JORGE RAY CORONA, Plаintiff - Appellee, v. OFFICER BRENT AGUILAR, in his official capacity, Defendant - Appellant, and CITY OF CLOVIS; CLOVIS POLICE DEPARTMENT; OFFICER TRAVIS LOOMIS, in his official capacity, Defendants.
No. 19-2147
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
May 27, 2020
959 F.3d 1278
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 2:17-CV-00805-JCH). Christopher M. Wolpert, Clerk of Court.
PUBLISH
Submitted on the briefs:*
Mark D. Standridge and Cody R. Rogers, Jarmie & Rogers, P.C., Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant.
Daniel R. Lindsey, Lindsey Law Firm, LLC, Clovis, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
During a routine traffic stop in August 2014, Clovis Police Officer Brent Aguilar arrested Plaintiff Jorge Corona, a passenger in the back seat of the vehicle, after he did not produce identification in response to the officer‘s demand for ID. Defendant Aguilar charged Plaintiff with (1) resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer and (2) concealing his identity. The district attorney‘s office dismissed the concealing-identity charge, and a jury later acquitted Plaintiff of the charge against him for resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer.
Plaintiff subsequently sued the arresting officers, Defendant Aguilаr and police officer Travis Loomis; the City of Clovis; and the Clovis Police Department for, among other things, alleged constitutional violations under
In this interlocutory appeal, Defendant Aguilar argues the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity because, in his view, a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff during the traffic stop. We disagree. The district court properly concluded that a reasonable jury could find Defendant Aguilar arrested Plaintiff without probable cause. Additionally, clearly established law would have put a reasonable officer in Defendant Aguilar‘s position on notice that his conduct violated Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful arrest. Defendant Aguilar is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction under
I.
Early in the morning of August 3, 2014, Defendant Aguilar was on patrol in Clovis, New Mexico, when he pulled over a car for speeding through a red light. After Defendant Aguilar approached the vehicle, he instructed the driver to roll down the back-passenger window and shined his
While the driver searched for her license, Plaintiff again аsked Defendant Aguilar why he stopped the vehicle. At this point, Defendant Aguilar did not suspect Plaintiff of committing any crime. In response to Plaintiff‘s question, Defendant Aguilar said, “You‘re not driving, buddy. You got ID?” Plaintiff responded, “Nah. Why you stopping us?” Defendant Aguilar replied, “Let me have your ID.” Again, Plaintiff asked Defendant Aguilar why he stopped them, and Defendant Aguilar once again responded, “Let me have your ID.” Plaintiff immediately asked again, “Why you stopping us?” Defendant Aguilar responded, “I‘m gоing to ask you one more time, and then I‘m going to place you under arrest,” and asked Plaintiff for his ID. Plaintiff asked, “For what?” Defendant Aguilar then ordered Plaintiff to step out of the vehicle. During this approximately fifteen-second interaction, the driver continued to search for her license.
Plaintiff exited the vehicle and again asked Defendant Aguilar why he stopped them. Defendant Aguilar instructed Plaintiff to turn around, face the vehicle, and place his hands behind his baсk. As Defendant Aguilar was handcuffing Plaintiff, Plaintiff once more asked, “Why are you stopping us?” Plaintiff repeated his question and asked if Defendant Aguilar had a reason to pull them over, to which Defendant Aguilar replied, “Yes I do.” Plaintiff asked, “For what?” And Defendant Aguilar told him not to worry about it.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Travis Loomis arrived on the scene. Defendant Aguilar told Officer Loomis that Plaintiff was under arrest for concealing his identity. In response, Plaintiff said, “Concealing ID, for what?” аnd repeatedly stated, “I didn‘t conceal ID.” Plaintiff further remarked, “You didn‘t even ask me what my name was.” While Defendant Aguilar led Plaintiff to the patrol car, Plaintiff repeatedly stated that he did not conceal his identity. Defendant Aguilar then told Plaintiff three times in a normal tone of voice, “Come on. Come on. Stop. Stop. Stop. Come on. I asked you for your ID.” Defendant Aguilar then slammed Plaintiff to the ground and loudly commanded, “Stop, stop.” A few moments later, Defendant Aguilar informed Plaintiff, “Now you are under arrest for resisting and evading too.”
Following the arrest, Defendant Aguilar filed a criminal complaint charging Plaintiff with: (1) resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer, in violation of
Plaintiff subsequently filed a civil actiоn in New Mexico state court, which was then removed to federal court, alleging various state and federal claims against Defendant Aguilar, Officer Loomis, the City of Clovis, and the Clovis Police Department. As relevant here, Plaintiff asserted a
In a well-rеasoned Memorandum Opinion and Order, the district court denied Defendant Aguilar‘s motion with respect to Plaintiff‘s unlawful-arrest claim. Corona v. City of Clovis, 406 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (D.N.M. 2019). The district court first determined that a reasonable jury could find Defendant Aguilar violated Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment right by arresting him without probable cause. The district court then concluded Defendant Aguilar was not entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff‘s right to be free from unlawful arrest under the circumstances here was clearly established at the relevant timе. Defendant Aguilar timely appealed from the district court‘s ruling.
II.
At issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Defendant Aguilar on Plaintiff‘s
A.
We review de novo a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, with our review limited to purely legal issues. Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015). Because the doctrine of qualified immunity protects public officials from both liability and the burdens of litigation, our review of summary judgment rulings in this context differs from that applicable to other summary judgment decisions. Id. Specifically, when a defendant raises the qualified-immunity defense at summary judgment, the plaintiff must establish (1) the defendant violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant‘s unlawful conduct. Id. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either part of this two-part test, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2019). In determining whether the plaintiff has shouldered this heavy burden, “we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-movant.” Quinn, 780 F.3d at 1004.
B.
Defendant Aguilar first contends he is entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff failed tо show he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Defendant Aguilar maintains probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for (1) resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer and (2) concealing identity when Plaintiff did not produce an ID after Defendant Aguilar demanded it.
A warrantless arrest violates the Fourth Amendment unless probable cause exists to believe a crime has been or is being committed. Id. at 1006. “Probable cause exists if fаcts and circumstances within the arresting officer‘s knowledge and of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense.” Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995)). In New Mexico, it is a misdemeanor to “conceal[ ] one‘s true name or identity . . . with intent to obstruct the due execution of law or with intent to intimidate, hinder or interrupt any public officer . . . in a legal performance of his duty.”
For reasonable suspicion to exist, an officer must have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting” criminal conduct under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). “[T]he likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). Thus, reasonable suspicion may exist “even if it is mоre likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009)).
Defendant Aguilar argues both reasonable suspicion and probable cause existed to believe Plaintiff was “resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer” in violation of
Defendant Aguilar does not argue that Plaintiff engaged in any physical act of resistance prior to his arrest for concealing identity.1 Nor does Defendant Aguilar contend
See id.; Wade, 667 P.2d at 460, 462 (holding the defendant did not violate
The question remaining, then, is whether Plaintiff refused to obey a lawful police command. See Diaz, 908 P.2d at 259-62. Defendant Aguilar insists we should answer this question in the affirmative because Plaintiff failed to comply with his order to produce identification. But Defendant Aguilar‘s circular reasoning rests upon a flawed foundation—namely, that he could lawfully order Plaintiff to produce identification on pain of arrest absent “reasonable suspicion of some predicate, underlying crime.” See Keylon, 535 F.3d at 1216. Allowing Defendant Aguilar to stand on Plaintiff‘s failure to produce identification as the sole basis to arrest him for concealing identity would not only fly in the face of this court‘s decision in Keylon but also toss to the wind Supreme Court precedent. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt County, et al., 542 U.S. 177, 184 (2004) (holding that “specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was involved in criminal activity” is necessary to require identification); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (explaining that whatever purpose may be served by “demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it“). This, of course, we cannot do.
But wait, Defendant Aguilar says, surely it was reasonable for him to request identification from Plaintiff during the course of a lawful traffic stop. That may be true. As a general matter, this court‘s precedent does permit a police officer to ”ask for identification from passengers” in а lawfully stopped vehicle even when there is no particularized suspicion the passenger has engaged in or is engaging in criminal activity. United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
The question before us, however, is not whether Defendant Aguilar violated the Fourth Amendment by asking Plaintiff to provide his ID. Defendant Aguilar‘s initial request for ID may have been lawful, but he could not—in the absence of “reasonable suspicion of some predicate, underlying crime“—lawfully arrest Plaintiff for concealing identity based solely on his failure or refusal to identify himself. See Keylon, 535 F.3d at 1216-17. The casеs Defendant Aguilar cites do not suggest otherwise. See United States v. Fernandez, 600 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[P]olice requests for identifying information typically do not trigger Fourth Amendment
In sum, the facts known to Defendant Aguilar when he demanded identification were insufficient to give rise to a particularized and objеctive basis for suspecting Plaintiff had committed any offense or was engaging in criminal activity. Without reasonable suspicion to believe Plaintiff had violated
C.
Having concluded Plaintiff has satisfied the first step of our qualified-immunity inquiry, we must now consider whether Plaintiff‘s asserted Fourth Amendment right was clearly established on August 3, 2014, when Defendant Aguilar effected the challenged warrantless arrest. In concluding Plaintiff carried his burden of demonstrating the law was clearly established at the relevant time, the district court relied on our decision in Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2008). On appeal, Plaintiff likewise argues Keylon would have put a reasonable officer in Defendant Aguilar‘s position on adequate notice his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. We agree.
1.
“A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.‘” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). As a practical matter, “[i]n the context of a qualified immunity defense on an unlawful arrest claim, we ascertain whether a defendant violated clearly established law by asking whether there was arguable probable cause for the challenged conduct.” Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2012)). Put another way, a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if she “could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in light of well-established law.” Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 879 (10th Cir. 2014).
To be clearly established, ordinarily “a preexisting Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision, or the weight of authority from other circuits, must make it apparent to a reasonable officer that the nature of his conduct is unlawful.” Carabajal v. City of Cheyenne, 847 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2017). In deciding whether a precedent provides fair notice, the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). Instead, “the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). Although there need not be “a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting White, 137 S. Ct. at 551).
Here, Plaintiff is able “to identify a [prior] case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as Officer [Aguilar] was hеld to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. That case is Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2008). There, the plaintiff, Bertha Keylon, was approached by a police officer outside her home. Id. at 1213. The officer was investigating Ms. Keylon‘s son for committing a felony. Id. He asked Ms. Keylon for her son‘s birth date and address. Id. Ms. Keylon said she did not know the information. Id. The officer then asked Ms. Keylon for identification. Id. Instead of providing her ID, Ms. Keylon walked toward her van. Id.Id. After Ms. Keylon told him it was inside her house, she began walking toward her home. Id. At this point, the officer told Ms. Keylon, “Ma‘am I need to see your ID.” Id. After Ms. Keylon responded, “Well, I‘ll get my ID when I‘m ready[,]” the officer arrested her for concealing identity in violation of
In the
The circumstances at issue in Keylon are closely analogous to those at issue here. Keylon considered the same interplay between
2.
Defendant Aguilar‘s attempts to distinguish Keylon from the circumstances at issue here are unpersuasive. He contends that, in Keylon, the plaintiff did not actively obstruct the officer‘s investigation, while in this case Plaintiff “rudely and insolently
Defendant Aguilar also contends the warrantless arrest in Keylon occurred on the sidewalk and lawn in front of Ms. Keylon‘s home, whereas Plaintiff was a passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle. We decline to cabin Keylon so narrowly. As noted above, Defendant Aguilar was free to request identification from Plaintiff during the traffic stop. See Rice, 483 F.3d at 1084. But Defendant Aguilar did not merely ask for identification; rather, he arrested Plaintiff for his failure to immediately produce it on demand without possessing particularized reasonable suspicion of an underlying crime. Defendant Aguilar has not explained—nor do we see—how Plaintiff‘s status as a passenger in a vehicle could obviate the threshold inquiry under Keylon into the arresting officer‘s reasonable suspicion of another, prеdicate offense. See id. at 1216-17. Because this distinction does not bear on the operation of the predicate-offense requirement under Keylon, it is a distinction without difference for purposes of our clearly-established-law analysis.
Finally, Defendant Aguilar contends Romero v. City of Clovis, No. 1:17-CV-00818-PJK-GBW, 2019 WL 2327660 (D.N.M. May 31, 2019) (Kelly, J., sitting by designation), supports his qualified-immunity defense. Defendant Aguilar‘s reliance on Romero is misguided. To begin, Romero is a district court decision, which “[m]any Courts of Appeals [ ] decline to consider . . . when determining if constitutional rights are clearly established fоr purposes of qualified immunity.” Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1300 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011)); see also Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071, 1079 (10th Cir. 2017) (explaining “a district court‘s holding is not controlling in any jurisdiction“).
But even assuming such a decision is entitled to consideration in the clearly-established-law analysis, there are several facts that distinguish Romero from this case. Notably, the circumstances presented
We thus conclude that, in light of Keylon, a reasonable officer in Defendant Aguilar‘s pоsition would have known that his conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, violated the Fourth Amendment. Defendant Aguilar is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff‘s unlawful-arrest claim.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court‘s order denying Defendant Aguilar qualified immunity on Plaintiff‘s