plaintiff has insufficiently pled Defendant Turner owed Plaintiff a duty of care to protect him from his cellmate Burleson. (Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 15–18.)

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged a duty to protect. First, Plaintiff argues that, to the extent he has alleged a deliberate indifference claim, he has also stated a negligence claim as negligence requires a much lower level of culpability. (Opp‘n Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 13.) However, Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged deliberate indifference. See Section II.B supra. Thus, those allegations alone cannot support his negligence claim.

Plaintiff also argues that, under California law, there is a special relationship between a jailer and a prisoner giving rise to a duty of care to protect the prisoner from foreseeable harm inflicted by a third party. . However, the reasoning behind the Giraldo court‘s imposition of a special relationship does not clearly extend to health care providers in prisons, who occupy a very different role than prison officials. In recognizing a jailer‘s duty to prisoners in their care, the court in Giraldo reasoned that the “typical setting for the recognition of a special relationship is where ‘the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has some control over the plaintiff‘s welfare.‘” . Turning to the relationship between jailers and prisoners, the court concluded that jailers, who have taken custody of their prisoners and thereby deprived them of the ability to protect themselves, are under a duty to protect the persons in their custody from foreseeable harm, including by controlling the conduct of third persons. See .

Here, Defendant Turner was employed to provide mental health services to inmates at the jail. Unlike a jailer or other prison official, she was not charged with the inmates’ general safe keeping, nor was she in a position to control the conduct, classification, and housing of inmates. Therefore, the Court declines to extend the duty recognized under Giraldo to mental health care providers such as Defendant Turner, particularly given that Plaintiff fails to cite any case where a contracted mental

health care provider was found to owe an inmate-patient a duty to protect them from third-party conduct. Rather, Defendant Turner owed Plaintiff a duty to provide adequate mental health care. See (mental health care providers have “‘a duty to use a reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care in treating a patient, commensurate with that possessed and exercised by others practicing within that specialty in the professional community‘” (quoting )). However, Plaintiff has not alleged that that duty was breached here. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege any applicable duty arising under the common law.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Turner failed to comply with various established policies, trainings, standards, and procedures relating to protecting and reporting threats to patients which Plaintiff argues sufficiently states a negligence claim. (Opp‘n Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 14-15.) However, while Plaintiff lists the relevant policies, he has failed to allege what these policies required of Defendant Turner (i.e., duty), or how she violated them (i.e., breach). (See FAC ¶ 92.) Such conclusory pleading fails to state a plausible claim for relief.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff‘s negligence claim against Defendant Turner with leave to amend.

III. The County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Relevant Factual Allegations

On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff was discharged from the JPS unit to general population OPP housing. (FAC ¶ 51.) On September 23, 2021, Plaintiff and Burleson were both assigned to cell #203. (Id. ¶¶ 80–82.) Plaintiff was assaulted by Burleson in their cell on September 26, 2021. (Id. ¶ 93.) Defendant Noda, a records officer, along with other Defendants, were the jail staff responsible for monitoring the inmates in the area of the jail where Plaintiff and Burleson were housed that day, including monitoring inmates via a closed-circuit television (“CCTV“) surveillance system and conducting direct visual checks of cells and inmates. (Id. ¶ 95.)

After Plaintiff was assaulted, he was on the ground of his cell bleeding from a headwound and struggling to breathe for about 30 minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 100, 102.) Plaintiff‘s blood was leaking underneath the cell door and was visible on at least two different CCTV surveillance cameras. (Id. ¶ 101.) More than 22 minutes after the blood was visible on the jail‘s CCTV cameras, and about 55 minutes after the last cell check, Josh Soules, an inmate-trustee, noticed the stream of blood leaking from cell #203 and approached the cell for inspection. (Id. ¶ 106.) Burleson observed that Soules had discovered his assault, used the emergency button to activate the intercom inside of the jail, and informed Defendant Noda, who was located in the control area, that he had attacked and “might have killed” Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 107-08.) Defendant Noda relayed Burleson‘s message to other Defendants, who responded to the attack. (Id. ¶¶ 109-25.) Eventually, Plaintiff was transported to the hospital where he was placed in a medically induced coma. (Id. ¶ 126.)

B. First Cause of Action for Deliberate Indifference

The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s claims for deliberate indifference against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Defendant Noda should be dismissed, as Plaintiff has failed to adequately remedy his allegations as to those claims. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 4-9.)

Plaintiff does not assert any claims against Sturgis and Albright-Mundy in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (See FAC ¶¶ 6-23 (listing the Parties).) Thus, the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to those officers is denied as moot.

However, the Court will grant the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Noda. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff‘s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Noda, reasoning that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege Defendant Noda made an intentional decision with respect to Plaintiff‘s conditions of confinement as Plaintiff failed to explain how Defendant Noda deliberately failed to monitor Plaintiff‘s cell. (Dismissal Order at 23.) Plaintiff has failed to add any allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint remedying this shortcoming, as Plaintiff

neither plausibly alleges Defendant Noda was scheduled to conduct a visual check of Plaintiff‘s cell but failed to do so, nor that Defendant Noda had access to CCTV footage while he was in the control room to monitor Plaintiff‘s cell but failed to do so. At most, Plaintiff alleges that “NODA ignored or failed to detect or notice Plaintiff ANTHONY CRAVOTTA II‘s stream of blood that continuously grew and leaked from under the cell door” and “fail[ed] adequately to monitor cell #203” via CCTV or visual checks, “caus[ing] serious harm, including the non-detection of LEMAR BURLESON‘s assault on Plaintiff ANTHONY CRAVOTTA II and delay in summoning medical care.” (FAC ¶¶ 103-04). These conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish Defendant Noda made an intentional decision to inadequately monitor Plaintiff‘s cell. See (finding plaintiff failed to allege a deliberate indifference claim when his conclusory allegations that defendants “failed to properly conduct cell checks required to verify an inmate‘s safety and welfare” were insufficient to create a plausible claim that defendants intentionally chose the conditions of confinement and were not merely negligent).

Thus, the Court will grant dismissal of Plaintiff‘s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Noda but will grant Plaintiff one final chance to amend.

C. Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Summon Medical Care

The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s claim for failure to summon medical care against Defendant Noda is inadequately pled and should be dismissed. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 9-10.) The County Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to adequately allege supervisory claims against Sheriff Jones, and that the County and Sheriff‘s Department are immune from liability pursuant to California Government Code section 844.6(a). (Id. at 10-11.)

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant Noda for the same reasons set forth in the Court‘s prior Order: Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged Defendant Noda knew, or had reason to know, that Plaintiff was in need of immediate

medical care during the 30-minute period between when Plaintiff was attacked and the attack was reported. (Dismissal Order at 25.) Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Noda was assigned, along with other Defendants, to monitor Plaintiff‘s cell during the period when he was assaulted, that blood was visibly leaking out from underneath Plaintiff‘s cell door for 22 minutes before the attack was reported, and that Defendant Noda was in the control room when he received Burleson‘s report that Plaintiff had been attacked. (FAC ¶¶ 95, 101, 106-08.) These allegations fail to establish, however, how Defendant Noda knew or should have known of the assault. In other words, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Noda failed to conduct a scheduled safety check after the attack, or that he had access to CCTV footage while in the control area during the time when blood was visibly leaking underneath the cell door. Further, Plaintiff alleges that once Defendant Noda was made aware of the attack, he promptly alerted other jail staff of the emergency and medical care was swiftly summoned. (See id. ¶¶ 108-27.) Thus, Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant Noda will be dismissed.

With respect to Sheriff Jones, courts have held that prison officials may be liable for their employees’ failure to summon medical care because section 845.6 permits claims against prison officials for negligent supervision and training as to when to summon medical care. (”California Government Code § 845.6 permits claims against prison officials for negligent supervision and training as to when to summon medical care.“); (finding Government Code section 845.6 could support claim against a County defendant for negligent supervision and training). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Jones failed to adequately train and supervise jail staff in summoning necessary medical care for inmates at the jail. (See FAC ¶¶ 139–41, 181.) In support of these allegations, Plaintiff alleges numerous incidents when other inmates at the jail suffered injuries as a result of jail staff inadequately diagnosing,

monitoring, and providing care for inmates, including failing to respond to immediate medical needs. (Id. ¶ 145.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Preston, another employee at the jail, failed to summon medical care in violation of section 845.6, thereby resulting in Plaintiff‘s harm. (See id. ¶¶ 178–84.) Plaintiff‘s claim against Defendant Preston has not been challenged here. Viewing these allegations as a whole, Plaintiff has adequately pled Sheriff Jones inadequately trained and supervised jail staff, including Defendant Preston, in summoning medical care, resulting in Plaintiff‘s injuries. Thus, Plaintiff‘s claim against Sheriff Jones will not be dismissed.

Finally, concerning the County and Sheriff‘s Department, section 845.6 provides that a “public entity” may be liable for a failure to summon medical care by an “employee [who] is acting within the scope of his [or her] employment.” Gov‘t Code § 845.6. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the County and Sheriff‘s Department are vicariously liable for the injuries caused by Defendant Preston, against whom Plaintiff has a viable claim for failure to summon medical care under section 845.6. (FAC ¶ 182.) The County Defendants argue that the County and Sheriff‘s Department are immune from liability under Government Code section 844.6(a). However, immunity under section 844.6 is expressly “except[ed] as provided . . . in Section[] . . . 845.6 . . . .” Gov‘t Code § 844.6(a); see, e.g., (recognizing “multiple exceptions to [section 844.6] immunity,” including liability under section 845.6); (“[T]here are statutory exceptions to § 844.6, one of which is failure to summon medical care under California Government Code § 845.6.“). The County Defendants have not explained why, despite this clear language, they should benefit from the immunity provisions of section 844.6 as to Plaintiff‘s failure to summon medical care claim.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff‘s fourth cause of action against Defendant Noda only with leave to amend.

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D. Fifth Cause of Action under the Bane Act

The County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff‘s Bane Act claims against Paredes, McLean, Albright-Mundy, Sturgis, and Defendant Noda, arguing all are insufficiently pled. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 13–14.)

As this Court has already observed, Plaintiff does not assert any claims against Sturgis and Albright-Mundy in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (See FAC ¶¶ 6-23 (listing the Parties).) Similarly, Plaintiff no longer asserts any claims against Paredes or McLean in the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Id.) Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff‘s Bane Act claims as to those officers is denied as moot.

However, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff‘s Bane Act claim as to Defendant Noda. That claim is premised on Plaintiff‘s claims against Defendant Noda for deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution, and failure to summon medical care in violation of Government Code section 845.6. (See id. ¶¶ 187, 191.) As held supra, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Noda for either deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment or failure to summon medical care under section 845.6. See Sections III.B-C supra. Thus, those claims cannot support Plaintiff‘s Bane Act claim here.

As with Defendant Turner, Plaintiff argues that the County Defendants have not specifically sought dismissal of Plaintiff‘s Bane Act claim premised on violations of Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution. (Opp‘n County Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 139) at 13-14.) However, as discussed in Section II.C supra, to state a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant had a specific intent to interfere with the plaintiff‘s rights, and that the interference was carried out by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” Civ. Code § 52.1(b); . Here, for the reasons discussed in Section III.B supra, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege Defendant Noda acted with reckless disregard for Plaintiff‘s rights under the California Constitution.

Thus, the Court will grant dismissal of Plaintiff‘s fifth cause of action against Defendant Noda with leave to amend.

E. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence

Finally, the County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff‘s claims for negligence against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Defendant Noda. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 11-13.)

Plaintiff does not assert any claims, including negligence, against Sturgis and Albright-Mundy in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (See FAC ¶¶ 6-23 (listing the Parties).) Thus, dismissal of Plaintiff‘s negligence claims as to those officers is denied as moot.

The Court will, however, dismiss Plaintiff‘s negligence claim as to Defendant Noda. “In California, prison officials owe detainees a duty to protect them from foreseeable harm.” ; ; . Plaintiff alleges Defendant Noda breached this duty when he insufficiently monitored Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 199.) However, Plaintiff‘s allegations are insufficient to conclude Defendant Noda breached any duty, as Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Defendant Noda failed to conduct scheduled safety checks during the assault in question, conducted insufficient safety checks during that time, or had access to but failed to monitor CCTV footage of Plaintiff‘s cell. See Section III.B supra. Thus, as held in this Court‘s prior order, Plaintiff has failed to state negligence a claim on that basis. (See Dismissal Order at 27-28.)

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff‘s negligence claim against Defendant Noda with one final chance to amend.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, it is hereby ordered that the Regents Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 127) is GRANTED. It is further ordered that the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 130) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Finally, the County Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 131) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Specifically, the Court hereby STRIKES any reference to Defendants Haynes or Higley in paragraph 191 of Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amended Complaint. The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff‘s first, fifth, and sixth causes of action against Defendant Turner; fifth cause of action against the Regents; and first, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action against Defendant Noda, all with leave to amend. The Court notes, however, that this is the Court‘s third order dismissing claims brought in a case that was filed over three and a half years ago and cautions Plaintiff that any future dismissals may well be with prejudice. The Court DENIES dismissal as to Plaintiff‘s remaining claims.

Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days of this Order. If Plaintiff wishes to add any additional claims or defendants to his amended complaint aside from those specifically contemplated by this Order, Plaintiff must seek the Court‘s leave to do so pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The Parties are reminded of the Court‘s prior order requiring the Parties file a status report pursuant to this Court‘s Initial Case Management Order within thirty-five (35) days after the Court‘s ruling on these motions. (ECF No. 132.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2025

Daniel J. Calabretta

Hon. Daniel J. Calabretta

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DJC4 Cravotta22cv167.ThirdMTD&MotStrike

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