CITY OF CLEVELAND v. LA‘SHA BATTLES
No. 104984
Cоurt of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
January 25, 2018
2018-Ohio-267
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court, Case No. 2015 CRB 026858
BEFORE: Blackmon, J., Keough, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 25, 2018
Leigh S. Prugh
P.O. Box 450678
Westlake, Ohio 44145
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara A. Langhenry
Cleveland Law Director
By: Omar Lebron Siddiq
Assistant Prosecutor City of Cleveland
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} La‘Sha Battles (“Battles“) appeals from her conviction for criminal damaging and assigns thе following errors for our review:
I. The trial court erred in denying La‘Sha Battles’ Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal in the face of insufficient evidence to prove guilt of the offense of criminal dаmaging beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. The trial court erred in finding La‘Sha Battles guilty because her conviction is agains[t] the manifest weight of the evidence.
Having reviewed the recоrd and pertinent law, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The apposite facts follow.
{¶2} On December 14, 2015, Battles was charged with criminal damaging, in violation of
{¶3} Precious Earley testified that she lives at 3503 Capers Avenue, in Cleveland. At some point, she allowed Battles to temporarily stay with her for “about a week, two.” However, Earley‘s lease did not permit other tenants to live in the apartment, and when she learned of an upcoming inspection, Earley asked Battles to leave. According to Earley, Battles “caught a [sic] attitude” about being asked to leave, although Battles ultimately agreed.
{¶4} On November 22, 2015, Earley went to the store. Battles, Battles‘s best friend, Ronesha, and Battles‘s and Ronesha‘s kids were in Earley‘s house. Although
{¶5} Earley was gone for “an hour or so.” When she gоt back, the door was unlocked and nobody was in the apartment. Earley testified that the condition of the apartment was “a mess * * * the house was a wreck.” Asked about the cоndition of her home when she left for the store, Earley testified, “Normal. Everything was in condition.” Earley explained that this meant everything was “fixed, working” and “[n]othing was broken.”
{¶6} Earley further testified as follows: “I seen [sic] make up all over the walls. I seen, [sic] like, black shampoo/conditioner all that stuff poured in the sink; TV knocked on the floor; the other TV scattered like somebody kicked it; and then the pipes in my little closet broke all up. That‘s what I saw when I got there.” Earley called the police and when they got to her apartment, she stated that Battles “did this.” Ultimately, Earley had to pay $70 for the damages to avoid eviction. According to Earley, that same day or the day after, Battles sent Earley the following message via Faсebook: “I hope you pass your inspection.”
{¶7} Nicketia, who is Battles‘s aunt, testified on behalf of Battles. Nicketia testified that on November 22, 2015, Battles called and asked Nickеtia to pick up Battles at Earley‘s apartment. When Nicketia arrived, Battles had her “stuff sitting at the door
{¶8} Nicketia testified that as they were driving away, Battles‘s friend said she lеft her phone at Earley‘s, so they went back to get it. “The friend had too much stuff in her lap, so [Battles] got out and went in the house, went in came right back out [sic] she said that she didn‘t see the рhone * * * and we left again.” According to Nicketia, Battles was in Earley‘s apartment “[n]ot even two minutes.” The next day, Nicketia received a phone call from Earley accusing Battles of “mess[ing] up her apartment.”
{¶9} In finding Battles guilty, the court stated: “I had my doubts until [Nicketia] testified. I couldn‘t figure out how this happened. So [Battles is] found guilty because the witness said [Battles] wеnt back to get the phone and there was no phone. Only have one bag or basket of stuff.”
{¶10} On August 24, 2016, the court sentenced Battles to “90 days, $750. * * * So $750 is the fine. I‘m going to suspend $550. Well, six months probatiоn, active, pay restitution, $280, lipstick, whatever. * * * and inactive probation when the restitution is paid and the fee, fine is paid. Goodbye.”
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶11}
{¶12} The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vickers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97365, 2013-Ohio-1337, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶13} In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard of review for a criminal mаnifest weight challenge, as follows:
The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained in State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. In Thompkins, the court distinguished between sufficiency of the evidenсe and manifest weight of the evidence, finding that these concepts differ both qualitatively and quantitatively. Id. at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. The court held that sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequaсy as to
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, but weight of the evidence addresses the evidence‘s effect of inducing belief. Id. at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541. In other words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more persuasive — the state‘s or the defendant‘s? We went on to hold that although there may be sufficient evidence to support a judgment, it could nevertheless be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder‘s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, citing Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652.
{¶14} An appellаte court may not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Thompkins at 387. Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id.
Criminal Damaging
{¶15}
{¶16} Upon review, we find that there is sufficient evidence to convict Battles of criminal damaging. Additionally, Battles‘s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 27, 514 N.E.2d 394 (1987), the Ohio Supreme Court held the following:
A conviction based on purely circumstantial еvidence is no less sound than a conviction based on direct evidence. Consideration of circumstantial evidence as a mitigating factor would inevitably lead to undercutting the underlying conviction itself by implying that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is inherently less reliable than a conviction based on direct evidence.
In fact, a сonviction based upon purely circumstantial evidence may be just as reliable as a conviction based on direct evidence, if not more so.
{¶17} In the case at hand, thеre was direct evidence of the criminal damaging to Earley‘s apartment and circumstantial evidence that Battles was the offender. Nicketia testified that Battles was the last person inside Earley‘s apartment before it was damaged, and Earley testified that Battles had an “attitude” when asked to leave. Furthermore, Battles sent a Facebook mеssage to Earley stating that she hoped Earley‘s apartment “passed inspection.”
{¶18} Despite the court‘s comments regarding Nicketia‘s testimony — which the court heard after Battles moved for a
{¶19} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordеred that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR