Commonwealth v. Sepulveda

to “hold decision Majority’s with the disagree I Finally, pending issues penalty phase remaining appellant’s abeyance” which approach, such a piecemeal agree I do remand. in the form unnecessary delay conceivably lead could remands. multiple this Court reviews multiple dissenting opinion. concurring joins this EAKIN Justice A.2d 783 Pennsylvania, Appellee COMMONWEALTH SEPULVEDA, Appellant. Manuel Pennsylvania. Supreme Court Argued 2003. Dec. Aug. 2004.

Decided Schurdak, Anders, Stroudsburg, E. Ellen C. Marshall Sepulveda. Marcus Manuel Leeth, Harrisburg, D.

Donald M. Elmer Chris- Amy Zapp, tine, Jr., Stroudsburg, for Com. CAPPY, C.J., CASTILLE, NEWMAN, NIGRO,

Before SAYLOR, EAKIN, LAMB, JJ. THE ANNOUNCING JUDGMENT

OPINION OF THE COURT Justice NIGRO. case, appeals

In this Manuel capital Sepulveda from of Common imposed the sentences death Court found jury guilty Pleas of Monroe A County. degree, two first counts of counts of murder two assault, restraint, aggravated conspiracy, criminal unlawful Following tampering fabricating evidence. hearing, aggravating determined the one penalty jury 222

circumstance it found with respect to' each murder1 out weighed mitigating the two it circumstances also found respect to each murder.2 Accordingly, jury returned a convictions,3 sentence of death each the murder and on 27, 2008, January the trial- court formally imposed two death against Appellant. sentences After the trial court denied motion, Appellant’s post-sentence Appellant filed this direct appeal.4 follow, For the reasons we affirm judgments of sentence.

Appellant first jury’s contends that the verdict con him victing of two counts of murder the first degree was not supported by the As in all evidence. in which cases the death penalty has been this imposed, Court is required to determine whether the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict for first-degree murder. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 552 Pa. 499, 580, (1998); 716 A.2d 583 Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 16, 937, (1982), denied, 500 Pa. 454 942 A.2d n. 3 cert. 461 U.S. 970, 2444, (1983). 103 S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 In conducting review, such a must trial, we view the evidence admitted at therefrom, and all reasonable inferences drawn light most favorable to the winner, Commonwealth as verdict determine whether jury could’ every find element of the beyond crime a reasonable doubt. Spotz, 583; 716 A.2d at Keaton, 442, Commonwealth v. 529, 556 Pa. (1999). Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to convict a Rios, defendant of a crime. See Commonwealth v. (1996), denied, A.2d cert. 520 U.S. 117 S.Ct. 137 L.Ed.2d 1032 Specifically, aggravating 1. by jury circumstance found was that Appellant had been convicted of another murder committed either issue, 1). l(d)(l before or at the time § of the offense at 42 Pa.C.S. mitigating 2. The two jury circumstances Appel- found were that convictions, significant history lant had prior no criminal 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(e)(1), § only twenty-two years-old when he murders, 9711(e)(4). § committed the 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(c)(4). § 3. 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(h), §

4. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. jurisdic- this Court has automatic judgment tion to review the trial court’s of a sentence of death. Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for first- degree murder where the Commonwealth establishes defendant unlawfully killed another human being with the specific 2502(d); Rios, § intent do so.5 Pa.C.S. A.2d at 1030. The use of a deadly weapon on a part vital body sufficient to establish specific intent to kill. Rivera, See Commonwealth v. 565 Pa. 773 A.2d (2001); Jones, Commonwealth v.

Here, the evidence adduced at trial establishes that on 26, 2001, November Appellant was at the home of Daniel Heleva and Robyn Otto in Polk Township, Monroe County, where he resided the couple and two their children. At approximately p.m., 6:30 John Mendez and Ricardo Lopez arrived at the house to recover two guns that Mendez claimed belonged to him. Appellant retrieved guns from an upstairs bedroom and gave them to Mendez. Mendez and Lopez then left.

Later that night, Heleva returned to the house with Richard Boyko and discovered that guns were missing. After Appellant explained to Heleva that Mendez had taken the guns, Heleva Boyko instructed to call Mendez and him have come back to time, the house. At this man, another Jimmy Frey, inwas the living room watching television. Lopez

Mendez and house, returned but Heleva did not permit Lopez Mendez, however, enter. inside, came where Heleva immediately accused him of stealing guns and the two men began fighting in the kitchen. When this fight resolved, was Appellant joined and Lopez Heleva and kitchen, Mendez where the four men then sat around the table talking. Boyko left the house. While the men were kitchen, in the argument another erupted. time, This Appel- lant grabbed a .12 gauge shotgun and shot Mendez stomach. He then gun turned the towards Lopez and shot him in the side. Lopez After collapsed floor, on the Appellant placed barrel shotgun on Lopez’s back and again 5. A intentionally defendant being kills another killing human if the willful, deliberate, premeditated. 2502(d). and § See 18 Pa.C.S. chased Mendez weapon, killing Appellant him. then

fired the house, where he shot stairs to the second floor up the wounded, Although escaped Mendez second time. Mendez to a house with neighbor’s from and Heleva and fled Appellant on the pursuit. Mendez knocked Appellant Heleva answered, door, anyone front but neighbor’s before dragged him across the lawn grabbed Mendez and Heleva watching who had been Frey, back to their house. incident, had shotgun dropped retrieved lawn, it inside a sofa the house. Once the men hid inside, Appellant back inflicted several dragged had Mendez him. type weapon, killing blows with hatchet Meanwhile, call neigh- received a 911 from Heleva’s at Heleva’s home. dispute bor a domestic violence reporting Matthew Pennsylvania Troopers Tretter response, State neigh- at to spoke and Rutter arrived the scene and the Joel bor, high- told that a noise and a who she had heard loud them her and pitched screaming voice me” outside of door “help outside, being had that when she looked she seen someone front lawn into residence. The dragged across her Heleva’s a of blood on the that smear troopers noticed there had railing front door and that a neighbor’s porch wooden troopers proceeded broken. then to Heleva’s resi- been The bloody jacket a on Along way, troopers dence. the noticed lawn, and on Heleva’s door neighbor’s they observed blood on troopers knocked the door they when arrived. When the and presence, Appellant announced door opened and their incident, that knowledge denied but then stated initially he had been assaulted two men. time, in the back Trooper placed Appellant

At this Tretter him, and, car, believing still that this patrol handcuffed incident, Appellant was a domestic violence asked where They was. is no Appellant responded: woman “There ‘she.’ N.T., 11/15/2002,at I shot them.” See in the are basement. Trooper 80. then After additional backup. Tretter called scene, resi- troopers they arrived entered the state dence, log. a initiated a scene The up perimeter set and crime in Lopez found bodies of and Mendez the basement of the residence.6 Heleva, troopers transported Appellant, along

The children, Otto, to Barracks. Robyn Lehighton and their brought and to Boyko Frey up and were also rounded station, and Trooper Joseph station. Once at the Sommers Thomas Miranda warn- Corporal Appellant McAndrew read rights 3:45 a.m. ings approximately Appellant signed at form, and him. After troopers began waiver interview a.m., hour, approximately Appellant began about one at 5:04 statement, tape-recorded Appellant make a statement. this twice, shot both but Lopez admitted he Mendez only shooting Lopez claimed started after he believed N.T., was about to out to his car to go gun. retrieve 11/18/2002, at 270-71. Appellant also admitted after Mendez ran outside he and following shooting, Heleva inside, dragged back at which Appellant grabbed Mendez time in type weapon the hatchet struck Mendez the head. See id. at 272-73. statement, Appellant

After made this 6:00 approximately m., n . questioning. the officers took a break from this Trooper and Corporal Sommers McAndrew conferred with the other investigators to Appellant involved the case returned a.m., for further At questioning. approximately Appel 7:10 lant indicated that he wished to speak Corporal McAndrew alone and proceeded corporal tell the that he had lied original gave statement. then a statement which murders, statement, again implicated himself but this once, actually only claimed that he had shot Lopez N.T., 11/19/2002, in the kitchen. See at 290. Appellant stated time, that did not shoot see id. at 291.7 Lopez he the second material, Lopez dry 6. was found beneath slabs of insulation and wall ankles, pulled pants with his to and Mendez was found beneath laundry, pile stripped of naked with his thumb his mouth and with a bungee wrapped tightly rubber cord around his neck. Instead, Appellant Lopez 7. indicated that Heleva shot the second time. McAndrew, According Appellant's Corporal to statement to after he kitchen, stairs, Lopez up shot and Mendez in the he chased Mendez engaged struggle. During struggle. Appellant where the two in a that

Although also Appellant admitted that he shot Mendez a time, Appellant second claimed that it was Heleva who eventu- ally struck type weapon, Mendez the head with the hatchet killing him. See at 292-93. id. trial, also at his

Appellant again testified where he admitted both shooting Lopez and Mendez. told the jury, however, had not to kill Lopez he intended either N.T., 11/21/2002, at In general, Mendez. See 635-38. Appel lant’s testimony described the events as he had recounted Corporal them his second statement id. McAndrew.8 See Land, performed Dr. Samuel who autopsies Mendez Lopez, also took the stand at Dr. Appellant’s trial. Land that, degree testified to a reasonable certainty, medical Lopez’s shotgun cause death wounds to the chest and abdomen, and that each wound was to a vital part body N.T., 11/19/2002, independently fatal. See at 348-49. that, Dr. Land degree further testified to a reasonable certainty, gunshot medical the cause Mendez’s death was sharp wounds the abdomen9 and force wounds to the head. claimed that he heard fired shots from the kitchen where he had left N.T., 11/19/2002, gun. Heleva with the at 291. Although

8. there were few Appellant’s inconsistencies between trial testimony Corporal his statement McAndrew at the station, only noting. two of the inconsistencies are worth In his McAndrew, above, Corporal statement to as noted indicated only Lopez infra, he had heard Heleva shoot the second time. See However, trial, Appellant jury note 7. at told that after he shot kitchen, Lopez actually grab gun and Mendez in the saw Heleva N.T., 11/21/2002, Lopez's and fire a second shot into back. at 636. Second, although Appellant shooting admitted to Mendez a second time trial, Corporal stating both his statement to McAndrew and at both shooting struggle times occurred amidst a between Heleva and Mendez, particular shooting he described the circumstances of this differently Corporal at trial than in his statement to McAndrew. See N.T., 11/19/2002, 292)1/21/2002, Corpo- at at 637. his statement to McAndrew, Appellant merely grabbed gun ral away stated that he they struggled, gun from Heleva and Mendez as turned the toward Mendez, N.T., 11/19/2002, and shot him in the arm. See at 292. Meanwhile, trial, Appellant testified that when he shot Mendez in the arm, accidentally attempt gun away he did so in an to wrestle the from N.T., 11/21/2002, Mendez and Heleva. See at 637. explained 9. Dr. Land that there were two shots fired at Mendez: one abdomen, penetrated right shot that Mendez's lower and one shot that Id. at 358-61. Dr. Land that gunshot stated each wounds to was to a vital part body. Mendez’s abdomen of his Id. evidence, this agree

Based on we trial court clearly that there was sufficient to convict Appellant evidence Lopez the murders of and Mendez. Although Appellant elaboration, argues, now without much that there was not to convict him sufficient evidence because the Commonwealth failed to establish that had specific he intent to kill anyone, just above, the evidence shows opposite. As detailed Appellant shot both Lopez Mendez and in vital parts body, which alone sufficient to establish Appellant’s specific Rivera, to kill. intent 773 A.2d at 135.10 claim, In his Appellant next argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress prior he filed to his Specifically, trial. Appellant argues that the trial court should (1) have suppressed: his Trooper statement Tretter car, patrol during because he made it of a course custodial but interrogation before he was Miranda given warnings; and (2) the Corporal statement he made to McAndrew after he alone, to speak asked with the corporal as that statement elicited after had hours, been six custody over violation of Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. (1977). below,

A.2d 301 For the reasons forth set find that we the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress these statements. (cid:127)

In evaluating motion, the denial of a suppression our initial task is to determine whether the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record. See Commonwealth v.

passed through striking upper Mendez’s left forearm before abdo- N.T., 11/19/2002, men. See at 353-54. assuming arguendo 10. Even Appellant only Lopez shot once and trial, only shot Mendez a accidentally, second time as he claimed at Dr. testified, above, Land gunshot as noted that both of the wounds suffered by Lopez parts were body to vital of his and that the first shot to abdomen, fired, Mendez’s which concedes he was to a vital Thus, part body. Appellant’s of the even under own version of the trial, jury events at was entitled to infer that had the specific Lopez. intent to kill both Mendez and making this Bridges, 563 determination, “consider only we must the evidence witnesses, and so much of the defense prosecution’s evidence in context of fairly that uncontradicted when remains read supports as a Id. the record whole.” When the evidence may by findings only factual bound such and findings, we are court if the conclusions drawn suppression legal reverse the are Id. therefrom erroneous. instance, Appellant

In fails to completely the first how he the admission of explain unduly prejudiced by was argues now trial court should either the statements he trial took at his suppressed. Appellant have the stand Mendez, Lopez and this admitted he did indeed shoot was, in to the testimony respects, all material similar second police gave Corporal statement he to McAndrew at the sta Likewise, Trooper tion. admission to in Appellant’s Tretter car that in patrol people way he had shot is no inconsistent with his at trial he had shot Mendez and testimony Thus, see, and to Lopez. we fail to fails demon Appellant strate, how of the two prejudiced he was the admission says statements he now the trial court refused to improperly event, below, suppress.11 agree as we with discussed Appellant the trial court that each of the now statements of was admitted trial. complains properly in first that the trial court argues refusing erred patrol to to car suppress Trooper statement Tretter custody it because was obtained while he was in but police rights. Miranda disagree. before he read his We is in for Miranda person custody pur Whether deprived on is poses depends person physically whether the or is in a any significant way placed his freedom action reasonably situation in which that his freedom of he believes v. action movement is restricted. See Commonwealth Williams, 420, (1994). A.2d The test for 650 427 argument, example, testimony trial 11. makes no that his improperly substantially allegedly was not cumulative of the admitted explain only attempt the stand statements or took in an inculpatory suppress. two statements that the trial court refused subjective depend upon not does interrogation custodial rather, officer, but focuses law enforcement intent reasonably believes interrogated being the individual whether id.; Common being of action restricted. his freedom Brown, v. Pa. 375 A.2d 1260 Once wealth person provided must be interrogation, custody, prior n makes will Miranda any statement he warnings before however, Miranda admissible. See id. warnings, be deemed ask where the certain situations required are and not to elicit incrimina public safety questions ensure 649, 655-57, Quarles, York responses. New v. 467 U.S. ting Commonwealth, v. (1984); 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 104 S.Ct. Stewart, on other (Pa.Super.1999), A.2d 719-20 aff'd Perry, sub nom. Commonwealth grounds (2002) (plurality). A.2d 697 his

Here, clearly of free Appellant deprived was him, Trooper placed handcuffed dom of action when Tretter car, and door. patrol him in the of the locked the back Williams, Therefore, with agree Appel 650 A.2d at 427. we for Miranda purposes in custody lant that he was indeed However, with trial court that agree that time.12 we also the (1999), Gwynn, a In 12. Commonwealth Court, Announcing Judgment Opinion in an the of the plurality of this ("OAJC”), police placement the concluded the officer’s of Court car, defendant, subsequent handcuffing the patrol of defendant in a presented an the did not rise the level of arrest under circumstances There, stopped the after the defen- in that case. an officer defendant repeatedly away walked the officer in an area where a dant from burglary identification, reported. been The officer asked the defendant for had might because feared the defendant flee but the officer head, kept moving placed the officer the defendant in his after arrived, thought they backup the patrol car. After a officer officers saw result, they placed a in trying escape, and as him the defendant appeal, rejected claim handcuffs. On the OAJC the defendant’s arrest, illegal police by an instead conclud- these actions the constituted legitimate investigative ing part the were all a detention. actions of conclusion, reaching the OAJC found that the officers had In this stop initially suspicion defendant and then reasonable stated: Terry during stop permissible remaining actions constituted The dissipat- preservation quo while the officer confirmed or of the status preservation quo while suspicions. ed his The status occurred: identity [Appellant's] identification to confirm the officer retrieved by placing during in appellant; appellant car this of the overriding of public safety justified considerations Trooper Miranda failure to provide Appellant warnings Tretter’s asking him the limited question regarding before the woman’s in Appellant patrol whereabouts while was car. Based from the call Appellant’s neighbor, Trooper Tretter Trooper they Rutter believed that were responding to a they scene, domestic dispute. violent When arrived at the troopers not but only damaged property, observed also saw door, jacket on the front on a in neighbor’s blood the yard, left door Appellant’s and on the troopers residence. The then a account of from confusing received events Appellant. Given circumstances, the troopers' these could not certain of be of danger they extent before them nor could be sure woman safety alleged involved the reported domestic addition, violence incident. once placed car, patrol Trooper Tretter asked a very focused question, discovering aimed at the whereabouts of the alleged circumstances, woman. Based on these we conclude that the troopers were not to elicit an attempting incriminating re- from sponse Appellant when him in they placed patrol car location, rather, and asked him about woman’s but were solely motivated safety concern their own and the nighttime high-crime street encounter area while his identifica- checked; appellant tion was and when was handcuffed after he tried escape completed. before the check on identification was apparently applied analysis Id. at 149. The OAJC rejecting then this Appellant's subsequent patrol claim that his statements made in the car given he was warnings suppressed, before Miranda should have been stating that “the record reflects that [the statements] did not occur as interrogation." the result custodial Id. at 150. Gwynn instance, inquiry does not control our here. In the first Court, Gwynn only opinion announcing judgment is an the and reasoning binding its is therefore on this Court. C & M 2, ZHB, 143, Developers Twp. (2002) v. Bedminster 820 A.2d (opinion announcing judgment binding precedent). of court is not Second, determining the for person standard whether a has been case, placed custody particular in on the based of each circumstances 555, 56, (1983), Ziegler, see Commonwealth v. Pa. 470 A.2d Gwynn be there can no doubt the in completely circumstances are event, than Gwynn different those in instant case. even if here, inquiry were to control our in it could somehow be read as establishing proposition the broad that an individual who is handcuffed placed patrol “custody" in a car any purpose, is not in for this clearly contrary position opinion today. Court has taken a in this safety of alleged Quarles, 657, woman. See 467 U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 2626 (concluding “the need answers to in questions a situation posing a threat public safety outweighs the need for prophylactic rule protecting Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination”); see Bowers, also Commonwealth v. 377, 400 Pa.Super. 583 A.2d (1990) 1165, 1171 (recognizing Quarles). in reasoning Accordingly, Appellants statements to Trooper Tretter were admissible public under the safety exception and thus were properly admitted trial Quarles, court. See at U.S. 655-57, 2626; Stewart, 104 S.Ct. 740 A.2d at 719-20.

Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress a portion of his statement it because elicited violation of the “six-hour rule” set forth Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 370 A.2d 301 (1977). Specifically, Appellant argues that because he was taken into police custody a.m., at approximately .12:35 statement he made to Corporal McAndrew more than six later, hours a.m., approximately 7:10 should have been However, suppressed. in light of the fact that a majority of this Court recently abandoned the six-hour rule Common Perez, wealth v. 845 A.2d (Pa.2004), 2004 WL 576101 Appellant’s claim fails.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require that an individual who has been arrested “shall be afforded a preliminary arraignment by the proper issuing authority with- out 516(A). unnecessary delay.” Pa.R.Crim.P. this While requirement is not mandated, constitutionally it ensures that a defendant is afforded the constitutional rights embodied in Pennsylvania Rule Criminal requires Procedure which (1) the issuing authority to: read complaint to a defendant to inform him of the nature of charges him, against Pa. Const, I, (2) 9;§ art. inform counsel, him of his right to U.S. Const, VI, XIV, Const. Amends. I, 9; (3) Pa. § art. Const, inform him of his right bail, to reasonable I, art. 540; § 14. Perez, Pa.R.Crim.P. 783.

Prior Perez, to our decision this Court’s approach to prompt arraignment requirement was governed by our deci- Duncan, and Davenport

sions in Commonwealth First, in Davenport, this Court 525 A.2d 1177 of state- admissibility under which the established rule but his custody, was before ment taken while the defendant delay of length preliminary arraignment, depended arraignment. We arrest between defendant’s stated: six hours of arraigned is not within [defendant]

If the but ar- arrest, after arrest before any statement obtained at If the accused shall not be admissible trial. raignment arrest, delay within six hours of arraigned pre-arraignment such suppression shall not be statements grounds may as to constitutional stan- delay be relevant except admissibility. dards of adopted bright- at Court this A.2d 306. The

Davenport, certain and even- line in order “assure more approach requirement, application prompt arraignment handed courts, guidance to trial the bar provide greater [to] law Id. enforcement authorities.” Duncan, later,

However, a this explained Court decade six-hour rule was although adoption the Court’s law meant to rule with which enforcement provide workable per “our readily comply, experience applica- could with the se Duncan, 525 proven contrary.” tion of the has to the rule Duncan Daven- recognized A.2d at 1182. The Court to violations port applied rule had on a mechanical basis “been no and has relationship which bear to the statement obtained for no relevant to the individual guilty shielded reason circumstances of their Id. at 1182. response, case.” “to goals of Davenport Court held to better achieve the interrogation, guard against the coercive influence custodial rights that the to which an accused is entitled [and] ensure unnecessary preliminary arraignment afforded without are an delay,” determining suppress the focus when whether statement, “should be on when the statement incriminating obtained, i.e., Id. period.” was within or the six-hour beyond Thus, rule modi- Davenport (emphasis original). fied to allow admission of that were made statements arrest, when regardless of his hours within six accused Id. occurred. arraignment Davenport-Duncan the recently reconsidered

This Court Perez, majori a where in rule Commonwealth stringent of a “application that the concluded of the Court ty of circumstances sets vastly different rule to the bright-line arrest, arraignment and investigation, in be involved may ” Thus, the Id. at 784. results.... perplexing has yielded “voluntary rule and held six-hour abandoned the majority hours after accused, than six given more by an statements longer are no arraigned, has not been the accused arrest when Instead, in majority at 787. the se.” Id. per inadmissible totality to the should look that courts Perez concluded state a pre-arraignment whether to determine circumstances made, admissib and therefore voluntarily freely was and ment that, in this determi making majority explained Id. The le.13 attitude such as the nation, consider factors courts should interrogation, whether during the police exhibited he rights, whether of his constitutional was advised defendant confessed, and ill, or intoxicated when injured, drugged was food, attention or medical sleep, deprived he was whether 784-86. Id. at during the detention.14 majority’s decision to abandon author dissented from 13. This Perez rule, stating: Duncan-Davenport police in which clear time restraints of reasonable and In the absence suspects are much more question suspects, are allowed to officers prolonged police interro- effect of likely exposed to the coercive to be turn, yield greater pool of unreliable confes- gation, will which potential police By using to curb officers' time restrictions sions. rule, Duncan-Davenport my interrogation process, the abuse view, rights than safeguards of defendants the constitutional better adopted by approach 'totality of the circumstances' the new thus, majority today not be abandoned. and should J., Perez, dissenting). concurring (Nigro, A.2d at 791 However, the six-hour given majority Court abandoned that a of this Perez, holding applies to approach delineated in in favor of the rule the instant case. accused, age include the to be considered 14. Additional factors previous intelligence, extent of his level of education and nature of repeated prolonged police, the experience with the prior to the confession. See length of detention questioning, and the case,15 Applying Perez to the instant we find that the totality of the circumstances that Appellant’s demonstrates Corporal statement McAndrew was voluntarily given and properly therefore admitted at trial. instance, the first there is nothing the record to indicate that delay Appellant’s arraignment was at overcoming aimed Appellant’s will, or that utilized coercive tactics to persuade him give trial, a statement. At Corporal McAndrew testi fied the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s confession that Appellant indicated was informed of his constitutional rights spoke officers, before he permitted to use the bathroom given and was coffee and blanket during the interview, and injured was not or under the of drugs influence or alcohol when N.T., 11/19/2002, he made the confession. See Moreover, at 261-301. the record shows that Appellant him self was responsible part of delay the as spent the first hours of the interview a providing statement that he later partially recanted the follow-up statement at issue here. Perez, See (noting 787-88 that appellant’s deception to about his identity and his age contrib case). uted to the delay processing Under these circumstances, we find that Appellant’s statement to Corporal McAndrew was voluntarily given and therefore admissible pursuant to Perez.

As we find that Appellant’s claims for relief are without merit, must, in compliance we statutory with our duty pursu- 9711(h)(3), § ant to Pa.C.S. affirm his of sentences death (1) unless we determine the sentences were the product passion, of prejudice or (2) other factor arbitrary evidence fails to support the of finding at least aggrava- one ting factor with respect to each murder. 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(h)(3). § upon Based our record, review of the con- we clude that the sentences of death were not product of passion, prejudice or any factor, other arbitrary rather, but

Perez, People (citing Cipriano, 845 A.2d at 785-86 431 Mich. (1988)). N.W.2d explicitly 15. This Court stated in totality the new of Perez apply circumstances pending standard would to "all cases where the properly issue has been raised.” Id. at 788. also properly were based evidence admitted trial. We was find support conclude that evidence sufficient ing aggravating of at least one factor to each respect Mendez, of Specifically, regarding murder. the murder showed that first- evidence was convicted of the degree Lopez, murder which was committed at time of 9711(d)(11). § the murder of Mendez. Like Pa.C.S. wise, regarding the murder of Lopez, the evidence showed was first-degree convicted of murder Mendez, which committed at time of the murder Lopez. See id. Appellant’s we affirm

Accordingly, convictions and the sen tences of death.16

Former Justice Lamb did participate the decision this case.

Chief CAPPY opinion. Justice files concurring Justice opinion joins CASTILLE files concurring which opinion majority part. Justice NEWMAN a concurring files opinion.

Justice EAKIN a concurring files opinion. Justice files a dissenting opinion. SAYLOR CAPPY, Chief Justice Concurring.

Appellant asserts that the statements elicited without bene- fit of pursuant Arizona, his constitutional rights to Miranda v. 436, (1966) 1602, 384 86 16 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 694 should have suppressed. been Insofar as majority the disposes of this law, claim join under federal I am I compelled recognize as Quarles, 649, 2626, that New v. York 467 104 U.S. 81 S.Ct. (1984), L.Ed.2d 550 that requires result. Although Appellant perfunctory makes a that statement this claim is raised under Constitution, the Pennsylvania beyond boilerplate that asser- Prothonotary Supreme 16. The of the is directed to the Court transmit complete Pennsylvania. record of this case the Governor of See 42 (i) (Supp.1997). § Pa.C.S. 9711 state our independent argument tion no under he offers of viability of question the the Accordingly, constitution. against to the Quarles, public safety right exception and the an- self-incrimination, for our state constitution is left under day. other majority’s with my disagreement I

Additionally, note preju this claim as one considered under depiction being of 789-90). asser As the analysis. (Majority opinion p. dice error, I it is of that presents tion of a claim trial believe error v. How analysis. subject to a harmless error Commonwealth (1994) ard, 86, 1300, (discussing 538 Pa. prejudice and a analysis between harmless error difference Baez, 66, 720 v. analysis); see also Commonwealth (1998) (denial 711, pre-trial suppress A.2d of motion to However, agree I subject analysis). to harmless error as error, is no discussion majority there is of error for assessing consequences standard unnecessary. I respects join opinion. all other the lead CASTILLE, Concurring.

Justice all join following I of opinion except respects, the lead admissibility inculpatory statement which concern the car. appellant patrol made “custody” common This does not the more pose case questions Miranda “interrogation” involving seen cases (1966). Arizona, 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d arrest, transport not formal The does involve the classic case interro- incommunicado headquarters, extended of a gave Supreme adoption which to the Court’s gation rise I believe requirement prophylactic warnings. Ultimately, how case would fit within the need determine we because, well-ex- paradigm classic Miranda reasons admissibility pressed by opinion, question the lead safety appellant’s public statement controlled York v. in New exception Miranda which established Quarles, 104 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d 550 U.S. Quarles controls, to its conclusion that howev- Along way er, findings and statements opinion makes some the lead Miranda with which I law concerning the status under occasion this concurrence. disagreement am in as to sufficient First, opinion’s analysis I disagree the lead determining for contours of federal constitutional test of Miranda. The lead states opinion for “custody” purposes action,” of his freedom of clearly deprived was “appellant of Miranda. therefore, in “custody” purposes Op. 228-29, at is not federal test. proper at 790. This R.H., In Re I my Dissenting Opinion As noted (2002): 791 A.2d 331 for Miranda purposes simply

An is not in custody individual in a of action has been restricted because freedom reasonably or that his freedom of significant way believes by questioning. action or movement has been restricted authority Court—which is the ultimate Supreme The U.S. of Miranda that, held interpretation questions—has on the in custody, an individual was determining whether ... there a ‘formal arrest inquiry [was] ultimate whether degree or on freedom of movement’ of the associ- restraint Stansbury California, arrest. with a formal ated 1528-29, 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 293 U.S. (1994) (citations omitted). initial determination of [T]he custody objective on the circumstances the inter- depends subjective not on the harbored rogation, views either the Id. interrogating person being questioned. officers Thus, every at 1529. not deprivation S.Ct. mere Miranda’s an individual’s of action triggers freedom subjective protections, constitutional and the sentiments of being wholly are person interrogated irrelevant objective custody inquiry. 420, 440, McCarty,

In Berkemer v. 468 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, (1984),for example, Supreme 82 L.Ed.2d 317 that Miranda warnings required prior Court held were of a motorist questioning to the roadside detained Although traffic Court that a stop. Supreme recognized stop significantly traffic curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of driver, that, states, under the law of most it is in

fact a away crime to drive permission, without it emphasized that this was not the end of custody the Miranda inquiry. Fidelity to the doctrine in announced Miranda requires that it be enforced ... in only types those of situations in which the concerns powered the decision implicated. are Id. 437, at S.Ct. 3148-49. The Supreme Court found that the fact that traffic stops are typically temporary and brief, are in public, conducted and usually only involve one or at most two policemen mitigate[d] danger that a .person questioned will be induced ‘to speak where he would freely.’ otherwise do so Id. at 104 S.Ct. at 3149 Miranda, (quoting 1624). 384 U.S. at 86 S.Ct. at (Castille, Id. at 338 Quarles, J. dissenting); accord 467 U.S. at (“the 104 S.Ct. at 2631 inquiry ultimate is simply whether is there a ‘formal arrest restraint on of freedom movement’ arrest”) degree of the with a associated formal (quoting Cali Beheler, 1121, 1125, 3517, 3520, 463 U.S. 103 S.Ct. fornia (1983) curiam) L.Ed.2d 1275 (per (quoting Oregon v. Mathia son, 492, 495, 711, 714, (1977) U.S. S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 714 curiam))). (per I Because opinion believe the lead test, misconstrues controlling I also believe that the lead is opinion mistaken its extended criticism of plurality decision Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 723 A.2d 143 (1999), and I necessarily disagree with the broad contrary custody holding opinion the lead would announce to supplant non-precedential decision in Gwynn. atOp. 229-30 n. 12, 855 A.2d at 790-91 n. 12.1 view,

In my question of custody for Miranda purposes under the proper test these unusual circumstances is a close one, but it ultimately, is a question this Court need not This resolve. is so because if it even is assumed that appel- lant in custody when police him temporarily placed in the event, Gwynn 1. In unnecessary discussion of to the decision of (1) notes, opinion Gwynn this case because as the plurality lead is a value; (2) opinion precedential that, with no apparent it is not portion plurality opinion opinion to which the lead takes exception, Gwynn speaking “custody” Court was rather than ‘'interrogation.” patrol car so that they could “freeze the situation” they while investigated this late-night report of an incident domestic report violence-a corroborated the on-scene cooperation the reporting witness and the presence blood the doors homes, of the two neighboring as jacket well as on a found Quarles between the homes—the public safety obvi- exception ated necessity police warnings recite Miranda asking before appellant single question they posed, a question which was designed to locate and thereby secure the safety of the woman had reason believe was a victim of domestic violence.

I also write to highlight importance of undertaking the appropriate analysis constitutional determining when whether or not “interrogation” has in given occurred case. As the United States Supreme Court articulated Rhode Island v. Innis, 291, 1682, 446 (1980): U.S. 100 S.Ct. 64 L.Ed.2d 297

[T]he term interrogation under Miranda refers not only express questioning, but also to words or actions on the (other part of police than those normally attendant arrest custody) police should know are reason- ably likely to elicit an incriminating from response suspect. portion The latter of this definition focuses pri- marily upon perceptions of the suspect, rather than the But, intent of police.... police surely since cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable of results actions, their words or interrogation definition of only can extend to words part or actions on the they officers that should have reasonably known were likely incriminating to elicit an response. 301-02, (bold

Id. at added). 100 S.Ct. 1689-90 emphasis Thus, the absence of Miranda warnings does not require suppression of a suspect’s if, custodial statement for example, the suspect spontaneously statement, “blurts out” the Com Baez, 66, 711, monwealth v. 554 (1998); Pa. 720 A.2d 720-21 an makes incriminating statement in the course of “small authorities, talk” Ahdul-Salaam, Commonwealth v. 544 514, 342, (1996); Pa. 678 A.2d 351 or is merely responding biographical questioning, Daniels, Commonwealth v.

240 incriminating (1994); an 1175, 1181 or makes

464, A.2d 644 with the communication voluntarily initiating after statement Yards, 571, A.2d Pa. 549 v. 519 Commonwealth authorities, statement (1988); incriminating 513, or makes an 523-24 part on the declaration, inquiry, than an rather to a response Brantner, 518, v. Commonwealth authorities, addition, a statement even 1015-16 406 A.2d for of Miranda may be admissible in direct violation elicited York, v. New Harris U.S. purposes. impeachment (1971). Moreover, concern 28 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. par interrogation question examination thorough judice, sub case, such as that in a close ticularly appropriate were troopers where, aptly “[T]he notes: opinion as the lead from Appel incriminating response an to elicit attempting him and asked him in car patrol they placed lant when 230-31, at 791. Op. at woman’s location.” about the preliminary opinion’s lead join I do not Finally, preju- “undue failure to demonstrate appellant’s finding of the statement into evidence from admission dice” had if it merit. his claim otherwise would defeat question in violation obtained if the statement were Presumably, Miranda, prove would be the Commonwealth the burden doubt. a reasonable beyond that its admission harmless 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. California, 386 U.S. Chapman (1967). However, the state- 827-28, because 17 L.Ed.2d admitted, because importantly, and more was properly ment error, no there is argued has not harmless the Commonwealth of a non-existent of the effect question to address the reason Berkemer, at 443—445, 3152- at 104 S.Ct. error. 468 U.S. error to harmless (citing Chapman refusing apply 54 standard standard, whether harmless error decide even not violation, argue to Miranda where state did apply could error). harmless concerns, join I the lead foregoing exception of the

With opinion. NEWMAN, Concurring.

Justice convictions to affirm the I with the decision Although agree that the sentences, not with the determination agree I do

241 to the statement applies safety exception” “public car. police made of the Court Judgment Announcing the Opinion

As the Appellant’s concludes, leading interrogation correctly handcuffed and car, was while he police confession presumptively seat, in nature was custodial back Williams, v. warnings.1 Commonwealth Miranda required “Miranda Nevertheless, (1994). A.2d 420 650 situations where the in certain required ... warnings are safety and not elicit public ask ensure police questions Judgment Announcing responses.” Opinion incriminating 655-57, 104 S.Ct. Quarles, at U.S. (citing at of the Court Stewart, (Pa.Su 712, 719-20 v. Commonwealth 2626; Announcing Judgment Opinion The per.1999)). presents one that the instant matter determines

Court public situations, “overriding considerations in which these to provide failure justified Trooper Tretter’s safety him ques the limited with Miranda warnings asking before ” An Opinion the woman’s whereabouts.... regarding tion safety public at 791. The Judgment the Court nouncing (1) that troopers thought included: concerns considered (2) they dispute; to a domestic violent they responding were (3) door; a “confus gave and Appellant blood on the front saw transpired. that had account” of the events ing justify find circumstances to be ones I do not these articulated Supreme Court exception” “narrow Quarles, v. 81 L.Ed.2d New York 104 S.Ct. U.S. (1984), a and immediate threat which involved real far exigent of circumstances more safety, consisting public case, 650, 104 a Id. 2626. In that S.Ct. than the ones here. had and told them she two officers approached woman assailant, and them informed just raped, described her been and was nearby supermarket just man had entered store, saw a man who officer entered the carrying gun. One run, ordered description, suspect witnessed the matched the him, wearing an and discovered he stop, him to frisked Arizona, 436, 86 S.Ct. 16 L.Ed.2d 694 384 U.S. 1. Miranda empty holster. After handcuffing suspect, the officer him was, asked gun where the and suspect gestured said “over there.” The officer gun, retrieved the arrested the suspect, then read him his rights. Supreme The Court stated that: police case, very

The in this in the apprehending act of suspect, a were confronted necessity with the immediate ascertaining gun they whereabouts of a which had every reason to suspect just believe the had removed empty from his holster and supermar- discarded in the ket. long gun So as the was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its unknown, actual whereabouts it obvi- ously posed more than one danger the public safety: an accomplice it, might make use of or employee customer might come upon it.

Quarles, added). U.S. at 104 S.Ct. 2626 (emphasis

The situation in the instant matter stands in stark contrast Quarles. to the one in police When took Appellant into custody, they responding were first to a report of domestic violence and then to an inconsistent claim by Appellant that he victim of an attack by Quarles, two men. Unlike victim, no there was report scene, identified no of gun at the and no contemporaneous crime being Further, witnessed. Appellant was already handcuffed placed in the back seat patrol car when he was questioned and blurted out his Clearly, confession. Appellant did not pose a to public threat and, safety, police while knew that something bad had hap- pened, Appellant himself was a victim, self-described crime and there were no weapons or suspects armed known to be It strains present. credulity in these circumstances to hold that the exception” “narrow based on public safety articulated Quarles applies.

n I Although believe that car confession was not admissible, I agree with the result and would not reverse the determination on guilt because there sufficient evidence record, including a second confession and Appellant’s inculpa- tory to testimony,2 support the conviction even the absence of the first statement.3 EAKIN,

Justice Concurring. I join the Opinion lead affirming appellant’s convictions However, and sentences of death. respect the admis- sibility of appellant’s car, statement made I patrol do not believe we need to public reach the safety exception to Miranda to resolve the issue, as no interrogation occurred. Miranda warnings are necessary only when a defendant is subject to custodial I interrogation. agree that appellant, in car, handcuffs in a patrol was in I custody. do not agree that he was interrogated.

Interrogation of course not only express “refers question- ing, but also to any words or actions on of part police (other than those normally attendant arrest and custody) police that the should know reasonably are likely to elicit an incriminating response from suspect.” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 415, (2001) (citing Rhode Innis, Island v. U.S. 100 S.Ct. 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)). The likelihood of an incriminating response to this single non-accusatory question of the woman’s whereabouts was slim. Such not was the design of the inquiry, and hence Miranda warnings not required. were

Trooper question Tretter’s was based his logical belief had responded he to a dispute. blood, domestic Seeing he was understandably faced, anxious to define what he asked one question about the location of another potential party. He did not ask appellant done, what he had how he it, it; had done why he had done he didn’t even ask “what happened here?” He nothing did at all designed to elicit 2. testified that he shot the pathologist two victims. The who performed autopsies testified that each victim had been shot in a part body. Specific vital intent can be inferred where defen- deadly weapon dant uses a upon part a vital of body. the victim's Washington, Commonwealth v. 692 A.2d 1024 3. has not raised issue based on poisonous the fruit of the doctrine, regarding tree evidence obtained police as a result of the car confession. information; got fact that the answer

incriminating itAs question is not measure of the itself. incriminating incriminating response, an designed was not to elicit interrogation. simply did not rise to the level question itself warnings no Miranda were being interrogation, There an exception and we not address whether necessary, need implicated. is not implicated—Miranda itself Miranda SAYLOR, Dissenting. Justice Court’s Recently, supported I the abandonment constraining former, rule bright-line six-hour prophylactic, ar- custodial, interrogation prompt the absence continual- raignment, pattern because I believed that the exceptions engrafted onto the ly expanding evolving and it had it in an condition that impaired rule had left such to do harm See Common- potential good. the more than Perez, 360, 381-82, 845 A.2d 792-93 wealth v. 577 Pa. (2004) J., (Saylor, concurring dissenting); accord Com- 1, 47, 563 Pa. 757 A.2d Bridges, monwealth v. (2000) J., concurring) the view (Saylor, (expressing as to readily of a so of avoidance capable “continuation rule it potential as no rule at all ... the function carries respect authority eyes for the in the diminishing courts’ mandates”). I to lawful also took the subject of their those however, be position, change implemented the should orderly prospectively, approach as this would best serve the justice of and maintain essential fairness. administration J., Perez, 381-82, A.2d at 792 (Saylor, concurring dissenting). of disadvantage

A Perez Court’s decision substantial the replace to rule retroactively Davenport/Duncan the six-hour totality-of-the-circumstances approach appar with a made by focus of efforts below parties’ ent this case. The the a six-hour rule that developing concerning record the as of the represented prevailing law Commonwealth Thus, interrogation appear time of at issue.1 there does attempt complete to to build a full and have been directed presented totality an Although Appellant approach 1. have as could claim, style certainly alternative basis for his was entitled voluntary, knowing, this issue of regarding record statements, Perez which Appellant’s character intelligent of the inquiry into the exclusive converted retrospectively has pertaining trial court of the case, part on the decision Furthermore, majority’s question. now-central for the necessary assessment perform effort present poten and at least on the cold review appellate time on first with its own it is inconsistent record before tially incomplete appellate of its the character concerning pronouncements function.2 Perez in terms of I bound am recognize I

Although six-hour Davemport/Duncan the retroactive elimination instance, to matter, first in the rule, present I would defer There, may be parties at least the setting. post-conviction concerning the record complete opportunity afforded the in- surrounding Appellant’s circumstances totality can be accom- finding fact necessary and the terrogation, forum. appropriate in a more plished Court, by this according prevailing law as established claim to other i.e., Davenport/Duncan rule. six-hour 292, 297-98, Jackson, See, e.g., Commonwealth 2. ("The (1975) findings fact or contains no record before us law, only suppression court's conclu- conclusions of statement coercion!;] first court does not (cid:127) (cid:127) (cid:127) [t]his was no sion that there law.''); findings accord Com- of fact and conclusions instance make denied, 66, Grundza, appeal (Pa.Super.), 574 A.2d 68 v. 819 monwealth 764, (2003) (same); City Thompson Philadel- v. A.2d 435 Pa. cf. 669, (1985) ("An 592, 599, appellate 672-73 phia, 493 A.2d plane than a trial court. by a different its nature stands on court grant deny a new trial is aided Whereas a trial court’s decision evidence, appellate review an court's evaluation of the an on-the-scene vantage disparity of this solely upon a cold record. Because rests merely empowered substitute its appellate points an court is of the trial concerning weight the evidence for that opinion recently substantial alterations Notably, Court has based judge.”). appellate the roles of process between review distinction to the respective abilities original jurisdiction courts in terms of their versus Grant, See, Pa. finding. e.g., v. fact Commonwealth relative to Freeman, (2002); see also Commonwealth 532, 543-44, 827 A.2d

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Sepulveda

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Aug 19, 2004

Citation: 855 A.2d 783

Docket Number: 402 CAP

Court Abbreviation: Pa.