COLLINGTON v. CLAYTON COUNTY et al.
S22G1146
Supreme Court of Georgia
January 17, 2024
318 Ga. 29
LAGRUA, Justice.
FINAL COPY
LAGRUA, Justice.
(unpublished). While we agree with the Court of Appeals that
1. Pertinent Facts and Procedural History
The relevant facts, as drawn from the allegations in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are as follows:
On August 30, 2018, Mary Collington was operating her vehicle on State Route 85 in Clayton County when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jesse Curney, a deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff‘s Department, who was operating a 2015 Dodge Charger owned by Clayton County. It is undisputed that Deputy Curney was acting in the scope of his official duties as a deputy sheriff at the time of the collision.
Based on the description of Deputy Curney‘s vehicle in the accident report — i.e., “2015 Dodge Charger Police” — Collington was initially under the impression that Deputy Curney was a Clayton County police officer. Accordingly, on February 12, 2019, Collington‘s attorney sent notice of her claims via certified mail to the Clayton County Chief of Police, the Clayton County Commissioners, and the District Attorney of Clayton County. Thereafter, on October 21, 2019, Collington filed a lawsuit against Clayton County, asserting that she suffered injuries in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of Deputy Curney,
who was driving a county-owned vehicle and acting in the course and scope of his employment with Clayton County at the time of the accident. Clayton County moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the County did not employ Deputy Curney and was not liable for his actions. On December 1, 2020, Collington voluntarily dismissed the action.
On December 21, 2020, Collington filed a renewed complaint pursuant to
Court of Clayton County. On February 12, 2021, the Defendants filed a consolidated motion to dismiss Collington‘s complaint, arguing that: (1) Deputy Curney was an improper party pursuant to
In response to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Collington conceded that, because
Collington asserted that, with respect to her claims against the Sheriff, if the trial court were to conclude that the Sheriff was the proper defendant, then presenting notice of her claims to Clayton County should be deemed sufficient under
this one, she provided notice to Clayton County, which was sufficient
On June 9, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that: (1) Collington‘s claims against Deputy Curney should be dismissed under
On June 2, 2022, the Court of Appeals issued a decision7 affirming the trial court‘s dismissal of Collington‘s claims against the Sheriff, vacating the dismissal оf Collington‘s claims against the County, and remanding the case with direction. See Collington, 364
Ga. App. XXV, supra. In affirming the trial court‘s dismissal of the claims against the Sheriff, the Court of Appeals determined that Collington did not present notice of her claims to the Sheriff as required by
Collington then filed her petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court.9 We granted certiorari to address whether
2. Analysis
(a) The answer to the first question is yes —
In other words, discerning the meaning of
“When construing a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Bell v. Hargrove, 313 Ga. 30, 32 (2) (867 SE2d 101) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Accordingly, we afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, viewing the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and reading the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
isolation and instead, must be read in the context of the [statute] as a whole.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). “The primary determinant of a text‘s meaning is its context, which includes the structure and history of the text and the broader context in which that text was enacted, including statutory and decisional law that forms the legal background of the written text.” City of Guyton v. Barrow, 305 Ga. 799, 805 (3) (828 SE2d 366) (2019).
The text of
1933. See
To begin, we look to decisions issued by this Court in and around the time the presentment statute was enacted in 1860 to ascertain how the statute was then understood. See Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179, 182 (II) (A) (824 SE2d 265) (2019) (examining the “original public meaning” of a constitutional or statutory provision is “an interpretive principle” that we apply to discern how the provision was understood at the time it was adopted).10 At that time, clаims against counties could only be brought in accordance with strict statutory guidelines — guidelines which instituted a “uniform practice” of naming “the person or persons charged with the duty of attending to the affairs of the county [as] the defendant or defendants to the suits.” Conyers v. Commrs. of Roads and Revenues
of Bartow County, 116 Ga. 101, 103 (42 SE 419) (1902). Initially, “[t]he proper way to sue the county” was “to proceed against the inferior court of the county.” Id. at 102 (citing
Several other cases issued by the Court during that timeframe similarly suggested that bringing claims against the appropriate government officials in their official capacities was a recognized way to proceed against a governmental entity — be it the State or one of its counties. See, e.g., Western & Atlantic R. v. Carlton, 28 Ga. 180, 182-183 (2)-(3) (1859) (noting that, where the State embarked on an enterprise to run a railroad and a plaintiff suffered damages to property being carried by the railroad, the plaintiff could “present [its claims] for settlement to the superintendent of the railroad” as
an agent of the State and “bring suit against the superintendent of the railroad” to rеcover for its damages); Southern Mining Co. v. Lowe, 105 Ga. 352, 354-356 (31 SE 191) (1898) (noting that, in a lawsuit filed against the prison commissioners of Georgia where the plaintiff sought to enjoin the commissioners from entering into a contract for the hiring of penitentiary convicts, the commissioners had been “sued as officials, having no personal interest in the subject-matter of the suit,” and thus, “[t]he injunction sought, if granted, would be against representatives of the State in their official capacity, and therefore neither more nor less than a judicial proceeding against the State itself“); Roberts v. Barwick, 187 Ga. 691, 694-695 (1) (1 SE2d 713) (1939) (holding that a lawsuit filed against the commissioner
In Roberts, the Court observed that “[i]t is difficult to describe in advance every action or suit against an officer or agent of the
State that should be classified as an action against the State.” Roberts, 187 Ga. at 695 (2). Thus, in an effort to provide some guidance, the Roberts Court explained that
[t]he general rule that is applicable in all cases is that any case, regardless of who are named parties thereto, that could result in a judgment or decree that would in any manner affect or control the property or action of the State, in a manner not prescribed by statute, is a suit against the State[.]
Id. The Court expounded upon this rule, noting that, in Roberts, a judgment was being sought against the commissioner of agriculture, “not as an individual,” but as “an officer of the State.” Id. The Court further noted that the commissioner оf agriculture “owns no funds or property out of which a judgment in this case could be satisfied[;] [i]nstead, every asset of every nature held and possessed by him in his official capacity is property of the State of Georgia.” Id. Thus, “a judgment for the plaintiff . . . in the instant case, for any amount, if satisfied at all, would be satisfied from the assets of the State, and to the extent the State‘s assets were used in this manner[,] the State itself would be bound by the judgment.” Id.
Subsequent cases issued by this Court relied on the Roberts rule tо similarly conclude that, “[w]here a suit is brought against an officer or agency of the State” and “the State, while not a party to the record, is the real party against which relief is sought, so that a judgment for the plaintiff . . . will operate to control the action of the state or subject it to liability, the suit is in effect one against the state.” Musgrove v. Ga. R. & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 155 (49 SE2d 26) (1948). See also, e.g., Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 330 (264 SE2d 878) (1980) (holding that “in instances where an officer or agent of the [S]tate is sued in his official capacity” and “a judgment can be rendered controlling the action or property of the State in a manner not prescribed by statute,” any such suit “is a suit against the State“) (citation and punctuation omitted); Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 750 (4) (452 SE2d 476) (1994) (noting that “suits against public employees in their official capacities are in reality suits against the state“) (citation and punctuation omitted).
As these precedents show, by the time the presentment statute was enacted in 1860, it would hаve been understood that claims against a government could include official capacity claims against at least some of the government‘s officials; this was inherent within the meaning of the statute when it was adopted. That meaning is to be applied in light of the ensuing precedent, which further developed how and when suing a county official made the claims in that lawsuit qualify as claims against the county itself. This development was based — in part — on changes to the broader statutory context in which the presentment statute operates. And all of that contextual development leaves us today with a presentment statute that, in requiring claims against counties to be presented within 12 months, is properly understood to apply to official capacity claims against county officials, as well. See
The general rule articulated in Roberts also applies to official-capаcity claims filed against a county sheriff for losses arising from the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. See
seq. Sheriffs are county officials, see
(providing that “[c]overed motor vehicle means: . . . [a]ny motor vehicle owned by the local government entity“). Therefore, any “judgment or decree” issued in this case would “affect or control the property or action of” Clayton County and thus is a suit against the County. Roberts, 187 Ga. at 695 (2).
Accordingly, we conclude that official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for a deputy‘s allegedly negligent use of a county-owned vehicle are claims against the county itself, and thus, the presentment requirement of
(b) Turning tо the second question before us, we also answer this question in the affirmative — a claimant‘s duty under
“our appellate courts have consistently construed
“There is no justification for holding, contrary to more than a century of precedent, that presentment of claims against counties covered by
covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, Collington‘s timely presentment of notice of her claims to the Clayton County Commissioners satisfied her burden under
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur.
Decided January 17, 2024.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 364 Ga. App. XXV.
Penn Law, Darren W. Penn, John D. Hadden; Morgan & Morgan Atlanta, R. Walker Garrett; Benjamin F. Windham, for appellant.
Freeman Mathis & Gary, Jack R. Hancock, A. Ali Sabzevari, Wesley C. Jackson, Jacob E. Daly, for appellees.
Charles M. Cork III; Walker Hulbert Gray & Moore, Kellye C. Moore, amici curiae.
Notes
When any case has been commenced in either a state or federal court within the applicable statute of limitations and the plaintiff discontinues or dismisses the same, it may be recommenced in a court of this state or in a federal court еither within the original applicable period of limitations or within six months after the discontinuance or dismissal, whichever is later, subject to the requirement of payment of costs in the original action as required by subsection (d) of Code Section 9-11-41; provided, however, if the dismissal or discontinuance occurs after the expiration of the applicable period of limitation, this privilege of renewal shall be exercised only once.
(a) Any local government officer or employee who commits a tort involving the use of a covered motor vehicle while in the performance of his or her official duties is not subject to lawsuit or liability therefor. Nothing in this chapter, however, shall be construed to give the local government officer or employee immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the local government officer‘s or employee‘s conduct was not within the performance of his or her official duties.
(b) A person bringing an action against a local government entity under the provisions of this chapter shall name as a party defendant the local government entity for which the officer or employee was acting and shall not name the local government officer or employee individually. In the event that the local government officer or employee is individually named for an act for which the local government entity is liable under this chapter, the local government entity for which the local government officer or employee was acting shall be substituted as the party defendant.