Belinda J. Coleman, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Columbus State Community College, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15AP-119 (Ct. of Cl. No. 2014-00716)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
November 12, 2015
[Cite as Coleman v. Columbus State Community College, 2015-Ohio-4685.]
(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
DECISION
Rendered on November 12, 2015
Dahman Law, LLC, and Samir B. Dahman; Campinha Bacote, LLC, and Avonte D. Campinha-Bacote, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric A. Walker and Christopher L. Bagi, for appellee.
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{1} Plaintiff-appellant Belinda J. Coleman appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio dismissing her complaint pursuant to
I. Facts and Procedural History
{2} On August 22, 2014, Coleman filed a complaint in the Court of Claims against defendant-appellee Columbus State Community College (“CSCC“) alleging disability discrimination. The complaint included the following allegations. Coleman was employed by CSCC as an associate registrar
{3} On September 2, 2014, Coleman filed, in the Court of Claims, a statement of the existence of a connected action, indicating she had also sued CSCC in federal court. According to this statement, the lawsuit in federal court was initiated on June 6, 2014. On October 20, 2014, Coleman filed a notice of final disposition of the connected action, attaching a federal district court entry dismissing the action she filed against CSCC pursuant to
II. Assignments of Error
{4} Coleman assigns the following errors for our review:
- [1.] The Court of Claims erred in dismissing Ms. Coleman‘s FMLA and ADA claims when it applied the Court of Claims’ state statute of limitations to Ms. Coleman‘s federal law claims, instead of the federal limitations periods.
- [2.] The Court of Claims erred in dismissing Ms. Coleman‘s claim for prospective injunctive relief, which falls outside of the scope of state sovereign immunity protections.
- [3.] The Court of Claims erred in dismissing Ms. Coleman‘s claims when it failed to equitably toll the applicable limitations period.
III. Discussion
A. First Assignment of Error – Statute of Limitations
{5} In her first assignment of error, Coleman argues the trial court erred in dismissing her federal claims because it applied the Court of Claims Act statute of limitations and not federal statutes of limitations. We disagree.
{6} Under
{7} The statute of limitations for claims brought in the Court of Claims is set forth in
{8} Coleman‘s reliance on the Supremacy Clause is unavailing, and she does not properly consider state sovereign immunity principles. The Supremacy Clause provides that “the Laws of the United States * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
{9} State sovereign immunity is “implicit in the constitutional design.” Alden at 730. “In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution * * * the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.” Id. at 754. But Congress may abrogate a state‘s immunity from suit pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. See Id. at 756 (noting “that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power“). For example, in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that Wisconsin‘s notice-of-claim statute that effectively shortened the statute of limitations and imposed an exhaustion requirement on claims against public agencies and employees was pre-empted insofar as it was applied to
{10} A state may also be subject to suits for damages if it elects to waive its sovereign immunity. Alden. Such a waiver may be conditional—a state “may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued.” Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527 (1858). That is, waiver of state sovereign immunity need not be “absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.” Alston v. New York, 97 N.Y.2d 159, 164 (2001), citing Alden. However, a state cannot use its waiver of sovereign immunity as a tool to discriminate against federal causes of action. Alden at 757-58.
{11} Ohio has generally consented to being sued, but it has placed conditions on when and where it may be sued. In 1912, the Ohio Constitution was amended to provide: “Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.”
{12}
{13} Coleman asserts Ohio courts have consistently applied federal limitations periods to federal causes of action brought in the Court of Claims. This assertion holds true in circumstances involving a federal limitations period that is less than two years. See, e.g., Stevens v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-1015, 2013-Ohio-3014 (applying 90-day limitations period in
B. Second Assignment of Error – Request for Prospective Injunctive Relief
{14} In her second assignment of error, Coleman argues the trial court erred in dismissing her claims for injunctive relief because those claims are excluded from state sovereign immunity protection and thus the federal statutes of limitations applied to those claims. This argument was not advanced in the trial court. Arguments raised for the first time on appeal are improper and generally not considered. Tucker v. Leadership Academy for Math & Science of Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-100, 2014-Ohio-3307, ¶ 20, citing Marysville Newspapers, Inc. v. Delaware Gazette Co., Inc., 3d Dist. No. 14-06-34, 2007-Ohio-4365, ¶ 23. Therefore, we decline to consider this argument. Accordingly, Coleman‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
C. Third Assignment of Error – Equitable Tolling
{15} In her third assignment of error, Coleman asserts the trial court erred when it did not equitably toll the limitations period applicable to her claims. Coleman argues her case is exceptional and warrants equitable tolling. We disagree.
{16} The doctrine of equitable tolling is to be applied sparingly and in only exceptional circumstances. Stevens at ¶ 19, citing Moore v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-732, 2011-Ohio-1607, ¶ 21. “Equitable tolling is available only in compelling cases which justify a departure from established procedure.” Sharp v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 7th Dist. No. 04 MA 116, 2005-Ohio-1119, ¶ 11. A litigant seeking equitable tolling must demonstrate he diligently pursued his rights, but some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely action. In re Regency Village Certificate of Need Application, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-41, 2011-Ohio-5059, ¶ 37. The doctrine is generally limited to circumstances in which an employee is intentionally misled or tricked into missing the
{17} Here, the trial court properly declined to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to extend the applicable statute of limitations. The circumstances of this case are similar to those in Stevens. In Stevens, plaintiff Robert Stevens initially filed, prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, his discrimination claims in federal court after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC“). Id. at ¶ 4. He later voluntarily dismissed the claims in federal court upon learning he could not sue the state for monetary damages in that court. Id. at ¶ 20. After the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Stevens filed a complaint in the Court of Claims of Ohio. Id. at ¶ 5. Stevens argued for equitable tolling because the EEOC‘s letter allegedly misled him into believing he could bring his claims in federal court. Id. at ¶ 20. He also argued the court should apply the equitable tolling doctrine because the defendant would suffer no prejudice. Id. at ¶ 21. This court rejected these arguments, finding that Stevens failed to demonstrate an exceptional circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Id.
{18} Coleman argues the circumstances are exceptional in this case because she received her right-to-sue letter 20 months after she filed her charges with EEOC. She asserts her complaint was ready to file months in advance but that she was required to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing her ADA claim. These arguments are unpersuasive. While Coleman asserts she had to wait for the right-to-sue letter before filing her ADA claim, and thus equity warrants extension of her time to file, she actually filed her complaint in federal court within two years of her employment termination. That Coleman filed her claims in federal court within two years of her employment termination weighs heavily against any finding of exceptional circumstances warranting the equitable tolling of the applicable statute of limitations. Had Coleman filed in the Court of Claims at that time, the statute of limitations would not bar the action. Furthermore, Coleman does not suggest that CSCC misled or tricked her into first filing her claims in federal court. Coleman‘s initial misunderstanding, through no fault of CSCC, of where her claims for money damages against the state could be brought, does not warrant application of the equitable tolling doctrine.
{19} Accordingly, we overrule Coleman‘s third assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{20} Having overruled Coleman‘s first, second, and third assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio.
Judgment affirmed.
KLATT and HORTON, JJ., concur.