COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Manuel SEPULVEDA, Appellant.
144 A.3d 1270
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted March 24, 2016. Decided Aug. 15, 2016.
OPINION
Justice DONOHUE.
This capital appeal, filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act,
To properly frame our discussion, a summary of the relevant facts and procedural history is necessary.2 On November 22, 2002, a jury convicted Manuel Sepulveda (“Sepulveda“) of two counts of first-degree murder and related charges for the deaths of John Mendez (“Mendez“) and Ricardo Lopez (“Lopez“).3 The jury sentenced Sepulveda to death for each of the murders.4
Sepulveda‘s defense at trial was that the double homicide was justified based on his subjective, but unreasonable, belief that he was acting in the defense of others. Pursuant to this defense, Sepulveda claimed that he was only guilty of voluntary manslaughter. See Sepulveda II, 55 A.3d at 1121 & n. 11;
According to Sepulveda‘s testimony at trial, just prior to the murders, Otto told Sepulveda that “she was scared [Mendez] was going to do something to her and the kids.” N.T., 11/21/2002, at 634. Sepulveda then joined Heleva, Mendez and Lopez in the kitchen. The men got into an argument and, per Sepulveda, Mendez began “throwing punches at Heleva” and Lopez “jumped in.” Id. Sepulveda testified that he shot Lopez and Mendez to protect Heleva and the children. Id. at 635-36, 672. Although Otto testified, as a witness for the Commonwealth, at Sepulveda‘s trial, trial counsel did not cross-examine her about her alleged fear of Mendez or the threats Sepulveda testified that Mendez made. See generally N.T., 11/20/2002, at 598-615.
Following sentencing, Sepulveda filed a direct appeal to this Court. On August 19, 2004, we affirmed his judgment of sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied his request for certiorari on February 21, 2006.
Sepulveda thereafter filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. Three attorneys from the Federal Community Defender Office (“FCDO“) entered their appearances on Sepulveda‘s behalf and filed an amended PCRA petition on January 2, 2007, raising fourteen claims in 386 averments spanning nearly 150 pages. Prior to the hearings held on this petition, one of Sepulveda‘s FCDO attorneys (Keisha Hudson, Esquire) drafted an affidavit detailing two in-person interviews she had with Otto.6 The affidavit detailed Sepulveda‘s drug use at the time of the murders, as well as her acknowledgment that prior to the murders, she told Sepulveda that Mendez had previously threatened to burn down the house with her and her children inside; Sepulveda knew that Otto feared Mendez; that, like Otto, Sepulveda was also “convinced . . . that something bad was going to happen and that the kids were going to get hurt“; and that he participated in the murders to protect Otto and her children.7 PCRA Exhibit D-11, 6/11/2007, ¶¶ 9, 11, 13. In the same unsigned affidavit, Otto also indicated that she had made a deal with the District Attorney to testify against Sepulveda and Heleva and in exchange, she could plead guilty only to child endangerment and she was assured that her children would be placed in the care of family members; otherwise, the District Attorney told her she would be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, her children would be placed in foster care and her parental rights would be terminated in fifteen months.8 Id., ¶ 16. Otto did not
Despite having this information prior to the 2007 PCRA hearings, the FCDO did not raise any PCRA claims pertaining to Otto‘s belief that Sepulveda committed the killings to protect her children or the Commonwealth‘s pretrial knowledge of her belief. Further, at the 2007 PCRA hearings, the FCDO limited its questioning of Otto to her knowledge of Sepulveda‘s drug use and his behavior when he was high. N.T., 6/11/2007, at 14-17. Although the FCDO confronted Otto with her unsigned affidavit, counsel asked no questions about the substance of it. Counsel only asked Otto why she did not sign the affidavit, and she explained that she was afraid; she had lost custody of her children as a result of this ordeal and she wanted to reunify with them. N.T., 6/11/2007, at 22. She stated that she nonetheless “wanted to help” Sepulveda. Id.
The 2007 PCRA hearings proceeded over four days, during which the court heard from fifteen witnesses, three of whom testified as experts, and all of whom were called to testify on Sepulveda‘s behalf. Following the hearing, the PCRA court granted the FCDO permission to file another amended PCRA petition, which, once again, did not include the claims at issue in this appeal. Thereafter, in a seventy-page written opinion, the PCRA court addressed each of the arguments raised, and ultimately denied Sepulveda‘s request for relief.
Sepulveda, with the continued assistance of his FCDO counsel, appealed the decision to this Court, raising fourteen issues and sub-issues. In a fifty-three-page opinion, we detailed the facts of record and addressed each of the arguments raised. See Sepulveda II, 55 A.3d at 1118-51. We agreed with the PCRA court‘s denial of relief on all but one issue—whether trial counsel was ineffective9 for failing to investigate and present at Sepulveda‘s penalty hearing evidence of his mental health diagnoses and traumatic childhood.10 We found that the claim had arguable merit, as Sepulveda‘s trial counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation into his background to discern the existence of possible mitigating evidence, and that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his deficient performance. Id. at 1130. Because the question of whether trial counsel‘s performance prejudiced Sepulveda was not “self-evident,” and “require[d] careful analysis of prejudice in the specific factual context of the case,” we remanded the prejudice determination to the PCRA court, which could be “assisted by relevant advocacy from both sides.” Id. at 1131.
If federal funds were used to litigate the PCRA below—and the number of FCDO lawyers and witnesses involved, and the extent of the pleadings, suggest the undertaking was managed with federal funds—the participation of the FCDO in the case may well be unauthorized by federal court order or federal law. Accordingly, on remand, the PCRA court is directed to determine whether to formally appoint appropriate post-conviction counsel and to consider whether the FCDO may or should lawfully represent appellant in this state capital PCRA proceeding. See
18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (authorizing appointment of counsel to indigent state defendants actively pursuing federal habeas corpus relief from death sentence).
Id. (italicization omitted).
On February 21, 2013, the FCDO removed the proceedings related to the propriety of its representation of Sepulveda to the federal district court pursuant to
The PCRA court held its own proceedings in abeyance while awaiting the decision
The PCRA court entered an order requiring the clerk of courts to forward Sepulveda‘s pro se filing to his counsel pursuant to
At the April 20 hearing, the PCRA court heard argument on the question remanded by this Court regarding whether Se- pulveda was prejudiced by his trial counsel‘s
Thereafter, regarding the new claims, Otto testified in conformance with her amended affidavit. Id. at 32, 34-35, 37-38. Otto further testified that she told the District Attorney that she had been afraid of Mendez and feared for her children‘s safety, but that neither the Commonwealth nor defense counsel asked her questions about this at trial. Id. at 36-37.
Following the PCRA hearing, Sepulveda filed a counseled motion seeking leave to amend his first, timely PCRA petition “to conform his claims to the evidence presented.” Motion for Leave to Amend PCRA Petition, 4/20/2015, ¶ 10 (citing
The Commonwealth responded, arguing that the PCRA court should not treat the new filing as an amended PCRA petition, but as a second, untimely PCRA petition that failed to satisfy any of the exceptions to the PCRA‘s timeliness requirements. See
On August 14, 2015, the PCRA court entered an order and opinion granting Sepulveda‘s request to amend his first, timely PCRA petition, but denying relief on the merits of the claims raised. In the same order, the PCRA court granted Sepulveda a new penalty hearing based on its conclusion that trial counsel‘s failure to investigate and present mental health mitigation evidence prejudiced Sepulveda.16 The Commonwealth has not challenged the latter determination.
Sepulveda appealed from the PCRA court‘s dismissal of his newly raised claims. On appeal before this Court, he asserts that he is entitled to a new guilt-phase trial because “(1) [Sepulveda] presented newly discovered exculpatory evidence that ‘would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced,’ requiring a new trial under both the PCRA and the Due Process Clause, and (2) the Commonwealth suppressed material, exculpatory evidence, in violation of [Sepulveda]‘s right to due process[.]” Sepulveda‘s Brief at 1. As it did below, the Commonwealth contends that this was not a proper amendment, and the PCRA court should not have treated the new claims as amending Sepulveda‘s first, timely PCRA petition. Commonwealth‘s Brief at 24-25. As agreement with this argument would obviate review of the merits of the new claims raised, we begin our analysis here.
In support of its decision to treat the new claims as an amended petition, the PCRA court stated that both the Rules of Criminal Procedure and case law from this Court state that a PCRA court may, in its discretion, permit a defendant to file an amended PCRA petition with previously unraised claims years after the initial, timely filing. PCRA Court Opinion, 8/14/2015, at 17 (citing
Sepulveda agrees, asserting that it was within the PCRA court‘s discretion to permit him to amend his first, timely PCRA petition. Sepulveda‘s Reply Brief at 4-5 (citing cases and
In Flanagan, a case relied upon by the PCRA court and Sepulveda, we found no abuse of discretion in a PCRA court‘s decision to permit a defendant to amend his PCRA petition and raise new claims eleven years after he filed his initial, timely petition. Flanagan, 854 A.2d at 495-96, 499-500. In Flanagan, however, the defendant‘s PCRA claims had never been ruled upon by the PCRA court, let alone any appellate court. At the time Flanagan sought to amend his original, timely PCRA petition, that petition was still pending, unadjudicated, before the PCRA court. In fact, the Flanagan Court specifically identified this as a factor affecting its assessment of whether the petition could properly be treated as an amendment. We contrasted the procedural posture of Flanagan from those present in Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 573 Pa. 503, 827 A.2d 369 (2003), wherein we concluded that amendment was not proper. See id. at 371 (finding that the Superior Court erred by treating petitioner‘s second filing as an amendment to his first PCRA petition, as petitioner had withdrawn his first PCRA petition before the PCRA court, only filing the petition at issue ten months later, at which point there was nothing to “amend“); Flanagan, 854 A.2d at 500 n. 7 (distinguishing Flanagan from Rienzi because “Flanagan‘s original petition for collateral relief was never withdrawn or dismissed“). Flanagan, therefore, is inapposite to the case at bar.
So too are the other cases relied upon by Sepulveda in his reply brief. See Sepulveda‘s Reply Brief at 5 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 573 Pa. 613, 828 A.2d 981, 993 (2003) (holding that because the defendant attempted to withdraw his first, timely pro se PCRA petition without the advice of counsel, and the PCRA court never ruled upon that motion and treated the filing as active, the subsequent petitions filed must be treated as amendments to his first, timely petition); Commonwealth v. Padden, 783 A.2d 299, 308-09 (Pa.Super.2001) (finding an amended PCRA petition filed by appointed counsel following the initial pro se PCRA petition filed by the defendant was not an untimely, second petition “because the [t]rial [c]ourt did not at any time prior to the filing of the amended petition rule on the merits of the claims contained in the initial petition“)).
The PCRA court and Sepulveda are correct that
Once the PCRA court renders a decision on a PCRA petition, however, that matter is concluded before the PCRA court, having been fully adjudicated by that court, and the order generated is a final order that is appealable by the losing party. See
Our mandate in Sepulveda II did not bestow upon the PCRA court jurisdiction over the entirety of the PCRA petition. Following our complete review on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, we winnowed down the issues raised by Sepulveda to one identifiable subpart of one claim, which we ordered the PCRA court to consider in “proceedings upon limited remand.” Sepulveda II, 55 A.3d at 1151 (emphasis added). Absent an order specifying otherwise, to construe
Moreover,
Our remand order specifically instructed the PCRA court to consider (1) the propriety of the FCDO‘s representation of Sepulveda in this matter and (2) whether Sepulveda suffered prejudice by trial counsel‘s failure to investigate and present mental health mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. Nonetheless, the PCRA court in this case permitted Sepulveda, on remand, to raise new claims in what it considered to be an amendment to his timely-filed first PCRA petition. While we believe that our case law is clear, to the extent there is any lack of clarity in our prior decisions by their failure to consider
In the case at bar, the PCRA fully addressed the issues raised in Sepulveda‘s first, timely PCRA petition (which included several amendments) and rendered a final decision on that petition in 2007. Sepulveda appealed from the final order disposing of his first PCRA petition to this Court. After thoroughly considering all of the issues presented on appeal, this Court issued an order remanding the case to the PCRA court for its consideration of two specific and discrete issues. By permitting Sepulveda to amend his otherwise finally
Order vacated in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Chief Justice SAYLOR and Justices BAER, TODD, DOUGHERTY, WECHT and MUNDY join the opinion.
Notes
Sepulveda II, 55 A.3d at 1115; see also Sepulveda I, 855 A.2d at 787.As the four men were sitting around the kitchen table, another argument erupted, at which point [Sepulveda] grabbed a .12 gauge shotgun and shot Mendez in the stomach. He then shot Lopez in the side. Lopez collapsed on the floor. [Sepulveda] then placed the gun on Lopez‘s back and fired, killing him. Mendez escaped from the kitchen and ran upstairs. [Sepulveda] then chased him upstairs where he shot him a second time. Mendez was able to exit the house and flee to a neighbor‘s house. [Sepulveda] and Heleva followed him, entered the neighbor‘s property, seized Mendez, and dragged him back to Heleva‘s house. . . . After the men dragged Mendez back to the house, [Sepulveda] struck him with a hatchet type of weapon, killing him. There was no evidence that either victim had, or displayed, a firearm when [Sepulveda] murdered them.
* * *
Police found the dead bodies of Lopez and Mendez in the basement. The police found Lopez beneath slabs of insulation and dry wall material, with his pants pulled to his ankles. They found Mendez beneath a pile of laundry, stripped naked with his thumb in his mouth and with a rubber bungee cord wrapped tightly around his neck.
Id. at 476-77 (internal citation omitted).. . . Congress has authorized grants to Community Defender Organizations [of which the FCDO is one] and tasked the [Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AO“)] with supervising grant payments. The disqualification proceedings, however, seek to supplant the AO by allowing the Commonwealth‘s courts to determine whether a Community Defender Organization has complied with the terms of its federal grants and to attach consequences to noncompliance.
Significantly, the disqualification proceedings are preempted whether or not federal law authorizes the [FCDO] to use grant funds for certain purposes in PCRA cases. If the [FCDO] is authorized to use grant funds, the Commonwealth plainly cannot disqualify it for doing so without undermining congressional objectives. But even if the [FCDO] is not authorized to use grant funds, the disqualification proceedings interfere with the regulatory scheme that Congress has created.