COMMONWEALTH vs. ANGELO TEIXEIRA. COMMONWEALTH vs. CHRISTOPHER A. MEADE.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Suffolk. January 11, 2016. - September 16, 2016.
475 Mass. 482 (2016)
Present: GANTS, C.J., CORDY, BOTSFORD, DUFFLY, LENK, & HINES, JJ.1
Boston Municipal Court. District Court, Probable cause hearing. Practice, Criminal, Probable cause hearing, Discovery. Moot Question.
This court considered a moot question, where the issue was one that implicated the interests of all defendants in the same situation as the defendants in the instant cases and, more generally, was significant for the proper administration of the criminal justice system, and where the issue was likely to evade appellate review. [488]
This court concluded that a judge in the Boston Municipal Court has inherent authority to order discovery in preparation for probable cause hearings and that, if the situation requires, judges in that court have adequate means at their disposal to address the grave concern of possible witness tampering arising from such discovery. [488-495]
This court remanded a criminal matter to the Superior Court for consideration, after any hearings that the judge might deem appropriate, whether a sanction should be imposed on the Commonwealth for its refusal to obey the order of a judge in the Boston Municipal Court and, if so, the nature of such a sanction. [495-496]
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 2, 2015.
The case was reported by Lenk, J.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on August 10, 2015.
The case was heard by Spina, J.
Valerie A. DePalma (Jeffrey M. Miller also present) for the defendants.
Kathryn Leary, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
John D. Donovan, Jr., Jesse M. Boodoo, Joshua D. Rovenger, & David M. Coriell, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
LENK, J. These cases stem from two unrelated, nonfatal shootings in the Roxbury section of Boston in June, 2015, and July, 2015. Angelo Teixeira was arrested for the first shooting, and Christopher Meade for the second. Meade and Teixeira each were charged by complaint in the Boston Municipal Court (BMC) with a number of felonies, including some that are outside the final jurisdiction of that court. Pursuant to
In considering these cases, we must determine whether judges of the BMC may order prehearing discovery in the absence of specific authorization from
hearing shall have the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and present testimony in his own defence“).
a. Teixeira.
On June 20, 2015, Boston police officers were dispatched to the scene of a shooting in Roxbury. There, they encountered Teixeira, who had been shot in the leg and soon thereafter was transported to a hospital. The officers interviewed three witnesses, including an off-duty police officer from another jurisdiction, who said that they heard gunshots and that, subsequently, someone matching Teixeira‘s description had fired several shots at “unknown persons.” Police obtained surveillance footage from a store near the scene, which showed two individuals — one of whom is apparently believed to be Teixeira — “remov[ing] items from the store,” “flee[ing]” down the street, and “plac[ing] a white garbage bag in the rear of [a nearby] yard.”5 Police recovered two firearms from the garbage bag.
On June 24, 2015, a complaint issued in the BMC, charging Teixeira with four crimes within the final jurisdiction of that court: carrying a firearm without a license,
Teixeira was arrested and arraigned the same day. At arraignment, the judge scheduled a probable cause hearing for July 7, 2015. Over the Commonwealth‘s objection, the judge granted Teixeira‘s motion for discovery in advance of that hearing. He ordered that the names and contact information of the Commonwealth‘s three witnesses be turned over by the close of business the following day, and that the surveillance footage be turned over the following week, four days before the hearing. The judge
The following day, June 25, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the discovery orders. A hearing on the Commonwealth‘s motion was scheduled for June 26, 2015. At that hearing, the Commonwealth‘s motion was denied, and the judge ordered that the witness information be turned over by the close of business. The judge did, however, allow the Commonwealth‘s motion to continue the probable cause hearing for approximately one month.
Later that day, the Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal with respect to the discovery order, a motion to stay the order pending appeal, and a request for a written ruling. The judge stayed the discovery order until the close of business on June 30, 2015. The judge also issued a written ruling, explaining that he had ordered discovery because
“[a]ffording such minimal discovery as the identities of witnesses and an opportunity to view video footage of the alleged incident in advance of the probable cause hearing is essential to the defendant‘s ability meaningfully to exercise his rights to confrontation and to present evidence at that hearing. . . . For example, one of the witnesses might describe the alleged shooter differently from the way that the defendant is described in the police report or from other witness accounts. Without the witnesses’ identities being disclosed to defense counsel in advance of the hearing, such discrepancies, which might raise genuine issues with respect to probable cause, could not be explored . . . .”
On June 30, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a motion to further stay the discovery order. The judge denied the motion, and the stay expired, by its own terms, at the close of business that day. The Commonwealth did not provide the ordered discovery.
The next day, July 1, 2015, Teixeira filed a motion seeking sanctions. At a hearing later that day, the judge asked the Commonwealth to address why “[nineteen] and a half hours after that stay expired . . . there‘s been no compliance.” He noted,
“[M]y order is in effect . . . [A]s far as I know, it hasn‘t been stayed, and I‘m starting to get a little impatient, because I
feel like I‘m trying to do things procedurally in a way that respects the law and procedure. And I‘m starting to feel like not everybody is adhering to the same rules.”
The judge did not then issue a ruling on sanctions. Rather, he allowed the Commonwealth‘s request for seven days in which to respond to the defendant‘s motion for sanctions.
On July 2, 2015, the Commonwealth filed an emergency petition in the county court, seeking an immediate stay of execution of the discovery order, and also seeking to vacate that order. The motion for a stay was allowed on July 7, 2015, and a single justice thereafter reserved and reported the Commonwealth‘s petition to the full court.
On July 30, 2015, a Suffolk County grand jury returned eleven indictments against Teixeira.7 On August 26, 2015, the defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court and was provided with the discovery he had been seeking from the BMC.
b. Meade.
Shortly after midnight on July 5, 2015, a “black male” wearing a red sweatshirt approached a sedan parked on a street in the Roxbury section of Boston, and fired approximately three shots into the vehicle. Four people, including the driver, were inside; two passengers were hit. The driver drove away from the scene, pulled up next to a nearby police cruiser, and sought help. The two victims were taken to a hospital. Police interviewed the driver and one of the passengers,8 and obtained a surveillance video recording of the shooting.
On July 8, 2015, police showed a photographic array, which did not contain a photograph of Meade, to the driver and one of the passengers. Neither could identify any of the pictured individuals as the shooter. On July 10, 2015, Meade was arrested and held in custody on an unrelated charge. On July 11, 2015, police presented another photographic array to the driver and to the
Two days later, a ten-count complaint issued against Meade in the BMC. Three of the counts — carrying a firearm without a license,
At arraignment, a probable cause hearing was scheduled for August 12, 2015. In advance of that hearing, Meade sought discovery of the photographic arrays, several police reports, and contact information for witnesses mentioned in the reports. Over the Commonwealth‘s objection, the judge allowed Meade‘s motion for discovery, ordering that the discovery “be disclosed and turned over by” August 10, 2015, two days before the hearing. The judge stated that Meade‘s “ability to defend himself and assist his attorney in his defense [at the probable cause hearing] will be impacted severely if they‘re not allowed to obtain this discovery.” She also entered a protective order allowing disclosure of the witnesses’ contact information only to Meade‘s counsel.11
On August 10, 2015, the day discovery was to be turned over, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the county court pursuant to
2. Discussion.
The Commonwealth contends that the two judges did not have authority to order discovery in advance of the probable cause hearings. Teixeira maintains that the Commonwealth should be sanctioned for its failure to comply with the discovery order in the BMC.
a. Mootness.
Because the defendants have been indicted and are no longer entitled to probable cause hearings, the discovery orders themselves are moot.
The issue here — whether a BMC judge may order discovery in anticipation of a probable cause hearing — is one that “implicate[s] the . . . interests of all defendants who are so situated, and more generally [is] significant for the proper administration of the criminal justice system.” See Perkins, supra. The issue also is likely to evade appellate review, since it becomes moot upon the return of an indictment, when a defendant loses his or her right to a probable cause hearing. See Lataille, supra. Moreover, “[w]e have been advised that the issue is occurring on a frequent basis in the trial courts and uncertainty exists whether an order similar to the one[s] in issue can be entered.” Commonwealth v. Durham, 446 Mass. 212, 217 (2006). We therefore consider the issue raised in these cases.
b. Discovery.
Defendants who are charged by complaint in the BMC, but whose cases will be finally adjudicated in the Superior Court, have a statutory right to a probable cause hearing, “unless
an indictment has been returned for the same offense.”13
“shall . . . examine on oath the complainant and the witnesses for the prosecution, in the presence of the defendant, relative to any material matter connected with such charge. After the testimony to support the prosecution, the witnesses for the prisoner, if any, shall be examined on oath, and he may be assisted by counsel in such examination and in the cross-examination of the witnesses in support of the prosecution.”
Following this hearing, the judge assesses whether “there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime or crimes alleged in the complaint” and, on that basis, whether to “bind the defendant over to the Superior Court” for final adjudication of the charges.14
Neither the statute, the rules of criminal procedure, nor any trial court standing order provides for discovery in advance of the probable cause hearing. The question we confront is whether a judge, in his or her discretion, nonetheless may order discovery to promote the parties’ full participation in the hearing and, thereby, to assist in the assessment of probable cause. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851-852 (1973) (“primary function of the probable cause hearing of screening out ‘an erroneous or improper prosecution,’ . . . can only be effectuated by an adversary hearing where the defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the credibility of the prosecution‘s witnesses and to raise
General Laws
A court‘s “inherent powers” constitute, among other things, those “whose exercise is essential to . . . [the court‘s] capacity to decide cases” (citation omitted).15 Id. This includes the authority “to facilitate . . . discovery.” DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446, 454 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209, 214 (2011). See Cavanaugh v. McDonnell & Co., 357 Mass. 452, 454 (1970), quoting Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Bresnahan, 322 Mass. 629, 631 (1948) (power to order discovery “does not depend upon statute, but is a part of the general jurisdiction of a court of equity“);
We are persuaded that, in at least some instances, a judge reasonably could conclude that prehearing discovery is “essential.” This is so because, at a hearing pursuant to
The Appeals Court reached a similar conclusion in Commonwealth v. Silva, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 791 (1980). In holding that a prosecutor may be sanctioned for disobeying an order to provide prehearing discovery, the court presumed that a District Court judge has inherent authority to issue such an order. See id. at 790-791 (“In connection with that hearing, it is essential that the District Court have the power to enforce any of its orders which are reasonably designed to provide the means for intelligent consideration of probable cause . . .“). Similarly, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a “court[ ] ha[s] the inherent power to order appropriate . . . discovery . . . ancillary to [its] statutory power to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the defendant to answer.” Holman v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 29 Cal. 3d 480, 485 (1981) (magistrates may order such discovery notwithstanding that criminal charges are outside their final jurisdiction). See State v. Laux, 167 N.H. 698, 704 (2015) (“circuit court has the inherent authority, within its sound discretion, to order discovery prior to the preliminary hearing” even where final adjudication will take place in superior court); State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1983) (“power to compel discovery is . . . inherent in the magistrate‘s power to conduct” probable cause hearing). See also People v. Laws, 218 Mich. App. 447, 451 (1996) (“district court may order discovery in carrying out its duty
183 (1975) (same). The Commonwealth cites two other decisions from other jurisdictions that are claimed to reflect a similar conclusion. Those cases, however, involved materially different issues from the question before this court. See State v. O‘Brien, 349 Wis. 2d 667, 682 (2013), aff‘d, 354 Wis. 2d 753, 850, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 494 (2014) (no constitutional right to prehearing discovery); Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo. 1999) (prehearing discovery proper in general, but improper where judge “ordered the State to permit discovery of material which did not pertain to probable cause“).
This analysis notwithstanding, the Commonwealth contends that BMC judges have no authority to order prehearing discovery, and that, even if they have such authority, they ought not to exercise it.
The Commonwealth notes, first, that BMC judges may not depart from the rules of criminal procedure, which make no provision for discovery in advance of a probable cause hearing. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (“Whatever the scope of [a court‘s] ‘inherent power,’ however, it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure“). This silence, the Commonwealth argues, is significant because the rules anticipate other occasions when BMC judges may or must issue discovery orders. See
The Commonwealth‘s contention is unavailing. The fact that the procedural rules are silent about a court‘s authority to exercise one of its inherent powers does not imply that the rules envision the court being deprived of that power. See Bradford v. Knights, 427 Mass. 748, 752 (1998) (“While the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly permit a judge to rehear a matter, no policy prohibits reconsideration of an order or judgment in appropriate circumstances,” and doing so is an “inherent
Nor are we persuaded that the rules of criminal procedure cited by the Commonwealth were intended to occupy the field with respect to discovery. Those rules concern one specific issue: the mandatory pretrial discovery process. See
As mentioned, the Commonwealth maintains also that, even if BMC judges have authority to order prehearing discovery, it would be unwise for them to exercise it. The Commonwealth expresses concern that, because prehearing discovery might reveal the identities of the prosecution‘s witnesses, it will lead to witness tampering.19 Such tampering is asserted to be particularly problematic during the early stages of an investigation, when
While we acknowledge the gravity of this concern, judges of the BMC have adequate means at their disposal to address it if the situation requires. For example, when discovery is warranted, they may, as here, issue protective orders concerning a witness‘s identity or contact information, allowing it to be disclosed only to defense counsel. See
We turn now to the orders at issue here. The parties recognize that, to the extent that BMC judges have authority to order prehearing discovery, there was no abuse of discretion in ordering it in these two cases. In each, the central issue at the probable cause hearing was likely to be whether the defendants had been identified correctly by witnesses, and each defendant sought discovery of materials that would allow him to test this issue, such as police reports, photographic arrays, the identities of the witnesses, and surveillance video. See Holman v. Superior Court of Monterey County, supra at 485-486 (judge properly ordered “limited discovery directed to the restricted purpose of the preliminary examination“). Without these materials, as the judge in Teixeira‘s case reasoned, “discrepancies [regarding identification], which might raise genuine issues with respect to
conducted by a grand jury, sometimes months after the initial appearance“).
c. Teixeira‘s motion for sanctions.
Teixeira asks that this court impose sanctions on the Commonwealth for failing to comply with the BMC judge‘s discovery order during the period before a stay was issued by the single justice.21 He seeks dismissal of the indictments or, alternatively, imposition of another “appropriate sanction.”
The Commonwealth acted inappropriately by failing to comply with the judge‘s order. Even if that order had been issued in error, the Commonwealth was not without its remedies. It could have, as in Meade‘s case, sought an immediate stay from the single justice pursuant to
Whether some other sanction is appropriate we leave to the discretion of the Superior Court judge in whose jurisdiction this case now lies. See id. at 280 & n.8 (while dismissal with prejudice not appropriate, case remanded for factual findings and determination whether “some other sanction” appropriate); Reporters’ Notes (Revised, 2004) to Rule 14, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1517 (rule regarding sanctions “is based on [the] assumption that the trial court is in the best situation to consider the opposing arguments concerning a failure to comply with a discovery order and to fashion an appropriate remedy“).
3. Conclusion.
The orders requiring discovery in the Boston Municipal Court are affirmed. In Teixeira‘s case, the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for consideration, after any hearings that the judge might deem appropriate, whether a sanction should be imposed on the Commonwealth for its refusal to obey the Boston Municipal Court judge‘s order and, if so, the nature of the sanction.
So ordered.
Notes
Id. at 850.“view[s] the case as if it were a trial and he were required to rule on whether there is enough credible evidence to send the case to the jury. Thus, the magistrate should dismiss the complaint when, on the evidence presented, a trial court would be bound to acquit as a matter of law.”
In practice, however, probable cause hearings, which are meant to be conducted “as soon as may be” after a defendant is charged, see