Corenbaum v. LampkinCorenbaum v. Lampkin
The opinion filed in this matter on April 30, 2013, is hereby modified in the following manner:
Page 21: The last sentence of footnote 12 is hereby deleted and replaced with the following:
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Barbara A. Jones, Kelly Bagby and Kimberly Bernard for AARP Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin; Khorrami, Scott H. Z. Sumner; LaFave & Rice, John J. Rice; Kabateck Brown Kellner, Brian Kabateck and Richard Kellner for Consumer Attorneys of America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.
The Phillips Firm, Thomas M. Phillips, Timothy E. Kearns and Michael A. Kramer; Masserman & Ducey and Mitchell F. Ducey, for Defendant and Appellant.
Coddington, Hicks & Danforth, R. Wardell Loveland and Hyon M. Kientzy for AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Insurance Exchange as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland and Robert A. Olson for Association of Southern California Defense Counsel and Association of Defense Counsel of Northern California and Nevada as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Cole Pedroza, Curtis A. Cole, Kennedy R. Pedroza and Cassidy C. Davenport for California Medical Association, California Dental Association and California Hospital Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Fred J. Hiestand for Civil Justice Association of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Hager Dowling Lim & Slack, John V. Hager for Mercury Insurance Group as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Sedgwick and Christina J. Imre for Personal Insurance Federation of California, Pacific Association of Domestic Insurance Companies, Property Casualty Insurers‘ Association of America and National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
John Corenbaum and Charles Carter (Carter) suffered injuries when a vehicle driven by Dwight Eric Lampkin collided with a taxicab in which they were passengers. Lampkin was convicted of fleeing the scene of an injury accident (
In their appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erroneously held that section 1021.4, which authorizes an attorney fee award to the prevailing plaintiff ―[i]n an action for damages against a defendant based upon that defendant‘s commission of a felony offense for which that defendant has been convicted,‖ does not authorize a fee award in these circumstances. We conclude that the court properly held that this action is not based on the felony offense for which Lampkin was convicted. We therefore will affirm the order denying a fee award.
1. Plaintiffs’ Injuries and Lampkin’s Arrest and Conviction
Corenbaum and Carter were passengers in a taxicab traveling east on Broadway in downtown Long Beach at approximately 1:30 a.m. on April 5, 2008, when a Lexus automobile traveling south on Atlantic Avenue collided with the taxicab in the intersection of those two streets. A witness in the vehicle immediately behind the taxicab testified that the Lexus ran the red light traveling at a speed of approximately 50 to 70 miles per hour. The posted speed limit on Atlantic Avenue was 25 miles per hour. Both vehicles involved in the collision came to a rest, and the driver of the Lexus fled on foot. Corenbaum and Carter suffered serious injuries.
Lampkin was one of two registered owners of the Lexus at the time of the collision. He had spent the evening of April 4, 2008, eating dinner with friends at a restaurant and nightclub in downtown Long Beach. He consumed copious amounts of alcohol that evening. Security guards asked him to leave the restaurant and escorted him out at approximately 11:30 p.m. His companions left as well, and the group walked to a bar nearby. While the group was walking to the bar, Lampkin stumbled and fell to the ground. He later separated from the group, walked away from the others and fell a second time.
Nicolle Topp was one of several friends who were with Lampkin on the evening of April 4, 2008. After leaving the bar, several of them went to Topp‘s condominium a few blocks away. Lampkin arrived later, at approximately 2:15 a.m., apparently still intoxicated. He fell asleep on the floor. After he awakened in the morning he stated
The police interviewed Lampkin that morning and arrested him. A jury found him guilty of fleeing the scene of an injury accident (
2. Proceedings Before Trial
Corenbaum filed a complaint against Lampkin and others in February 2010 and filed a first amended complaint in August 2010 alleging counts against Lampkin for negligence and gross negligence, and seeking punitive damages. Charles and Daniella Carter, husband and wife, filed a complaint against Lampkin and others in March 2010 alleging counts against Lampkin for negligence and loss of consortium. The two actions were consolidated before trial.
Lampkin filed a motion in limine before trial to exclude any evidence of his arrest and conviction of driving under the influence arising from a prior incident that
Plaintiffs filed a motion in limine before trial to exclude any evidence of the payment of plaintiffs‘ medical bills by a collateral source. On the same day, Lampkin filed a ―Request for Court to Hold a Post-Verdict Hearing on Reduction of Plaintiffs‘ Medical Expenses to the Amount Incurred,‖ requesting a postverdict hearing ―in the event that the jury verdict includes damages for past medical expenses in an amount exceeding the amount paid for those medical services.‖ The trial court granted plaintiffs‘ motion in limine ―without prejudice‖ subject to a posttrial ―Hanif/Nishihama‖ motion.1 The court also granted Lampkin‘s request to hold a postverdict hearing, stating, ― . . . we‘ll have the hearing.‖
3. Trial and Verdict
A jury trial in the consolidated actions commenced in May 2011 with Lampkin as the sole defendant appearing at trial. Lampkin admitted that he was negligent before
In accordance with the trial court‘s in limine rulings, the jury heard evidence of the full amounts billed for Corenbaum‘s and Carter‘s past medical care and heard no evidence of the lesser amounts accepted by their medical providers as full payment pursuant to prior agreements with Lampkin‘s private insurers. The trial court, over Lampkin‘s objection, also allowed him to be questioned regarding his arrest for driving under the influence on December 23, 2007. The court instructed the jury, including an instruction that Lampkin had admitted his negligence.
The jury returned a special verdict on June 3, 2011, finding that Lampkin‘s negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to each of the three plaintiffs. It found that Corenbaum and Carter had suffered past and future economic and noneconomic damages totaling $1,834,602 and $1,392,141.87, respectively, and that Daniella Carter had suffered $75,000 in damages for loss of consortium.2 It also found that Corenbaum and Carter, respectively, bore 10 percent and 20 percent of the responsibility for their own injuries. The jury also found that Lampkin had acted with malice.
Lampkin testified in the second phase of the trial relating to punitive damages. He admitted that he had been served with a subpoena to produce at trial all records in
4. Posttrial Motions, Judgments and Appeals
On June 24, 2011, Lampkin filed a motion to reduce the compensatory damage awards pursuant to Hanif, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 635, and Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 298, and pursuant to the trial court‘s pretrial ruling granting Lampkin‘s request to hold a postverdict hearing on such a reduction. Lampkin sought to reduce the awards by the difference between the full amounts billed for past medical expenses and the amounts actually accepted by plaintiffs‘ medical providers as full payment for the services provided. The hearing on the motion was noticed for July 19, 2011, but later was continued to August 23 and then to September 6, 2011.
On July 5, 2011, the trial court entered a separate judgment against Lampkin for each plaintiff, awarding Corenbaum and Carter, respectively, $1,537,985.97 and $1,108,362.08 in compensatory and punitive damages, and awarding Daniella Carter
Lampkin filed a new trial motion challenging the punitive damage awards as excessive and unsupported by the evidence. He argued that there was insufficient evidence of his financial condition at the time of trial and that the awards were excessive in light of Lampkin‘s testimony as to his limited assets. He also moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the same grounds. The trial court denied both motions on August 17, 2011.
The California Supreme Court filed its opinion in Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th 541, on August 18, 2011.
The trial court heard Lampkin‘s motion to reduce the compensatory damage awards on September 6, 2011. The court denied the motion, stating in a minute order, ―[w]hile this Court feels that a reduction is appropriate, it is without jurisdiction to do so. As this Court has already denied the Motion for New Trial, the jurisdiction now rests with the Court of Appeal.‖
Corenbaum filed a motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 1021.4.4 Charles and Daniella Carter filed a separate fee motion under the same
Lampkin filed a notice of appeal on September 16, 2011, stating that he was appealing the judgment entered on July 5, 2011 (No. B236227).5 Plaintiffs jointly filed a notice of appeal from the order denying their motions for attorney fees (No. B237871). We have consolidated the two appeals.
CONTENTIONS
Lampkin contends the trial court erred by (1) admitting evidence of the full amounts billed for Corenbaum‘s and Carter‘s medical care when the amounts accepted by their medical providers as full payment were less than the amounts billed; (2) admitting evidence of his prior arrest for driving under the influence on December 23, 2007; (3) instructing the jury on punitive damages as to Carter despite the absence of a claim for punitive damages in Carter‘s complaint; and (4) denying his motion for a new trial on punitive damages.
Corenbaum and Carter contend the trial court erroneously concluded that section 1021.4 does not authorize an attorney fee award in these circumstances.
1. The Admission of Evidence of the Full Amounts Billed for Plaintiffs’ Medical Care Was Error
a. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc.
The California Supreme Court in Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th 541, held that an injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are paid by private insurance can recover damages for past medical expenses in an amount no greater than the amount that the plaintiff‘s medical providers, pursuant to prior agreement, accepted as full payment or, to the extent that payment is still owing, the amount that the medical providers had agreed to accept as full payment for the services provided. (Id. at p. 566.) The plaintiff‘s pecuniary loss is limited to the amount paid or incurred for past medical services, so the plaintiff cannot recover damages in excess of that amount. (Id. at p. 555.) Howell approved the general rule from Hanif, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 635, 640-641, and Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 298, 306-307, in this regard. (Howell, supra, at pp. 553-555.)
Howell also held that limiting a plaintiff‘s recovery in this manner does not contravene the collateral source rule. (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 563-566.) The collateral source rule provides that the damages awarded to an injured plaintiff cannot be reduced by the amount paid on the plaintiff‘s behalf by a source independent of the tortfeasor, such as an insurer. (Id. at p. 551; Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6 (Helfend).) ―The rule thus dictates that an injured plaintiff may recover from the tortfeasor money an insurer has paid to medical providers on his
Medical providers typically enter into agreements with private insurers in which the medical providers agree to accept discounted payments for the services provided to insured patients. (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 558, 560-561.) The term ―negotiated rate differential‖ refers to the difference between the full amount billed and the amount that the provider has agreed to accept from the insurer as full payment. (Id. at p. 555Id. at pp. 555, 557Id. at p. 555.)
Howell also stated that the full amount billed by medical providers is not an accurate measure of the value of medical services. (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 562.) Howell addressed this issue in rejecting the argument that limiting the plaintiff‘s recovery to the amount paid or incurred for medical expenses would result in a windfall to the tortfeasor. (Id. at pp. 560-563.) Howell noted that there can be significant disparities between the amounts charged by medical providers and the costs
―With so much variation, making any broad generalization about the relationship between the value or cost of medical services and the amounts providers bill for them—other than that the relationship is not always a close one—would be perilous. [¶] . . . it is not possible to say generally that providers’ full bills represent the real value of their services, nor that the discounted payments they accept from private insurers are mere arbitrary reductions.‖ (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 562, italics added.) Howell stated that ―a medical care provider‘s billed price for particular services is not necessarily representative of either the cost of providing those services or their market value.‖ (Id. at p. 564.)
Howell emphasized that the negotiated rate may be the best indication of the reasonable value of the services provided and that it is unclear how any other ―market value‖ could be determined. Howell stated, ―pricing of medical services is highly complex and depends, to a significant extent, on the identity of the payer. In effect, there appears to be not one market for medical services but several, with the price of services depending on the category of payer and sometimes on the particular government or business entity paying for the services. Given this state of medical economics, how a market value other than that produced by negotiation between the
Howell also held that the negotiated rate differential is not a collateral source payment and therefore is not subject to the collateral source rule. (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 563-566.) The collateral source rule does not apply to losses or liabilities that the plaintiff never incurred and therefore is not entitled to recover. (Id. at pp. 563-564Id. at pp. 564-565.)
Further, the evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule makes any evidence of a collateral source payment inadmissible for the purpose of determining the amount of damages. (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 552Id. at pp. 563, 567Id. at p. 567.)
Evidence of the full amount billed, in contrast, is not relevant to the amount of damages for past medical expenses if the plaintiff never incurred liability for that
Although Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th 541, did not directly so hold, we are persuaded by the carefully considered reasoning in Howell, and therefore do hold that evidence of the full amount billed for a plaintiff‘s medical care is not relevant to the determination of a plaintiff‘s damages for past medical expenses, and therefore is inadmissible for that purpose if the plaintiff‘s medical providers, by prior agreement, had contracted to accept a lesser amount as full payment for the services provided.10 In contrast, evidence of the amount accepted by medical providers as full payment does not violate the collateral source rule and is admissible provided that the source of the payment is not disclosed to the jury and the evidence satisfies the other rules of evidence. (Id. at p. 567.)
Consumer Attorneys argues that any evidence of the amount accepted by a medical provider as full payment for the services provided, including testimony given in court, constitutes evidence of a statement as to the terms of the agreement between the medical provider and the plaintiff‘s health insurer and therefore is inadmissible under the hearsay and parol evidence rules. We disagree. The hearsay rule provides
Consumer Attorneys also argues that a plaintiff seeking damages for past medical expenses should be able to present evidence of not only the amount accepted as full payment for past medical services provided, but also the reasonable value of those services. We reject that argument as well. Because an injured plaintiff can recover as damages for past medical expenses no more than the amount incurred for those past medical services (Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 555), evidence that the reasonable value of such services exceeded the amount paid is irrelevant and inadmissible on the issue of the amount of damages for past medical services. (See id. at p. 559.) Moreover, for the jury to consider both evidence of the amount accepted by medical
We therefore conclude that evidence of the full amount billed for plaintiffs’ medical care was not admissible for the purpose of determining plaintiffs’ damages for their past medical expenses. Unresolved issues remain, however, as to whether evidence of the full amounts billed for plaintiffs’ medical care in this case was
c. Evidence of the Full Amount Billed For Past Medical Services Is Not Relevant to the Determination of Damages for Future Medical Expenses
An injured plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical services that are reasonably certain to be necessary in the future. (
As already noted, Howell stated that the full amount billed is not an accurate measure of the value of medical services, that there can be significant disparities between the amounts charged by medical providers and the costs of providing services
d. Evidence of the Full Amount Billed For Past Medical Services Cannot Support an Expert Opinion on the Reasonable Value of Future Medical Services
Our conclusion that the full amount billed by medical providers for past medical services is not relevant to the value of the services provided also has implications for expert opinion testimony that may be offered on remand as to the reasonable value of medical services to be provided in the future. Because the full amount billed for past medical services provided to plaintiffs is not relevant to the value of those services, we believe that the full amount billed for those past medical services can provide no
Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b) states that an expert opinion must be “[b]ased on matter . . . that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates . . . . ” ” ‘We construe this to mean that the matter relied on must provide a reasonable basis for the particular opinion offered, and that an expert opinion based on speculation or conjecture is inadmissible.’ ” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770 (Sargon), quoting Lockheed Litigation Cases (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 558, 564.) Expert opinion testimony based on matter that provides no reasonable basis for the opinion offered is properly excluded under Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b). (Sargon, supra, at p. 776.)
Similarly, Evidence Code section 802 allows the trial court to inquire into the reasons for an expert‘s opinion and to exclude expert opinion testimony if it is “based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 771.) Evidence Code section 802 also allows the courts to develop ” ‘case law restrictions on an expert‘s “reasons.” ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 771.) If the material on which an expert relies does not support the expert‘s reasoning, the expert‘s opinion is properly excluded under Evidence Code section 802. (Id. at p. 771.)
e. Evidence of the Full Amount Billed Is Not Relevant to the Amount of Noneconomic Damages
Noneconomic damages compensate an injured plaintiff for nonpecuniary injuries, including pain and suffering. Pain and suffering is a unitary concept that encompasses physical pain and various forms of mental anguish and emotional distress. (Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1972) 7 Cal.3d 889, 892-893.) Such injuries are subjective, and the determination of the amount of damages by the trier of fact is equally subjective. (Id. at p. 893.)15 There is no fixed standard to determine the
This is no easy task. In Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, the Supreme Court, in allowing a per diem pain and suffering argument, commented, “One of the most difficult tasks imposed upon a jury in deciding a case involving personal injuries is to determine the amount of money the plaintiff is to be awarded as compensation for pain and suffering. No method is available to the jury by which it can objectively evaluate such damages, and no witness may express his subjective opinion on the matter. [Citation.] In a very real sense, the jury is asked to evaluate in terms of money a detriment for which monetary compensation cannot be ascertained with any demonstrable accuracy. . . . ‘Translating pain and anguish into dollars can, at best, be only an arbitrary allowance, and not a process of measurement, and consequently the judge can, in his instructions, give the jury no standard to go by; he can only tell them to allow such amount as in their discretion they may consider reasonable. . . . The chief reliance for reaching reasonable results in attempting to value suffering in terms of money must be the restraint and common sense of the jury. . . . ’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 167.)
Lawyers have used the amount of economic damages as a point of reference in their argument to a jury, or in settlement discussions, as a means to help determine the amount of noneconomic damages. We need not comment on this practice except to
f. The Judgment Must Be Reversed for a New Trial on Compensatory Damages
As explained above, we conclude that evidence of the full amounts billed for Corenbaum‘s and Carter‘s medical care was not relevant to the amount of their damages for past medical expenses, future medical expenses or noneconomic damages, and it was not offered in evidence for any other purpose. The admission of evidence of the full amounts billed therefore was error. (
2. Lampkin May Raise the Issue on Appeal
Lampkin‘s failure to object to the admission of evidence of the full amounts billed does not preclude him from raising the issue on appeal. An appellant may challenge the admission of evidence for the first time on appeal despite his or her failure to object in the trial court if the challenge is based on a change in the law that the appellant could not reasonably have been expected to foresee. (People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 810-811; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703.) Opinions by the Courts of Appeal prior to Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th 541, held that the rule from Hanif, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 635, and Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 298, limiting the amount of a plaintiff‘s recovery did not preclude the admission of evidence of the full amount billed for past medical care, and stated that such evidence provided the jury a more accurate indication and a more complete picture of the extent of the plaintiff‘s injuries. (Olsen v. Reid (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 200, 204; Greer v. Buzgheia (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1157.) Lampkin could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate the rule announced for the first time in Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at page 567, that evidence of the full amount billed is not relevant on the issue of past medical expenses in these circumstances.
The parties here relied on the former rule allowing the admission of evidence of the full amounts billed, but did so subject to Lampkin‘s right to seek a reduction of damages in a posttrial hearing. Our application of the rule that evidence of the full amounts billed is inadmissible in these circumstances will not upset any expectation or reliance regarding the amount recoverable and will result in no unfairness. Moreover, the new rule concerns only the relevance and admissibility of evidence of the full amount billed and does not change the legal consequences of past conduct by imposing
3. Lampkin Has Shown No Error in the Admission of Evidence of his Prior Arrest for Driving Under the Influence
Lampkin contends the evidence of his arrest for driving under the influence on December 23, 2007, was not relevant to any issue in this case and was unduly prejudicial. He argues that the evidence was not relevant to his awareness of the dangers of drunk driving at the time of the April 5, 2008, incident because at that time he had neither attended drug or alcohol counseling as a result of the prior incident nor suffered a conviction as a result of that incident. He argues that the only purpose of the evidence was to show a tendency to act consistent with his conduct on a specific prior occasion. He argues that such evidence is inadmissible character evidence under
Lampkin‘s argument on appeal differs somewhat from his argument in the trial court. He argued on his motion in limine in the trial court, based on
Lampkin also has not shown that he is entitled to a reversal based on
Lampkin contends Carter failed to allege a claim for punitive damages in his complaint, so the trial court erred by instructing the jury on punitive damages as to Carter. But the reporter‘s transcript shows that the court granted the Carters’ oral motion before opening statements to amend their complaint by adding a count for willful misconduct and a prayer for punitive damages. We therefore conclude that the court did not err in instructing the jury on punitive damages as to Carter.
5. Lampkin Is Estopped From Asserting That the Punitive Damage Awards Are Excessive
Lampkin contends there is insufficient evidence of his financial condition to justify an award of punitive damages in any amount, and his own testimony as to his financial condition shows that the $40,000 awarded in punitive damages is excessive. Whatever the merits of this argument, Lampkin is estopped from asserting it.
California law permits the recovery of punitive damages “for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (
“Even if an award is entirely reasonable in light of the other two factors . . . , the award can be so disproportionate to the defendant‘s ability to pay that the award is
A trial court ruling on a new trial motion may grant a new trial on the ground of excessive damages only if “after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.” (
A defendant who fails to comply with a court order to produce records of his or her financial condition may be estopped from challenging a punitive damage award based on lack of evidence of financial condition to support the award. (Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 597, 608-609 (Mike Davidov).) The trial court in Mike Davidov ordered the defendant to produce all records of his financial condition for the purpose of determining the amount of punitive damages. The defendant failed to comply with the order, and the court awarded $96,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at pp. 603-604.) We noted that the defendant‘s records were the only source of information available to the plaintiff regarding the defendant‘s financial condition and that the defendant‘s disobedience of the court order prevented the plaintiff from obtaining that information. (Id. at p. 609.) We held that having failed to comply with the order to produce records and having failed to challenge that order on appeal, the defendant was estopped from challenging the punitive damage award based on the lack of evidence of his financial condition. (Id. at pp. 600, 608-609.)
Similarly here, Lampkin failed to comply with a subpoena requiring him to produce at trial records of his financial condition, and he does not challenge that subpoena on appeal. A subpoena “is a writ or order directed to a person and requiring the person‘s attendance at a particular time and place to testify as a witness” (
6. Section 1021.4 Does Not Authorize a Fee Award in These Circumstances
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erroneously concluded that it had no authority to award them attorney fees under section 1021.4. We independently review the denial of the plaintiffs’ motions for attorney fees to the extent that the ruling was based on the
“Our fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 623, 74 P.3d 726].) Because the statutory language ordinarily is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent, we begin by examining the words of the statute. (Ibid.) We give the words of the statute their ordinary and usual meaning and construe them in the context of the statute as a whole and the entire scheme of law of which it is a part. (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1043 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 343, 88 P.3d 71].) If the language is clear and a literal construction would not result in absurd consequences that the Legislature did not intend, we presume that the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning governs. (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676, 101 P.3d 563].) If the language is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, legislative history, and public policy. (Ibid.)” (Frontier Oil Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1448-1449.)
Section 1021.4 authorizes an attorney fee award in favor of the prevailing plaintiff “[i]n an action for damages against a defendant based upon that defendant‘s commission of a felony offense for which that defendant has been convicted.” In our view, an action for damages is “based upon” the defendant‘s commission of a felony
Vehicle Code section 20001 states, in relevant part:
“(a) The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person, other than himself or herself, or in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004.
“(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a person who violates subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail
for not more than one year, or by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine.”20
Many courts have concluded that the conduct made criminal by
We therefore conclude that when a defendant has been convicted of a violation of
People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, cited by plaintiffs, is not on point. The trial court in Carbajal ordered restitution, as a condition of probation, for property damage caused by a driver who was convicted of fleeing the scene of an injury accident (
The judgments in favor of Corenbaum and Carter are reversed as to the awards of compensatory damages against Lampkin, and the matter is remanded with directions to conduct a new trial limited to determining the amounts of compensatory damages in favor of Corenbaum and Carter in accordance with the views expressed herein. The judgments are otherwise affirmed. The order denying the motions for attorney fees is affirmed. Lampkin is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CROSKEY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KITCHING, J.
ALDRICH, J.