58 N.E.3d 292
Mass.2016Background
- Two defendants (Teixeira and Meade) were charged in Boston Municipal Court (BMC) for Roxbury shootings; each faced some charges within BMC final jurisdiction and others requiring Superior Court adjudication.
- Probable cause hearings under G. L. c. 276, § 38 were scheduled to determine bind-over to Superior Court; both defendants sought prehearing discovery (witness IDs, contact info, photographic arrays, surveillance video, police reports).
- BMC judges ordered limited prehearing discovery and entered protective orders (disclosure to counsel only; in Teixeira the defendant was barred from learning civilian witness names).
- The Commonwealth objected, filed interlocutory appeals / petitions to a single justice, and in Teixeira’s case failed to comply with the BMC order before seeking a stay; both cases were later indicted, rendering the orders moot for the defendants.
- The SJC considered whether BMC judges have authority to order prehearing discovery absent explicit statutory or rule authorization and whether the specific orders were an abuse of discretion; it affirmed the orders and remanded Teixeira for consideration of possible sanctions.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority of BMC judges to order prehearing discovery | Rules and statutes do not provide for prehearing discovery; rules occupy the field and preclude inherent power here | Judges have inherent authority to issue orders essential to deciding cases, including limited discovery to enable meaningful hearings | BMC judges have inherent discretionary authority to order prehearing discovery when essential to decide probable cause |
| Scope and propriety of the specific discovery orders | Prehearing discovery risks witness tampering and is unnecessary because defendants can learn case at hearing or via grand jury discovery | Discovery requested was narrowly tailored to test identifications and prepare for cross-examination; protective orders mitigate tampering risk | Orders were limited in scope, protective measures were used, and judges did not abuse their discretion in these cases |
| Effect of procedural rules silence on inherent power | Silence means rules should control and courts cannot create procedures that conflict with Rules of Criminal Procedure | Silence does not strip courts of inherent procedural powers; rules are general and do not displace discretionary court powers | Rules do not preclude exercise of inherent powers; inherent procedural powers remain available subject to rule conflict (none here) |
| Sanctions for Commonwealth's noncompliance with BMC order (Teixeira) | Commonwealth sought relief from order; noncompliance was improper but not warranting dismissal | Teixeira sought dismissal of indictments or other sanctions for failure to comply before stay issued | Commonwealth’s failure to comply was inappropriate; dismissal with prejudice is not warranted absent a showing of prejudice; Superior Court to determine appropriate sanction if any |
Key Cases Cited
- Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843 (recognition that complete cross-examination at probable cause hearing is crucial)
- Lataille v. District Court of E. Hampden, 366 Mass. 525 (indictment renders preliminary hearing unnecessary)
- Brach v. Chief Justice of the Dist. Court Dep't, 386 Mass. 528 (inherent powers permit orders reasonably designed for intelligent consideration of probable cause)
- Commonwealth v. Hinterleitner, 391 Mass. 679 (district courts may issue orders to provide means for intelligent consideration of probable cause)
- Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63 (courts’ inherent power to ensure fair hearings when liberty is at stake)
- Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 459 Mass. 209 (inherent authority to facilitate discovery, including protective orders)
- Silva v. Commonwealth, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 784 (assumed power of District Court to order prehearing discovery and to sanction noncompliance)
- Holman v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 29 Cal. 3d 480 (magistrates have inherent power to order discovery ancillary to preliminary examinations)